Minnesota and Nevada federal judges are on the same bandwagon using occupational licensing of attorneys to deny counsel of choice to criminal defendants in high profile cases

I recently described on this blog how a federal judge in Minnesota did not allow representation of a criminal defendant by a criminal defense attorney of his choice because of the alleged disciplinary history the attorney had, even though the judge had no right to restrict right to counsel at all, or on such grounds.

In that particular case, occupational licensing (discipline from another state imposed upon the criminal defense attorney) was used by Minnesota federal district court judge Michael Davis to preclude criminal defense attorney Mitchell Robinson from representing criminal defendant Hamza Ahmed. 

Occupational licensing is used for the declaratory purpose of protecting consumers from bad service providers.

Attorney licensing is (supposedly) no different.

When an attorney is licensed - or his or her license is taken - that happens, supposedly because to allow the attorney to practice will hurt the consumers.

There are certain ways how an admitted attorney in one jurisdiction may be precluded from practicing in another jurisdiction - lack of automatic reciprocity of attorney licensing across jurisdictions.

If an attorney is licensed, for example, to practice law in the State of New York, his license may not permit him to practice law in a state which does not have mutual agreement with New York recognizing each other's state licenses without an additional bar examination and a separate licensing process.

Federal courts are usually less restrictive.

If an attorney is admitted in at least one federal court, they usually admit that attorney in their court, permanently or for a particular case (it is called a "pro hac vice" admission) without any problem.

Apparently, not so if the incoming attorney attempts to represent a criminal defendant in a high profile case.

In the case I described earlier on this blog, criminal defendant, Hamza Ahmed, who is charged with various counts related to ISIS, was denied representation by an attorney who is admitted in the State of Minnesota, so there was supposed to be no problem allowing him to step into a federal case in the same state of Minnesota.

In the Cliven Bundy case currently prosecuted in Nevada, after the famous ranchers' stand-off in Oregon where Cliven Bundy's son Ammon Bundy was involved, a criminal defense attorney who tried to enter the case and represent the defendant (and was denied that right by the judge on pretextual grounds) was not registered in that particular federal court, and filed a petition to the court for admission for that case only - a "pro hac vice" petition.

There is no question that Larry Klayman, the attorney who attempted to get into the criminal case on the criminal defense side, and was denied entry, is a seasoned, skilled and knowledgeable attorney.

Attorney Larry Klayman is skilled, seasoned, aggressive and courageous to get his point across, even if it does not coincide with the point of view of judges - and that may exactly be the reason why Larry Klayman was blocked from representing a criminal defendant charged with a list of serious felony counts.

Here is what Cliven Bundy was charged with:

 And, Cliven Bundy was represented by just one criminal defense attorney - who wanted Larry Klayman to join the team and be the SECOND criminal defense attorney on the team.

The Prosecution has FOUR prosecutors on their team across the defendant's current ONE.  

In Hamza Ahmed's case in Minnesota the prosecution had FIVE prosecutors against Hamza Ahmed's ONE public defender.
There was no question that Larry Klayman was the attorney of Cliven Bundy's choice.

As I indicated above, Larry Klayman was, undoubtedly (1) skilled and (2) wanted by his client.

And, these two conditions was undoubtedly enough to have representation by Larry Klayman mandated by the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution that, under the Supremacy Clause, trumps any inconsistent state law.

Yet, Chief Judge Gloria Navarro, of the Nevada District Court, thought, as well as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, that there is a compelling interest that may allow her to preclude representation of a criminal defendant in an extremely high-profile case from being represented by a skilled criminal defense attorney of his choice helping the defense team.

The Nevada Chief federal judge Gloria Navarro would not allow representation of Cliven Bundy in his criminal proceedings by the well known conservative public interest lawyer Larry Klayman.

This is the decision:

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases does not have exceptions in its text.

So, any exceptions invented by courts - like the one Chief Judge Gloria Navarro cited - is amendment of the U.S. Constitution by the court, and is completely illegal, and unconstitutional, as is Chief Judge's Navarro's order denying an extra skillful counsel to a criminal defendant faced by steep charges and a prosecution team of 4 prosecutors against his one current criminal defense attorney.

 Of course, the particular attorney who is being blocked from entering the case, sued the federal government based on Edward Snowden's disclosure of NSA surveillance over American citizens through cell phone data.

Of course, Larry Klayman won a groundbreaking decision against the government on the basis of government surveillance.

Of course, discipline imposed upon him in Florida - that's why Judge Navarro blocked him from representing the criminal defendant who hired and chose him - had nothing to do with his ability to provide a quality criminal defense, and for Cliven Bundy, I am sure, that particular quality in a lawyer controls at this time.

Chief Judge Gloria Navarro, along with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, found an exception to the 6th Amendment right to counsel - which, in her view, trumps the U.S. Constitution that she is sworn to uphold.

The court-invented exception to 6th Amendment is like this:

 The 6th Amendment right to counsel in a criminal case is now, apparently, according to Chief Judge Gloria Navarro, a "qualified" (restricted) right.

And it is "qualified" (restricted) if satisfying that (constitutional) right will be too much of a burden for the court where counsel is "incompetent or unwilling to abide by court rules and ethical guidelines".

But - wait a second - if for any reason, Cliven Bundy chooses to represent himself, he cannot be blocked from doing so even:

• if he is incompetent;
• if he is completely unethical with the court; and
• if he is completely unable or unwilling to follow court rules

 His right to self-representation cannot be denied then.

His right to representation by another cannot be denied either - there is NO such restrictions in the text of the 6th Amendment, and a federal court does not have an authority to amend the U.S. Constitution, the clear and unambiguous text of the 6th Amendment, through interpretation.

Chief Judge Navarro indicated that a criminal defendant's 6th Amendment right to counsel of his choice may be restricted only for "compelling reasons", meaning that the so-called "strict scrutiny" test is supposed to be applied.

But, first, the strict scrutiny test (invented by the U.S. Supreme Court to analyze whether the government STILL has authority to violate fundamental constitutional rights of individuals, even if the U.S. Constitution clearly says it doesn't give the government such an authority) requires also to go through an extra step - to verify whether the restrictions of the 6th Amendment right is "narrowly tailored" to that allegedly "compelling interests".

You saw in the order of Chief Judge Gloria Navarro (cited ) above the cited "compelling reason" to deny criminal defendant Cliven Bundy a counsel of his choice - "fair, efficient and orderly administration of justice".

Huh?

To deny a federal constitutional right to counsel of his choice to a criminal defendant who, once again, has only one criminal defense attorney on his side, while the prosecution has 4 prosecutors on their team - satisfies the "compelling" interest of "fair, efficient and orderly administration of justice"?

And, what "orderly" and "efficient" has to do with "justice"?

There is no compelling interest by the government for "efficient" administration of justice, because the only "efficient" resolution for the government is a conviction.

There is no compelling interest of the government in "orderly" administration of justice either, because the only "orderly" way out is to kill all criminal defense and civil rights attorneys or permanently seal their lips (they are trying to do that through attorney discipline that disproportionately, if not solely, targets feisty criminal defense and civil rights attorneys).

There is no statutory or constitutional definition of "orderly" or "efficient" administration of justice, and what is a "fair" administration, is already set in the U.S. Constitution, its Amendments and federal penal and procedural statutes.

So, the strict scrutiny test, as illegal and unconstitutional as it is in itself, was not even followed by Chief Judge Gloria Navarro to the end, she did not prove:

(1) that "fair" administration of justice is a "compelling interest" OF THE PROSECUTION and the court that may be used to restrict a criminal defendant's 6th Amendment right to counsel;

(2) what "orderly" or "efficient" administration of justice is, why it is a "compelling interest" of the government, and what is the legal basis to allow that "compelling interest" to trump a fundamental constitutional right under the 6th Amendment (other than a decision by another court made without authority to make such a decision).

With such a drastic decision, made on such a contrived ground - a decision that very obviously stinks - I started to look what kind of background Chief Judge Gloria Navarro has to lead her to make such a decision.

Chief Judge Navarro, according to her official biography, worked previously both as a public defender, and as a prosecutor.

Apparently, becoming part of judicial establishment must go to people's heads.

Obviously, Judge Navarro's ruling may help her career should a Republican president be elected (even though she was appointed initially to the bench by President Obama).  And Chief Judge Navarro, who is just 48 at this time (very young for a federal judge) has some ways to go up the ladder - she can still become:

• a federal appellate court judge;
• a federal appellate court's Chief judge, and
• a U.S. Supreme Court justice

And, these three extra steps to go may make the whole difference in whether Chief Judge Navarro wants to do "fair" administration of justice - or just "efficient and orderly" one.

One thing is also clear - that Chief Judge Navarro's order is unconstitutional, that it was a reversible error to deny counsel of his choice to a criminal defendant based on judge's contrived reasoning.

But, since Judge Navarro already relied on the 9th Circuit "precedent", it will be for the U.S. Supreme Court - if it would take the case for review should there be a conviction and appeal - to rule on this issue.

In this country the U.S. Constitution exists and becomes visible only if the Council of 9 (now 8) elders says so.

New York Senate does have a (no longer secret) contact e-mail address for Freedom of Information Requests!

I wrote on this blog previously about the run-around people are put through when they are making FOIL requests with New York Senate.

I also analyzed, in detail, the illegality of certain restrictions or demands by New York State Senate as a condition to file a FOIL request with the Senate.

Also, I blogged about my own attempts to file a FOIL request with New York Senate - the lack of confirmation e-mail, my attempts to secure that confirmation through NYS Senate's Facebook page etc.

Yesterday - lo and behold - I received a response from NYS Senate to my FOIL request.

And, I am happily informing my readers that they now have an e-mail to use to file their FOIL requests, instead of the Senate's run-around "fill-in" page that provides you no means of confirmation and improperly restricts you in how you can file your FOIL requests, what kind of information you "must" provide about yourself as a condition of filing such FOIL request, and what you can ask.

Here is the FOIL e-mail of the NYS Senate:  foil@nysenate.gov.

Here is the full response by the NYS Senate to my FOIL request - which I am going to appeal, of course.

I will fully analyze the response in a separate blog, but the key preliminary points are that the NYS Senate:

1) claimed a fee from me when I asked to provide to me the records I requested in digital format, or, if the request is denied, an inventory of the Senate's scanning equipment - the Senate provided no inventory, but denied provision of records in digital format and attempted to charge me a fee;

2) denied me records that I clearly identified - financial disclosures of NYS Senators and enactment/amendment history of several statutes, and

3) asked me practically for the purpose of my FOIL request - by requesting to narrow down my request from ALL records of enactment/amendment history to SOME records that I am looking for.

In any event, you now have the e-mail address to file your FOIL requests, instead of the Senate's imposed online "form".

Once again, foil@nysenate.gov.

Enjoy and use!

What 1st Amendment?

Judicial retaliation against attorneys who criticize judges has been a recurrent topic on this blog.

I, as an attorney whose license was suspended for two years on November 13, 2015, for criticizing two judges in three motions, two of them to recuse, know the brunt of that retaliation first-hand.

Despite the fact that my criticism was (1) true and (2) fully protected by the 1st Amendment (as the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed in June of 2015 in the case Reed v Town of Gilbert, invalidating content-based regulation of speech that did not pass strict scrutiny - and strict scrutiny test was never applied to my sanctions - courts stubbornly continue to enforce the unconstitutional suspension.

I am not alone in my plight.  Attorneys throughout the U.S. are being sanctioned, and raise the issue of their 1st Amendment protection to criticize misconduct of public officials, including judges.

Now, amazingly, a judge entered the fray of this fight.

In my previous blog (just updated) I described the plight of a judge who dared to call a spade and a spade and accused a prosecutor of being racist - based on the prosecutor's unquestionably racist actions.

Now the judge is in hot waters and is facing a disciplinary action for his protected speech on issues of grave public concern - CONFIRMED, systematic racism in criminal proceedings in his state.

Now a judge has to sue the Judicial Conduct Commission to protect his right of free speech that he did not abdicate when he put on his black robe - and that is exactly the same situation with attorneys, who did not abdicate their 1st Amendment rights to speak out on issues of public concerns, including judicial misconduct, in exchange for their state license and "permission" by the state to earn their livelihood, a federal constitutional right.

So, when an attorney criticizes a judge, she is disciplined.

When a (black) judge criticizes a (white) politically connected attorney, he is about to be disciplined, too.

This bacchanalia of discipline only hurts the public and prevents their access to court by eliminating attorneys and judges who can actually do their jobs honestly, as they were sworn to do.

And the public should be aware of it.

#JudgeOluStevensNeedsPublicSupportInHisFightAgainstRacismInCourt. Does a judge have a 1st Amendment right to call a prosecutor a racist (in social media) - updated?

I updated and corrected this blog since yesterday, after reading in-depth Judge Stevens' federal lawsuit, and included some information about potential conflict of interest of the members of Kentucky Commission for Judicial Conduct to judge Judge Stevens.

===

A Kentucky judge, his name is #JudgeOluStevens, has reportedly filed a federal civil rights lawsuit trying to block the local Judicial Conduct Commission from prosecuting him for public comments on issues of public concern.

Judge Stevens (who is himself black)

was reportedly removed from a criminal trial this past January because he previously dismissed two juries as having too few black people on them, and who made comments on Facebook reportedly indicating that a certain prosecutor wanted all-white juries.

The accusations against Judge Stevens are that 

• Judge Stevenst took an issue that the prosecutor in question appealed his decisions and, in those appeals, allegedly "impugned" the judge's integrity, and was reportedly not shy expressing those feelings about it at public meetings at a bar association, and that
• Judge Stevens went to Facebook to discuss the case that was being appealed and called people to action, to "stand up" and prevent impaneling all-white juries.

The accusations, while factually correct, are incorrect as a matter of judicial ethics.

According to Judge Stevens' federal lawsuit, the so-called "appeal" that Judge Stevens discussed, was not an appeal, but a "motion for certification of the law" by the Commonwealth Attorney Thomas Wine - made after an ACQUITTAL of a black defendant, James Doss, by a racially diverse jury (8 white jurors, 4 black jurors).

In criminal law of this country, acquittal by a jury ends a criminal case - as Judge Stevens correctly pointed out in his federal lawsuit.

Here is what Judge Stevens said in his federal lawsuit on the subject:

The Commonwealth Attorney apparently took an issue, after the acquittal, that Judge Stevens replaced a jury panel with no African-Americans (the defendant James Doss was black), and Judge Stevens agreed.  The Commonwealth Attorney - a white guy Thomas Wine - who represents ALL people of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, not just its white residents, had the audacity to make a motion to the Kentucky Supreme Court, practically in lieu of an appeal, for "certification of the law", whether Judge Stevens' dismissal of the all-white panel was valid.

Such a motion was, most likely, jurisdictionally invalid, because, once again, the defendant was acquitted - and that ends jurisdiction of all courts on the subject.

That's why Judge Stevens stated in his federal lawsuit that Commonwealth Attorney's motion "for clarification" should have been named not Commonwealth v James Doss (a case that was already over and finished), but "Commonwealth v. All Black Defendants".

The ONLY discernible motivation for such a motion "for clarification" is racial.

It is quite apparent that filing of such a motion indicates Thomas Wine's desire to be able to do what he did (but what Judge Stevens stopped him from doing) - selecting all-white juries for black criminal defendants - in the future, with the support of the State Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

While making his motion, Thomas Wine must have known - as a seasoned attorney - that:

1) the criminal case ended with an acquittal, and there is no criminal case "Commonwealth v James Doss" to appeal or make motions in; and that
2) even if theoretically, hypothetically, there would be jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the question that Thomas Wine was asking was already answered - against him - by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case named Batson v (gasp!) Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), 30 YEARS AGO!

The Kentucky Commonwealth Attorney Thomas Wine clearly knew that the state Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Kentucky cannot overrule the U.S. Supreme Court on the issue that has been conclusively decided 30 years ago, so his unlawful and out-of-wack motion "to clarify" or "to certify" the law was - what?  why? for what reason?

Even asking this question 30 years after Batson v Kentucky was proof of Wine's racism, incompetence and bias against black defendants.

And - after the case was finally decided, with no possibility for appeals for the prosecution, and with the motion that was made, being completely ultra vires (made without authority) by Thomas Wine, NOTHING precluded Judge Stevens from making comments wherever he wanted, from rooftops, if needed, raising the issue of grave public concern - ADAMANT and OUTRAGEOUS RACISM of the Commonwealth Attorney whose current "accomplishment" is that the current Kentucky inmates are 55% black while only 21% of Louisville, Kentucky residents are black (see excerpts from Judge Stevens' federal lawsuit).

In other words, 30 years after Batson v Kentucky, a black person in Louisville, Kentucky has a 2.6 TIMES more chance - that's 260%, ladies and gentlemen - than a white person, to be put in jail, even if, as Judge Stevens' lawsuit says, black defendants are not the majority.

That means that the rates of convictions by jury - and the rate of leniency of prosecutor Thomas Wine in plea bargains, by the way, is different in Kentucky between white and black criminal defendants.

THAT must be the issue of grave concern for the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

Yet, it appears, instead, that the grave concern for the Commonwealth of Kentucky was that Judge Steven said that Thomas Wine is a racist (and his actions as a prosecutor show that he sure is), and that what he is doing in criminal proceedings is illegal.

Did Judge Stevens have a right to dismiss juries because they did not represent a racial cross-section of the community, and when they were all-white when the community was not all-white?

I think he did, based on the "Batson" challenge to the racial composition of the jury.

Did the judge have a right to discuss the prosecutor the way he did - that the prosecutor is "impugning" the judge's character in Thomas Wine's "appellate" motion?  

Absolutely he did - because, after the acquittal, the prosecution very obviously had no right for any "appeal" or motions to "clarify" what was clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court 30 years prior - against the prosecution.

That judge Stevens is serious about race, is a grave understatement.

It was reported in January of this year that Judge Stevens sentenced a man to 60 more days in jail for contempt of court, when the man whose bond Judge Stevens just revoked used a racial slur after he left Judge Stevens' courtroom.

Was Judge Stevens justified in doing that?

I actually think he was.  To cast a racial slur at a judge during, or right after, a court proceeding, while still in the courthouse, is unacceptable.

There are issues in such situations though, of impartiality - where the judge acts as prosecutor, judge and jury, and where the judge is also the victim.

I would say that Judge Stevens was unwise doing the contempt proceeding and the sentencing himself, but that racism is alive and kicking in Kentucky, and Judge Stevens wouldn't have it in his courtroom, and especially directed at him himself - is only commendable.

The controversy with the jury composition resulted in an escalating open war between the judge and the local prosecutor Thomas Wine.

In December of 2015 the Kentucky Chief Judge reportedly refused the request of prosecutor Thomas Wine to remove Judge Stevens from all criminal trials.

Then, in January of 2016, Judge Stevens was removed from two criminal cases, on a motion from Thomas Wine, because Judge Stevens discussed Thomas Wine's behavior in the CLOSED case of James Doss on Facebook.


Yet, earlier than he was removed from two cases, an investigation by the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission of Judge Stevens started - with  catch: that the Commission is itself all-white.

Here are the list of members of the Commission whom Judge Stevens sued - with their respective pictures showing their race:

1) meet the Chairman of the Kentucky Commission for Judicial Conduct, Stephen D. Wolnitzek, sued by Judge Stevens in his federal 1st Amendment lawsuit.

Stephen D. Wolnitzek, a white attorney and director of an insurance company - he must know a lot about criminal law, and especially about Batson v Kentucky.

Steven D. Wolnitzek's race is abundantly clear - white.

2)  Janet Stumbo, the next member of the Commission sued by Judge Stevens, a white Kentucky Court of Appeals judge

Let's note that, according to Judge Stumbo's official biography, her husband Ned Pillersdorf is an attorney (why judges and their attorneys spouses so often have different last names - so the connection would not immediately pop up in cases of potential conflict of interest?) - so, Judge Stumbo must rule "in line" with the establishment not only for her own sake, but for her husband's business's sake, too.

By the way, Judge Stumbo's white husband Ned Pillersdorf actively advertises that his wife is a judge on his law firm's website - which is an obvious appearance of impropriety:  see, my wife is a judge, courts will rule in my favor because of it.

So, Judge Stumbo who obviously allows her husband to run her name around in support of his advertisements and promotion of his law firm's business, must know a lot about ethics in general and judicial ethics in particular.

Shouldn't Judge Stumbo's Commission investigate her own behavior for allowing her husband to use her name and judicial office in private advertisements and drumming up business for his private law firm?

By the way, Judge Stumbo's husband is a criminal defense attorney fighting "for the rights of the underdog".

It will help his business in front of white judges tremendously if his wife would help to put down a black judge a little bit - don't you think?

3)  The next sued member of the Commission, Eddy Coleman - a circuit judge in Pike Judicial Center, Kentucky, see also here.

Judge Coleman is very obviously white.


Judge Coleman's LinkedIn profile showing 500 connections (I wonder whether those "connections" appear in Judge Coleman's court and, if they do, how Judge Coleman rules in their regard), also shows that Judge Coleman has been a judge in Kentucky for 21 years.

Judge Stevens' lawsuit indicates that until 2009 there were no black trial judges in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Judge Stevens was the first one.

So, Judge Coleman - who is about to judge and, possibly, discipline or oust Judge Stevens, one out of three black trial judges at this time in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, has been part of the state's racist judiciary that disproportionately puts in jail black people, and approves all-white jury panels for black defendants.

Judge Eddy Coleman (I love those diminutive names - "Eddy" for a judge, like "little boy Eddy", a cute little angel) must be a true expert to decide the issues of Judge Steven's alleged ethical violations.

Judge Eddy Coleman's LinkedIn profile also shows endorsements of the Judge's "Skills" - it is interesting, does Judge Coleman reward the endorsers for their praise in his court cases?  

Shouldn't his Commission for Judicial Conduct investigate that?

 4) The next sued member of the Commission, Karen Thomas "is a district court judge for the 17th District Court, which presides over Campbell County in Kentucky."

Judge Thomas is very obviously white.

Judge Thomas was elected in 2009 as the president of Kentucky District Judges Association.

Judge Thomas is a member of the "Salmon P. Chase Inns of Court", 

see link to that organization here, which is part of American Inns of Court, a secret membership organization where attorneys wine-and-dine judges behind closed doors on a monthly basis, have an unlimited potential for ex parte communications (you can word-search this blog, there is a lot of information as to how American Inns of Court operate and how they influence judges, from trial level to the U.S. Supreme Court) .

I wonder whether attorney Thomas Wine (no pun intended) wined-and-dined Karen Thomas in the Inn of Courts meeting to influence her decision regarding Judge Stevens.

Judge Thomas' membership in the Inns of Court, as well as her activities their, her contacts there, general membership there and Judge Thomas' case outcomes for members of that Inn and of other Inns should be investigated by her own Commission, and that includes an investigation whether attorney Thomas Wine is a member of that organization, and used it to influence Judge Thomas in her disciplinary decision about Judge Stevens.

Since the meeting schedule and membership of the Salmon P. Chase Inns of Court are secret, the possibility of Thomas Wine wining-and-dining Judge Thomas through Inns of Court cannot be excluded, and raises grave issues of public concern.

5) Diane E. Logsdon is another member of the Judicial Conduct Commission about to "investigate" and judge Judge Stevens' statements against racism of Kentucky Commonwealth prosecutor Thomas Wine.

Diane E. Logsdon is white.

As a business person, Ms. Langdon has an interest to rule in a way that will not cause retaliation of the predominantly white, and racist, Kentucky judiciary against her company.

6)  The next (sued) Commission member, Joyce King Jennings is from Louisville, Kentucky, the town where Judge Stevens presides.

Joyce King Jennings is white, here are two pictures of her from her Facebook page, the picture with the chicken leg is Joyce Jenning's own most recent choice of her profile picture.

Joyce King Jennings is a Louisville, KY business owner, 

with a distinct interest to stay on the good side of the judicial establishment - which is the white judicial establishment.

Joyce King Jennings is reportedly the founder of an annual charitable gala for the American Lung Association - a worthy cause.

Yet, pictures advertising this "worthy cause" have very few faces of black people - they are overwhelmingly of white people.  The message sent by Jennings is what - that black people are not really interested in engaging in charitable pursuit?

Jennings very obviously would like to keep on the good side of racists in the Kentucky business establishment - otherwise how will she be able to get money for the "gala" and advertisement for herself and her business?

And, judging by the pictures, Jennings is doing her job just fine - there are hardly any black individuals featured in her advertisements - only enough to duck accusations of open racism.

So, this white businesswoman from Louisville, Kentucky, is, of course, perfectly suited to judge whether Thomas Wine is a racist, whether the black Judge Stevens said the truth about the white prosecutor Thomas Wine that he is a racist, and whether to discipline the black judge Stevens for speaking out against racism in criminal proceedings in Kentucky.

7)  The next sued member of the Kentucky Commission of Judicial Conduct is Jeffrey Walson.

Jeffrey Walson is, reportedly,  " a family court judge for the Clark and Madison Counties Family Court of the 25th Judicial Circuit, which presides over Clark and Madison counties in Kentucky". 

Jeffrey Walson recently sued Kentucky Ethics Commission for a determination whether a Kentucky judge can sit on a board of directors of a financial institution, including the one in which the judge has a personal stake - the answer of the court was "no". 

Walson is a former prosecutor.

I did not find Walson's picture on the Internet, but Judge Stevens' lawsuit indicates that the Commission for Judicial Conduct is "all-white" and I did find comments on Judge Walson's campaign to be elected from the Family Court to the Circuit Court, in order to hear criminal case - he is called "Whitie Watson" and is being accused of "gang politics".

Judge Walson was also accused of lack if integrity in playing politics and smearing his opponent in a judicial election race - by a person who received an election flyer from Judge Walson's campaign.

Judge Walton is, apparently, a very fair choice to judge Judge Steven's anti-racist stand against Commonwealth Attorney Thomas Wine.

8)  The next Commission member Judge Stevens sued is Kent Westberry.

R. Kent Westberry is white, 

and a private attorney, a senior partner at Landrum & Shouse LLP, according to his LinkedIn profile.

Attorney Westberry's area of practice is, according to his law firm's website:

While practicing in federal courts:

attorney Westberry advertises that in 2011 he was the Chairman of the U.S. District Court Magistrate Judge Merit Selection Panel for the Western District of Kentucky.

Here are attorney Westberry's professional associations and affiliations:

To be successful in the white judges' criminal court - one has to trump on the "black sheep" of the family who stepped out of line and spoke about racism in the criminal proceedings, especially if he is also a black judge - doesn't one?

After all, attorney Westberry is part of the white old boys' club for a very long time and must know the rule of the game well.

 9) The next Commission member sued by Judge Stevens is David Bowles.

David Bowles is white, and is "a district court judge for the 30th District Court, which presides over Jefferson County in Kentucky" - this is his younger picture, when he was running in judicial elections.

Judge Bowles is also a retired police officer who, according to his own information in his election campaign, "retired at the rank of Lieutenant from the Jefferson County Police Department".

A white veteran police officer who participated in putting a disproportionate number of black defendants behind bars is a perfect choice to decide issues before the Commission in Judge Stevens case.

10)  Jeff Taylor concludes the list of members of the Kentucky Commission for Judicial Conduct sued by Judge Stevens in federal court.



Jeff Taylor is a judge of Kentucky Court of Appeals, and he is white.

These white people are who Judge Steven is up against.

I am not sure whether Judge Stevens removed his disciplinary proceedings to federal court, but I know that the law allows him to do that.

There is a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443, that allows a state litigant to remove a proceeding to a federal court because he does not expect fairness in state court.

I used that statute to remove my attorney disciplinary proceeding to a federal court.

It was remanded back because, as the federal court reasoned, the statute could only deal with racial unfairness.

While that was not true, in Judge Stevens' case that is exactly the point:

• a black judge who tries to follow the U.S. Constitution, and
• who tries to ascertain the proper racial composition of criminal juries, is opposed
• by a white prosecutor 

• who has a tendency to pick all-white juries (Judge Stevens dismissed two) in a non-all-white community, and
• who has filed a frivolous motion, post-acquittal of a black defendant by a racially diverse jury for a "clarification" whether he can still select all-white juries to preside over criminal trials of black defendants - even though this question was decided in the negative 30 years ago by the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v Kentucky (the prosecutor's own state); and
• the judge is about to be investigated and prosecuted by an all-white Commission for Judicial Conduct, where members have a wide array of conflicts of interest and in-built biases.

Looks like the stage is set up for a racial slamming of Judge Stevens and, 

unless the federal court intervenes - as it obviously should under the circumstances, and, 

unless Judge Stevens is given public support for his brave stance against racism in court proceedings, the gang of all-white old boys - and girls - may succeed.

I encourage my readers to write petitions to the Kentucky Commission for Judicial Conduct in support of Judge Stevens.

Judge Stevens did not commit any misconduct.

He is fighting to right the wrongs in the judicial system - and did it the legitimate way.

Judge Stevens deserves and should be given full public support in his stance against racism in courts.