Attorney Mary Gasparini is urging Referee Stephen Sirkin to engage in further ex parte communications with her and to defraud the court

I received a "Proposed Referee Report" by Mary Gasparini with a cover letter.

Both the Proposed Referee Report and the cover letter are documentary monuments to stupidity, incompetence and an all-encompassing sense of entitlement to break the law with impunity that our governmental officials "enjoy" since the introduction and proliferation of the concept of "absolute immunity" for judicial and prosecutorial misconduct.

The cover letter calls a referee (appointed only to "hear and report the facts" - which the Referee refused to do) a "Judge" or a "JHO" (Judicial Hearing Officer), which are three completely different positions and three completely different sets of duties.

The cover letter also blatantly invites the Referee to engage in an ex parte communication with Mary Gasparini:

"If you [Referee Sirkin - T.N.] have any questions, or if I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me".

The "Proposed Referee Report" is a masterpiece of fraud, pure and unadulterated. 

 I am publishing it because when a prosecutor presents to the a referee a cooked court record, makes false statements in the "Proposed Referee Report" and withholds relevant information, that is a matter of public concern that the public (that same public that Mary Gasparini is seeking to protect from me in the disciplinary proceeding) - should know, for self-protection.  

First and foremost, the referee was appointed to schedule and conduct an evidentiary hearing on the outstanding issues of fact.

He did not do that.

Instead, on December 21, 2014 Referee Sirkin decided the somehow outstanding Petitioner motion for a summary judgment ON PAPERS and INSTEAD of holding an evidentiary hearing, and BEFORE the conference that Sirkin has scheduled FOR THE PURPOSE of SCHEDULING an EVIDENTIARY HEARING, as ordered by the court.

Not that the Referee seems to care.

Not that the Petitioner and its attorney Mary Gasparini seems to care.

Look how "subtly" Mary Gasparini attempts to defraud the court and urge Sirkin to file with the court a fraudulent document.

First, Mary Gasparini states what Referee Sirkin was supposed to do:

Sirkin was supposed to "take proof" - meaning conduct an evidentiary hearing on outstanding issues of fact, NOT reading what was already filed with the court.

After "taking proof" Sirkin was supposed to report his "findings" from that hearing to the court, "without recommendations".

So, how Gasparini is going to try to help Sirkin wiggle out of NOT holding an evidentiary hearing and NOT taking proof in accordance with the court order.

In other words, how does one report "findings" from a non-existent hearing?  Here is how one does it - Mary Gasparini, a Continued Legal Education certified lecturer - will teach you how to do that:

First, Mary Gasparini states in her "Proposed Referee's Report" that a pre-trial "hearing" was held on October 23, 2014 (p. 2 of Gasparini's Proposed Referee's Report above).

While saying that, Mary Gasparini does not apparently care that:

(1) I received a notice only of a pre-trial conference to be held on October 23, 2014;
(2) that no court order allowed pre-trial "hearings";
(3) that pre-trial "hearings" are not allowed in attorney disciplinary proceedings by procedural rules of court (or I would have availed myself of those "hearings");
(4) that no "hearing" was, in fact, held.

Let's go further.

The next statement of Gasparini is that at the "pre-trial hearing" on October 23, 2014 I appeared "without counsel"

It apparently does not occur to Gasparini that an attorney appearing on her own behalf is appearing "as her own counsel", not "without counsel".

Let's go further.

Gasparini then puts three misstatements into just two phrases:

The misstatements are:

(1) that "as a result" of my motion, anything was adjourned.  A motion such as I filed, does not automatically impose a stay, so it was Referee Sirkin's decision to adjourn the scheduling conference, so it could not be said that "as a result" of my filing, the "matter" was adjourned;

(2) Gasparini manipulates the indeterminate word "matter" instead of a definite "scheduling conference" to claim that what was adjourned was "the matter" that she previously called a "pre-trial hearing";

(3) yet, I have irrefutable evidence that Referee Sirkin held the October 23, 2014 appearance as a conference, and planned the December 8, 2014 appearance, adjourned to January 12, 2015, also as a conference, designed to "set the dates" for "pre-trials" and "trials", and thus that no "hearing" as ordered by the court to the Referee was scheduled, planned or held.

(4) The stenographer on October 23, 2014 failed to fully take the record of the scheduling conference and provided a false transcript with false statements that the October 23, 2014 conference was a "hearing" and that there were "waivers" and "stipulations" on my behalf.

I will provide my notes as to what really occurred on October 23, 2014 in a separate blog in the future.

Then, Mary Gasparini claims in her Proposed Referee's Report that the transcript with multiple false statements is actually a "true and correct copy" of what occurred in the January 12, 2015 "proceedings" (which was a scheduling conference, but was represented in the transcript as a hearing with testimony, by a different stenographer).

Further, Mary Gasparini calls what the transcript calls "a hearing" with testimony, a "pre-trial":

Mary Gasparini also includes Sirkin's Decision (see above) dated December 21, 2014 which eliminates any further needs of any "pre-trials", since it resolve the motion on liability, usurping authority of the court to do that, and only left the stage of mitigation remaining.

The stage of mitigation occurs only after:

(1) the Referee holds a hearing - which did not happen;
(2) files his findings of fact from that hearing, without recommendations - which did not happen;
(3) Petitioner moves to confirm the Referee's report;
(4) Respondent moves to disaffirm the Referee's report;
(5) the court reviews both motions, denies Respondent's motion and grants Petitioner's;
(6) the court decides against Respondent on the issue of liability

Sirkin skipped those 6 steps above, already attempted to schedule mitigation on January 12, 2015 (meaning that the 6 steps above are already over) and now Gasparini tries to steer him BACK to step (2) above, while knowing that Sirkin did not satisfy condition precedent for step (2), step (1).  

That is, ladies and gentlemen, pure fraud, the crime of fraud or attempted fraud upon the court, mail fraud and attempt for theft of honest services of a public official - a federal criminal offense.

Gasparini claims that I failed to appear on January 12, 2015, but fails to present as part of the Proposed Referee's Report or even mention that I faxed a letter with a weather advisory to her showing why I CANNOT appear without risk to my life.

The way Gasparini presented it in her Proposed Referee's Report is as if I did not appear in person on January 12, 2015 without justifications, at least, without my letter and weather advisory, that is the implication, and a false implication.

Then, Gasparini presents a rare truthful piece showing that there was no court-ordered hearing, because the Proposed Report does not mention a hearing or proof taken at a hearing:

So, a Referee was ordered to hold an evidentiary hearing.

The Referee did not do that.

Instead, without a hearing, he claims that Respondent failed to present evidence - to the Referee, obviously, without a hearing - that would "rebut" Petitioner's evidence, while Petitioner - naturally - also did not present any evidence on outstanding issues of fact, because - once again - there was no hearing.

But that does not deter Gasparini from putting this piece into the Proposed Referee's Report:

Gasparini sustained burden of proof without a hearing.  She thinks.

Gasparini then went so far as offering Sirkin in her "Proposed Referee's Report" "Findings in Mitigation".  "Findings" is actually "findings of fact" as a result of already HELD proceedings in mitigation, but when did such trifles deter Gasparini, a NYS court-certified CLE lecturer on the topic.

It is obvious that Sirkin has no authority to:

(1) Make findings in mitigation; or
(2) to schedule mitigation 

and that mitigation cannot be scheduled before the previous steps - including, please, forgive me, THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING that was not scheduled or held by Sirkin (see the above 6 skipped steps).

It is clear from the transcript that I did not waive anything because there was nothing to waive, mitigation stage was not there yet - if it was, Gasparini would not have been offering a "Proposed Referee's Report".

Mitigation is a stage after the court already confirms that report - and it was not even filed at this time, and cannot be because there was no HEARING to report from.

The 4th Department announces on its site the following rules:

Following the completion of a hearing and the filing of a report by a referee, the Court will schedule an appearance for the argument of motions by the parties and to afford the respondent attorney an opportunity to be heard in mitigation. The respondent attorney may waive in writing the opportunity to appear (22 NYCRR 1022.20 [d] [2]).


So, the mitigation can only happen:

(1) after the evidentiary hearing;
(2) after the report of the referee was filed
(3) after the motions by the parties, 

AND

the waiver of the right to appear must be done IN WRITING, 22 NYCRR 1022.20(d)(2).

Obviously, none of that was important to Mary Gasparini when she put that paragraph into her "Proposed Referee's Report".

I already covered in my blog here false statements in the transcript that Gasparini attached as Exhibit 1.

As to the Decision of December 21, 2014, which I saw for the first time when Gasparini sent it to me (the Referee or the court never did), it is yet another masterpiece of stupidity and incompetence and desire to sweep any issues of judicial misconduct under the rug.

The Decision enumerates three decisions where I allegedly committed "frivolous conduct":

First of all, I already discussed that the Referee had no right to make this "Decision", when the Referee was appointed only to hold a hearing which the Referee refused to do.

Second, note how carefully the Referee avoids mentioning in the enumeration that all three sanctions:

June 30, 2011       for $1,250.00
August 2, 2011    for  $2,500.00
August 10, 2011  for  $ 1, 250.00

Were imposed by Judge Carl F. Becker

3 days
1 month and 6 days
1 month and 2 weeks 

after June 27, 2014, the date after I sued Judge Carl F. Becker on behalf of Alecia Bracci, myself and my husband for misconduct.

That pure unconstitutional retaliation and abuse of power by the judge is the ENTIRE basis of the disciplinary proceedings against me. 

Moreover, Alecia Bracci, who dared to sue Judge Becker for misconduct (on and off the bench, and off the bench is not covered by any immunity) and Barbara O'Sullivan, who served that lawsuit upon Judge Becker on June 27, 2014, are even more severely retaliated against than I am, with the courts staging falsified criminal proceedings against them which are pending as we speak. 

 Barbara was released on bail, but proceedings against her and her daughter, staged obviously because her daughter dared to file a motion to vacate these same sanctions of Judge Becker based on later-discovered misconduct, rage on.

But back to Sirkin's "Decision".

Look at this magnificent piece:

Sirkin states that the burden to prove collateral estoppel rests upon the Petitioner, and makes no indication that the Petitioner has met its burden of proof, that there was any HEARING where such proof would be presented.

Sirkin was appointed to TAKE PROOF, not to make a decision on motion ON PAPERS already filed.

Moreover, the reason why the Referee was appointed in the first place is because there is a significant difference between rules of frivolous conduct of the court - 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(c) (1), (2) and (3) and rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys , 22 NYCRR 1200 Rule 3.1(d)(1), (2) and (3), precluding a possibility of using collateral estoppel as a matter of law, because of the different evidentiary standards.

No	What is frivolous conduct under the Court Rule under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(c )	What is frivolous conduct under the Attorney disciplinary rules, 22 NYCRR 1200 (b) What is frivolous conduct	Meaning of the difference for purposes of collateral estoppel
1	it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law;	the lawyer knowingly advances a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;	Attorney disciplinary rule presupposes a subjective standard (“knowingly”) while the court rule is an “objective” (lower) standard. Collateral estoppel is applicable from Attorney Rules down to Court Rules, but not vice versa, from Court Rules down to Attorney Rules, how Gasparini wants to apply it For court rules, the court does not have to consider whether the attorney’s conduct was “knowing”. For attorney rules, the court does have to consider this factor. Collateral estoppel, thus, does not apply as a matter of law.
2	it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or	the conduct has no reasonable purpose other than to delay or prolong the resolution of litigation, in violation of Rule 3.2, or serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another; or	Under the court rules, the court can sanction for a meritorious lawsuit that is undertaken “primarily”, but not entirely, for prohibited purposes. Under attorney disciplinary rules, the court can only sanction if the conduct was ONLY (not primarily) for prohibited purposes Since Judge Becker never had to consider whether the alleged misconduct occurred ONLY with the prohibited purposes in mind, collateral estoppel does not apply as a matter of law
3	it asserts material factual statements that are false	the lawyer knowingly asserts material factual statements that are false	The “knowing” element is lacking from the court rule of frivolous conduct, as opposed to the Attorney disciplinary rule. Judge Becker did not have to consider whether I knew that the statements I was making were false, and because of that, collateral estoppel does  not apply as a matter of law

Sirkin could not possibly apply collateral estoppel to Judge Becker's decision, even if he were an appellate judge and had a right to decide motions in that court (while he is not a judge and does not have such an authority).

Yet, Sirkin did not even attempt to conduct the above comparative analysis of the rules, and "granted the motion" to the Petitioner with a minimum effort, simply enumerating my "sins".

He did not mention that:

(1) In the Family Court case I was right that Judge Becker did not have a valid certificate of election, and Judge Becker later filed a false certificate of election, 9 years after elections of 2002 and when all original petitions and ballots were gone, so there was nothing to do the certification from.  So, Judge Becker was not a lawfully elected judge from 2002 to 2012, and all sanctions are imposed by a lay individual - but that is too explosive an issue to touch for Referee Sirkin.

(2) That Judge Becker had extrajudicial knowledge as to the Family court case that disqualified him from presiding, but he did not disclose that information, and it was not disclosable due to privacy law, until we discovered it by chance in 2013, long after the sanctions were imposed.

(3) That Judge Becker skipped an entire motion in the Torum case - and the Appellate Division affirmed the sanctions, even though, had the motion been reviewed and properly resolved, sanctions were supposed to be imposed on attorney Follender - but he is a judge in the Town of Denning court, so instead I was sanctioned.

(4) That Judge Becker engaged in an ex parte communication with my opponent in Shields v. Carbone, and a transcript of the opponent's admission to that, uncontroverted by Becker, exists - only the Appellate Division did not want to review or even mention it when it affirmed the sanctions.

(5) That in 2012 Becker sent to my home a pre-election flyer where the Plaintiff in Shields v. Carbone endorsed Becker in such a way that it was clear she was Becker's close personal friend - and that was after sanctions were affirmed on appeal.

All of the above, if mentioned (and all that information was in the record) would clearly bar application of collateral estoppel, but Sirkin was appointed to do quite a different job than that dictated by law.

Instead doing his job, Sirkin makes a "Decision" where he falsely claimed that I, without a hearing, "failed to sustain my burden" on rebuttal - when the Petitioner did not even start to present evidence to sustain Petitioner's initial burden.

 Sirkin even manages to punish me for availing myself of the right, guaranteed to me by statute, to stay the effect of any court orders when I file an appeal and post the money into the court's escrow, which I did on all three sanctions in 2011, 1.5 years before the Petition was filed, making the entire Charge IV frivolous, as it was never ripe, and was moot before it was brought.

Sirkin states that:

(1) Charge IV alleges I did not pay the sanctions as ordered by "the court" (or rather, by Judge Becker in retaliation for the lawsuit - see above); that

(2) I "filed appeals" from all orders,

and from these two statements Sirkin makes a leap to state that it is "indisputable" to him that I violated the court order by not immediately paying the sanctions to the Lawyers Protection Fund (which exists only to collect money from lawyers who were involved in fraudulent conduct against their own clients - while I was sanctioned for fighting FOR my clients, but AGAINST a biased judge).

In fact, a statute says that what I did was legal, not that Sirkin cares.

CPLR 5519(a)(2) provides that if I filed an appeal and put in an "undertaking" into escrow, the order to pay sanctions was stayed without a court order.

I did it by the book.

Delaware County Clerk is also court clerk of the Supreme Court for purposes of receiving any filings and any money into escrow of the court trust fund.

Two cases of sanctions were from the Supreme Court.

As to the Family Court case, Judge Becker did not allow the Family Court clerk to accept money from me into the court escrow, the clerk told me that they never do that and that I should file it with the Delaware County Clerk - which I did.

But, to Sirkin, following statutory law when Becker wants me to suffer immediately was wrong.

Let's wait and see whether Sirkin will accept Gasparini's masterpiece and will have the gall of filing this "Referee's Report" with "exhibits" with the court - because that will be a federal crime under RICO, not to mention several state law crimes.

Stay tuned.

It is illegal to jail an attorney for talking about her own disciplinary case - but when did the illegality of what she is doing stop attorney Mary Gasparini?

In 1978 the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) that invalidated the law restricting publication of confidential records
of judicial discipline proceedings on the basis of 1st Amendment and the public's right to know about issues of judicial misconduct discussed in those proceedings.

My disciplinary prosecutor Mary Gasparini was admitted to the bar in 1992.

Attorneys in New York get admitted to the bar at the age of 25-26 y.o. (a New Yorker graduates from high school at 18 + 4 years of college + 3 years of law school plus half a year until admission to the bar in January of the next year after graduation), so that puts her year of birth at around 1966. 

Mary Gasparini was approximately 12 years old when the U.S. Supreme Court case-on-point Landmark Communications Inc. was decided, Mary Gasparini did not even graduate from high school yet, but already learnt how to read (even though the way she acts suggests she lost the skill by now).

And, following the glorious traditions of disciplinary prosecutors in the State of New York, Mary Gasparini apparently lacks intellectual curiosity or due diligence to read applicable cases before attempting to charge people criminally.

May Gasparini attempted to charge me for "criminal contempt of court" for talking about my own disciplinary case on the blog, which is, according to Mary Gasparini, in violation of a court order based on Judiciary Law 90(10) which deems all records of attorney disciplinary proceeding "sealed".

Of course, it is technically impossible to seal all the public records upon disciplinary inquiries and proceedings against attorneys are based, see my blog post here listing mutliple exhibits from my disciplinary cross-motion which are "deemed sealed' by the same court order that Mary Gasparini claims I violated by talking about my disciplinary proceedings.  All of the "deemed sealed" papers remain in open access to the public, and custodians of such papers remain happily unaware that the papers are actually "deemed sealed".

Moreover, the same court where Mary Gasparini practices, NYS Supreme Court, Appellate Division 4th Judicial Department, recently held that Judiciary Law 90(10) has a dual function and protects confidentiality of:

(1) the complainant if there is one in the proceedings (there is no complainant in my disciplinary proceedings, the petition was directly filed by the Committee for Professional Conduct without a complainant, plus the Petition is available on Pacer.gov since the case was removed by me to a federal court and was not sealed by the federal court when it was remanded back to the state court) and

(2) the attorney who is the subject of the disciplinary proceeding, and I have expressly waived my own privacy, as any competent adult in the State of New York can do without any permission from anybody, and requested the court to make my proceedings public.

Yet, despite a precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court on point which was decided before Mary Gasparini graduated from high school, and despite a precedent on point from her own court, the 4th Department, decided 6 years ago, Mary Gasparini rages on in her desire to punish me for violating my own privacy.

Of course, to put me in jail for violating my own privacy is beyond stupid, but when did that stop any government from acting, no matter how stupid and unlawful the action can be?

I guess, my privacy will be better protected in jail - thank you, Mary Gasparini, for your concern about me and my privacy, it is touching...  Even though, as I said before, let me sugar-coat the word a little bit - it is disingenuous (which in legalese means "stupid").   

When the decision-maker and the expert in regulation of the market are market participants - protection of consumers goes out the door

Heard an argument before the U.S. Supreme Court today (see the previous post) for and against using private professionals, market participants, for regulation of the same market.

The case was about teeth whitening and whether it is the practice of dentistry.

The U.S. Supreme Court justices definitely were not experts in dentistry.

Yet,  I heard arguments from the judges about who should regulate neuro-surgeons and why shouldn't neuro-surgeons (experts) regulate neuro-surgeons.

My question to the judges then is - why are they there on that bench and why do they allow themselves to decide a case about regulation of dentistry instead of allowing dentists to get on that bench and decided it for themselves?

The ultimate question, in my opinion, is the distinction between the two groups which are now conflated:

(1) the panel of who decides for the benefit of protection of consumers (which is the whole declared point of occupational licensing);  and

(2) the experts that the panel that is vested with making such decisions use to inform them, as neutral experts, of what they need to know.

That is exactly the same as what is happening in courts.

A judge (like the U.S. Supreme Court justices in this case) is not an expert in dentistry, chemical engineering, dentistry, medicine, whatever is the topic of the case in front of the judge.

(If a judge is an expert in law, and the case is about regulation of lawyers, the judge should not be using his or her expertise, because that will mean utilizing unsworn and un-told testimony of the judge as a witness on behalf of one of the parties.)

Yet, when the judge or the jury, however the case is heard, by a jury trial or by a bench trial, does not have enough knowledge in a particular field to make an informed decision, that is when the party bearing the burden of proof must bring forth before the court a NEUTRAL expert to provide this missing information.

A practitioner in the field is hardly a neutral expert.  For purposes of a case involving occupational licensing, neutral experts would have to be researchers with knowledge in the same field, but with no financial motivation in restricting competition in the profession.

Lawyers are a knowledgeable bunch and they know exactly what is going on and why they want to keep the status quo the way it is.

Unlike a court where both the decision-maker and the expert informing the decision-maker must be neutral, disciplinary proceedings in occupational licensing are where the decision-maker and the expert informing the decision-maker are ONE and NOT NEUTRAL - which is a big anti-trust and anti-competitive problem.

Such a regulatory scheme which is allegedly designed to protect the public, is in fact designed to do the opposite.

In the legal profession, where all judges on the panels regulating lawyers are lawyers themselves who, on expiration of judge's terms or on retirement, will practice law, even though they are not practicing (presumably) at the time of presiding over the proceedings, such judges may not be 100% considered not private market participants, at least with a vested, but delayed interest in restricting competition in their profession for personal gain.

What should be happening in the legal profession is that it should not be regulated at all, since regulation of lawyers by the government strips lawyers of independence when a necessity arises, on behalf of clients, to challenge actions of any of the three branches of the government, and strive to obtain an impartial judicial review of their claims.

The oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court whether market participants appointed to regulate occupational licensing may be deemed private actors for antitrust purposes

This is the case of The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission which has made it all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The essence of the case is that private dentists on the North Carolina Board of Examiners pursued lay individuals engaged in teeth whitening for unauthorized practice of dentistry, and the question is whether that is proper enforcement of state interests or private anticompetitive practices.

The interesting part is that there is an amicus curiae brief filed raising the question that the state bar associations are engaged in the same type of anti-competitive practices as the dental associations.

The case was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court in October of 2014.

Listen to the oral argument - it is quite interesting.  The link to the oral argument in front of the U.S Supreme Court is located here.

The way the legal profession is regulated (at least in New York) is by disciplinary committees where the absolute super-majority of such committees consists of practicing private attorneys, all members of the committees are appointed by the courts without any supervision and in complete discretion, there is no oversight over committee's work and there is no discipline over misconduct of committee's members.

There are no constraints, therefore, to use the membership of the committee for any number of anticompetitive practices rather than for the direct purpose of protecting the public, and what helps that is:

(1) supermajority of the committees are practicing private attorneys;
(2) there is no oversight over appointment of members;
(3) there is no oversight or discipline over conduct of members;
(4) discretion of members to prosecute or not to prosecute is absolute;
(5) members are free to pursue their own competitors and to absolve politically-connected attorneys turned in for prosecution in exchange of accepting them as private clients or law partners.

All of the above hardly characterizes a state regulations, but rather using the state regulatory scheme to promote anti-competitive self-interest of the politically connected private lawyers, to the detriment of the consumers.

Let's see what the U.S. Supreme Court will rule regarding the dentists' case.

The appeal is from the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit affirming the decision of the Federal Trade Commission that the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners illegally thwarted lower-priced competition by engaging in anticompetitive conduct to prevent non-dentists from providing teeth whitening services to consumers in the state.

The amicus brief of LegalZoom and others supporting the position that the practice of the states to use private professionals to regulate other professionals may be regarded as a private tool of quashing competition can be found here.

The amicus brief of the North Carolina bar association supporting the ongoing regulation of the legal profession through the use of private lawyers can be found here.

Another interesting quote suggesting an interesting parallel...

"It was obvious to every unprejudiced observer and to the members of the international press present at the trial during these scenes how nervous the ... leadership has become, and it is impossible to overlook how the court was hopelessly failing to meet the ... expectations and simultaneously to preserve a shred of its own dignity in the public eye".

In my disciplinary case, the "unprejudiced observers" and "the members of the international press" were not allowed into the hearing - and even the hearing was ordered, but not given to me, and the disciplinary prosecutor is now trying to have the court put me in jail for even trying to call public attention to the nightmare of lawlessness that my disciplinary proceedings have become.

And yet, it is still impossible to overlook how the New York State Appellate Division Fourth Judicial Department is, same as described in the quote above, failing to meet the expectation of the judicial and political establishment of the State of New York to have me disbarred and now convicted of a crime I did not commit, after an impeccable record in two countries for over half a century,  and to preserve at the same time a shred of its own dignity in the public eye.

And, for the reference, the quote at the beginning of this post was from the book by Ingo Muller "Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich", 1999, p. 32, but there uncanny parallels, in my opinion, between what is happening in my "Star Chamber" court insulated from any rule of law and any public scrutiny, and what was described of the German judiciary which endorsed their corporate loyalty and loyalty to "the government" of any kind, right or wrong, over the rule of law.

The "Reichstag Fire" trial was at least open to the public, so the Nazi state at the very least attempted to make a pretense of dignity and of an independent and public court proceeding.

In my case, all such pretenses are tossed to the winds, it is Star Chamber and any attempts to reveal what is happening within the Star Chamber are now sought to be punished as a crime, with a punishment of incarceration and criminal record.

"Once the criminal was identified, it was a simple matter to find out what his crime had been" - an interesting quote

A woman in a Nazi Germany "denounced her husband to the Nazis as a defeatist, in order to get him out of the way so that she could pursue a new love affair.  Her action was consistent with wartime Nazi law. But was that really "law"?  ...  Does a law have to be compatible with basic moral conceptions in order to be truly law?  Or is it enough that the body or person exercising control has said that is its or his will?"

Ingo Muller, "Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich", Harvard University Press, 1991, Introduction, p. xvii.

  E.T.A. Hoffman, a judge of the Prussian Supreme Court in the 19th century described the work of police investigations into "subversive activities" in his work "Master Flea":  "..a whole web of arbitrary acts, blatant disregard for the law, [and] personal animosity", id, p. 3.

The tale "Master Flea" describes an investigator who had the following opinion about what comes first - establishing that a person committed a crime or finding a person you want to pin a crime on and pin it:  "When reminded that, after all, a crime had to have been committed for there to be a criminal, Knarrpanti opined that once the criminal was identified, it was a simple matter to find out what his crime had been.  Only a superficial and careless judge would ... not be able to slip into the inquest some small lapse or other on the defendant's part that would justify the arrest", id., pp. 3-4.

Does all of that ring the bell, ladies and gentlemen?

If it does, you should be scared, you should take your heads out of the sand and make sure that your laws in your country can never be subverted the way described above.

Because the legal chimeras that the German legal scholar of the XIXth century described went out of control and grew to become the courts of the Nazi Germany that justified massive genocide by the Nazis.

Once the government starts on the slippery slope of pursuing a person and trying to "pin" upon that person anything the government can find to 'get" that person - and once the courts of that country justify this course of conduct, under various disguises and "legal doctrines' - there is nothing to prevent the slippery slope to further deteriorate into a situation where anything at all that the government does will be endorsed and "legalized" by the courts.

And what happens then, we know only too well from the history of the Nazi Germany.