Absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts, public policy decisions, Star Chamber and authority of federal courts

The judge-created doctrine of absolute judicial immunity FOR MALICIOUS AND CORRUPT ACTS on the bench is relatively new, dating back only to 1978, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

Yet, the concept of judicial immunity that the U.S. Supreme Court judges so readily crafted to prevent liability of their brethren under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, was created not in a democracy, but in a monarchy, and not in a regular court, but in a Star Chamber.

In the case Floyd and Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607), Sir Edward Coke unilaterally established a standard of judicial immunity of a judge "for anything done by him as a judge".

The Barker case was a suit by one named Floyd after a person named William Price was executed on a sentence of death from Judge Barker.  Floyd was suing Judge Barker on a conspiracy theory.

Sir Edward Coke then instantly created a doctrine of immunity from liability for a judge based on the following principles:

1. finality of judgments - well, there can be nothing more final than an execution of a condemned prisoner, but we know how many people on death row now turn up innocent, and that is with DNA evidence.  There was no DNA evidence in the 17th century England.  Moreover, the triumph of finality over fairness is definitely not and cannot be in compliance with the constitutional concept of due process of law which American courts and especially federal courts dealing with constitutional lawsuits, must deal with and abide by.
2. immunity is necessary to maintain judicial independence - so, it is necessary to allow judges to do a sloppy job and even to engage in conspiracies to sell their performance - in order for that performance to be independent.  This principle is, once again, worthy of the Star Chamber where it was born, but definitely not of a court in a constitutional democracy.
3. immunity provides independence of thought and freedom from manipulation - see above, it the same problems flaw this "principle".  Sloppy work and corruption is allowed to slip away in order to allow the judge to maintain "independence of thought" to engage in that same sloppy work and corruption.  Not a concept that belongs in a constitutional democracy.
4. the necessity "to engender respect and confidence in the judiciary and the government".  That one is really worthy of the Star Chamber and truly does not comport in any way shape or form with a constitutional democracy.  It makes no sense whatsoever to allow a negligent or corrupt judge to escape liability in order to maintain amongst people respect and confidence in the government, because immunity breeds the very opposite of respect and confidence in the government in general and in the integrity of the judiciary specifically.

The Star Chamber was dissembled in England around 1641 as a lawless institution used as a tool of political oppression and has become a symbol of abuse of power.

That the highest court in a nation that emerged by breaking away from that same England because of the king's arbitrary power that the Americans DID NOT WANT TO RESPECT OR HONOR, long after the Star Chamber was dissembled, adopted the principles that came out of a Star Chamber case to restrict rights of litigants established by the U.S. Constitution and by the U.S. Congress by enacting a statute to enforce the U.S. Constitution, is a symbol of abuse of power in the modern times.

Moreover, the four aforementioned principles were created by Sir Edward Coke as a matter of public policy.
 
You know what the U.S. Supreme Court said about restricting civil rights litigation based on concepts of public policy?

              "We do not have a license to establish immunities from
              Section 1983 actiona in the interests of what we judge to
              be sound public policy.   It is for Congress to determine
              whether Section 1983 litigation has become
              too burdensome to state or federal institutions and,
              if so, what remedial  action is appropriate",
              Tower v Glover, 104 S. Ct. 2820, 2826 (1984).

This statement in Tower v. Glover was made by the U.S. Supreme Court 6 years after Stump v. Sparkman that is considered the starting point of the judge-created doctrine of the absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts in the American jurisprudence.  Truly, the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing with the U.S. Supreme Court.

Yet, federal courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court itself, do not seem to notice what they stated in Tower v Glover and continue to create and apply immunities to Section 1983, in obvious full knowledge that their actions are unlawful and that they are unlawfully usurping Congressional power and depriving victims of governmental misconduct of their legitimate remedy - based on federal judges' personal judgments that civil rights litigation became much too burdensome for federal and state institutions.

So, litigants and attorneys whose countless cases were rejected on the principles of judicial, quasi-judicial, prosecutorial absolute immunity, and qualified immunity for police and social workers - all of those lawsuits were rejected, as the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledges, unlawfully.

And all the sanctions that were imposed, and fees that were ordered to be paid by victims of official misconducts to the perpetrators of such misconducts because perpetrators were allegedly protected by immunities - are admittedly unlawful, and sanctioning civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys is an ever growing trend in  the U.S. federal courts.

And - the above statement in Tower v. Glover can finally serve as a revelation of the reasons why doctrines of immunities, as well as other "public policy doctrines" such as Rooker-Feldman, comity, federalism, deferences, and a wide range of abstentions, exist - because federal courts unilaterally decide that civil rights litigation is much too burdensome to state and federal institutions and use judge-created barriers to reduce their own caseloads, which is NOT a lawful ground to refuse a remedy to victims of governmental misconduct lawfully exercising their private right of action to sue governmental officials for constitutional violations, a right created by Congressional enactment and that DOES NOT have exceptions for judges, prosecutors and police officers.

Moreover, in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), a textbook case on constitutional law taught in law schools as the origin of the U.S. Supreme Court's authority to interpret the U.S. Constitution (something that is not found in that same U.S. Constitution), the U.S. Supreme Court has stated the following:
 
"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws
when he receives an injury", 1 Cranch 137 at 163 (1803).
This is how the U.S. Supreme Court explained the purpose of the Civil Rights Act in the same year when U.S. Supreme Court established the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts for a judge who screwed up royally and issued an ex parte order of secret sterilization of a 15-year old girl on request of her mother because she was allegedly mentally ill and "promiscuous" in Stump v Sparkman:

       "The purpose of the statute was to deter public officials
       from using the badge of their authority to violate persons'
       constitutional rights and to provide compensation and other
       relief to victims of constitutional deprivations when that
       deterrence failed", Carey v Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978).

Yet, what rules in federal courts nowadays is not the U.S. Constitution, not the Civil Rights Act enacted by Congress, but the concept born out of the darkness of the 17th-century Star Chamber ditched by the English in that same 17th Century for unlawfulness.

Long live the rule of law.

Posted important information for parents charged with child neglect/abuse in my blog dedicated to child protective services

The link is here.

The blog post is about a procedural (unlawful)  trick social services use to coerce parents to talk to social services in child neglect proceedings outside of formal discovery, that allows social services to forgo proper investigation, pleading and discovery and assure their victory in such proceedings.

Judge Guy and Judge Mulvey did not come through with the "amended orders of assignment"

I've written on this blog recently how Judge David H. Guy claimed that the order of his assignment to a Delaware County Supreme Court, removed from the Delaware County Surrogate's Court is one big error (because Judge Guy was caught issuing orders out of Surrogate's court and pointing out to me that my perfectly correct service under the CPLR was incorrect and must be redone in accordance with the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act).

Of course, see, when you are a judge and you are supposed to APPLY the law AS IT IS WRITTEN, but when you, at the same time, know that you are covered by ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY whatever crap you commit on the bench - negligently or intentionally - that power goes to your head and prevents you from making rational decisions.

So, Judge Guy, when caught red-handed in acting in clear absence of all jurisdiction as a Surrogate's Court judge, advised me and clerks of two courts that the order of his assignment to the SUPREME COURT case is an error and that the case remains and is calendared in the SURROGATE'S COURT to which Judge Guy was never assigned.

I notified of Judge Guy's misconduct the following authorities:  Judge Guy's superior Judge Robert C. Mulvey and the NYS Commission for Judicial Conduct.

Today is May 23, 2015.

The "calendared" date was May 22, 2015.

Judge Guy told Delaware County Supreme Court Kelly Sanfilippo as of May 13, 2015 that it was all big error and his order of assignment will be corrected.

To this day (and today's mail already came, with no new orders of assignment), the only order of assignment for Judge Guy was dated April 4, 2015 and directed him to be assigned to a Delaware County SUPREME COURT case which Judge Guy read as SURROGATE'S COURT case.

I do not know what is Judge Guy's problem - is it the eyesight, perception, lack of reading skills, all of the above?

Yet, as of today, Judge Mulvey did not come to Judge Guy's rescue yet with a new court order of assignment, and I did not submit anything to the Surrogate's Court because it lost jurisdiction over the case as of April 4, 2015, in accordance with Judge Mulvey's order of removal/assignment.

I will hold my breath to learn how Judge Guy will rule on his pretend calendar date in the court he was not assigned to.

When a clerk of the court gives you a directive, it is not "really" a court order - and that is an opinion from the lips of the clerk of an Appellate Court

My disciplinary prosecutor Mary Gasparini charged me, as a prosecutor, witness and alleged victim (it all fits nicely into Gasparini's personal concept of impartial and ethical prosecution), with disobeying orders of court, where several orders of court were letters from a court clerk and a court attorney relating to me what they were allegedly "directed" to tell me by the "court".

I requested, pursuant to Judiciary Law 255, to provide me certified copies of court orders/decisions, with names of judges who made those orders/decisions, with the "directives" to the clerk and court attorney, respectively, to transmit those directives to me or to Gasparini.

The particular letter that was the subject of my Judiciary Law 255 was a directive by Christopher Lindquist, Appellate Court Attorney giving Mary Gasparini how to defeat my request to open court proceedings to the public - which has been done many times, for months and even years, and the law in the state of New York is that attorney disciplinary proceedings MUST be open to the public if the attorney asks for that and waives her privacy, which I did.

Instead, Linquist taught Gasparini that she may simply file an "Affidavit of Opposition", instead of making a motion to close proceedings which are presumed open as soon as I made my request.

So, Lindquist issued an order on behalf of the court that changed rules in favor of Gasparini, and indicated that he was directed by the court to direct Gasparini to file the "Affidavit in Opposition".

I filed a request, pursuant to Judiciary Law 255 (because Freedom of Information Law does not apply to court proceedings) for a certified copy of the order from the court directing Gasparini to do what Lindquist said the court directed  him to direct Gasparini to do.

Here is the response of the clerk of the court to my request for a copy of that order, and for copies of other orders, reflected in other letters of the clerk and the court attorney Lindquist (member of a recently created with much fanfare statewide commission to improve efficiency and fairness of attorney disciplinary proceedings - good luck with that, with Christopher Lindquist on board):

Ladies and gentlemen:

The clerk says by this letter that, even though what she or court attorney express in their letters are "written directions from the Court" (of course, she mischaracterizes blatantly giving legal advice to a party as "directives concerning calendaring and filing deadlines"), those same "written directions from the Court" "do not constitute deliberative 'decisions' or 'orders' of the Court".

So written directives of the court are not orders of the court, to make sure you understand.

So, when you are given a "written directive" by a clerk or a court attorney, it is a directive by the court - but not an order by the court.

I failed to find a legal term "directive by the court" in New York State law.  New York State law only deals with orders, decisions and judgments of the court - and those are made not by court clerks, not by court attorneys, but by judges, elected public officials.

I guess, Ms. Carafell needs re-training - along with the entire Appellate Division 4th Department allowing clerks and court attorneys to run lose, give legal advise under the guise of "court directives" and, when caught red-handed and when the actual court orders as to those "directives" are requested from him, try to clumsily cover their backsides by claiming that "written directives" are not "deliberative decisions or orders" and thus are not really court orders that I am entitled to a copy of.

Good job, Appellate Division, in further messing up.

One more reason why public servants, including the judiciary and its personnel, should be most rigorously subjected to supervision by members of the public - to prevent this circus at public expense from continuing.

Mary Gasparini: violations of constitutional rights are remedied by pleas of mercy

Imagine a prosecutor telling a criminal defendant:  yes, you were not given a trial, and I admit that.

But the decision not to give you a trial (even though you are entitled to it by law) was made, and, therefore, all your claims that you are entitled to a trial are now moot.

And - after all, you have a remedy of addressing the court at sentencing, so you were not deprived of any rights.

===

Sounds insane?

It does.

Yet, here is what my disciplinary prosecutor Mary Gasparini stated to the court in her May 15, 2015 affirmation, under oath:

That is exactly the same as the insane hypothetical above - Mary Gasparini believes that, if a court ordered not a judge, but referee Sirkin, to hold an evidentiary hearing, if Sirkin refused to do that, thus defying a court order and engaging in a crime of contempt of court (with Mary Gasparini's whole-hearted support) - and because Sirkin refused to do what the court ordered him to do, in Mary Gasparini's opinion, the issue of whether I am entitled to the evidentiary hearing and whether the court has authority to proceed when no such court-ordered hearing was held, is somehow "moot".

This is my response to the court to Mary Gasparini's above learned contentions.  I think Mary Gasparini is incompetent, not to mention that her demonstrated willingness to commit fraud upon the court and unwillingness to diligently do her job should forever bar her from wasting taxpayers' money and from any public employment.

A "Family Crime Lab" is reportedly open - reporters should proceed with caution

It has been reported that a reporting service for families has been created where families could report "bad actors" who are violators rights of families and children or are causing undue delay in Family Court proceedings - such as "attorneys, attorneys, judges, guardians, social workers, child protection workers, and government/court employees".

I am reporting it for what it's worth - as it was reported on the Internet.

Of course, before reporting anything to this reporting service, I would do a thorough background investigation of the service itself, not to end up in a situation that you are feeding complaints that will be forwarded to the objects of the complaints for further retaliation - no offense meant to the "Family Crime Lab", if they were formed and operate in good faith.

Yet, stakes are so high that caution cannot be overrated.

Those dangerous attorney blogs...

Unfortunately, I am not the only attorney in this country who is being persecuted for criticism of judicial misconduct - far from it.

Here is a blogpost from an Illinois attorney who challenged improprieties in that state's Surrogate's Courts that leave the elderly unprotected from robbing their estates, separating them from their loved ones and depriving them of the necessary medical care, all for the sake of greed of attorneys favored by courts.

The Illinois attorney's blog was considered a very dangerous thing, warranting a 3-year suspension from the practice of law, blocking the attorney in question from her ability to help the poor with her low-cost and pro bono services.

I guess, the danger of blogs written by attorneys are in their persuasiveness, because attorneys are witnesses of judicial misconduct who, due to their everyday experience with the courts, their legal expertise and knowledge and their eloquence, may carry a very persuasive message to the public that courts in this country are corrupt and are in dire need of reform - a concept to which the general American public is increasingly awakening.

I must mention that New York  appears to consider me a more dangerous person than Illinois considered JoAnne Denison - because JoAnne Denison at least was provided an evidentiary hearing and was allowed to call witnesses.  

Why?

JoAnne Denison's blog presents excerpts from an evidentiary hearing in her disciplinary case.

In my case, I am too dangerous to even allow me to have an evidentiary hearing, and especially an open public hearing in the county where I practice law the most (as I requested many times), and to allow me to call witnesses - lest the public hear from the lips of the witnesses that the charges against me were fraudulent and the real reasons were to discredit me as an eloquent and active critic of judicial misconduct in this state and in this country.

Vicious retaliation by the judiciary against attorneys who criticize judicial misconduct, and deprivation of the public of services of such attorneys, mostly those who provide low-cost and pro bono services, at the time when over 80% of the public cannot afford an attorney, is why regulation of the legal profession should be removed from the hands of the judiciary and the government altogether.