The much claimed judicial independence is hailed as a reason for lifetime tenure of federal judges.
Judges are claimed to be independent of politics.
Yet, judges nominated by Democratic presidents, as well as judges nominated by Republican presidents, linger in office without desired retirement to ensure that their successor will be nominated by a president of the same party that nominated them. That does not seem as being far away from politics to me.
Having as long-time friends high-ranking government officials, as Judge Antonin Scalia claimed the U.S. Supreme Court justices have a history of having, also does not put judges away from politics.
Being "free from political pressure" translates in everyday English as not having to re-run for judicial office.
Yet, judges come to that judicial office well advanced in age, at or long after 50 years of age. At this age, lawyers are usually very well set in their careers and already generated enough income and have enough savings to retire comfortably, judicial election or appointment or not.
So, talking about judicial independence in terms of being free from judicial elections, in application to representatives of the very-well paid legal profession (and majority of judges are not paupers when coming to the bench, they are usually either successful governmental officials or successful law professors) is not really forthcoming.
What is also taken out of the consideration of the so-called judicial independence is that at the time judges usually come to the U.S. Supreme Court bench (and federal bench), they usually have kids of college age at the least.
Those kids most often follow in the path of the judge-parent.
They need to make their own career in law, and these children may and do become a real danger to judicial independence of their parents who are life-tenured judges.
Exercise your "judicial discretion" my way - and I will appoint your child to a prestigious and well-paying position, a stepping stone for the child's further legal and political career.
And judge Antonin Scalia veered that way.
He decided Bush v Gore for Bush, where Bush's running mate Dick Cheney was Scalia's longtime friend.
And Scalia's son was nearly immediately appointed into the Department of Labor.
Judges have children.
They have friends, siblings, in-laws and friends.
All of them want their careers to be furthered.
Judges, such as Antonin Scalia, believe that recusing from cases of friends is impracticable, as it will stall the work of the U.S. Supreme Court.
So, they sit on cases of their friends.
And rule for their friends.
And, since their friends may be in the U.S. legislature, the U.S. legislature does not impeach, and does not enact rules that would stop this corruption.
And judges write their own rules of judicial conduct - and enforce them in their own closed circles, or rather, magnanimously decide that there is no misconduct because "all U.S. Supreme Court judges had as friends high-ranking government officials", as Scalia said.
Judges attend duck-hunting trips with friends who are parties in front of them.
Judges attend Christmas parties, in other words, are wined and dined, by parties in front of them.
And they can be doing it for a lifetime - because there is life tenure.
For that reason, I believe, life tenure should be replaced, by constitutional amendment, to 2-year terms maximum.
And the U.S. Supreme Court should be expanded to 200 to 250 judges - enough to serve the growing population and caseload in this country's courts. 9 judges, most of them past the usual retirement age, many of them well past that age, to serve 13 circuits and 50 states as the court of original jurisdiction and the ultimate appellate court from state and federal courts is simply grossly inadequate.
This country has a large supply of brilliant men and women who can serve as Supreme Court justices. Let them serve. Let them not have the time get entrenched with their "good friends" in the government, undermining the "checks and balances" principles upon which this country is founded.
Let them not have the time to build their children's careers upon favors given to their "longtime friends".
And let's address our respective U.S. Senators to introduce laws to make judges really accountable for corruption and impropriety in office - because the "self-regulating" judiciary, as it exists now is - no, not a joke, it is a tyranny that can cost this country a lot of turmoil and blood to change, if it is not changed radically, peacefully, through lawful process - and soon.
Shorter terms in office and larger number of justices will prevent the most severe cases of corruption, nepotism and cronyism.
Voters should also push their U.S. Senators and representatives in Congress to introduce and enact legislation preventing employment of family members of federal judges in other branches of federal government, vaster disclosures of income by federal judges, including non-monetary gifts like free trips and dinner invitations, and significant and well-defined punishments for judges for failure to disclose conflicts of interest, such as presiding over cases where a party or attorney for a party is a family member or friend of a judge.
Without such drastic changes we will be where we are - in a mess where ex parte communications of Antonin Scalia during hunting trips with a friend who is a party in litigation, or promotion of Judge Scalia's son's career at the expense of the American public after the father put a particular president on the throne.
Quid pro quo in the judiciary should end, soon.
Sunday, July 19, 2015
On shining integrity of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia - "those **** do not even bother to pretend anymore, do they?"
Justice Antonin Scalia argued constitutionality, propriety, reliance on history and tradition in the same sex marriage case.
What he is doing in his own practice though, appears to be too much of the wrong "family tradition" - nepotism and cronyism, and too little due process that Justice Scalia apparently hates.
Just some facts. I am sure there are others...
In 2000 Antonin Scalia, as part of the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, decides the case Bush v Gore, handing over the presidency to George Bush-the-son.
The very next year, in 2001, Antonin Scalia's son Eugene was appointed by President Bush-the-son to be a chief legal officer in the U.S. Department of Labor.
To nominate Judge Antonin Scalia's son George Bush used a "back-door procedure" bypassing the U.S. Senate.
Nobody is seeing anything corrupt here, right?
The more - the merrier.
In 2004 Antonin Scalia had a duck hunting trip with his "longtime friend" Dick Cheney, Vice-President to - guess who - President Bush whom Antonin Scalia put on the throne.
This little issue that he was the "longtime friend" of part of the presidential team did not cause Scalia to recuse in 2000 in Bush v Gore. Antonin Scalia reportedly angrily defended his right to go on a hunting trip with a litigant in front of him (and a longtime friend, which should have caused his recusal to begin with). His justification? Other justices actually were at Cheney's home at Christmas time...
In 2005, Justice Scalia lost his bid for the position of the Chief Judge of the U.S. Supreme Court because of "ethical problems" involving not in small part the duck-hunting trip with Cheney.
The article interlinked above is from January of 2005. In September of 2005 John Roberts was appointed as a judge and selected as a Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Scalia did not stop his "ethical problems" at that. Since there was at that point nothing to lose, and nothing to gain by "being good", he persisted in them.
In 2006, Scalia did not recuse from the case where his son Eugene Scalia's law firm argued a case in front of him, Wal-Mart v. Maryland.
Antonin Scalia did not disqualify himself despite calls from civil rights organizations to do so, moreover, he cast a decisive vote for his son's client.
As succintly summarized by an anonymous commentator on the web, "these f**kers don't even bother to pretend anymore, do they"?
What he is doing in his own practice though, appears to be too much of the wrong "family tradition" - nepotism and cronyism, and too little due process that Justice Scalia apparently hates.
Just some facts. I am sure there are others...
In 2000 Antonin Scalia, as part of the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, decides the case Bush v Gore, handing over the presidency to George Bush-the-son.
The very next year, in 2001, Antonin Scalia's son Eugene was appointed by President Bush-the-son to be a chief legal officer in the U.S. Department of Labor.
To nominate Judge Antonin Scalia's son George Bush used a "back-door procedure" bypassing the U.S. Senate.
Nobody is seeing anything corrupt here, right?
The more - the merrier.
In 2004 Antonin Scalia had a duck hunting trip with his "longtime friend" Dick Cheney, Vice-President to - guess who - President Bush whom Antonin Scalia put on the throne.
This little issue that he was the "longtime friend" of part of the presidential team did not cause Scalia to recuse in 2000 in Bush v Gore. Antonin Scalia reportedly angrily defended his right to go on a hunting trip with a litigant in front of him (and a longtime friend, which should have caused his recusal to begin with). His justification? Other justices actually were at Cheney's home at Christmas time...
In 2005, Justice Scalia lost his bid for the position of the Chief Judge of the U.S. Supreme Court because of "ethical problems" involving not in small part the duck-hunting trip with Cheney.
The article interlinked above is from January of 2005. In September of 2005 John Roberts was appointed as a judge and selected as a Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Scalia did not stop his "ethical problems" at that. Since there was at that point nothing to lose, and nothing to gain by "being good", he persisted in them.
In 2006, Scalia did not recuse from the case where his son Eugene Scalia's law firm argued a case in front of him, Wal-Mart v. Maryland.
Antonin Scalia did not disqualify himself despite calls from civil rights organizations to do so, moreover, he cast a decisive vote for his son's client.
As succintly summarized by an anonymous commentator on the web, "these f**kers don't even bother to pretend anymore, do they"?
Public hearings are announced by the Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline - coincidentally, during vacation months
I was alerted today of the announcement that the new New York Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline is going to hold public (allegedly) hearings on dates provided below:
My source, an extremely reliable source, indicated to me that the person tried to contact the New York State Court Administration and the Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline directly to verify how public the meetings are going to be and exactly what is the procedure of being selected for testimony and as to written submission, and that the NYS Court Administration or the Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline did not have coherent answers to these questions.
The date of announcement (June 23, 2015) and the dates of the hearings with testimony BY INVITATION ONLY (July 28, 2015, in a month), August 4, 2015 and August 11, 2015, are suspect to me because:
(1) one month is not enough to prepare testimony on topics as important as attorney misconduct, attorney discipline for protection of the public, and how efficient that protection of the public works (or, on the case of the State of New York, does not work). Such testimony, if undertaken seriously, must rely upon documentary evidence, and such evidence often needs to be pulled from archives, either personal archives that need time to go through, or from public archives, and people need to put together time, money and effort to obtain copies of documents from such archives, where people serving the archives may be on vacations at this time of year. My conclusion - the timing appears to be scheduled intentionally in order to have less people coming forward with testimony or written submissions, and that begs the next question - why?
(2) Scheduling the "public hearings" with only a month's advance and in the middle of vacation time, once again, appears to show the public that the "public hearings" are "for show" only, and are insignificant. Significant events are not treated in such a casual way.
(3) Identity of the Commission members, about which I already blogged here, indicates that practically all of the members of the Commission are "insiders" of the system of provision of legal services who are dependent on that system for their financial well-being. To expect for some cardinal changes from inside players is, at the very best, naive.
(4) Testimony "by invitation" is what? What is the criterion of who is going to be allowed to testify? And why people are given only 10 minutes for the testimony where they have to cram a story of a lifetime into those 10 minutes?
(5) The length of hours assigned to the so-called public hearing is laughable. It is:
2 hours around lunch time - from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. in Albany - so, the maximum to be heard are 12 people (120 minutes, 10 minute testimony each), and that is not going to happen because some time will be eaten up on procedural issues at the beginning, during and at the conclusion of the "public hearings";
4 hours around lunch time in Buffalo, NY - from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m.;
2 hours around lunch time in New York City, NY - from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m.
It appears that the whole idea of "public hearings" is to appease the public that something was done, but it is clear that nothing serious can be accomplished with such a "public hearing" where less than 50 people can picked by the Commission itself can testify not more than 10 minutes each - which, realistically, may be completely inadequate time to carry through their story and their message for any meaningful changes to be made based on that testimony.
(6) People on the Committee, such as, for example, Chief attorney for the 3rd Department disciplinary committee Monica Duffy and Samantha Holbrook, are at the root of the problem -
It is to appeal to the ultimate fox that the henhouse is not guarded properly.
By the way, an appeal is at this time pending of the decision of federal Judge Lawrence Kahn to dismiss a federal civil rights lawsuit against Monica Duffy for blocking access to disciplinary file and against Monica Duffy's employee for unlawful investigation of a former attorney for fake reasons. The dismissal was on grounds having nothing to do with the merits of the case.
Moreover, Monica Duffy and Samantha Holbrook dismissed several complaints against themselves and attorneys working for their disciplinary Committee or members of the Committee - imagine if you would be able to investigate and decide not to prosecute your beloved self.
So, these members of the Commission possess overwhelming integrity. I can hold my breath to read what they will produce as a report on the "public" hearings.
Christopher Lindquist, another member of the Committee, participated in attorney misconduct in, being a court attorney, giving legal advice to the disciplinary prosecutors and - guess what - blocking public access to court records and blocking an attorney (me) from receiving a - guess what - public hearing that I was entitled to by law.
Lindquist is yet another shinig star on the Commission from whom public can expect great accomplishments as a result of these public hearings.
(7) Consumers of legal services who are supposed to be protected by attorney discipline, are not represented on the Commission, instead those who perpetrate misconduct are the "reviewers".
My position as to "what needs to be done" with attorney disciplinary system in New York is clear - to declare it unconstitutional, to prohibit the government to control the livelihood of advocates of the public who challenge misconduct of government officials, in other words - to cancel the attorney licensing system, and to have attorneys disciplined as other professionals are disciplined - through lawsuits.
There are enough causes of action to do that - for malpractice, for breach of contract, for breach of fiduciary duty, for breach of privacy etc.
The whole reason why this so-called Commission was created was because Lippman was afraid for his guts when his friend Silver was indicted on federal charges and wanted to do something to deflect attention from his "badness" into his newly found alleged "goodness".
Well, I for one will never believe in the "goodness" of what Lippman creates, and especially when it considers the already crumbling legal profession.
Public hearings. Reviewed by the main perpetrators of the problem that the public cannot afford legal representation and why rampant attorney misconduct of politically connected attorneys (especially those connected to the judiciary) remains uncontrolled - for decades.
It is clear that these hearings will not and do not intend to resolve the main problem - regulation of the legal profession by the judiciary which judiciary uses that regulation to undermine the American democracy, as the tool of control and of oppression and retaliation against attorneys who challenge judicial misconduct, misconduct of politically connected attorneys and of attorneys working for the government and who are the real protectors of the public.
To think that perpetrators of misconduct (such as Duffy, Holbrook and Lindquist) will investigate, prosecute and provide an EFFICIENT and FAIR solution to the problem they created...
Not in real life.
One last thing I wanted to say.
With all said above, I encourage the public to appear and tell their stories, and to demand that attorney discipline is fair. Why? Because fairness of attorney discipline directly relates to availability of legal defense, especially to unpopular clients, such as criminal defendants and civil rights plaintiffs.
If you remain silent, if you, the public, the People, the sovereign, do not demand accountability as to how attorney discipline is imposed, mainly upon civil rights attorneys, criminal defense attorneys and those attorneys who dare to challenge judicial misconduct for the sake of you, the people - do not ask why attorneys are unwilling to make motions to recuse when you need it, and why they refuse to take on cases involving "sensitive issues" against the government or "well connected" opponents and attorneys.
Because your attorneys are unprotected from judicial retaliation, because they can lose their livelihood by protecting you and because you, the sovereign did nothing to stop that from happening.
Attending such supposedly public hearings will also be valuable in showing to the attending public why attorney discipline by attorneys and judges will never produce a fair result - not for disciplined attorneys, not for the public whose interests the disciplinary proceedings are supposed to address. Too many self-serving interests are involved for proceedings where the public is not allowed a meaningful participation, to be fair.
My source, an extremely reliable source, indicated to me that the person tried to contact the New York State Court Administration and the Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline directly to verify how public the meetings are going to be and exactly what is the procedure of being selected for testimony and as to written submission, and that the NYS Court Administration or the Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline did not have coherent answers to these questions.
The date of announcement (June 23, 2015) and the dates of the hearings with testimony BY INVITATION ONLY (July 28, 2015, in a month), August 4, 2015 and August 11, 2015, are suspect to me because:
(1) one month is not enough to prepare testimony on topics as important as attorney misconduct, attorney discipline for protection of the public, and how efficient that protection of the public works (or, on the case of the State of New York, does not work). Such testimony, if undertaken seriously, must rely upon documentary evidence, and such evidence often needs to be pulled from archives, either personal archives that need time to go through, or from public archives, and people need to put together time, money and effort to obtain copies of documents from such archives, where people serving the archives may be on vacations at this time of year. My conclusion - the timing appears to be scheduled intentionally in order to have less people coming forward with testimony or written submissions, and that begs the next question - why?
(2) Scheduling the "public hearings" with only a month's advance and in the middle of vacation time, once again, appears to show the public that the "public hearings" are "for show" only, and are insignificant. Significant events are not treated in such a casual way.
(3) Identity of the Commission members, about which I already blogged here, indicates that practically all of the members of the Commission are "insiders" of the system of provision of legal services who are dependent on that system for their financial well-being. To expect for some cardinal changes from inside players is, at the very best, naive.
(4) Testimony "by invitation" is what? What is the criterion of who is going to be allowed to testify? And why people are given only 10 minutes for the testimony where they have to cram a story of a lifetime into those 10 minutes?
(5) The length of hours assigned to the so-called public hearing is laughable. It is:
2 hours around lunch time - from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. in Albany - so, the maximum to be heard are 12 people (120 minutes, 10 minute testimony each), and that is not going to happen because some time will be eaten up on procedural issues at the beginning, during and at the conclusion of the "public hearings";
4 hours around lunch time in Buffalo, NY - from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m.;
2 hours around lunch time in New York City, NY - from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m.
It appears that the whole idea of "public hearings" is to appease the public that something was done, but it is clear that nothing serious can be accomplished with such a "public hearing" where less than 50 people can picked by the Commission itself can testify not more than 10 minutes each - which, realistically, may be completely inadequate time to carry through their story and their message for any meaningful changes to be made based on that testimony.
(6) People on the Committee, such as, for example, Chief attorney for the 3rd Department disciplinary committee Monica Duffy and Samantha Holbrook, are at the root of the problem -
- it is Monica Duffy and Samantha Holbrook who participate in tossing complaints against politically connected attorneys,
- it is Samantha Holbrook (law partner of appellate Judge Elizabeth Garry before she came to the bench) who engage in conflicted prosecutions of attorneys in cases where Ms. Holbrook is suing such attorneys and has a vested interest in having them disbarred; and
- it is Monica Duffy and Samantha Holbrook who block access of attorneys subject to discipline, including suspended and disbarred attorneys, to their own files - and apparently, documents in at least one federal case and exchange of this author with Monica Duffy's committee and the Committee's attorney in federal litigation the New York State Attorney General, show that the disciplinary committee simply does not keep records of attorney discipline and thus escape investigation of the so-called "efficiency" of their own work.
It is to appeal to the ultimate fox that the henhouse is not guarded properly.
By the way, an appeal is at this time pending of the decision of federal Judge Lawrence Kahn to dismiss a federal civil rights lawsuit against Monica Duffy for blocking access to disciplinary file and against Monica Duffy's employee for unlawful investigation of a former attorney for fake reasons. The dismissal was on grounds having nothing to do with the merits of the case.
Moreover, Monica Duffy and Samantha Holbrook dismissed several complaints against themselves and attorneys working for their disciplinary Committee or members of the Committee - imagine if you would be able to investigate and decide not to prosecute your beloved self.
So, these members of the Commission possess overwhelming integrity. I can hold my breath to read what they will produce as a report on the "public" hearings.
Christopher Lindquist, another member of the Committee, participated in attorney misconduct in, being a court attorney, giving legal advice to the disciplinary prosecutors and - guess what - blocking public access to court records and blocking an attorney (me) from receiving a - guess what - public hearing that I was entitled to by law.
Lindquist is yet another shinig star on the Commission from whom public can expect great accomplishments as a result of these public hearings.
(7) Consumers of legal services who are supposed to be protected by attorney discipline, are not represented on the Commission, instead those who perpetrate misconduct are the "reviewers".
My position as to "what needs to be done" with attorney disciplinary system in New York is clear - to declare it unconstitutional, to prohibit the government to control the livelihood of advocates of the public who challenge misconduct of government officials, in other words - to cancel the attorney licensing system, and to have attorneys disciplined as other professionals are disciplined - through lawsuits.
There are enough causes of action to do that - for malpractice, for breach of contract, for breach of fiduciary duty, for breach of privacy etc.
The whole reason why this so-called Commission was created was because Lippman was afraid for his guts when his friend Silver was indicted on federal charges and wanted to do something to deflect attention from his "badness" into his newly found alleged "goodness".
Well, I for one will never believe in the "goodness" of what Lippman creates, and especially when it considers the already crumbling legal profession.
Public hearings. Reviewed by the main perpetrators of the problem that the public cannot afford legal representation and why rampant attorney misconduct of politically connected attorneys (especially those connected to the judiciary) remains uncontrolled - for decades.
It is clear that these hearings will not and do not intend to resolve the main problem - regulation of the legal profession by the judiciary which judiciary uses that regulation to undermine the American democracy, as the tool of control and of oppression and retaliation against attorneys who challenge judicial misconduct, misconduct of politically connected attorneys and of attorneys working for the government and who are the real protectors of the public.
To think that perpetrators of misconduct (such as Duffy, Holbrook and Lindquist) will investigate, prosecute and provide an EFFICIENT and FAIR solution to the problem they created...
Not in real life.
One last thing I wanted to say.
With all said above, I encourage the public to appear and tell their stories, and to demand that attorney discipline is fair. Why? Because fairness of attorney discipline directly relates to availability of legal defense, especially to unpopular clients, such as criminal defendants and civil rights plaintiffs.
If you remain silent, if you, the public, the People, the sovereign, do not demand accountability as to how attorney discipline is imposed, mainly upon civil rights attorneys, criminal defense attorneys and those attorneys who dare to challenge judicial misconduct for the sake of you, the people - do not ask why attorneys are unwilling to make motions to recuse when you need it, and why they refuse to take on cases involving "sensitive issues" against the government or "well connected" opponents and attorneys.
Because your attorneys are unprotected from judicial retaliation, because they can lose their livelihood by protecting you and because you, the sovereign did nothing to stop that from happening.
Attending such supposedly public hearings will also be valuable in showing to the attending public why attorney discipline by attorneys and judges will never produce a fair result - not for disciplined attorneys, not for the public whose interests the disciplinary proceedings are supposed to address. Too many self-serving interests are involved for proceedings where the public is not allowed a meaningful participation, to be fair.
Thursday, July 16, 2015
Statutory rape and trading underage girls into slavery of their adult husbands for money, property, titles, influence and political power as the part of "history and tradition" of the institution of marriage omitted by the dissenters in the same sex marriage case
I am continuing to analyze the dissents in the same sex marriage case.
One more unifying theme in the four dissents - by judges Roberts, Scalia, Alito and Thomas - is that in defining marriage the majority deviated from the definition of marriage "deeply rooted in history and tradition" of the United States and of the entire world.
Yet, judges demonstrated selective blindness as to what kind of "history and tradition" pertaining to marriage they wanted to consider and what kind they wanted to hide and not touch with a 10-foot pole.
First of all, the issue of constitutionality of the same sex marriage (as well as issues of constitutionality of any other concept or law) have nothing to do with "history and tradition". Nowhere in the U.S. Constitution does it say that the "due process of law" is restricted to what is "deeply rooted in history and tradition".
The history and tradition, if you look at the Bible is that of incest and polygamy, by the way.
Let's think logically and mathematically - if Adam and Eve were the only human couple on earth, then their progeny had to mate with one another (full brothers and sisters, clear incest) to procreate the human race. Nothing to be proud of, and that kind of "history and tradition" is a felony in most states and most countries of the world at this time.
Moreover, this country is a melting pot of different ethnic groups from around the world. Judges, nevertheless, arrogantly presume as "history and tradition" of marriage only heterosexual monogamous marriage as a model. Yet, humans are historically polygamous, hystorically matriarchal, therefore, the history of marriage must include plural marriage on both sides - polyandric (many husbands) and
In fact, Bible abounds of examples of polygamy (a crime in majority, if not all of the states of the U.S.). And that is also "the history and tradition" of marriage.
Moreover, while the dissenting judges expounded on the alleged goal of the marriage that cannot be fulfilled through a same sex marriage - procreation - judges at the same time recognized that 40% of children in the U.S. are currently born to "unwed mothers" (!). Thus judges, first, denigrated the mothers, and second, assumed that the "unwed mothers" are somehow giving birth alone, and not that the children are born to a mother and father, or to a homosexual couple who did not yet or could not legally, marry, only showing the discriminatory and demeaning look of the judges at women and family.
If 40% of children in the U.S. are born outside of wedlock, and at the time when in vitro fertilization, egg adoption, sperm adoption, sperm adoption, child adoption and birth of children through surrogate carriers/birth mothers are widely available to same sex couples, while there is no restriction on age and reproductive health for heterosexual couples, procreation seems like a weak argument to make a case against legitimizing the same sex marriage.
It is peculiar that one of the dissenters pointed out at a case citing that marriage is a union between a man and a woman that had a goal of procreation, a case decided in January of 1978, while on July 25 of that same 1978 the first in vitro baby was born, paving the path to all sorts of combinations of procreative options for single individuals and same sex couples.
Now, let's go back into common law England where the dissenters delved, but left entire portions of "history and tradition" pertaining to marriage untouched.
Marriage from the time of Magna Carta (the 13th century) to the 20th century was a contract between parents of the couple to be married, the couple to be married had no say in the matter, and most often the marriage was about joining properties and forming political unions, and producing heirs to certain properties and to titles of nobility.
By the way, even the allegedly "noble" goal of procreation and "survival of human race" through such procreation (for which marriage was never necessary at any time, since procreation does not need official permission and happens naturally, and it is needed even less with the onset of IVF, surrogacy and adoption) could not be a realistic goal of the marriage when brides and grooms were betrothed/engaged and often married as infants far below the age of puberty.
A sociological study on the history of the age of consent reports that "[m]ore than 800 years after the first recorded age of consent laws, the one constant is the lack of consistency. Laws around the world define the socially appropriate age of consent anywhere from 13 to 18". Having sex with a 13-year-old is a felony of statutory rape in most states, and it does not matter how the girl looked or behaved, the law simply presumes that a child that young cannot form a consent, cannot fully realize the consequences of her act.
Other sources report the age of consent as low as 7, 7 was reportedly the age of consent in the State of Delaware, following the "tradition" of the English common law, and a bride as young as 9 in the state of Virginia, here in the U.S.
In the U.S. the age of consent was, reportedly, in most states, 10 (!) until the 1960s.
Yet, in the "history and tradition" of marriage, it was that the male leader of the family - the father, brother or other male guardian - decided the fate of the female and married her off, without seeking her consent and without being interested in her consent, at whatever age he wanted to do that, mostly for property reasons and reasons of lust, in other words, marriage was "historically" selling of, mostly, an underage girl without her consent - which constitutes a number of crimes nowadays.
Somehow, the dissenters did not want to consider THAT part of the "history and tradition" of the "sacred" "institution of marriage".
So, when judges of the U.S. Supreme Court get on their high horses to expound on "history and tradition" of marriage, it is important to look what sides of that same "history and tradition" they are omitting from the discussion. It is clearly a rhethorical question to ask why they do that - because it does not help their argument. But such manipulation of the truth in argument does not give these four dissenters much credit.
I will try to show some personal background on judges in how and why they possibly ruled the way they did in the next blog.
Stay tuned.
One more unifying theme in the four dissents - by judges Roberts, Scalia, Alito and Thomas - is that in defining marriage the majority deviated from the definition of marriage "deeply rooted in history and tradition" of the United States and of the entire world.
Yet, judges demonstrated selective blindness as to what kind of "history and tradition" pertaining to marriage they wanted to consider and what kind they wanted to hide and not touch with a 10-foot pole.
First of all, the issue of constitutionality of the same sex marriage (as well as issues of constitutionality of any other concept or law) have nothing to do with "history and tradition". Nowhere in the U.S. Constitution does it say that the "due process of law" is restricted to what is "deeply rooted in history and tradition".
The history and tradition, if you look at the Bible is that of incest and polygamy, by the way.
Let's think logically and mathematically - if Adam and Eve were the only human couple on earth, then their progeny had to mate with one another (full brothers and sisters, clear incest) to procreate the human race. Nothing to be proud of, and that kind of "history and tradition" is a felony in most states and most countries of the world at this time.
Moreover, this country is a melting pot of different ethnic groups from around the world. Judges, nevertheless, arrogantly presume as "history and tradition" of marriage only heterosexual monogamous marriage as a model. Yet, humans are historically polygamous, hystorically matriarchal, therefore, the history of marriage must include plural marriage on both sides - polyandric (many husbands) and
In fact, Bible abounds of examples of polygamy (a crime in majority, if not all of the states of the U.S.). And that is also "the history and tradition" of marriage.
Moreover, while the dissenting judges expounded on the alleged goal of the marriage that cannot be fulfilled through a same sex marriage - procreation - judges at the same time recognized that 40% of children in the U.S. are currently born to "unwed mothers" (!). Thus judges, first, denigrated the mothers, and second, assumed that the "unwed mothers" are somehow giving birth alone, and not that the children are born to a mother and father, or to a homosexual couple who did not yet or could not legally, marry, only showing the discriminatory and demeaning look of the judges at women and family.
If 40% of children in the U.S. are born outside of wedlock, and at the time when in vitro fertilization, egg adoption, sperm adoption, sperm adoption, child adoption and birth of children through surrogate carriers/birth mothers are widely available to same sex couples, while there is no restriction on age and reproductive health for heterosexual couples, procreation seems like a weak argument to make a case against legitimizing the same sex marriage.
It is peculiar that one of the dissenters pointed out at a case citing that marriage is a union between a man and a woman that had a goal of procreation, a case decided in January of 1978, while on July 25 of that same 1978 the first in vitro baby was born, paving the path to all sorts of combinations of procreative options for single individuals and same sex couples.
Now, let's go back into common law England where the dissenters delved, but left entire portions of "history and tradition" pertaining to marriage untouched.
Marriage from the time of Magna Carta (the 13th century) to the 20th century was a contract between parents of the couple to be married, the couple to be married had no say in the matter, and most often the marriage was about joining properties and forming political unions, and producing heirs to certain properties and to titles of nobility.
By the way, even the allegedly "noble" goal of procreation and "survival of human race" through such procreation (for which marriage was never necessary at any time, since procreation does not need official permission and happens naturally, and it is needed even less with the onset of IVF, surrogacy and adoption) could not be a realistic goal of the marriage when brides and grooms were betrothed/engaged and often married as infants far below the age of puberty.
A sociological study on the history of the age of consent reports that "[m]ore than 800 years after the first recorded age of consent laws, the one constant is the lack of consistency. Laws around the world define the socially appropriate age of consent anywhere from 13 to 18". Having sex with a 13-year-old is a felony of statutory rape in most states, and it does not matter how the girl looked or behaved, the law simply presumes that a child that young cannot form a consent, cannot fully realize the consequences of her act.
Other sources report the age of consent as low as 7, 7 was reportedly the age of consent in the State of Delaware, following the "tradition" of the English common law, and a bride as young as 9 in the state of Virginia, here in the U.S.
In the U.S. the age of consent was, reportedly, in most states, 10 (!) until the 1960s.
Yet, in the "history and tradition" of marriage, it was that the male leader of the family - the father, brother or other male guardian - decided the fate of the female and married her off, without seeking her consent and without being interested in her consent, at whatever age he wanted to do that, mostly for property reasons and reasons of lust, in other words, marriage was "historically" selling of, mostly, an underage girl without her consent - which constitutes a number of crimes nowadays.
Somehow, the dissenters did not want to consider THAT part of the "history and tradition" of the "sacred" "institution of marriage".
So, when judges of the U.S. Supreme Court get on their high horses to expound on "history and tradition" of marriage, it is important to look what sides of that same "history and tradition" they are omitting from the discussion. It is clearly a rhethorical question to ask why they do that - because it does not help their argument. But such manipulation of the truth in argument does not give these four dissenters much credit.
I will try to show some personal background on judges in how and why they possibly ruled the way they did in the next blog.
Stay tuned.
Tampering with trial exhibits is the privilege of chosen attorneys? The saga on trial exhibits spans more than one case now
A reader of my blog pointed out to a problem with trial exhibits that occurred in the reader's court case (reader is pro se, the opponent is represented by a "connected" attorney).
The story goes this way:
the reader was allowed by the judge, as well as opposing attorney, to submit to the judge, after a bench trial, a written summation.
The reader wanted to review trial exhibits (the reader's and the opponent's) to rely upon in the summation.
The court clerk told the reader that (1) the reader could not have access to trial exhibits, but that (2) the opposing party's attorney not only could have access to trial exhibits, but could and did take the trial exhibits out of the court's custody and into the attorney's office.
After the reader took an issue with such inequality of treatment, he was actually given access to trial exhibits, after the opposing attorney returned it to the court.
While reviewing the exhibits, the reader found that exhibits, upon the reader's recollection, were re-marked and re-labeled, the markings put on the exhibits by the stenographer were moved from one exhibit to another.
That's why it is very important to have the list of exhibits created immediately as the trial progresses and have the court clerk file that list of exhibits for public access, or, if the record of the case is private, for access by the parties and their attorneys immediately on conclusion of the trial, and not after the judge makes his or her decision on the case.
That prevents tampering with exhibits and preserves the record for purposes of the appeal - if anybody in the court system is genuinely concerned about these issues.
Yet, the issue remains in that particular case that the trial exhibits for BOTH sides were not given (at least, at first) to a pro se party and were released out of the custody of the court into the custody of the opposing attorney without any record in the court files of doing that - and were returned from the custody of that attorney relabeled, or, in other words, there is a likelihood that the opposing attorney or somebody in that attorney's office tampered with public records, a crime in the State of New York.
Apparently, since that attorney misconduct occurred with the help of the court personnel, and since the attorney in question is one of the "connected" attorneys, I doubt that any discipline will be imposed on any participants in what has happened.
Yet, that's why I suggest to my readers that any and all telephone conversations with court clerks about their cases must be audio-recorded. Otherwise, you will never be able to prove that access was denied to you and given to the opposing party.
When you record, you at least have an opportunity to catch court clerks unaware, and have them blurp out the truth before their superiors coach them how to lie.
As it happened recently in my case where NYS Court Administration attempted to deny what was already recorded and published, see here (with links to audio recordings) and here (with a full copy of a letter from NYS Court Administration blatantly denying that I was denied access to trial exhibits by the court clerk at the direction of Judge Kevin Dowd and that the court clerk, and not the County Clerk, had possession of those exhibits at all times after the trial, even though the County Clerk should have had them) - as an illustration of how court personnel lies to protect judges committing misconduct.
Once again - only recordings can prove court personnel is lying to protect their jobs and to protect judges who they think they serve (instead of the public who they are hired to be serving, and paid to be serving).
It is lawful in New York to record conversations secretly, as long as the recording person is a party to that conversation.
So - insist on having a list of trial exhibits right at the end of the trial.
Insist on having that list particularly describe marked and admitted exhibits.
Insist on review of trial exhibits in preparation of your written summations, if such are allowed.
Note if trial exhibits were allowed by court personnel to leave the court's custody and go to the custody of "connected" attorneys.
Be vigilant as to the state of exhibits as they are returned from such attorneys' offices, if that happened - look for signs of tampering, document them, photograph them, write about tampering to the court before the court made its decision based on such exhibits.
Preserve your rights. yourselves. The court personnel sure wouldn't do that for you, at least in New York courts.
The story goes this way:
the reader was allowed by the judge, as well as opposing attorney, to submit to the judge, after a bench trial, a written summation.
The reader wanted to review trial exhibits (the reader's and the opponent's) to rely upon in the summation.
The court clerk told the reader that (1) the reader could not have access to trial exhibits, but that (2) the opposing party's attorney not only could have access to trial exhibits, but could and did take the trial exhibits out of the court's custody and into the attorney's office.
After the reader took an issue with such inequality of treatment, he was actually given access to trial exhibits, after the opposing attorney returned it to the court.
While reviewing the exhibits, the reader found that exhibits, upon the reader's recollection, were re-marked and re-labeled, the markings put on the exhibits by the stenographer were moved from one exhibit to another.
That's why it is very important to have the list of exhibits created immediately as the trial progresses and have the court clerk file that list of exhibits for public access, or, if the record of the case is private, for access by the parties and their attorneys immediately on conclusion of the trial, and not after the judge makes his or her decision on the case.
That prevents tampering with exhibits and preserves the record for purposes of the appeal - if anybody in the court system is genuinely concerned about these issues.
Yet, the issue remains in that particular case that the trial exhibits for BOTH sides were not given (at least, at first) to a pro se party and were released out of the custody of the court into the custody of the opposing attorney without any record in the court files of doing that - and were returned from the custody of that attorney relabeled, or, in other words, there is a likelihood that the opposing attorney or somebody in that attorney's office tampered with public records, a crime in the State of New York.
Apparently, since that attorney misconduct occurred with the help of the court personnel, and since the attorney in question is one of the "connected" attorneys, I doubt that any discipline will be imposed on any participants in what has happened.
Yet, that's why I suggest to my readers that any and all telephone conversations with court clerks about their cases must be audio-recorded. Otherwise, you will never be able to prove that access was denied to you and given to the opposing party.
When you record, you at least have an opportunity to catch court clerks unaware, and have them blurp out the truth before their superiors coach them how to lie.
As it happened recently in my case where NYS Court Administration attempted to deny what was already recorded and published, see here (with links to audio recordings) and here (with a full copy of a letter from NYS Court Administration blatantly denying that I was denied access to trial exhibits by the court clerk at the direction of Judge Kevin Dowd and that the court clerk, and not the County Clerk, had possession of those exhibits at all times after the trial, even though the County Clerk should have had them) - as an illustration of how court personnel lies to protect judges committing misconduct.
Once again - only recordings can prove court personnel is lying to protect their jobs and to protect judges who they think they serve (instead of the public who they are hired to be serving, and paid to be serving).
It is lawful in New York to record conversations secretly, as long as the recording person is a party to that conversation.
So - insist on having a list of trial exhibits right at the end of the trial.
Insist on having that list particularly describe marked and admitted exhibits.
Insist on review of trial exhibits in preparation of your written summations, if such are allowed.
Note if trial exhibits were allowed by court personnel to leave the court's custody and go to the custody of "connected" attorneys.
Be vigilant as to the state of exhibits as they are returned from such attorneys' offices, if that happened - look for signs of tampering, document them, photograph them, write about tampering to the court before the court made its decision based on such exhibits.
Preserve your rights. yourselves. The court personnel sure wouldn't do that for you, at least in New York courts.
Wednesday, July 15, 2015
There are exhibits and exhibits
A question occurred to me - why New York State courts claim that it is somehow legitimate to give back exhibits "of a party" back to that party after trial and before the appeal of the decision that came out of that trial where exhibits from a proceeding bypassing a trial (a motion for a summary judgment) remain in the court's custody and are never returned to the party who submitted it?
What is the distinction that makes one type of exhibits - based on which the court bypasses a trial - non-returnable and exhibits used in a trial to arrive at a decision that is subject to an appeal - returnable before the appeal runs through or is even filed?
Does not seem either fair or equitable to me.
Does seem to me as a violation of equal protection of laws guaranteed by the Federal Constitution which pre-empts any inconsistent state law.
What is the distinction that makes one type of exhibits - based on which the court bypasses a trial - non-returnable and exhibits used in a trial to arrive at a decision that is subject to an appeal - returnable before the appeal runs through or is even filed?
Does not seem either fair or equitable to me.
Does seem to me as a violation of equal protection of laws guaranteed by the Federal Constitution which pre-empts any inconsistent state law.
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
The unanimous Younger abstention decision and the four dissents in the same sex marriage case - legislation by judges is ok if judges are high up and have no control over them?
I am finishing my analysis of the voluminous four dissents in the same sex marriage case and will start publishing them shortly, as they give a unique perspective as to the necessity of the U.S. Supreme Court at all, its authority and its excesses of authority, and its influence or, rather, undermining the American democracy.
What I must say as a foreword though is that the dissents are united by accusation of the majority opinion judges of exceeding their authority given to them by the American people.
Yet, all of the dissenters have recently participated in the unanimous decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on the so-called Younger abstention where the Younger abstention - a completely unconstitutional creature of courts that restricts, without authority, jurisdiction of the courts to hear civil rights cases - were allowed to live, albeit in a somewhat restricted format which was immediately expanded right back again by district courts.
I guess, in the minds of the same sex marriage dissenters - judges Alito, Roberts, Thompson and Scalia - judges can exceed their authority in some cases (that the dissenters approve) and not others.
The question is - do we need such a court at all where judges arbitrarily, often and grossly exceed their authroity and impose their personal view upon the entire country under the guise of "constitutional interpretation"?
What I must say as a foreword though is that the dissents are united by accusation of the majority opinion judges of exceeding their authority given to them by the American people.
Yet, all of the dissenters have recently participated in the unanimous decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on the so-called Younger abstention where the Younger abstention - a completely unconstitutional creature of courts that restricts, without authority, jurisdiction of the courts to hear civil rights cases - were allowed to live, albeit in a somewhat restricted format which was immediately expanded right back again by district courts.
I guess, in the minds of the same sex marriage dissenters - judges Alito, Roberts, Thompson and Scalia - judges can exceed their authority in some cases (that the dissenters approve) and not others.
The question is - do we need such a court at all where judges arbitrarily, often and grossly exceed their authroity and impose their personal view upon the entire country under the guise of "constitutional interpretation"?
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