19 unconstitutional rules invented by a federal judge Curtis Collier in order to reduce suspended civil rights attorneys to nothing

I am reading a 2008 decision by a federal judge Curtis B. Collier, who was 59 years of age when authoring the decision, so it is a little early for senility.

Here is Judge Collier's biography:

The judge had much-celebrated humble beginnings, but graduated from a prestigious Luke University School of Law and worked as an assistant U.S. Attorney for 16 years whose duty was, among other things, to prosecute criminal contempts of court.

Yet, Judge's decision of 2008, made in his capacity of a Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, regarding the status of a suspended attorney indicates that Judge Collier, who remains on the bench as a senior-status judge, has a problem comprehending the most basic principles about:

1) the nature of occupational licensing;
2) the nature of occupational licensing as it is reflected in the legal profession;
3) the concept of a crime of criminal contempt of court;
4) what is the nature of disbarment from the point of view of occupational licensing;
5) what is the nature of suspension of a law license from the point of view of occupational licensing;
6) what constitutes the practice of law;
7) what constitutes a presumption of knowledge of the law;
8) what constitutes notice of prohibited conduct for purposes of a criminal statute.

Determining this "status" should be simple.

Attorney admission is attorney licensing.  A "suspended attorney" is a legal nonsense, because the law defines an "attorney" as a person licensed to practice law.  If that person's license is suspended or revoked (disbarment), that person is not an attorney by definition, is simply a non-attorney, and has the same "rights and privileges" as he or she had before she or he was admitted to the bar.

Right?

Not so fast in Judge Collier's court.  




In his decision, available here, Judge Collier made interesting rulings that are worth commenting on, because judges, like Judge Collier, continue to demonstrate a complete misunderstanding as to:

1) what the practice of law is;
2) what the unauthorized practice of law is;
3) what a contempt of court, and especially the one pertaining to unauthorized practice of law is;
4) what is a notice in a criminal prosecution for such contempt of court and unauthorized practice of law, and
5) what are the remaining rights of individuals whose law licenses are suspended or revoked.

To see incompetence in a judge is not unexpected (to law experts), but is still scary, and the public should be aware of every instance where a judge displayed such incompetence, especially on issues of constitutional law.

First of all, here is how Judge Collier characterizes the nature of suspension of a law license:

"As a general matter, a suspension from practice is an intermediate sanction between disbarment and lesser sanctions such as reprimands and admonitions."

Judge Collier claims that a suspension of a law license is a "sanction".

If it is a "sanction", then elevated procedure is required before such a sanction can be imposed.

Yet, attorney disciplinary proceedings are claimed to be "remedial" in nature and not punitive - in order not to afford attorneys in such disciplinary proceedings protections that they would be afforded had the proceedings be classified as "punitive" in nature.

So, after stripping an attorney of his or her license, with the use of procedures allowing the attorney low-level procedural protections, if any at all, the court then turns around and claims that suspension of a law license is not a remedy to protect the public, but a "sanction" - penalty - against the attorney.

It is a "remedy" for purposes of denying the attorney procedural protections before the suspension and it becomes a "sanction" after the "remedy" is obtained using substandard procedures. 

This same tactic in business is a type of fraud called "bait and switch".  The judiciary, very obviously, should not be using fraud in proceedings - and especially when the court acts at the same time as a legislator (maker of the rules in disciplinary proceedings), prosecutor (appointing and structuring investigative and prosecutorial bodies, consisting in federal courts of 100% of the disciplined attorney's competitors, in violation of federal antitrust laws), and adjudicator.

But - bait and switch it is, as Judge Collier's decision demonstrates from the outset.

Sweet.

But there is more.

 "A suspension operates to temporarily deprive the suspended attorney from exercising the powers, prerogatives, and privileges of a member of the bar of the Eastern District of Tennessee. "An order of suspension deprives the suspended lawyer from performing any service recognized as the practice of law and which is usually performed by lawyers in the active practice of law." In re Mitchell, 901 F.2d at 1185."

Now, what is the practice of law?  It is not defined by statute, and is claimed by Judge Collier to be "any service recognized as the practice of law and which is usually performed by lawyers in the active practice of law".

No, lawyers who want to protect their turf from competition can claim anything is a practice of law.  I know a lawyer who has practiced for over 30 years (since then retired with an "honor plaque") who claimed that serving papers is unauthorized practice of law.  

Many lawyers eat, drink, have sex and go to the bathroom during the active practice of law, but such acts hardly constitute the practice of law. 

Lawyers also usually read, write and add numbers when drafting pleadings, but that hardly constitutes the practice of law.

So what constitutes the practice of law?  Nobody knows, and Judge Collier does not refer to a statute that would clearly define what the "practice of law" is.  

It refers only to a court case, which means that what is the "practice of law" is defined only on a case-by-case basis by courts, and is thus a violation of due process notice requirement, an ex post facto violation, and a violation on the prohibition to Article III (federal) judges to legislate.

Now, before a person is given a law license, a person can work as a paralegal, or legal assistant.

When his law license is taken away, temporarily or permanently, the individual should have the same rights as he had before he received the law license.

Right?

Not according to Judge Collier:





"In determining the scope of suspension, the Court will following the precedent of In re Mitchell with one exception. The court in In re Mitchell granted permission for a suspended attorney to function as a law clerk or paralegal. The judges of this court have decided to part company with In re Mitchell in this one respect. In considering "the procedures and determinations for those attorneys who fail to adhere to the standards of [the] district court" (Court File No. 69, p. 1), this district court has decided to follow those jurisdictions, including Tennessee, that strictly prohibit a suspended attorney from functioning as a law clerk, paralegal, legal assistant, or similar position".

Note that Judge Collier considers it a matter of his discretion (free right to choose) to prohibit to an individual whose law license was suspended, what people who have never had a law license, are allowed to do.

Judge Collier even included a catch-all provision, the so-called "similar position", which will block an individual whose law license is suspended from positions that do not require a license to practice law - including employment in Judge Collier's court, a public entity that has no right to discriminate in its employment decisions, but undertakes to prohibit some unlicensed individuals, but not others, to work as paralegals, legal assistants, or in "similar positions'.

As to "law clerks", a law clerk does not practice law, and thus, a license for a law clerk should not be required.

So, the statement of Judge Collier that he decided what is prohibited to an attorney AFTER the attorney's license is suspended (so, the attorney had no idea that this scope of suspension will be applicable when he was going through the disciplinary proceedings) is a clear equal protection problem, due process problem, legislating-from-the-bench problem and ex post facto law.

Moreover, Judge Collier announces by this decision, as the administrator of his court (a Chief Judge at that time) his determination to discriminate against individuals who have lost their law licenses, in employment decisions, notwithstanding the individual's knowledge of the law and fitness for the jobs as a law clerk, paralegal, legal assistant, or "similar positions" that do not require a law license from other candidates.

Here is how judge Collier explains away his decision to discriminate in employment decisions against individuals whose law licenses are suspended:

"Permitting a suspended attorney to act as a law clerk or paralegal raises very serious concerns".

And what should those concerns be?

"...the distinction between practicing law and serving as a
law clerk or paralegal is not always so clearly delineated."

Huh?

That is a clear admission that there is no statute that would clearly define what IS the practice of law.

If there is no clear definition of the practice of law, then

(1) regulation of the practice of law is unlawful and unconstitutional, because the government gets to regulate "nobody knows what it is";

(2) prosecution for unauthorized practice of law and for contempt of court for prohibition of unauthorized practice of law is unlawful and unconstitutional because a person lacks a STATUTORY notice as to what the practice of law is, to steer clear of it.

Moreover, Judge Collier recognizes that people who routinely are hired without law licenses by attorneys AND BY COURTS, may in fact be involved in unauthorized practice of law, and thus, that he, as an employer, is routinely engaged in aiding, abetting and even soliciting unauthorized practice of law by hiring unlicensed paralegals, legal assistants, law clerks (interns) and people "in similar positions".

To Judge Collier as an employer, it is apparently ok for a person who has never been licensed to practice law to commit a crime of unauthorized practice of law, but is not ok for a person who has lost his or her law license.  

Judge Collier, naturally, has no authority to grant permissions to violate criminal law to some classes of individuals (including himself as an employer), but not to other classes.

This is an equal protection, vagueness and unconstitutionality problem pertaining to the whole attorney regulation scheme presently existing in the U.S.
 
"The Court cannot be confident the public will appreciate the distinction when the public observes a suspended attorney still functioning in some legal capacity".

First of all, Judge Collier shifts the issue from a constitutional right of a suspended attorney to earn a living, and his right to his constitutional equal opportunities with other unlicensed individuals, with what the public will think.

And, while presenting what the public will think as a priority over the requirement of non-discrimination in employment, Judge Collier makes a confession that the law is so unclear as to what constitutes the practice of law, that the public, which is presumed to know the law (as it is written), will not understand what the law means and what it includes.

Such a pronouncement is an equivalent of a ruling that laws defining the practice of law, unauthorized practice of law, and all criminals statutes and administrative regulations of any kind regulating practice of law and unauthorized of law, are void as unconstitutional.

Yet, Judge Collier goes in an opposite direction, claiming the court's authority to somehow sweep wider in discrimination against individuals with suspended law licenses and prohibit more to them than is prohibited to never-licensed individuals, to prevent the public from seeing that the practice of law is not clearly defined, and are thus void and unconstitutional.

"...nor can the Court entrust maintaining this distinction to a suspended attorney, who has already demonstrated an inability to adhere to appropriate ethical and professional standards."

So, the court precludes an attorney from an employment that is allowed to other unlicensed individuals, as a preventive measure, because the court does not trust him not to violate criminal prohibition on unauthorized practice of law, whatever that is.

But, any non-attorney working in a law firm or for a court in the capacity of a paralegal or legal assistant, is supposed to work under supervision of his or her employer, a licensed attorney.

So, it is not the "suspended attorney" that the court does not trust not to engage in unauthorized practice of law, while the lines of what constitutes that practice of law are not "clearly delineated".

The court actually does not trust licensed attorneys with supervision of an individual whose law license was suspended - while it trusts those same attorneys with supervision of never-licensed paralegals and legal assistants.

Since employment in courts is also prohibited, the court does not trust even itself to be able to prevent unauthorized practice of law by "suspended attorneys" - because the court does not know what it means.

So, it is a prohibition on employment, a punitive one, and a completely unreasonable one.

After this "analysis" that practically recognized that the whole scheme of attorney regulation and prosecutions for contempt of court and unauthorized practice of law against suspended and disbarred attorneys, as well as prohibitions on employment that does not require a law license for suspended and disbarred attorneys are unconstitutional, Judge Collier invented the following 19 rules that a suspended attorney in Judge Collier's court (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee) is required to comply with.

Here they are, with comments.

 Rule No. 1

 A suspended attorney "may not appear in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee in connection with any matter or case (unless he or she is a party in the case), either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

Comment:  the rule does not define what "directly or indirectly" or "in connection with any matter or case" means.

For example, a suspended attorney can be hired as a law expert, and called to testify as a witness.

Testifying as a witness in a case would be prohibited, even if it is not prohibited by ethical rules of disclosure, and would actually benefit parties on whose behalf the suspended attorney is appearing.

Moreover, such a wholesale rule, by its all-encompassing language allowing only one exception (pro se representation) a suspended attorney from serving on a jury "in connection with any matter or case".

Such a prohibition also bans a suspended attorney from appearing in court as an observer and member of the public, a right constitutionally guaranteed to any member of the public without regard to their status as an attorney, non-attorney or a suspended attorney.

Such a prohibition also bans a suspended attorney from appearing in court as a court monitor or investigative reporter/journalist providing coverage of court proceedings in the press - individually (as a blogger) or "in concert with others" (on behalf of a media source as an employer).

Rule No. 1 is, thus, clearly overbroad and unconstitutional. 

Rule No. 2



A suspended attorney, according to Judge Collier "may not have any contact with federal court in this district, its staff, or any litigant, witness, or potential witness involved in any proceeding before a court in this district (unless that suspended attorney—acting as a pro se litigant—is representing him or herself as a party), regarding any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys. 

This rule clearly violates several fundamental constitutional rights of a suspended attorney:

(1) access to court;
(2) access to public records;
(3) freedom of association;
(4) due process right to earn a living - including in the capacity of:

• an investigator (does not require a law license), 
• journalist, 
• interpreter,
• church minister,
• mental health advisor,
• domestic violence advocate,
• police officer,
• friend, 
• neighbor
• relative.

Rule No. 2 is clearly overbroad, unconstitutional and thus void.

Rule No. 3.




According to Judge Collier, a suspended attorney "may not solicit clients regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys. "

What constitutes the word "regarding" is not clearly defined.  A suspended attorney can also be an interpreter.   Soliciting clients as an interpreter pertaining to a court case is not the practice of law, yet, Judge Collier prohibits it - with no reason for it whatsoever, since, once again, it is not the practice of law.

Rule No. 3 is thus vague, overbroad and unconstitutional.

Rule No. 4.

A suspended attorney "may not accept clients regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

 Rule No. 4 has the same problems as Rule No. 3 above.

Rule No. 5.

A suspended attorney "may not accept fees from clients or on behalf of clients regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

Same problems as in Rules 3 and 4.

 Rule No. 6.

A suspended attorney "may not share fees with another attorney for a client with a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys. "

A suspended attorney who is married to a licensed attorney or who works for a licensed attorney would necessarily share in the licensed attorney's fees "indirectly".

Thus, the rule is overbroad and unconstitutional as such.

Rule No. 7

A suspended attorney "may not retain fees for any legal services performed since the time of the suspension for any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

Here is what can happen:

The federal court backdates the suspension (happened to me) and sends the order of suspension by mail, which arrives a week or more after the date of the suspension (happened to me, too).

If an attorney provided valuable legal services during the time he or she does not know of the suspension, he or she is still stripped of a fee earned in good faith.

This problem seem minor, the only big problem with this rule is that what constitutes "legal services" is not clearly defined by statute.


Rule No. 8 

 A suspended attorney "may not retain any fees, expenses, or costs paid in advance that were not earned or expended prior to the suspension order from any client regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

This rule is straightfoward and fair, but overbroad, since the word "regarding" may refer to non-legal services to be provided in connection with or stemming from a court case (interpreting, mental health counseling etc.).

 Rule No. 9.

According to Judge Collier, a suspended attorney "may not have any contact with any client regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

This rule is in direct violation of freedom of association, freedom of speech and due process right to earn a living in a capacity not requiring a law license - such as an investigator, a journalist, a teacher etc.


Rule No. 10

A suspended attorney "may not provide legal services, advice, counseling, or the like to any client regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

What constitutes the practice of law is not defined by statute, so the prohibition on provision of "legal services" is unconstitutional.

As to "advice, counseling, or the like", the prohibition is overbroad and reaches conduct that may have nothing to do with court representation.

Rule 10 is clearly unconstitutional.

Rule No. 11


A suspended attorney "may not hold him or herself out as an attorney capable of rendering legal advice regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

In fact, a suspended attorney is VERY capable of rendering legal advice as an expert, and often that is exactly why that attorney, especially a civil rights attorney (in federal court) is suspended.

The correct way to put it is that a suspended attorney must not hold out to the public that he or she is LEGALLY capable to render such advice while being ACTUALLY capable to do that as a law expert, often in an area where such an advice is desperately needed, and where there is a shortage of experts willing to work with under-privileged population.

"An attorney suspended from the bar of the Eastern District of Tennessee cannot represent to the public, in any way, that he or she can practice law before federal court in this district. ... "

What is the practice of law, is not defined by statute, so this rule is unconstitutional as overbroad, vague and not based on a statute.

"This includes denotation by sign, stationary, letterhead, business card, telephone and internet listing, advertisement, and any other public or private pronouncement that he or she is permitted to practice law in federal court in this district, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."


There are a lot of internet listings (ratings) about an attorney which the attorney did not place.  Moreover, advertisements work in such a way that an attorney pays for the advertisement for a year in advance, and the advertisement then is picked up and re-published by so many sources that it is physically impossible to clean the Internet off that advertisement once the order of suspension is issued.

This rule is clearly too burdensome and physically impossible to comply with in all respects.



"Furthermore, a suspended attorney is prohibited from any representations, in word or deed which, although do not directly state he or she can practice law in federal court in this district, might reasonably lead a member of the public to infer it."

This portion of Rule 11 is clearly unconstitutional because it puts a burden on the attorney to define what constitutes the practice of law which is not defined by statute and which the court acknowledges "is not clearly delineated", and to steer clear from more conduct than what may constitute the practice of law, simply so that a member of the public who cannot understand what the practice of law is - because it is not defined by statute - would not "infer" that an attorney is engaged in prohibited conduct.

Yet, since this prohibition is a prohibition of CRIMINAL conduct (unauthorized practice of law, contempt of court), the notice requirement works THE OTHER WAY - from the government to ALL members of the public, suspended attorneys or not.

The required due process notice in criminal cases goes FROM the government, THOUGH A STATUTE, TO ALL THE PUBLIC.

Judge Collier who practiced law for decades before he issued this 19-rule wonder, and who worked - gasp! - as a criminal prosecutor - apparently does not know this fundamental principle of criminal law.


"This includes, but is not limited to, 

• presence in the courtroom during proceedings for former clients,  
• accompanying admitted attorneys to federal court, 
• appearing with admitted attorneys in federal court, 
• sitting with admitted attorneys in federal court, and 
• conversing with admitted attorneys in federal court in connection with any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

Aren't we really carried away here?

Presence of any individual at a public court proceeding is a constitutional right, also guaranteed by the 1st Amendment free speech clause, because any member of the public present during a public court proceeding is a potential court reporter.

Moreover, every member of the public present during court proceeding is a member of popular sovereign monitoring performance of the judge as the sovereign's servant - and has a right to be there.  For a servant to shoo his master out of the courtroom at whim is not a very reasonable idea, especially when the proceeding is open to all other members of the public.

Judge Collier is obviously concerned that a suspended attorney - especially if it is a civil rights attorney suspended in order to thwart a civil rights case (such a thing happened to me and is quite a frequent occurrence in federal courts, as far as I know) - will appear in court as a journalist or court monitor and will then blog as to what he or she observed, thus embarassing the court and "connected" attorneys.  This rule is a "damage control" rule that has nothing to do with prohibition on unauthorized practice of law.

Accompanying anybody to any public proceeding is a constitutional right guaranteed by 1st Amendment Freedom of Association clause, and the same applies to "sitting with", "appearing with" (as a secretary or an assistant carrying the file, for example, or as an interpreter), "conversing with".

Judge Collier was either becoming senile at the time he issued these rules, or mentally disabled, because otherwise it is unclear how could he stay a licensed attorney, then a prosecutor, and then a judge when he apparently lacks knowledge of elementary principles of constitutional law regarding access to courts, presence of the public during public court proceedings, freedom of press and freedom of association.



Rule No. 12




According to Judge Collier, a suspended attorney "may not write letters to clients, attorneys, or others regarding any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

 Once again, this is an overbroad prohibition on practicing of more professions than the practice of law.

Under such a rule, a suspended attorney may be prohibited from seeking reimbursement for his or her fee owed to him or her for services provided in a still-pending case, and provided at the time the suspended attorney was a licensed attorney.

In other words, this is an illegal fee-forfeiture rule.

Moreover, it is a rule under which a suspended attorney is prohibited to contact parties or attorneys in ANY federal case in that court, whether the suspended attorney represented clients in that case before suspension or not, and where the suspended attorney is a potential witness and wants to notify of that the parties or attorneys for the parties. 

Such a rule will prevent a suspended attorney to report to the parties or attorneys in a pending civil rights case that the suspended attorney is a witness of governmental misconduct, including misconduct of a presiding federal judge (that would potentially include Judge Collier).

This Rule, thus, constitutes advocacy by Judge Collier on behalf of parties, and federal judges are precluded from practicing law, and such practice of law, by statute, is grounds for impeachment of a federal judge.

Rule 12 is, thus, clearly unconstitutional.

Rule No. 13


A suspended attorney "may not supervise, direct, control, or exercise any direction or supervision over any admitted attorneys regarding any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

The rule is very vague, especially in regards of a "potential" case or a "potential" matter.

This rule is extremely overbroad. 

For example, such a rule would prohibit a directive from a suspended attorney 

• to his own attorney as to how to prosecute or defend his own or his legal ward's (child's, incapacitated relative's), or his business's (corporation's) court case;
• as a police officer against a licensed attorney (including a judge) as a motorist or suspect in a crime, of a suspended attorney who is 
• a fire captain against a licensed attorney who is a volunteer, by a suspended attorney who is 
• an army captain against a licensed attorney who is his subordinate, a directive by a suspended attorney who is an FBI agent to subpoena documents of a licensed attorney of any kind, related or unrelated to present litigation, and possibly related to commission of crimes by high-standing public officials - because any situations in the U.S. litigous society can be a "potential" court case, and when a person is employed in the government, any situation pertaining to gross negligence, insurbordination or violation of rights of 3rd parties is a potential federal civil rights case.

Thus, this rule would prohibit a suspended attorney to faithfully discharge his duties in a setting that does not require a law license, and creates a title of nobility in licensed attorneys who, apparently, cannot be commanded by an individual who is a suspended attorney, even if that would be the individual's duty to do so.

This rule, as others, makes me think that Judge Collier was not thinking much when issuing these rules, that these rules may have been authored by a student intern and not the judge, and that the governing principle in this rules is - "a suspended attorney has no rights, and is not worth thinking much about".

But, if a court of law treats one class of individuals as not worthy of equal protection of laws, and allows itself to pick and choose what will be that class of "outlaws", the next class can be anybody, and a judge acting on such principles is violating his oath of office to act not on a whim or personal prejudices, but pursuant to his constitutional oath of office.

Rule 13 is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional.

Rule No. 14



A suspended attorney "may not solicit clients regarding any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys, then refer those clients to other attorneys. "

The referral service to attorneys (where attorneys are paying clients and not the public) does not require a law license to set up, and advertising a referral service to attorneys as paying clients and to the public as potential clients of those attorneys, does not require a law license either.

If a certain business or conduct does not require a law license from anyone, a suspended attorney cannot be prohibited from engaging in that business, as a matter of equal protection of law.  There is no lawful reason for such a prohibition.

"To the extent a suspended attorney already had clients with matters before a federal court in this district, the suspended attorney is not precluded from suggesting to his or her former client the services of a specific attorney, but cannot collect any referral fee in doing so and must disgorge any fees the client has already paid for the suspended attorney's continued representation."

It is clear that it would be unethical to collect a referral fee for suggesting a new attorney to your own former client after suspension, but the rule does not have to be defined any broader than the last paragraph, and should not prohibit ANY referral services by a suspended attorneys.

Thus, Rule 14 is also overbroad and unconstitutional.



Rule No. 15

A suspended attorney "may not sign any pleading or filing in any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

Rule 15 would prohibit a suspended attorney from providing an affidavit as a witness or law expert, or an expert in any other field in a court case, and would prohibit pro se representation.

Rule 15 is thus overbroad and unconstitutional.


Rule No. 16




A suspended attorney "may not participate in any depositions, conferences, settlement discussions, and the like regarding any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

This is a prohibition on employment of suspended attorneys as:

(1) interpreters at depositions;
(2) law experts;
(3) experts in any field of knowledge (a doctor, an insurance broker, a forensic specialist) other than the law who would assist a non-expert attorney asking questions at a deposition.

Such employment does not require a law license.   Moreover, this rule hinders rights not only of the suspended attorney, but of parties who hire him - as an interpreter, law expert from another jurisdiction, or expert in the field other than law.

This rule is clearly an arbitrary, overbroad and unconstitutional knee-jerk reaction by Judge Collier driven to prohibit anything and any rights once an attorney is suspended, whether such prohibitions do or do not make any sense.


Rule No. 17








A suspended attorney "may not have any direct contact with witnesses or potential witnesses regarding any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."




 Wow.

This is a direct advocacy by a judge and a direct interference with cases and a violation of freedom of association clause of the 1st Amendment.

Anybody may be or become a "potential" witness in a federal case.

Moreover, most often, federal courts handle civil rights cases, and "witnesses" in those cases are public officials, so this prohibition actually bans a suspended attorney to contact any of his state public officials, because they may be witnesses or potential witnesses in federal civil rights cases.

I have never read anything more stupid than this judicial rule.

Other than public officials, that "witness" or "potential witness" can be the suspended attorney's current or former employer, doctor, minister, spouse, child, distant relative, friend, neighbor, former client or a chance travel acquaintance with whom the suspended attorney sat next to on an airplane and chatted.

Moreover, in our social media day and age, anybody's contacts are extended exponentially through the use of the Internet.

To prohibit contacts of "witnesses" or "potential witnesses" in a given court, Judge Collier prohibited to a suspended attorney to function as a human being and a member of society.

 The undertone is clear - when you are a licensed attorney, you are nobility, when your license is taken, you are reduced to less than nothing.  Doesn't work this way in a country that declares itself to be governed by the rule of law.

So, Rule 17 is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional.



Rule No. 18

A suspended attorney "may not negotiate or approve the settlement of any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

This rule prohibits to a suspended attorney:

• pro se representation - there is no exception for pro se;
• acting as a legal guardian (represented by an attorney) of a minor child or an adult adjudicated as an incompetent;
• acting as a representative of a business (corporation);
• acting as a represented party.

Rule 18 denies a suspended attorney multiple due process and access-to-court rights, and is unconstitutional on its face and as appied.

Rule No. 19



A suspended attorney, according to Judge Collier, "may not counsel the acceptance or denial of any settlement of any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

The rule is unconstitutional, for the same reasons as the Rule 18 above.

This came from an attorney, former prosecutor and present judge who - literally - holds people's lives in his hands, presiding over death penalty cases.

This is a judge who presides and have been presiding for years, over civil rights cases.

This is a judge who, as the Chief Judge of his court for many years, handled employment issues and defined hiring policy of his court.

This judge, very obviously, either does not know the text of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights that he is sworn to uphold, or does not care what is in there, as long as he can sit up on high and craft rules that would allow him to wield his power and stomp on his potential enemies, and attorneys suspended in federal courts are most likely civil rights attorneys who criticize the government.

Judge Collier, as I said at the beginning of the blog, is much celebrated for his "humble beginnings" and for his race.

I assert, time and again, that neither the "humble beginnings", nor the person's race, gender, sexual orientation or any other characteristics - other than (1) knowledge of the law and (2) commitment to follow that law and the judge's constitutional oath of office - matter as a judicial qualification.
Reportedly, "a man [Judge Collier] never met but who yet inspires him was U.S. District Judge Frank Johnson. Johnson, a native Alabamian, ruled on crucial cases during the civil rights era in Alabama.

He was not popular among his neighbors.

"He ruled against Alabama in many cases, not just one," Collier said.

There were threats. Johnson's children couldn't go to public school. He and his family were cut off from the community.

"He followed the Constitution and did what the law required even though he did so at tremendous personal sacrifice," Collier said."

Following "inspirations" for a public servant who took his office based on his oath to protect and uphold the U.S. Constitution is not necessary.

Upholding his oath, every day, and in every part of every decision - is.

Take that, Preet Bharara! Cuomo got to control your law license now.

Yesterday, when the NYS Senate did not immediately confirm Cuomo's puppet Janet DiFiore for the position of NYS Chief Judge, Cuomo threw in a sweet deal for the Senate - nominated the Senate's own attorney Michael Garcia for the position of an Associate judge of the New York State Court of Appeals.

Today, NYS Senate confirmed DiFiore without a single vote in opposition, after "an hour of praise".  

So, just when Preet Bharara started investigating Cuomo for his potential involvement in the Buffalo Billion shady deals (September of 2015), Cuomo nominated his puppet DiFiore to get in a position of control over Preet Bharara's own law license (December 2015).

Law licenses of attorneys licensed in New York are controlled by the state court system.

Janet DiFiore now heads that system.

Janet DiFiore has confirmed her pledge to protect Cuomo rather than her ethical duties as a public servant when she protected from disclosure private donors to a Cuomo-backed non-profit, thus allowing more shady donations to be made and allowing Cuomo to escape without criminal prosecution (in June of 2012).

DiFiore was already rewarded by Cuomo by:

1) having her husband Dennis Glazer appointed to the casino and racetrack-siting board (in July of 2014);

2) nominating DiFiore to head the top court of the State of New York as soon as the case got vacated by her predecessor judge Lippman, and fought against Lippman's efforts to prolong his time in that position by changing judicial mandatory retirement age in the state Constitution.

Now DiFiore will have to pay back for such generous gifts of her benefactor.

And, when DiFiore has Cuomo's prosecutor's law license in hand, what is better than to hold it over his head to prevent prosecution?

Bharara already felt the doom.

After DiFiore was nominated and endorsed by NYS bar associations, on January 11, 2016, Bharara publicly announced that he did not find any criminality in Cuomo's disbandment of the Moreland Commission.

The same may happen with the Buffalo Billion investigation by Bharara - especially that Cuomo's Leutenant-Governor is married to Bill Hochul, Assistant U.S. Attorney (who recused from investigating his own wife's office, but the taint still remains).

Even though Bharara is a federal prosecutor, he cannot practice in federal court if his state law license is revoked (federal courts usually have automatic "reciprocal" discipline, whether state courts are right or wrong in their license revocation decisions) - and it is easy to find fault with an attorney to take his or her law license, law or no law, only the power to do so is needed. 

And there is already a just-created and developing precedent in the neighboring state of Pennsylvania as to how to remove an elected top-level prosecutor from office if she is doing the right thing and fighting corruption at the top level of the government.

When Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane started to investigate misconduct of the "ol' boys club" - judges and prosecutors involved in the "porngate" e-mail scandal - attorney licensing was used so that the licensing "state board", or, in reality, a group of private attorneys controlled by and with ties to the judiciary, behind closed doors, brought proceeding before the corrupt judges Ms. Kane investigated and, with their help, yanked her law license, the law license of an elected public official who was elected by millions (!!) of voters.

Now, Kathleen Kane, who courageously refused to resign - after criminal charges were brought against her, after her law license was suspended - was made part of proceedings in the State Senate trying to unseat her.

It is obvious that Kathleen Kane would not have been elected in the first place had she not have good connections in the government in the first place.  Yet, those connections did not help her when she raised her hand (which was part of her duty) at the holiest subject - corruption at the top echelon of the state government, and especially in the judiciary.

The message is clear - in this country, if you fight corruption in the judiciary, you face major problems.

Like Kane, you can be:

1) stripped of your law license;
2) criminally prosecuted;
3) removed from office - and if that  happens - 
4) conviction and incarceration will become so much easier.

But, if you keep your mouth shut - like attorneys in the same Pennsylvania who did not report that two judges, for years, were selling kids for kickbacks into privately run juvenile jails - you will keep your license and be good and continue in your "honorable" profession, even if children suffered, even if children committed suicides because of that corrupt scheme.

So, now, 

• knowing what has happened and is happening to Ms. Kane, 
• knowing that New York viciously pursues attorney whistle-blowers of judicial misconduct and yanks their law licenses, 
• knowing that Cuomo now got from his corrupt puppet DiFiore mounted on top of New York Court system, and also 
• knowing that Cuomo nominated Michael Garcia, the attorney who toppled Governor Spitzer through claims of involvement as a customer of a prostitution ring (a direct hint),  - will Bharara show courage and integrity and still obtain an indictment of Cuomo and participants in his schemes?

Is it possible that Bharara will investigate DiFiore for:

•  reported participation in welfare fraud and using her office to quash that investigation through threats, 
• her actions, reportedly, to hush up her loss of her badge and gun, 
• her non-prosecution of police shootings while gaining the "highest felony conviction rates" against non-governmental defendants based on false or non-existing evidence, 
• for her corrupt acts in covering up Cuomo's ties with the gaming industry - for which favor her husband received an appointment to the location-siting board for the gaming indusry? 

I asked NYS senate to testify agaisnt DiFiore - and was denied.

I asked NYS Senate to ask her questions about the above - and was denied.

So - now that DiFiore is in the saddle,  time will show, and, I believe, soon, as to how DiFiore's position of power will start influencing Bharara's and other people's actions.  It already did.




I won't be surprised if Bharara will give up on his surge against corruption in New York state government, for fear of his own license. 
 

Meanwhile, I need time to research interests and disqualifications of New York State Senators who voted for confirmation of DiFiore, will compare those interests with their actions before, during and after the confirmation hearing and will report my findings on this blog.

Stay tuned.

To sweeten the deal with DiFiore, corrupt Cuomo nominates NYS Senate's own attorney Michael Garcia to the Court of Appeals - what a package!

Tomorrow New York Senate will vote whether or not to confirm Janet DiFiore (despite available documentary evidence of her corruption and misconduct warranting disbarment) as the Chief Judge of New York Court of Appeals.

Even after a unanimous vote of NYS Senate's Judiciary Committee after the theatrical "confirmation hearing" where only brown-nosers were invited and opposing witnesses with actual evidence against DiFiore were blocked, and their testimony misrepresented by Bonacic - NYS Senate somehow paused to vote today and did not yet confirm Janet DiFiore as Chief Judge of New York Court system.

So, NYS corrupt governor who needs DiFiore in that particular position of power, sweetened the deal - he nominated to the same court NYS Senate's OWN ATTORNEY!!!

Here is the proof:

Usually the State of New York and all of its branches, including the New York State Senate, is represented - by statute - by New York State Attorney General.

And if NYS Attorney General recuses himself, it is not just any random law firm that is picked to represent the New York Senate instead, those representing the Senate - and especially such known corruptioners as Skelos and Silver - are very close insiders, and especially when what the attorney is hired to do is fight subpoenas from the Moreland Commission.

By the way, Garcia was involved in investigation of the prostitution ring that outed as customer and led to resignation of Governor Spitzer and to put into power Governor Pataki, favored by the felon (and Garcia's client) Sheldon Silver.

Garcia ' s opposition to subpoenas for Silver and Dean did not save them from criminal prosecution.

Are Garcia and DiFiore nominated for high judicial seats to make them unreachable to Preet Bharara, now having made DiFiore in a position to regulate Bharara ' s law license?

So, Michael Garcia is joined at the hip with the Senate and it's felons.  And he is going to be on top of the judicial branch now?

What a sweet deal!

Cuomo is offering the Senate a deal they, probably, will not be able to refuse: to take Cuomo's corrupt nominee DiFiore, who will be fixing cases for Cuomo, and, so that the Senate would have their own benefit from the deal, to promote THEIR OWN COUNSEL to the same court - so that Michael Garcia would be fixing cases for the Senate, too.

Note names of two convicted felons Garcia represented and was in close contact with.  Silver is not yet in prison - but an attorney who represented him and, thus, was in close contact with him, is offered up as a bundle-deal for the replacement of Silver's buddy Lippman with Cuomo's corrupt puppet DiFiore.

I wonder what this nation's Founding Fathers would say about such "checks and balances" and such a "separation of powers":

the executive branch offers to the legislative branch a corrupt judicial nominee to fix its own cases, and sweetens the deal with another judicial nominee, attorney for the legislative branch, to fix their own cases.

Of course, it is better to have a judge on the top court as a case-fixer instead a "mere attorney".

Great job, Cuomo.  

I am holding my breath as to what NYS Senate will say.  Or - should I?

Unanimous vote by self-interested Judiciary Committee of the New York State Senate for Janet DiFiore - but the Senate did not confirm her yet

So Janet DiFiore was not confirmed as Chief Judge of NYS Court of Appeals yet - despite a corrupt unanimous vote of NYS Judiciary Committee, including its disqualified attorney-Senators/members.

Predictably, NYS Senator and Chair of Senate Judiciary Committee (and attorney) Bonacic lied to the public today at the confirmation hearing of Janet Difiore for the position of Chief Judge for NYS Court of Appeals - in many ways:

• by not disclosing that he denied anybody but bar associations and Janet DiFiore a right to testify at her confirmation hearing;
•  by not disclosing the fact that he and all other attorney senators were requested to be disqualified from voting - because they had personal financial stakes in the vote, as licensed attorneys, voting for their regulator.

Predictably, Senator Bonacic did not conduct the necessary due diligence investigation about Janet DiFiore and left open the question whether, if confirmed, a long-time hardened corrupt criminal, with a long record of corruption and with reported ties to the mafia, will head the NYS Court system.

In order to dupe the public - and the NYS Senate - Bonacic claimed that there were written submissions that were "negative" against the judiciary and the Court of Appeals, without details, and without mentioning that witnesses did not voluntarily make written submissions, but were forced to do so because they were denied their requests to testify, see the list of "uninvited witnesses" and their statements.  My blogs are mentioned there, too, I will also publish my e-mails to the Judiciary Committee that Senator Bonacic's was supposed to post on the NYS Senate website.

When praise comes in live testimony and the live opposition is blocked and is presented through mischaracterization  of a person with a personal interest in the outcome of proceedings, like Bonacic and other attorneys-Senators, are - that conduct smacks of corruption.

As I said before, New Yorkers are voting with their feet against that corruption, and will continue to leave the state if the government, instead of cleaning its pigsties of corruption, will try to put perfumed handkerchiefs of praise over them.

It is already clear - through the actions of NYS Judiciary Committee that unanimously voted to put a criminal (and criminal conduct of Janet DiFiore is well-documented) at the head of the NYS Court system, without proper investigation of her criminal and corrupt background - that no amount of perfume will be able to cover the stink.

The mandatory D.C. bar inadvertently shows the true reason for attorney regulation - collective bargaining under the guise of help to consumers of legal services.

At this time, the U.S. Supreme Court is reviewing a case of a California teacher who brought a civil rights action under the 1st Amendment claiming she does not have to pay for "services" of teachers' labor union if she does not want to be part of that union and does not endorse political agendas promoted by that union.

The case had nothing to do with attorney regulation - because attorney regulation is declared to be done for the benefit of consumers of legal services, and the Freidrichs case was brought NOT pursuing the interests of students, consumers of teachers'  services, but between a non-unionized provider of services and the union of such providers.

 And, attorneys do not even have labor unions.

Yet, sometimes you need not to even give people enough rope to hang themselves - they willingly find that rope and use it.  

I would die to be the fly on the wall and know who compelled 21 former presidents of a mandatory federal bar association (the D.C. bar) to file an amicus curiae brief in support of California teachers' mandatory labor unions dues for non-members?  

But - 21 former presidents found that proverbial rope and used it to strangle all the remnants of legitimacy out of regulation of the legal profession, see their amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief here.

By drawing parallels between collective labor bargaining on behalf of service providers and the bar associations that combine the functions of a trade association (not a labor union) for the benefit of its members, and a governmental regulatory agency for the benefit of consumers whose interests may be against interests of paying members of such mandatory bar associations,  the conflict of interest in attorney regulation by attorneys became even more clear, as bar associations were directly compared, by attorneys themselves with collective-bargaining labor unions.

If attorneys, especially such prominent attorneys as 21 former presidents of a D.C. bar associations, come together and file a "friend of the court" brief to support collective bargaining of teachers as parallel of attorney regulation  - they acknowledge that attorney regulation is nothing but a collective bargaining regime that has nothing to do with protection of consumers.  

In their amicus brief, 21 D.C.-bar presidents argued the following: that a certain court U.S. Supreme Court case provided that "where a state establishes a legal entitlement to a benefit, it may compel those receiving the benefit to pay their fair share of the cost."

While that is a true rendition of what the U.S. Supreme Court said, it had nothing to do with attorney regulation.

Yet, the D.C. bar insisted on shooting itself in the foot by arguing that "the Abood/Keller line of cases represents a firmly rooted body of law upon which not only states and unions but also integrated bars, including the D.C. Bar, have long relied in structuring their activities." 

"Integrated" means mandatory.

If D.C. bar and other "integrated" bars were established on the principles of collective bargaining, they cannot also conduct "state licensing".

After all, labor unions are non-governmental organizations that do not engage in teacher certifications, even when they pretend to "promote quality education" while in reality they only protect those who pay their dues from competition.

Unless we have here a case of a contagious senility that suddenly affected all 21 former presidents of the D.C. bar association, all of these individuals are competent lawyers themselves, and are represented in their amicus curiae brief by competent lawyers, too, so they knew exactly what they are doing when they said that mandatory bars is basically, the same as labor unions.

And if they put their collective proverbial foot into their collective proverbial mouth - they have only themselves to blame.

From this point of view, Friedrichs is a very interesting case in favor of deregulation of the legal profession, and I will wait with interest as to how the U.S. Supreme Court will decide it.  

At least, it shows that the legal profession jumps up to protect their imagined interests even where - according to their own declarations for why attorney regulation exists - there should not be any interests at all, because it is not the same to protect interests of consumers, like attorney regulation pretends to do, and interests of service providers, like labor unions do.


So, the bunny ears are sticking out of the trickster's hat, aren't they?

Criminal and child abuse cases in Delaware County, NY, from January 2002 to July 2015 are contaminated by undisclosed conflict of interest between the retired judge Carl Becker and attorney John Hubbard

According to ethical rules of judicial conduct, a judge should either recuse from cases where his former law partner appears, or disclose the fact that one of the attorneys is the judge's former law partner, and give all parties in the case an opportunity to move to recuse the judge.

There is no cut-off date as to when the judge should stop considering recusal from cases where his former law partner or his office appears, and that is especially true for law partners from partnerships in rural areas where such relationships are deemed especially close.

On January 12, 2016, the local Delaware County newspaper "The Walton Reporter" reported the following:

"Delaware County's Acting District Attorney John Hubbard, of Stamford, introduced himself to board members. Due to procedures in place, Hubbard said that because of his position as Chief Assistant District Attorney, he automatically became Acting District Attorney when former District Attorney Richard Northrup Jr. left his post to assume the role of Delaware County Court Judge.

Hubbard, who previously shared a private law practice with former Delaware County Judge Carl F. Becker (who abruptly retired in July), became the chief assistant district attorney in 2006. He will hold the position for one year."

I do not know where the Walton Reporter got this information, but this information was upon my information, NEVER disclosed by Becker, Hubbard or his boss Northrup for 12.5 years (!) that Becker was on the bench and presided over criminal and child abuse cases where Hubbard and his employer Northrup/Delaware County District Attorney's office, appeared in front of him.

My husband Frederick J. Neroni has practiced before Judge Carl F. Becker in criminal and child abuse cases in Delaware County from 2002 to 2011.

I practiced in front of Judge Carl F. Becker in criminal and child abuse cases from 2009 to 2012 (when Becker recused from all of my cases).

At NO time either Becker, or Hubbard, or the Delaware County District Attorney Northrup disclose to us that Hubbard is Becker's former law partner.

At no time did the just-retired Delaware County Judge Carl Becker recuse from criminal cases where his former law partner John Hubbard, or his office, the Delaware County District Attorney's office, appeared - and that covered not only criminal cases, but also child abuse cases where the County District Attorney is a necessary party by statute.

Only on January 12, 2016 it was reported that John Hubbard finally confessed to HAVING BEEN the law partner of the already retired ("abruptly") judge Carl Becker, and only when he got elevated to the position of the Acting Delaware County District Attorney due to election of Richard Northrup to the position of a judge.

Of course, I will be turning in the entire "trio" into the attorney disciplinary authorities - for Becker and Hubbard, and into Commission for Judicial Conduct - for Northrup.

Imagine how many criminal and child abuse cases they contaminated with their non-disclosure.

I will also write to the New York State Attorney General requesting removal of Richard Hubbard from his position as Delaware County Judge since he failed to disclose to the voting public this interesting detail that could have led to an entirely different result at election. 

First, had local attorneys known about Richard Northrup's misconduct that contaminated all criminal and child abuse cases in Delaware County from 2002 to 2015, more likely than not, Northrup would not have run unopposed, as he did.

Second, voters could be disgusted to vote for him and would have voted him down, as they did Porter Kirkwood, another of Carl Becker's "nominees".

I will report on this blog answers from these authorities.

Stay tuned.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, the enabler of sexual predators in federal courthouses - the case of Judge Samuel Kent

In 2009,  a federal judge Samuel Kent was convicted on a plea bargain after an indictment of a grand jury, and after that the U.S. Congress impeached him and took him off the bench.

Even after conviction, Judge Kent initially refused to resign and only wanted to retire on disability, drawing his full judicial salary. 

 When that offer of retirement was rejected by the House of Representatives and impeachment proceedings were instituted, with testimony of his two employees, Judge Kent turned in a full resignation which was accepted.  

Once again, Judge Kent was taken off the bench, and pled guilty to obstruction of justice.  He served 2 years in prison. 

Reportedly this is the gist of what happened:  "For years, Cathy McBroom and Donna Wilkerson stayed silent as an often intoxicated U.S. District JudgeSamuel Kent cornered them to inflict unwanted kissing, groping and occasionally furtive sexual touching, they said."

Of course, there is a lot more behind the story.

This blog is not just about what happened to Donna Wilkerson and Cathy McBroom, the two brave women who finally came forward, after years of abuse, to testify against a federal judge who was a raging alcoholic and a sexual predator who was on the hunt in the federal courthouse for nearly two decades, with nobody, including the security officers, brave enough to protect them and stop that criminal.

It is about the culture of enabling such predators through no accountability of judges, through giving them enormous power with practically no checks on that power, that made them kings in their particular area, with a feeling of entitlement to use their employees as sex slaves, and their position as the source of extra money, favors from lawyers and free entertainment, including forced sex with employees.

Judge Kent did not apologize to the two victims of his sex crimes, even at sentencing.  He reportedly apologized to his friends and family, but not to his victims.  That was, after, for years, he used his position of power, his giant height and considerable weight to physically overpower, intimidate and sexually assault his employees.

During his judgeship, Judge Kent was 6'4" and 260 pounds, enough to overpower any average-size female employee.

Judge Kent was the only Article III (Congress-appointed) judge in a federal courthouse in Galverston, Texas.

One of the employees he sexually harassed for years, has been picked out of an over a hundred applicants for the job as a the judge's case/docket manager.

This is one of many cases of judges-as-sexual-predators that I've read.

They are all the same - about dishonest men with a lot of power who impose their sexual attentions upon their helpless employees and who blame them and call them prostitutes (a ruder word, actually) when they are exposed.

It is the same situation where the victim feels helpless, when everybody around her "look the other way" or outright advise her not to do anything and try to "stay away" or transfer and shut up - but never confront the judge who can make the victim's life miserable, spread rumors against her and make her unemployable - as Judge Kent tried to do to his case manager, Judge Kent even had his "loyal employees" testify against the victim saying that she was flirting with the judge herself.

There also is the same situation where attorneys are afraid to take on a case representing a victim against a judge - fearing retaliation from the judge and ruination of their practice, career and livelihood.

There also is the routine discipline-as-slap-on-the-wrist - as the 5th Circuit did with Judge Kent (the 5th Circuit did it again in 2015 with another sexual predator, Judge Walter Smith, giving him a year-long lighter caseload as a reward of his drunkenness on the job, stalking and sexual harassment of employees for over 18 years).  The attorney who finally agreed to represent the victim of Judge Kent - pro bono - told her reportedly that the system of judicial discipline is built in order to protect the judge, and nothing she testifies about will result in anything but superficial discipline, and the prediction was true.

Then there is the fear where witnesses refused to talk to the investigator the victim's attorney hired to re-interview all people interviewed by the 5th Circuit.

Then, the victim was made a pariah in courthouses when people who knew her walked past her with eyes glued to the floor.

The interesting point about Judge Kent is that the abuse of power through sexual harassment of employees went hand-in-hand with abuse of power as a judge, through favoritism of "certain lawyers" in decisions and settlement negotiations.   There were no investigation as to that favoritism though because it was "related to litigation", and thus outside of the scope of discipline under the Judicial Disability Act.

Instead, it had to be handled through criminal proceedings when federal investigators (a great credit goes to them in this story) allowed the case to go to the grand jury.

"Besides presenting Cathy’s claims about his purported abuse, they presented the jurors with allegations that Kent had accepted but failed to report gifts from lawyers and that he had sold his Galveston home for a tidy profit in a deal arranged by a lawyer who had dozens of cases in his court."


Yet, the judge was not convicted of corruption.  Had he been convicted of corruption - same as in the "Kids for Cash" scandal in Pennsylvania, he would have had to serve 20 or more years in prison.  So he was saved by the system.  Where state corrupt judges went to prison for nearly 30 years, a federal judge was home with his family within 2 years.

The 5th Circuit apparently refused to address Judge Kent's corruption and fixing cases (favoritism to lawyers, likely to lawyers who gave him unreported gifts), thus enabling it to continue for years.


Judge Kent was indicted, and at his arraignment he, reportedly: At his arraignment, in his usual booming voice, he announced that he was “absolutely, unequivocally not guilty” and declared that he would bring a “horde of witnesses” to fight such “flagrant, scurrilous” charges".

That is not what he finally told the U.S. House - after he pled guilty in criminal court with admission of non-consensual sexual conduct with an employee:


Perhaps I was attempting to meet an unfilled need for affection.

The whole sordid story reads like an 18th century novel where a lord made advances to a maid and cast her out in the street accusing her of seducing him once the results of his "affections" started to show.

The amended indictment against Judge Kent in 2009 "accused him of forcing this employee to repeatedly “engage in a sexual act”—including oral sex—and of using his hands to “penetrate or attempt to penetrate” her. 

And, the lawyer who was involved in the scheme-of-favoritism with the judge appeared to be a very good witness for the feds;  based on his testimony the second victim of sexual misconduct was subpoenaed - a point for future investigators of similar crimes, which, I am sure, abound given the impunity of federal judges and the complete lack of accountability for anything they do, even criminal.

Of course that witness was initially intimidated by Judge Kent to prevent her from providing similar testimony to the 5th Circuit in his disciplinary investigation.

Judge Kent was reportedly trying to tamper even with the subpoenaed witness against him before the grand jury proceeding, visiting her at home, trying to convince her to stick to her prior testimony that nothing other than "trying to kiss" really happened: "we need to circle the wagons. Everything’s going to be fine. I don’t want you to worry.”

And, Judge Kent used yet another court employee to try to tamper with that same 2nd victim to prevent her from testifying having her call the victim, tell her that she can't believe that she turned on the judge, and saying that judge will kill himself if she testifies - and that, after the judge's attorney thoroughly defames the victim in the press claiming that the relationship was consensual, the judge did not reveal it because he was a gentleman, and the victim is not simply trying to save her marriage.

The bottom line:

1) The 5th Circuit gave the sexual predator of many years, with many victims, only a reprimand and a 4-months leave of absence. 

2) After all the troubles with federal criminal indictment, the sexual predator-judge was allowed to plead guilty to a non-sexual crime, which allowed him not to register as a sex offender, a boon that would not have been provided to him, I am sure, had he not been a judge.

3) After being a sexual predator, with multiple victims, for nearly 18 years, "King Kent" served only 2 years in prison and is back at home with his family, another boon which a sex offender with Kent's history would not have been given - if he is not a judge.

4) the judge was not convicted of receiving gifts from lawyers, fixing cases (favoritism in decisions), or hiring an attorney who practiced before him, without disclosure of conflict of interest, to get a deal in the sale of his home - selling his judicial position for favors.


Now.

• Favoritism and fixing cases
• Repeated sexual crimes, with claims that nobody will dare to protect the victims - in a federal courthouse
• Security officers whose duty was not only to protect the person of the judge, but to protect any person in that federal court house from coming to harm - looking the other way
• Federal employees "circling the wagons", and even attempting to interfere with grand jury proceedings

For years.

No real discipline.

No real protection for employees.

No policies changed as a result - oh yes, the Galveston court has been shut down, cases transferred to another court.

Attorneys afraid to take the victim's case.


When did it happen that judges in this country - federal judges included - became kings?

When did it happen when the best way to prevent the risk of being sexually assaulted for a woman is not to go to work in a courthouse?

As to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit that enabled further sexual harassment of not one, but three judges - sexual predators in federal district courts in that Circuit, Samuel King, Walter Smith and the one who was never disciplined, even though, according to testimony of a witness, he impregnated an employee  - stay tuned for more.

Judge Samuel Kent was taken off the bench - no thanks to the 5th Circuit who just "reprimanded" a sexual predator, the "drunk giant" as his victims called him at the sentencing, but did not protect the public by removing him from the courthouse.

The other ascertained sexual predator, Judge Walter Smith, is still on the bench in Waco court, and is still allowed to prowl in the courthouse, despite testimony that he is a sex criminal, and is even rewarded for his ordeal of the disciplinary proceedings with a lighter caseload - but the public, the litigants and attorneys and, certainly, the employees, are still exposed to his sexual hunting, and his rage in retaliation for the exposure in the disciplinary proceedings.

The lenient discipline can encourage Judge Smith into more crimes.

Because the courage of the three women, two who took on the sexual predator, Judge Samuel Kent, and one who came forward about sexual crimes of Judge Walter Smith, is an exception rather than the rule in federal employment, given the odds reporters of sexual harassment by judges are facing.

Thus, once again, the best way to prevent the risk of being raped is - not to get employed in the courthouse, where known sexual predators are aplenty, but where nobody will protect you from them.

No money, no salary or benefits are worth it.