THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:
"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.
“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).
“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.
It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.
" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.
"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.
“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.
Saturday, October 3, 2015
Who will prosecute the disciplinary prosecutor - and her counsel?
If sued, these two will invoke some kind of an immunity and will get the lawsuit dismissed.
Immunity is given based on the promise of availability of attorney discipline.
Monica Duffy, at the hearing in Albany before the New York State Statewide Commission on Attorney Discipline, claimed with a straight face that there is no such thing as selective non-prosecution of prosecutors by her disciplinary committee.
Not only that was a lie at that time, because Duffy blocked investigations and prosecutions against herself as a disciplinary prosecutor before making that statement, and that is on my personal knowledge and documentary evidence on file, but now, in view of her newly found frivolous conduct, yet another question arises:
WHO will prosecute disciplinary prosecutor Monica Duffy AND HER ATTORNEY - the New York State Attorney General.
Will they, once again, block a disciplinary complaint against themselves?
Until and unless disciplinary prosecutors - and their powerful attorney, the New York State Attorney General who is defending unconstitutional conduct instead of prosecuting it, as is his job as an elected public official in the State of New York - are treated equally by the disciplinary process and are equally punished for fraud upon the court, frivolous conduct and acts clearly indicating their lack of fitness to practice law, the whole idea of attorney discipline is void of any meaning.
If the most powerful attorneys, who can do the most damage to people, are not reachable by attorney discipline, the whole idea of attorney discipline is just a sham.
That idea was also CLEARLY expressed in my husband's lawsuit Neroni v Zayas that Duffy had dismissed twice at the district court level, and now had it dismissed on the appellate level, WITHOUT REVIEW.
The interesting part is the described fraud DUFFY, LIPPMAN, PETERS and SCHNEIDERMAN do on their taxpayer-paid time, at taxpayers' expense, and pretending that it is for taxpayer's benefit.
It is for your benefit, ladies and gentlemen, that you are defrauded.
One doesn't need to read Orwell nowadays.
Just read the dissonant claims in different forums of the so-called "public servants".
That is SOME double-speak.
Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman turned the New York State Commission for Attorney Discipline into a circus
I obtained it from Pacer, since Mr. Neroni was never served with it, it was served to his old address, while his new address was clearly stated on his filing papers.
The 2nd Circuit, which was supposed to reject this letter as a defective filing because:
- it was not signed;
- it was served to the wrong address
The order was made on September 24, 2015 (the deadline was September 25, 2015), the grace period was until October 1, 2015, the order was mailed to Mr. Neroni on September 26, 2015, cutting his grace period even more, NY law requires to add 5 days to any deadlines from the date of mailing if mailing is by regular mail, Mr. Neroni received the order with a "grace" deadline of October 1, 2015, on October 2, 2015.
In the letter of September 21, 2015 that was not signed by LIPPMAN's, PETER's and DUFFY's attorney, and which was deliberately sent to the wrong address, so that Mr. Neroni would not receive it on time to respond to it, LIPPMAN, PETERS and DUFFY claimed that the problem with Mr. Neroni's lawsuit was that it was "rambling and incoherent", and LIPPMAN, PETERS and DUFFY were against giving Mr. Neroni an opportunity to adequately present all issues he needed to present in the appeal, including the inconsistency of LIPPMAN's PETER's and DUFFY's position as the creator (LIPPMAN) and members (PETER's counsel and deputy clerk; DUFFY) in the New York Statewide Commission for Attorney Discipline.
Mr. Neroni sent the appellant brief in order to meet the deadline, without knowledge of such opposition, on September 23, 2015.
A day after Mr. Neroni has sent his appeal, and on the same day when LIPPMAN, PETERS and DUFFY received an order of conditional dismissal of Mr. Neroni's appeal by an instant electronic notification, on September 24, 2015, Defendants DUFFY and two employees of Defendant PETERS's court, her counsel and deputy clerk, now as members of the Commission on Attorney Discipline, provided a Report and Recommendations to Defendant LIPPMAN, creator of the Commission.
In the Report, Defendant DUFFY and employees of Defendant PETER's court freely borrowed ideas from the allegedly "rambling and incoherent" Neroni v Zayas (a constitutional challenge that they had dismissed in the district court and continued to oppose in the 2nd Circuit), and recommended to Defendant LIPPMAN the same reforms that Defendants LIPPMAN, PETERS and DUFFY were opposing and obtained two dismissals at the trial level and a conditional dismissal through bad faith failure to properly serve Mr. Neroni, at the appellate level.
So, ideas in Mr. Neroni's lawsuit were comprehensible enough in order to borrow them and present them to the public as the Commission's own conclusions, yet, members of the Commission and the Commission's creator, at the same time, opposed those same ideas expressed as challenges in a civil rights lawsuit.
So, Mr. Neroni's challenges in the lawsuit filed 2.5 years ago were "rambling and incomprehensible" to sustain a lawsuit, but were perfectly comprehensible to steal those ideas and defraud the public by claiming that the very same actors that fight against those same changes, "recommend" to bring about those same changes they fight.
For any mere mortal such conduct in litigation is characterized as frivolous and sanctionable.
Apparently, for members of the government and their counsel, New York State Attorney General (who was a Defendant in the case) and his assistants, it is the expected behavior.
What a circus.
Thursday, October 1, 2015
A challenge to constitutionality of attorney regulation in New York was filed on the basis of the final report of the New York Statewide Commission for Attorney Discipline
The motion was partially supported by transcripts of hearings and the final report of the New York Statewide Commission for Attorney Discipline.
The full copy of the motion will be published in the morning.
New York Judge John Hall: a prosecutor's duty is to zealously represent the complainant
The name of this winner is Judge John Hall of Warren County/Surogate's Court.
His statement is dating back to 2006, so I wonder how many convictions he approved since then with such a mentality.
Judge Hall stated, in his decision in 2006, while overturning a conviction of a local publisher, because the special prosecutor actually acknowledged that what the publisher did was constitutionally protected free speech, that such "conduct" of special prosecutor raises questions as to the special prosecutor's ability to be a special prosecutor, because, in Judge Hall's view, the duty of a prosecutor is to zealously represent the complainant.
The statement of Judge Hall in his decision regarding the special prosecutor has triggered a "petition drive" in the community to have the special prosecutor removed, because she did not zealously serve the complainants.
Yet, the courageous - and honest - special prosecutor Mary Moule responded to that drive that she is not stepping down, there is no basis for removal and that her "position on behalf of the people (of the state of New York) has not changed".
When a judge presiding over a criminal court says what Judge John Hall said in 2006, he should have been IMMEDIATELY removed from office, because what he considers as the DUTY of a criminal prosecutor, is grounds for REMOVAL of a prosecutor - if the prosecutor thinks he or she represents a "complainant" instead of the People of the State of New York.
Was he removed from office?
Obviously, not, because he is still listed as County/Surrogate's Court judge for Warren County.
Moreover, he was appointed by another winner, Jonathan Lippman (now the Chief Administrative Judge for the State of New York), who was then Chief Administrative Judge of the State of New York, for a position of Acting Supreme Court Justice.
And - guess what - he is the current president of the Warren County Bar Association, even though he is prohibited - by the State Constitution - to practice law since he has first come to the bench in 2004.
Here is Judge Hall with all of his credentials I wrote about above, as reported on the site of New York State Court Administration.
Taylor v. United States, 413 F.2d 1095, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
And the question remains - why didn't the judicial system get rid of Judge Hall after his bad-mouthing of a criminal prosecutor who DID HER DUTY in refusing to support unconstitutional charges and stating on record that her duty is to zealously represent the complainant and her stand in opposition to continuing an unconstitutional charge somehow makes her unfit for her position - which triggered a campaign of harassment of the prosecutor by the locals.
In fact, if Judge Hall overturned the conviction, he had absolutely no business to engage in prosecutor-bashing because she deemed the charge (that she inherited from a prior prosecutor) unconstitutional.
There is no statute of limitation on judicial discipline.
Will Judge Hall be disciplined now?
Will criminal cases where he presided be scrutinized now?
What is improper in Washington is business as usual in New York - on retaliation against whistleblowers of judicial misconduct
Yet, what New York State refuses to address in 2015, was already addressed by the State of Washington 5 years ago, in 2010.
In 2010 the Washington State Supreme Court has issued a policy where it specifically prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers of judicial misconduct.
Yet, under the law of precedent and equal protection, and pursuant to 1st Amendment, this policy can certainly be used as evidence that the State Court system of the State of Washington is at least aware that retaliation for complaints against judges exists and declared its readiness to fight it at least as against its own employees.
Once again, I do not know how well the policy is implemented, but at least it exists, which means, the court system at least acknowledged that retaliation for such whistleblowing exists, too.
In New York, the Commission's Report reflects no effort of the Commission to address the problem.
New York State court continue to endorse, through affirmation of sanctions imposed by the challenged judges upon their challengers for making motions to recuse, that New York court system refuses to acknowledge that such a situation is completely improper and shows, instead of the state attempting to remedy the situation, the state endorsing such retaliation.
The ultimate endorsement by the state of such retaliation is law license revocation of attorney critics, like it was done to George Sassower and Doris Sassower, as it is continued to be done today, when a suspended attorney was denied reinstatement because of his testimony to the Moreland Commission on corruption in the judiciary, which testimony (described by an independent source here) was used against him by the 3rd Department Committee and Court (both members of the Commission) as evidence of his alleged unfitness to practice law.
Here is how Leon Koziol describes what happened to him:
Quote
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All of these three attorneys (George Sassower, Doris Sassower, Leon Koziol) were disbarred, suspended or denied suspension for providing a BENEFIT to the public, for protecting the public's right to the integrity of the court system.
The Commission refused to ask the courts to introduce such an anti-retaliation policy for whistleblowers of judicial misconduct, or to raise the issue that attorney disciplinary system is being used as a tool of retaliation.
Why?
Because, as Leon Koziol mentions, the 3rd Department court and the 3rd Department committee were ENGAGED in such retaliation.
The 3rd Department and its disciplinary committee were also MEMBERS of the Commission allegedly attempting to verify how to make these proceedings more fair.
The main point of fairness would have been to dismiss them from their job and prosecute them criminally for witness tampering and intimidation.
Their attorneys resigned for committing other misconduct, falsifying time sheets as to their use of taxpayers' money - and escaped attorney discipline from the committee employees of which they were.
See an article here describes how time sheets of public employees CAN be falsified, because the matter were never made public, even though it is a matter of public concern.
See an article from 2014 stating the following:
"It appears that COPS [3rd Department disciplinary committee - T.N.] is in fact little more than a protective shield for attorneys, shielded from disciplinary action by their fellow attorneys in the department. Complaints filed with COPS by the public seem to be placed in a file and six months later, are summarily dismissed".
The author of the article was not invited to testify before the Commission on this issue of public concern - because the COPS were members of the Commission, an irreconcilable conflict of interest for participating in the Commission.
Not for all attorneys, of course, only for well-connected ones.
So, of course, the Commission will not try to whip its own butt by asking courts to:
- provide for introduction of special investigators and prosecutors to prosecute disciplinary prosecutors for attorney misconduct - which is rampant and unaddressed;
- provide for a policy to introduce the general policy that challenges to judicial integrity raised in pleadings or in public forums, may not be used as basis of retaliation, and as attorney discipline as a specific point.
After all, any such policies that a Commission members would recommend, could be turned against Commission members.
That's why reasonable citizenry does not appoint foxes to preside over the chicken coup in order to decide how to protect chickens better.
Foxes do that instead on behalf of the citizenry.
The gap in the Report of New York Statewide Commission for Attorney discipline - the use of disciplinary process as a tool of retaliation for whistleblowing, and whitewashing of well-connected attorneys not addressed
One important issue is prominently missing from the Report, which was present during the hearings - protection of whistleblowers of judicial misconduct from the use of attorney discipline as a tool of revenge.
Attempts to punish attorneys for criticism of the judiciary is not the invention of the State of New York.
Such attempts were made for over a century.
In fact, I made it a point to put a quote from a 1880 Pennsylvania case attempting to punish an attorney for criticizing the judiciary on top of this blog, and it appears on top of every blog post.
I will repeat the quote here:
"“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880)."
That was a noble thought expressed by an honest judge in the State of Pennsylvania 135 (ONE HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE) years ago.
One hundred and thirty five years down the road, the following is happening in all states of the United States:
- attorneys are a licensed profession;
- licensing of attorneys, an executive function, is in the hands of the judiciary (when all other occupational licenses are regulated by the executive branch), even when, as the quote says, attorneys "have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment" as to judicial integrity or misconduct - and must ensure, on behalf of their clients, their clients' constitutional right to a fair and impartial adjudication, pointing out issues of judicial bias and misconduct;
- the judiciary introduced specific rules of discipline against attorneys making "false statements" against judges or even judicial candidates (thus impairing attorney free speech to educate voters during judicial elections), and
- under these rules, all statements against criticizing judges are considered false; and
- attorneys are not entitled to 1st Amendment protection for criticism of judges
Here are FOUR very detailed articles of Margaret Tarkington, a law professor and an "order of coif" law school graduate (all "A"s throughout law school - a VERY rare thing)
I was punished for criticizing the judiciary in pleadings despite the references to scholarly articles supporting my position.
And I am not unique in that - unfortunately - I am part of a whole class of lawyers sanctioned and expelled (well, I am not expelled yet, but I am on the verge of it) from the legal profession for doing their jobs and trying to ensure for their clients a right for fair and impartial adjudication.
- making motions to recuse - where the challenged judge sanctions you for "harassing the judge", which the judge, of course, cannot do because there is a clear due process rule that a judge cannot sit in judgment of his own case, and when a judge issues a claim of harassment of himself, the judge operates as a
- complaining witness
- prosecutor
- testifying witness
- judge and jury
- for suing that same judge in another action - I was sanctioned by Judge James Tormey for suing him in federal court, on specific request of my opponent, attorney Jonathan S. Follender of Arkville, New York, who is a local town justice and thus his request to the member of his brotherhood had more weight than some puny constitutional restraints
- three sanctions imposed upon me by a judge;
- immediately after I sued that judge on behalf of a client for misconduct in and out of court proceedings
When the New York State Statewide Commission for Attorney Discipline was formed in February of this year, one of its declared goals was to verify how to make attorney discipline more fair.
A lot was said in the three public hearings in front of the Commission about dismissals of most of the complaints against attorneys.
A lot was said about non-prosecution of prosecutors involved in wrongful convictions.
There were statements by two witnesses - Elena Sassower and Alton Maddox, pointing out the issue of retaliation against attorneys for their professional activity.
Alton Maddox said in his testimony in the New York City public hearing:
This is what witness Elena Sassower has said in the same hearing:
- Doris Sassower was disbarred for challenging improprieties in judicial elections in New York State;
- Elena Sassower was put in prison for opposing the federal judicial nomination of a judge who self-servingly first ruled that such cross-endorsements are legal, and then used those cross-endorsements in his own re-election campaign;
- and judges who continue to regulate the legal profession - and who created the Commission, allegedly to make sure how to make attorney discipline "more fair", continue to use the system of cross-endorsement to get to the bench
- Judge Kahn has been appointed and continues to "serve" on the federal bench, and continues to engage in self-serving acts - like participating in a secret-membership organization The American Inns of Court that provides benefits to judges while its members appear in front of those judges in court
- perpetrators of attorney misconduct will remain in power;
- whistleblowers of official misconduct will be stripped of their livelihood, disbarred, jailed, abused in jail and driven into bankruptcy;
- attorneys will remain intimidated to speak out against judicial corruption, and
- the public will continue to be screwed in the corrupt courts, without any possibility of independent court representation
Are U.S. Supreme Court justices denying constitutional appeals in death penalty cases because of the threat of impeachment from Congress?
Richard Glossip was not executed only because the Oklahoma Governor issued a last-minute stay of execution for 37 days, exclusively because the Oklahoma Department of Corrections did not have the "right" drug for execution.
There was, reportedly, a lone dissenter as to denials of appeals by the U.S. Supreme Court - justice Stephen Breyer.
That is, Justice Stephen Breyer who recently published a book "The Courts and the World" where he discusses - at least somewhat - the death penalty and why the U.S. Supreme Court is not abolishing it.
A lot is said in this country about the necessity of judicial independence.
The completely insane concept of absolute judicial immunity for MALICIOUS and CORRUPT acts on the bench was introduced and enforced by all courts in this country allegedly because of the need to protect independence of judicial decisions.
From how the U.S. Supreme Court rules, it often seems that the U.S. Supreme Court IS the ultimate government in the United States and fears for nothing - there is no discipline of such judges, no punishment for failure to recuse, and there is no history that a U.S. Supreme Court justice was ever impeached.
Yet, in his book "The Courts and the World", the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer states at the Location 5161 (I have a Kindle version) the following:
"Seventy-four members of Congress sponsored
legislation in 2004 stating 'that judicial determinations
regarding the meaning of the laws of the United
States should not be based in whole or in part
on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of
foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments,
laws, or pronouncements ... inform an understanding
of the original meaning of the laws of the United
States",
and that the "sponsoring member of the House said that were the bill to become law, judges who deliberately violated it might 'subject themselves to the ultimate remedy which would be impeachment".
The statement that is quoted is the Statement of Rep. Nadler quoting Rep. Feeney on the "Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H. Res. 568 before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004), footnote 12 in Judge Stephen Breyer's book.
It is very obvious that prohibiting judges to rely upon foreign law in making their judicial decisions is undermining their independence, SEVERELY so when a threat of impeachment is clearly on the table for the contents of judicial decisions.
It is also very obvious that such law, if passed by the U.S. Congress, may be very well in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution that all legislators are sworn to uphold, because the Supremacy Clause includes International Treaties where the United States participates, and many foreign decisions may be based on the spirit, if not the letter of such Treaties.
Yet, the threat of impeachment for relying on what the world thinks of the shifts in the law - including the shifts in what is deemed by the international legal community basic human rights - is there.
Judges of the U.S. Supreme Court are appointed for life, it is a well-paid and prestigious job, and being booted off the U.S. Supreme Court would be the ultimate disgrace for any respectable judge.
A lot of arguments for abolition of the death penalty in the United States are based specifically on the concept that death penalty has been long abolished in other civilized countries, or, rather, in civilized countries, period, because the United States cannot call itself a civilized country while continuing to act as a serial killer in order to show that killing is wrong.
So, when you are seeing that the U.S. Supreme Court - once again - denied a death penalty appeal, that can be because judicial independence of that court is undermined by the death penalty lobby in the U.S. legislature, the legislature that does not care to introduce bills to abolish absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench, but would impeach a judge for bringing the state of human rights in the United States up to par with what it is in the international legal community.
And - when judges still dissent and vote to grant such an appeal, like Stephen Breyer did yesterday for Richard Glossip, a lonely dissent, I must stay, that means some courage, even if Stephen Breyer does not consistently dissent on all denials of death penalty appeals.