The #ASSLaw or #ASSoL - no better way to commemorate the passing of the devil #AntoninScalia

So, the George Mason School of Law wanted to brown-nose the judiciary a little bit (well, not a little bit), and to rename itself from the name of one of the founding fathers to the name of the "hunting trip crook" Antonin Scalia, a U.S. Supreme Court justice who considered that an innocent person may be "legally" executed, and who gave court victories to who greases his hand better.

The renaming was to - "Antonin Scalia School of Law".  That's right.

ASSLaw.

According to the school, that tries now to hastily re-name ASSLaw, the new name "caused some acronym controversy on social media".

Calling a school of law ASSLaw (or #ASSoL, which sounds no better), in a brown-nosing effort to commemorate the memory of a judge, is called "some acronym controversy".

Somebody has a sense of humor in that law school.

When you are trying hard to be the first to brown-nose the best way, you do not notice common-sense things - like the possible "acronym controversy" coming.

Isn't it poetic justice that the #ASSoL #AntoninScalia is called who he is - in the name of a law school no less.

There is reportedly a petition by the Virginia lawmaker circulating asking the school not to rename itself after the "controversial and polarizing" judge #AntoninScalia.

I, on the opposite, now support the renaming to be left in its first inspirational brown-nosing glory.

Please, do rename the school into #ASSLaw - it will be the symbol of the establishment of the legal profession, all of its core qualities at its very best.

U of Maryland School of Law: diversifying to prevent dying?

This is an announcement by the University of Maryland School of Law - of a brand spanking new quasi-law degree the law school invented to sucker money from somewhere, because of sagging enrollment into the J.D. program.

It is not a recognized degree.

It does not give you a right to practice law.

It costs $11,280 (15 credit hours times $750 plus $30 in fees).

The only value the degree appears to offer is for the school, to survive financially.

The degree is being aggressively advertised on the radio - according to my reader from Maryland (thank you for the tip!).

Do your marketing as to what "value" you are actually getting from this $11,280 degree - if any.

The American Bar Association's new piece of hypocrisy, a "professional manual" about lawyers' "reckless criticism of judges"

What is "reckless criticism" on issues of public concern?

How do you define "reckless" if you are criticizing a judge of:

1) a conflict of interest;
2) appearance of corruption;
3) bias or appearance of bias?

Is it "reckless" to even consider such a sacrilege?

This document came as a tip from my reader.

It shows that the American Bar Association, in its "analysis" of its members' 1st Amendment rights to criticize a judge - as part of their jobs no less - does not consider the main court precedent prohibiting ANY sanctions to be imposed for such criticism, at least without using the strict scrutiny test, which is never used in attorney disciplinary proceedings.

The ABA manual of "professionalism" for attorneys does not touch on the slippery topic (slippery for judges who sanction lawyers for criticism of judges) that content-based regulation in general, and especially content-based regulation of protected speech, and criticism of ANY public official for misconduct is protected speech, is presumptively unconstitutional.

Here is the masterpiece of the American Bar Association's advice to its members on "reckless criticism of judges".

I will analyze this piece at length and will publish more posts about it.

At this time, I would like to point out five things.

I.  Attorney disciplinary proceedings are used as substitute defamation actions on behalf of criticized judges where judges cannot legally win such actions, do not file such actions, and often when such actions are time-barred

The ABA points out to the use of the so-called "New York Times v Sullivan" DEFAMATION standard applied to criticism of public officials - applied to attorney disciplinary proceedings, thus EQUATING attorney disciplinary proceedings with a PRIVATE ACTION by judges that judges do not make against lawyers - because such actions will run into 1. truth as an absolute defense,  2. discovery against the judge that may reveal that the judge is, in fact, corrupt, and the extent of the judge's conflicts of interest and misconduct and 3. that judge's lawsuit is barred under the 1st Amendment.

So, when a judge cannot win a defamation lawsuit, attorney disciplinary proceedings are, instead, used as a substitute of a defamation lawsuit on behalf of a judge that is never filed because it cannot succeed and can reveal in discovery more than the judge wants to reveal, to suit the judge's rage - and to strip consumers of legal services of their most courageous providers.

II.  Means of investigations of judicial misconduct are limited, if at all available, stalled by authorities, and attorneys are sanctioned for actually doing thorough investigations that produce irrebuttable proof of judicial misconduct

Since the judge is not a party in attorney disciplinary proceedings, and in many states attorneys in such proceedings do not have a right to discovery, the claims that the attorney must be sanctioned for the lack of "investigation" are hypocritical.

I was actually sanctioned - by the then-judge Carl F. Becker - for my efforts to investigate Carl F. Becker through available means, Freedom of Information requests as to his semi-annual financial disclosures, which were also stalled from disclosure by the New York State Court Administration.

Christine Mire, an attorney from the state of Louisiana, was sanctioned because of her extremely thorough and diligent investigation against a judge which turned up PROOF in form of SWORN TESTIMONY of witnesses that not only transcripts, but even audiotapes of judge's alleged disclosure of conflicts of interest, were cooked, and the only person with an interest to cook those audiotapes and transcripts was the criticized judge.

Instead of taking the side of an attorney and castigate judicial corruption in how Christine Mire's - and, I am sure, many other attorney disciplinary sanctions - were imposed, the ABA "manual" authors had the audacity to quote Christine Mire's case as a case of "reckless disregard to truth or falsity" of Christine Mire's statements:

See my blogs about Christine Mire's case here, and here.

Since Christine Mire could not sue the judge because of absolute judicial immunity, and the judge did not sue Christine Mire for defamation, instead using the disciplinary process to avenge on the judge's behalf, the judge was not called to depositions, and no discovery against the judge was possible, as I understand.

Another bright example of attorney discipline used against an attorney for investigations of judicial misconduct is Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane - whose law license was suspended by a panel where a criticized judge was part of - because of her investigations, in her capacity as an Attorney General, of judicial misconduct.

Ms. Kane's law license was suspended not because she did not do a thorough investigation, but, on the opposite, because she DID do a thorough investigation, uncovered many instances of judicial misconduct, Judge Eakin and many other public officials in Pennsylvania lost their positions because of what Ms. Kane uncovered - but attorney regulation was used against her to punish her as a whistleblower.

It was not the disciplined attorney's "subjective belief is not enough", the actual rule is that - NOTHING IS ENOUGH, no level of evidence, is enough to save an attorney from losing her license if the attorney dares to criticize a judge.

So, claiming that "subjective belief is not enough", and that thorough "investigation" needs to be done is pure hypocrisy of the ABA.

III.  Courts and the ABA continue to ignore the implication of the U.S. Supreme Court new precedent on content-based regulation of speech decided in June of 2015, Reed v Town of Gilbert

There is no Reed analysis of constitutionality of content-based regulation, and no application of the Reed strict-scrutiny test - not by the ABA, not by courts imposing discipline after Reed (Reed was decided in June of 2015).

In other words, courts and attorney associations continue to adamantly defy the U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

IV.  Attorney discipline for criticizing judges has nothing to do with the declared SINGLE purpose of attorney regulation - protection of consumers from BAD attorneys

The root of the matter is that attorney regulation is declared to be done for purposes of protecting the public from bad providers of legal services.

All cases of attorney discipline for criticism of judges is cases where GOOD and COURAGEOUS providers of legal services were sanctioned - for doing their jobs for their clients, for trying to ensure for their clients their constitutional right for impartial judicial review.

If the legal provider did not do any harm to his or her clients, criticism of a judge must not be part of any disciplinary rules or subject of any disciplinary proceedings, since it has nothing to do with the declared SINGLE purpose of attorney regulation - protecting consumers from bad providers of legal services.

Attorneys-critics of judicial misconduct are GOOD providers of legal services, trying to ensure constitutional rights for their clients, to impartial judicial review and access to court.

V.  Courts imposing attorney discipline and the ABA makes no attempt to comply (for ABA - address non-compliance) with the U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding antitrust activities in occupational regulation

When attorney discipline is imposed by competitors of the attorney, without any supervision from a neutral state body, that constitutes an antitrust violation, a criminal activity in this country.

In February of 2015 the U.S. Supreme Court has stripped disciplinary bodies imposing discipline in regulated professions, of their "state" antitrust immunity if their markets, run by competitors of disciplined professionals, are not supervised by neutral bodies.

Attorney regulation is not supervised by a neutral body, as described in the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's "Guidelines to Staff".  

See how markets regulated by active market participants are defined by FTC.

See how the necessary neutral active state supervision of such market player-regulated professions is defined by FTC:

See where the "active state supervision" requirement is not satisfied:

Courts that preside over attorney disciplinary cases and that legislate the rules and appoint members of disciplinary commissions, are not neutral bodies for purposes of such supervision, because they themselves consist of licensed attorneys (judges).  

The State Attorney General is him/herself a licensed attorney, and what has been done to Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane (her license was suspended for investigation and criticism of judicial misconduct) shows that AGs are themselves not "neutral" in supervising the process upon which their own licenses, livelihood and positions depend.

Even federal courts where judges are allegedly "sit during good behavior" for life, are state-licensed attorneys, and revocation of their law licenses will result in their impeachment and removal from office, and revocation of their law licenses can be done by attorneys who are not  happy because of a federal judge's ruling, so there is no real judicial independence in federal judiciary either.

The ABA manual does not even mention the impact of the 2015 U.S. Supreme Court's antitrust precedent upon attorney regulation and attorney discipline - because it does not serve the purposes of this PRIVATE professional organization (American Bar Association) to perpetuate itself, its business run as an antitrust cartel, and its favors and privileges from the judiciary if their members "are good".

So, "to be good" - DO NOT CRITICIZE JUDGES.

ABA did not have to run such a long manual, with so many cases incorrectly cited (like it did Christine Mire) and so many key cases on point avoided.

Just say - "YOU WILL NOT SURVIVE AS A PROFESSIONAL IF YOU CRITICIZE A JUDGE", no matter how right you are and how wrong the judge is.

Period.

That's the law.

Being "strongly deferential" to (biased in favor of) governmental litigants is a qualification for high office in the U.S., being an honest criminal defense or civil rights attorney is a disqualification for high office. It worked with #JudgeJaneKelly, will it work with #HillaryClinton?

I recently made a blog post about the disgusting tactic aimed to derail a high-office appointment of a candidate because of the candidate's history of being a criminal defense attorney and representing an "unpopular" client.

The tactic actually worked in derailing President Obama's choice to nominate a worthy candidate #JudgeJaneKelly and instead to nominate a white male with no history of criminal defense Judge Merrick Garland, against whom a disciplinary complaint/letter was recently filed, and the complainant seeks to testify at Judge Garland's confirmation hearing, if that hearing ever happens.  

The letter, addressed to Judge Garland, contains a phrase: "As chief judge, you have fostered a culture of corruption in the E. Barrett
Prettyman Courthouse".

We truly needed to reject nomination of an honest criminal defender to instead put on the U.S. Supreme Court another corrupt judge, who is "strongly deferential" to "big government" power.

Being "strongly deferential" (in other words, biased) in favor of the government, the government that appears in front of Judge Garland in civil rights cases in the federal D.C. Circuit of Columbia Court, as a defendant - is, obviously,  a good qualification for advancement to the top positions in the U.S. Government.

Being an honest criminal defense attorney opposing efforts of the government to accuse, often falsely, often on false evidence, individuals and put them through the hell of the American criminal "justice" system is, instead, a disqualification from a high governmental office in the U.S.

Since the tactic worked with #JudgeJaneKelly and, previously, against President Obama's nominee Debo P. Agebile who was not confirmed for the position of the Director of the Division of Civil Rights in the U.S. Justice Department because of his successful motions on behalf of an unpopular criminal defendant.  In other words, Mr. Agebile was, allegedly, a bad candidate for public office because he was a good criminal defense attorney and civil rights attorney who took his job seriously - the tactic is now used against presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.

While being no fan of Hillary Clinton for the position of President of the United States, as a dispassionate observer of the circus that the presidential campaign has become, I can state that the use against Mrs. Clinton of the fact that she represented - as an assigned counsel - in 1975, a person accused of child rape, indicates that her opponents are getting desperate.

The attack also shows that people have no understanding of the concept of presumption of innocence, claiming that she represented "a child rapist".

No, she represented a person who was presumed innocent, and was accused of child rape.

Even when attorneys represent people convicted of most heinous crimes, even conviction in this country - with rampant judicial and prosecutorial corrutpion and now-frequent exoneration, some of them from death row, many of them because of prosecutorial misconduct - even a conviction is not conclusive proof that that particular person committed a crime.

An innocent person facing death penalty will most likely falsely confess to save his/her life.  

95% or more of criminal cases are "resolved" in this country through plea bargains, where often innocent people accept the lesser of two evils.

To blame an attorney to try to defend people in such situations - especially when such an attorney, like in Mrs. Clinton's case in 1975 - was court-appointed, is to put constitutional law of this country on its head.

And - once again, before casting such allegations, opponent of Mrs. Clinton should think whether they look as they looked when they used this little smear tactic against her - desperate.

A jurisdictional statement was filed challenging New York State Court of Appeals' illegal policy of dismissing as discretionary constitutional "as of right" appeals

I believe this pleading may be of interest to the public, as it raises issues of public concern - it challenges the recently revealed policy of the New York State Court of Appeals to dismiss constitutional appeals "as of right" (and mandatory for the court's review under a New York State statute and New York State Constitution that the court is sworn to uphold) as if such "as of right" constitutional appeals are discretionary - "we get to pick our cases" (statement from the bench of Judge Pigott on February 8, 2016 at the swearing-in testimony of Chief Judge Janet DiFiore).

On April 1, 2016 I have filed with the New York State Court of Appeals, the following:

Notice of Motion - I accompanied my jurisdictional statement to the NYS Court of Appeals with a motion to disqualify several judges, and to disqualify an attorney who lost authority to represent a corporate client since May 2, 2014, the day of the client's dissolution (of which dissolution he did not notify me or the courts);

Jurisdictional Statement - contains arguments regarding:

• 1st Amendment content-based regulation of speech;

• impropriety of recusal-reentry-retaliation schemes of several New York judges and courts;

• a motion to recuse Janet DiFiore;

• discusses New York State of Appeals recently announced policy that dismissing "as of rights" appeal is done because judges believe they "pick their cases", and not for any other contrived pretextual reasons;

• Discusses the split between appellate departments on the issue whether violation of CPLR 2103(a) (service of pleadings by a party in litigation) is a "mere irregularity" (3rd Department) or a jurisdictional defect (1st, 2nd and 4th Departments);

• discusses whether there exists a clear "pleading specificity standard" for defamation, fraud and fraud upon the court;

• discusses the sole remedy for bringing claims potentially barred by affirmative defenses (if they are raised) -  to timely and validly raise that defense in pleadings, or else waive it, CPLR 3211(e), but sanctions (as was done to me) is not a proper remedy for bringing a time-barred claim, and especially when the defense is waived by failure to serve properly under CPLR 2103(a);

• discusses that sanctions are not a proper remedy for allegedly imperfect pleadings - amendment of pleadings is, CPLR 3025;

• discusses due process, ex post facto and bill-of-attainder problems in the case

Exhibit A - Transcript of New York State Court of Appeals Chief Judge DiFiore swearing-in ceremony on February 8, 2016 where Judge Pigott claimed that the court "gets to pick its own cases", thus acknowledging that the court that routinely dismisses constitutional appeals "as of right" because allegedly no "substantial" constitutional question is raised - is doing it simply because the court is "tired", and to reduce its caseload.  

Exhibit 1 - Dismissal of "as of right" constitutional appeal of Frederick J. Neroni in 2011 which allowed to keep without change unconstitutional disbarment of my husband.

Exhibit 2 - Dismissal of my own "as of right" constitutional appeal in 2013 that allowed later suspension of my law license in 2015

Exhibit 3 - Dismissal of my disciplinary "as of right" constitutional appeal in 2016

Exhibit 4 - Dismissal of my husband's and my own "as of right" constitutional appeal pertaining to our property in New York in 2015 which allowed dismissal of the bulk of our federal civil rights lawsuit against the New York Department of Environmental Conservation on "Rooker-Feldman" grounds

Exhibit 5 - Printout from New York State Department of Corporations website indicating that the corporation that I am suing (and which is represented by judge/attorney Jonathan S. Follender has been dissolved since May 2, 2014, stripping Follender of authority to represent the corporation - of which he did not care to notify me or the courts);

Exhibit 6 - Stipulation and letter of resignation of Judge Delmar House showing that a judge has a duty to maintain a high integrity level in his private conduct, not only on the bench - which directly relates to Follender's fraudulent conduct that he was sued for;

Exhibit 7 - Decision by Appellate Division 3rd Department to affirm sanctions against me in Neroni v Follender for the same conduct for which other 3 judicial departments reward plaintiffs with a victory;  the Jurisdictional statement lists conflicts of interest of the 3rd Department court and Follender's efforts to inflame the court by stating to it, repeatedly that I need to be punished for my professional activity as a civil rights attorney;

Exhibit 8 - Order of June 11, 2014 by which 3rd Department recused from my disciplinary case;

Exhibit 9 - printout from my attorney registration page showing that I was admitted in 2009 by that same 3rd Department (which the court forgot and put in that a lawsuit was filed in 2007 against "my clients")

Exhibit 10 - a printout from New  York Justice Courts.org showing Jonathan S. Follender as a judge of the Denning Town Court, Ulster County, which is significant for the 1st Amendment issue that I am raising on my constitutional "as of right" appeal

Exhibit 11 - a printout from the "attorney lookup" page on the website of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York showing that Jonathan S. Follender has a federal law license, and is thus supposed to know federal law pertaining to civil rights litigation, and to know better than to ask a court to punish me for suing the court in its official capacity for a declaratory judgment - it's the law that designated that court as a proper defendant in such a civil rights action, and I just followed that law

Yet another New York judge of a justice court bounced off the bench? When will the Commission for Judicial Conduct go after bigger fish?

There are news that yet another judge of a New York justice court was bounced off the bench - allegedly for grabbing an intern.

Yet, the NYS Commission of Judicial Conduct did not reflect a decision against Judge Alan Simon as of this morning.

I will publish a post once the official decision will become available.

As of now, all I can say is that the Commission chooses to go after judges of the justice courts, carefully avoiding to touch with discipline judges of higher courts.

There is a good reason for it.

In New York, the infamous "rule of frivolous conduct" (that was used to suspend my law license for criticizing a judge in motions to recuse) do not operate in justice courts, so attorneys and litigants who turn in judges of justice courts do not run into a situation I faced - where the judge who you complained about gets assigned (or assigns himself) to all of your cases and starts to meticulously destroy your life by imposing sanctions for "frivolous conduct" left and right, no matter whether he is right or wrong - and the appellate courts no less meticulously affirm those sanctions, also, no matter whether there are facts in the record and laws in your support (like the 1st Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, for example) - simply to teach you and all other attorneys, through you, a lesson not to criticize higher-level judges.

Attorney licenses in New York are regulated by judges.

If you criticize a higher-ranking judge, the whole judiciary comes against you, and uses the rule of "frivolous conduct", at their "discretion", against you - and then take your license and livelihood away.

The majority of members, employees and referees of the NYS Commission of Judicial Conduct are licensed attorneys, themselves, or their close friends and/or relatives.

Thus, there is a strong incentive to go only against those judges who cannot hurt you or yours back - like the judiciary hurt me.

A lesson taught well.

The address of FOIL appeals officer in the New York State Department of State was disclosed

Here is the name and address of the officer assigned to review appeals of denials or constructive denials of FOIL requests by the New York State Department of State.

The initial response of the NYS DOS FOIL officer to my request of the name and address of appeals officer was that she did not deny my FOIL request, just asked for payment:

Helen Wilbard, who is not an attorney (I checked on the website of attorney registration with the New York Unified Court System), purported to give me legal advice (something that I would have been prosecuted for, but she never will be, because she works for New York State government).

Ms. Wilbard stated that:

1) my FOIL request "was not denied at all" - and then 
2) restated some (not all) of her prior restrictions:

   a) that I must pay a flat fee per document;
   b) and that I must request only paper copies ("plain" or "certified").

I asked for copies to be sent to me digitally, for free, to my e-mail address.

There should be no policy prohibiting this.

If plain copies of documents are provided, nothing precludes me to scan them, once I receive them, or to disseminate them, since they are public records.

Thus, nothing precludes the New York State Department of State to scan them and send them to me by e-mail in the first place.

After I just repeated my request to Ms. Wilbard, to send the name and address of the appeals officer assigned by the New York State Department of State to review administrative appeals from denials of FOIL requests, it was finally provided to me.

Here it is:

So, the NYS Department of State FOIL appeals officer is Daniel Shapiro, an attorney.