The Mr. Sunshine who blocked sunshine to the illiterates of Florida - for president?

The "Time" magazine has recently run an article on Jeb Bush, son and brother of two presidents who may run for president in 2016, calling him "Mr. Sunshine".


"TIME" wrote about "Mr. Sunshine's" family (father and brothers are former presidents), political views, aspirations for a possible presidential campaign, nothing singular.

Yet, to me, to call this man "Mr. Sunshine" sounded like an insult.

"Mr. Sunshine" caught my attention recently because he, as the Governor of the State of Florida, signed into law the controversial "5-strikes" statute allowing to impose anti-filing injunctions upon pro se litigants if they lose in court 5 times in a 5-year period.


To me, as a long-time researcher of the subject of access to justice and discrimination against pro se litigants, anti-filing injunctions are unconstitutional as prior speech restraints, as unconstitutional violations of people's right of access to court and as a discrimination against pro se litigants.

Anti-filing injunctions against pro se litigants are especially egregious at a time when, according to statistics, 80% of litigants or more cannot afford legal representation, when the language of the law is extremely complicated to the point that even trained lawyers and judges differ, sometimes drastically, on their interpretation of the same law.

In my experience as an attorney, judges treat pro se litigants with extreme disdain.  Pro se litigants regularly are not invited to court conferences where attorneys of represented parties are invited, are regularly talked down by judges.  Often, the only thing the judge wants to tell a pro se litigant is "go hire an attorney", even if the pro se litigant cannot afford to do that.

With the level of competency, or rather, incompetency of judges that I encounter in my daily practice as an attorney, combined with the attitude of judges toward pro se litigants, I will not be at all surprised if all cases of pro se litigants are marked for dismissal, whether they are good or not, under the "move up or move on" judicial principle, "move up" meaning "appeal" and "move on" meaning "give up".

If a pro se party cannot afford a lawyer to represent him or her in a trial court, most likely he or she will not be able to afford an even more costly and cumbersome appeal - and will not be able to navigate the maze of appellate rules on his/her own.

When that happens, and the deadlines to appeal are past, then the dismissing decision ("adverse decision") in the meaning of the "vexatious litigant" statute becomes final, and the pro se litigant has "waived" his/her right to an appeal.  Of course, how can you "waive" anything when you simply cannot pay for fighting in court, below or on appeal, but that's what it is.

The statute is not concerned with whether the adverse decision against a pro se litigant is correct or incorrect, constitutional or unconstitutional, done with violation of judicial ethics/undisclosed conflicts of interest or not.  Finality trumps fairness every time, and the count of the "5 strikes" is purely technical.

5 adverse decisions against you as a pro se litigant in 5 years - and your right to access to court is even more doomed than before.  "Before" you "just" could not afford an attorney and experienced disdain of judges, "after" you cannot even access the courts and file a grievance with the government (under a fundamental federal constitutional right protected by the Petitions Clause of the 1st Amendment) without permission of an administrative court judge.

Here also comes the possibility of being charged with "contempt of court" if you file a lawsuit without permission, even for an egregious constitutional violation.

The "5 strikes" statute also provide for a "security bond" that a "vexatious" litigant may be required to post in order to gain a right to file a lawsuit at all, including lawsuits involving constitutional issues.

So, let's follow the logic of the statute - the moneyed litigants whose moneyed attorneys are literate (presumably) enough to word lawsuits in such a way that they pass the "meritorious lawsuit" muster with literate (presumably) judges do not need to post security bonds.  It is the illiterate and the poor who cannot afford attorneys in the first place who must pay security to be able to have access to court.

Not only the "5 strikes law" is targeting the percentage of the population who cannot afford an attorney to begin with, which is 20% on average in every state.  Illiterate people are affected by this law even harder than poor, but literate people.

Illiterates can fall victim of the law simply because they do not understand the complicated language of the law and cannot express themselves correctly, while judges, in their disdain to pro se litigants and with their busy caseloads, do not care to give pro se litigants the benefit of the doubt.

To the illiterates, the "5 strikes law" simply prohibits them any hope of access to court, ever.


I understand that for Mr. Sunshine interests of the poor and of the illiterate are too mundane to consider, even if they are his own constituents.

At this time, many if not most states do have vexatious litigant statutes, and such statutes predominantly target pro se litigants.

With that in mind, I pulled some official numbers on illiteracy across the United States and then put those numbers into a table.  For each state, I took three numbers from official sources (National Literacy Survey of 2003, the latest available): 

1. Average illiteracy rate for the state;
2. Lowest illiteracy rate and name of county with the lowest illiteracy rate;
3. Highest illiteracy rate and name of county with the highest illiteracy rate.

I then measured the range between counties with the lowest and the highest illiteracy rates per state.

You know where Mr. Sunshine's state ended up?  

It made the 2nd place among states with highest illiteracy rates.

In Miami-Dade County the level of illiteracy - percent of people lacking "basic literacy skills" was in 2003 52%!!!

Florida ceded the laurels of the biggest loser only to Texas (Mr. Sunshine's brother's state), where there are 65% of illiterate people in Starr County.

The interesting fact about both Florida and Texas is that there are counties in both of these states with illiteracy levels of just 7%, a difference of 58% for Texas and 45% for Florida.

Think about it! More than half of population of one county is illiterate in Florida (2/3s in Texas), where the Bush brothers make their homes.

And in both "Bush" states (and in New York, by the way, from where yet another presidential contender, Mr. Cuomo, hales) the average percent of illiterates in the populations is about the same as the percent of people who cannot afford an attorney.

So, to eliminate those pesky pro se illiterates from court proceedings completely appear to be the unspoken purpose of the "5 strikes" statutes signed into law by Mr. Sunshine.

For the legislators in Florida who undoubtedly belong to the literate part of population, to introduce and for "Mr. Sunshine" to sign into law a statute that bars access to court of the poor and the illiterate is not only unconstitutional - it is simply disgusting, completely and utterly disgusting.

Mr. Sunshine blocked from access to court the most underprivileged of his constituents - the illiterate people.

One can only guess what kind of laws he can sign into law on a bigger - presidential scale.

Good job, Mr. Sunshine, you will make a great president!

Name of state	Average % of illiteracy	Lowest % of illiteracy	Highest % of illiteracy	Range	The "most literate county"	The "most illiterate county"
Texas	19	7	65	58	Randall County, Roberts County	Starr County
Florida	20	7	52	45	St. Johns County	Miami-Dade
New York	22	7	46	39	Ontario County	Queens County
Arizona	13	9	45	36	Coconino County	Santa Cruz County
New Jersey	17	6	37	31	Sussex County	Hudson County
Idaho	11	7	37	30	Ada County	Clark County
Georgia	17	8	36	28	Fayette County, Forsyth County	Atkinson County
New Mexico	16	5	33	28	Los Alamos County	Luna County
Washington	10	6	34	28	Island County, San Juan County	Franklin County
Alabama	15	7	34	27	Shelby	Bullock
California	23	7	34	27	El Dorado County	Colusa County
Kansas	8	5	32	27	Thomas County	Seward County
Louisiana	16	8	29	21	St. Tammany Parish	East Carroll Parish
Massachusetts	10	4	25	21	Barnstable County	Suffolk County
Mississippi	16	9	30	21	Lamar County	Jefferson County
Alaska	9	7	27	20	Juneau Borough, Sitka Borough	Aleutians East Borough
Colorado	10	5	25	20	Clear Creek County	Costilla County
North Carolina	14	8	28	20	Dare County	Halifax County
Virginia	12	6	26	20	Poquoson city, York County	Greensville County
South Carolina	15	10	29	19	Lexington County	Allendale County
Tennessee	13	6	25	19	Williamson County	Henderson County
Arkansas	14	9	26	17	Saline County	Lee County
Maryland	11	6	22	16	Anne Arundel County	Prince George's County
Nebraska	7	5	21	16	Banner County	Colfax County
Oklahoma	12	8	24	16	Cleveland County, Garfield County, Rogers County	Texas County
North Dakota	6	5	20	15	Burleigh County, Cass County	Emmons County, McIntosh County
Pennsylvania	13	7	22	15	Chester County	Philadelphia County
Kentucky	12	7	21	14	Fayette County	Clay County
Oregon	10	7	20	13	Benton County, Clackamas County	Morrow County
Missouri	7	4	16	12	Platte County	Pemiscot County
West Virginia	13	10	22	12	Jefferson County, Putnam County	McDowell County
Illinois	13	5	15	10	Monroe County	Alexander County
Nevada	16	8	18	10	Douglas County	Clark County
Ohio	9	4	13	9	Delaware County	Adams County, Franklin County, Holmes County, Vinton County
South Dakota	7	5	14	9	Hughes County	Buffalo County
Hawaii	16	12	20	8	Kauai County	Kalawao County
Indiana	8	5	13	8	Hamilton County, Hancock County	Elkhart County
Iowa	7	5	13	8	Johnson County	Buena Vista County
Michigan	8	4	12	8	Livingston County	Wayne County
Minnesota	6	4	12	8	Carver County	Watonwan County
Wisconsin	7	4	11	7	Ozaukee County, Waukesha County	Menominee County
Rhode Island	8	5	11	6	Bristol County, Newport County, Washington County	Providence County
Vermont	7	5	11	6	Chittenden County	Essex County
Connecticut	9	5	10	5	Middlesex County	Fairfield County
Montana	9	7	12	5	Lewis and Clark County	Big Horn County, Golden Valley County, Lincoln County, Mineral County, Sanders County, Wibaux County
Utah	9	7	12	5	Davis County, Morgan County, Summit County	Beaver County, Duchesne County, San Juan County
Maine	7	6	10	4	Cumberland County	Aroostook County, Somerset County, Washington County
New Hampshire	6	5	9	4	Rockingham County	Coos County
Wyoming	9	7	11	4	Teton County	Big Horn County, Carbon County, Platte County
Delaware	11	10	13	3	New Castle County	Kent County
District of Columbia	19	19	19	0

A second complaint has been filed against Judge Mary Work of Ulster County Surrogate's Court, for retaliation and harassment after the 1st complaint filed September 4, 2014

On December 30, 2014 I withdrew from two court cases in Ulster County where Judge Mary Work was and still is the presiding judge.

I did it on consent of my former client, by filing and serving notarized consents to change counsel in accordance with New York CPLR 321(b), as required by law.

No permission of the court is necessary when an attorney withdraws on consent of the client.  By operation of law I am no longer the attorney of record in those two cases from the moment my consents were filed with the court.  

Yet, today I received a phone call from Judge Work's clerk's office where Judge Work's employee, after acknowledging that I did file notarized consent to change attorney with Jduge Work's court, still claimed that Judge Work "did not relieve me" from the case, that there will be a conference about it,  that I need to accept a fax from the court about it or have the case read to me.

I indicated to Judge Work's employee that I am no longer attorney of record by operation of law, no matter what Judge Work says, pursuant to CPLR 321(b), and that I cannot appear in any further proceedings, as my client has relieved me.

Judge Work's employee continued to claim that Judge Work still issued some directives to me in a letter, which I, once again, refused to accept by fax or by having it read to me.

Judge Work must know the law, she is not a novice on the bench.  

She must know that a consent to change counsel filed with the court ends representation of an attorney, and the court has no power to bring a private attorney back in.  I was not assigned, I was retained, I was relieved, and that's the end of it.

My point is - why is Judge Work so desperate to have me, and not another attorney, or not my former client pro se, in this case, even after I left the case?

Combined with what Judge Work's said in the joint order of November 17, 2014 covering two proceedings which could not be merged or disclosed to one another's parties, I truly believe that Judge Work is retaliating against me and against my now former client for making the motions to recuse and especially for complaining against her to the Commission for Judicial Conduct.  

Since this appears to become a pattern in New York where New York judges engage in a course of retaliation if a motion to recuse is filed, no matter how well founded and supported the motion is, I felt it my obligation to file a 2nd complaint with the New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct about misconduct of Judge Work and requested to protect my now former client from Judge Work's retaliation.

By the way, this is not the first time when Judge Work manipulated with consents to change counsel specifically with me and this particular client.

In yet another court (the third court) Judge Work issued a decision ignoring my pleadings and claiming that I did not file a consent to change counsel to come into the case, while not only I filed and served such a consent, but I saw it in judge Work's Family Court's file, and the filing of that Consent to Change Counsel was the only reason why I was not only given access to the file, but was allowed into the back room in the Ulster County Family Court's office to make my own copies of the file.

It appears that Judge Work manipulates consents to change counsel, she ignores them when she does not want a certain attorney to be in a case or wants to ignore her pleadings, or, in my case, she wants to keep me in the case to keep retaliating against me and my former client, even though I left the case on my former client's consent.

The valiant New York State Bar Association and the Sgt. Schultz defense - see no evil, hear no evil

In 2009, New York State Bar Association surveyed 51 jurisdictions (all the states of the U.S. and the District of Columbia) to verify what kind of discovery, if any, U.S. jurisdictions provide to attorneys in attorney disciplinary proceedings.

On June 4, 2009, after the full survey, the NYSBA came up with the following results (I reduced the results into a table for convenience of reading) :

Group1	Group2	Group3
8 states and 3 out of 4 NYS departments appear to afford little to no discovery (page 5)	6 states and 1 NYS App. Div. Judicial Department “appear to provide” for “limited discovery” (certain kind of document production and witness information, but no express provision for depositions by respondent attorney)	35 states and the District of Columbia appear to provide for a fair amount of discovery (some states make their regular civil rules of procedure fully applicable to attorney disciplinary proceedings)
1.     Nevada 2.     South Dakota 3.     Kansas 4.     Virginia 5.     Delaware 6.     Connecticut 7.     Massachusetts 8.     Rhode Island 9.     NYD AD1st 10.NYD AD3d 11.NYD AD4th	·         Colorado ·         Hawaii ·         Tennessee ·         Michigan ·         Pennsylvania ·         New Jersey ·         NYS AD2d	·         Wyoming ·         Texas ·         New Mexico ·         Idaho ·         Montana ·         Wisconsin ·         Oregon ·         West Virginia ·         Washington ·         Alaska ·         Maine ·         Utah ·         California ·         Arizona ·         North Dakota ·         Oklahoma ·         Nebraska ·         Missouri ·         Arkansas ·         Louisiana ·         Iowa ·         Minnesota ·         North Carolina ·         South Carolina ·         Mississippi ·         Florida ·         Indiana ·         Illinois ·         Kentucky ·         Georgia ·         District of Columbia ·         Alabama ·         Ohio ·         New Hampshire ·         Maryland ·         Vermont

Furthermore, the NYSBA has found in the same survey that New York belongs to the 16 "winner" states who do not expressly apply evidentiary rules to attorney disciplinary proceedings.  The "winners" are:

• ·         Hawaii
• ·         New Jersey
• ·         New York
• ·         Alaska
• ·         Massachusetts
• ·         New Hampshire
• ·         Ohio
• ·         Pennsylvania
• ·         Connecticut
• ·         Washington
• ·         Kansas
• ·         California
• ·         Oregon
• ·         South Dakota
• ·         Mississippi
• ·         District of Columbia

Nor does New York allow the attorney a public hearing unless it is "allowed" by the court for "good cause shown", so, as I wrote here before, competent adults (attorneys) must ask court's permission to waive their own privacy, a unique situation.

After making all these findings, NYSBA stated that it does not really consider it necessary to change the status quo in New York, but if New York gets around to do that, then NYSBA advises New York to change its rules like the majority of states already did.

No statement that stripping attorneys in disciplinary proceedings of basic rights afforded in other parties in litigation in the same state, such as:

• discovery (paper discovery, subpoena power for pretrial depositions and at the trial);
• applicability of evidentiary rules (exclusion of hearsay, for example);
• public due process hearings

attorneys are deprived of very basic constitutional protections, making the whole attorney disciplinary process unconstitutional.

No, our valiant New York State Bar Association simply stated - if New York decides to come around to change the existing rules (or lack thereof), then it would be advisable to do it as the majority of our neighbors already did, otherwise, changes are not really necessary.

A classic Sgt. Schultz conclusion - see no evil, hear no evil, even when that evil is screaming in your face, according to your own findings.

The new disciplinary rules - that afford no discovery, subpoena power, evidentiary rules or public hearings to attorneys - were introduced on April 1, 2009.

Within 2 months time the New York State Bar Association surveyed 51 U.S. jurisdictions as to availability of procedural rights to attorneys in disciplinary proceedings, verified that New York belongs to the handful of the minority of states that do not provide any such rights - and did NOTHING about it, moreover, stated in the conclusions that no action is necessary to change the status quo.

How can the public rely upon zealous representation by attorneys whose association cannot even fight for equal rights of its members with the rest of New York population?

Menaces to society are not entitled to the rule of law

I described in this blog that I removed my disciplinary case to federal court, and it was remanded back on grounds of "lack of jurisdiction" (because the unfairness I was claiming was not racially-based) and because of the so-called "Younger abstention" (meaning that the federal court considered that the state court is competent and able to resolve my federal constitutional issues).

How the "competent court" has resolved my federal constitutional issues, I also described in this blog, but I will provide a brief summary once again.

The initial disciplinary court, the 3rd Department, entered into an ex parte communication with the prosecutors, issued an ex parte order of transfer of my disciplinary proceedings combined somehow with my husband's disciplinary proceedings (which concluded 3 years ago) to the 4th Department and blocked my access to the prosecutor's "application" for such a transfer that was never served upon me or my husband, for that matter.

The ex parte order with a caption including both me and my husband was the first time I saw my husband's name included into my disciplinary proceedings.  Apparently, the court does not have a clear picture who is being prosecuted, and it did not care.

The 4th Department court, after not receiving the full record from the 3rd Department and refusing to stay proceedings until the full record is provided by the 3rd Department, denied my federal constitutional claims without an explanation, once on a cross-motion, and the second time on a motion as of right to vacate, renew and reargue.  

After my motion to vacate, renew and reargue demanding, among other things, a reasoned decision on my cross-motion raising federal constitutional claims that were remanded on the Younger abstention from federal court, the 4th Department not only once again denied my motion without an explanation, reasoning or analysis, but also imposed upon me an anti-filing injunction without an explanation, reasoning or legal analysis - meaning that I may not, without court's permission, make another motion to the court.  

Enough of my pesky motions.  Enough of those pesky constitutional claims.  And enough of my pesky claims that I am entitled at least to a reasoning as to why my well-researched and pled constitutional claims are denied.

Now I am faced with a hearing.

Of course, it is a wonder as to how that hearing was even ordered since the prosecutor's motion for a summary judgment is still pending and is unresolved. 

I will have a hearing under the following conditions:

(1) the referee who the court refused to disqualify, is old, in my perception based on how he handled a trial conference, he has memory problems, and, most importantly, is not qualified by statute providing for clear requirements to qualifications of referees;

(2) I am not entitled to discovery;

(3) I am not entitled to send out witness subpoenas;

(4) the Department where the hearings are going to be held is located over 100 miles away from where the main witnesses are located, thus blocking for me any possibility for calling them even if I had subpoena power;

(5) New York State and 4th Department do not explicitly provide that evidentiary rules apply to such proceedings;

(6) I am not entitled to a jury trial;

(7) I am not entitled to even a public proceeding, as the court records were sealed under the statute that is supposed to protect my privacy, but, when I waived it, is now used by the court to protect itself and the prosecution from embarrassment and to intimidate me with the threat of contempt of court if I do publish the "sealed" court records, including those records which are in public domain and were not sealed are they were originally filed.


The federal court which was remanding the case back to the state court for a "fair determination", knew all of that.

Of course, in a federal civil rights litigation, I would have been entitled to:

(1) full discovery;
(2) a public trial by jury;
(3) rules of evidence fully applicable to all proceedings;
(4) reasoned decisions on constitutional issues
(5) strict rules as to how motions for a summary judgment can be brought (here, the prosecution first brought a motion for a summary judgment, without providing proof for their claims, and then the court rescued the prosecution by ordering a hearing while the motion for a summary judgment is still pending, which would NEVER have happened in federal court).

Attorney disciplinary proceedings are considered civil proceedings in New York.

There is no question that in other civil proceedings, litigants are entitled to public hearings, discovery, applicability of evidentiary rules and the CPLR, and to reasoned decisions on fundamental issues.

Since I am an attorney - and, "coincidentally", an attorney who criticizes judicial misconduct, and has been doing it for years - I am not entitled to any of the due process protections that normally must be afforded to litigants.

It is beyond the point to list attorneys who were engaged in: 

• "robo-signing" in foreclosures;
• ex parte communications with judges;
• filing (like my prosecutors) fraudulent charges and prosecuting them, with vigor, in several courts.

As long as you do not "cross the line", do the "taboo" thingy, say the "taboo" words "judicial misconduct" and especially if you do not make motions to recuse judges, do not speak out against pervasive judicial misconduct in our court system, contribute to election campaigns and private seminars of judges, wine and dine judges through "mentoring" programs, marry and befriend judges - you will be just fine with your law license.

The only attorneys that the public apparently must be protected from, and at its own expense (consider over 2 years of my disciplinary proceedings on fraudulent charges), appear to be civil rights attorneys seeking to protect that same public from official misconduct, including misconduct of judges and powerful attorneys.  

That is the same public where 80% of it cannot afford an attorney.  Yet, the same public can afford funding disciplinary proceedings on fraudulent charges to eliminate those few attorneys who are not afraid to do their jobs, be faithful to their oath of office and zealously and independently protect constitutional rights of their clients, and, as one of the most important of those rights - their right to an impartial judicial review.

To these menaces to society, such as I am, no normal rules of litigation should apply - because, if such rules would apply, prosecution would have to lose, and that cannot be tolerated.

A court permission to waive your own privacy?

I wrote on this blog about the order of December 17, 2014 "sealing" the order itself and the papers upon which it was made, including open public records from other courts and open newspaper articles.

In attorney disciplinary proceedings, the privacy that is protected is the ATTORNEY's privacy, and that privacy should be waiveable at attorney's WISH.  

Yet, since the December 17, 2014 order talked about "sealing" and "confidentiality", I had to make sure that I do not violate the court order if I actually publish it - and any papers it is based on.  Of course, the court has no right to seal public records from other courts, or newspaper articles in open access, or any other open-access records from third parties, without notification of the custodians or authors of such records.

I tested whether the December 17, 2014 order was, in fact, a "gag order" against me and an attempt of the court to close the courtroom from the public and the media and protect itself and the prosecutor from public scrutiny in a highly sensitive and politically charged case.

In my letter to the court I asked, politely, to unseal any records of my disciplinary proceedings and make them open to the public.  Since confidentiality of attorney disciplinary proceeding is for purposes of protecting my privacy, my privacy can be waived for the asking.  And I asked , in my letter, which is, in my view, all that is needed. 

Rules as to necessity of motions to "unseal" disciplinary records of attorneys are made for the benefit of attorneys and are directed at third parties, not attorneys themselves.  Apparently, that was not the view of the court.

The court replied to me in a letter that if I want to unseal the records of my own disciplinary proceedings, I need to do it on a motion, after filing a filing fee of $45, and the court will grant it only if there is "a good cause shown".

In other words, according to the court, it is not my call to waive my own privacy, it is the court's discretion, to allow me only "for good cause shown".

What is this "good cause shown", nobody knows.

The court did not concern itself with the issue that the only requirement for a person to be able to waive HER OWN privacy is to be a COMPETENT ADULT.

A licensed attorney is PRESUMABLY a competent adult.

In fact, any adult is considered competent under New York law unless adjudicated by a court incompetent.

There was never an adjudication (naturally) that I am incompetent.

Thus, under New York law, I can waive my own privacy without requesting anybody's permission.

(By the way, even incompetent adults do not need permission of a court to waive their own privacy, their guardian's permission is enough).

Apparently, that is not what the disciplinary court believes, and the reason why the disciplinary court's "beliefs" are contrary to existing New York law is, apparently, the highly political nature of the proceedings and the court's desire to protect itself and the disciplinary attorneys from public exposure into their procedures allegedly designed to protect that same public.  

To make motions to a court that denies motions, even on fundamental constitutional issues, without an explanation, reasoning or analysis, is an exercise in futility.  I am not going to be paying the state of New York money in filing fees and making motions ASKING the court to allow me to waive my own privacy when, once again, the condition precedent for me to waive such privacy without anybody's permission is simply to be a competent adult and simply DO it - and I did.

It is interesting to mention that the court "graciously" allowed me to file a motion to unseal the records that are going to be used in the disciplinary proceedings up and until February 6, 2014, without staying hearings in my proceedings.

Yet, hearings in my proceedings will have to be concluded, by order of the same court, by the same date of February 6, 2014.

Moreover, even if I make a motion now, the court, most likely, will not decide it until the proceedings will be over (judging by how much time it took to decide my previous motions), and the issue whether the public and the media should have been allowed into the courtroom, will be then declared "moot" by the court and will be an issue for appellate review.

Of course, I will insist that waiving my own privacy in attorney disciplinary proceedings and inviting members of the public and the press into the courtroom is my due process right that should be available to me for the asking (and I already asked, in a letter to the court) - and it is certainly not subject of the court's discretion "for good cause shown", nor should it be subject to any motion practice.

Courts keep generating more and more materials for my book on disciplinary proceedings in New York.  

I wonder if people who write such letters ever think what kind of "trace" in history they are leaving.  An infamous trace.

West Virginia joined the states punishing attorneys for criticism of judges, 1st Amendment be damned

Wouldn't you want to live in a dream world where you can eliminate your critics by taking away their licenses? 

Then, run for a judge and you can do it to your heart's desire, the 1st Amendment be doomed. 

West Virginia joins the states that discipline attorneys for criticism of judges - even though such criticism is a statement on the issue of grave public concern (integrity of a public officer), is in the core values protected by the 1st Amendment, an attorney has a duty to assure his or her client's right to an impartial adjudication (a fundamental constitutional right, by the way), discovery of judges' backgrounds in most states is unavailable, so the rules of judicial conduct require judges to recuse if there is even an APPEARANCE of impropriety. An appearance of impropriety is measured by a person's reasonable PERCEPTION. 

Yet, for purposes of discipline, a West Virginia judge required from an attorney FACTUAL BASIS for his statements and not reasonable perception. 

Thus, the right to an impartial adjudication of the litigant, and the right of the litigant to effective, independent, zealous and fearless representation was trumped by the fact that the objects of the criticism (judges) hold the livelihood of the critics (attorneys) in their hands. And in viciously pursuing such critics to the bitter end, revocation of their licenses, judges do not care whether they violate the U.S. Constitution which gave them the power to sit on that bench in the first place.

The interesting detail is that the disciplining judge, Justice Margaret L. Workman stated while disciplining the attorney that "the interests sought to be protected by the attorney disciplinary system require a less stringent standard than the actual standard", and with this statement Justice Workman rejected the attorney's 1st Amendment challenge.

I wonder if Judge Workman is aware of the concept of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution with the resulting pre-emption rule of federal law over inconsistent state law.  She should be aware of that clause, since she, as every judge in this country, took office swearing an oath of office as a pledge to uphold the U.S. Constitution, together with the Supremacy Clause and the 1st Amendment.

While the judge made a statement about the interests the attorney disciplinary proceedings sought to protect, there is no indication the judge paid attention to the interests the 1st Amendment was seeking to protect.

In fact, the higher the stigma and the consequences for the litigant, the higher should be the standards of protection, not the lower, as judge Workman stated.

But, of course, when "the interests sought to be protected" in this particular case, to shield judges from the most knowledgeable, capable, credible and eloquent critics - the attorneys who know what is going on in court better than the occasional litigant and whose statements would thus be believed by the public - those self-serving interests of the class of the judiciary, which class included Judge Workman herself, of course, trump everything, including the U.S. Constitution the judge pledged to uphold.

Following the logic of the judge, that the higher the government's interests in the proceedings, the lower should be the standards of defense afforded to litigants, criminal defendants should not be afforded any protections at all, because of the interests the state has - to protect the public from crimes.  Yet, the law is quite the opposite - the higher the possibility of a stigma and the graver the consequences to the litigant in terms of potential loss of civil rights, the higher should be procedural and substantive protection for the litigant, and NOBODY in this country, including judges, has authority to cancel protections of the U.S. Constitution, in ANY proceeding, for ANY reason.

Actually, when the government seeks to take away people's fundamental rights, such as, in the attorney disciplinary cases, a right to earn a living in the chosen profession and calling, an elevated standard of scrutiny, the so-called strict scrutiny, is applied by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Judge Workman should do a refresher course in constitutional law before being allowed on the bench since she demonstrated incompetence in constitutional law that would have garnered her a failing grade in law school and on a bar exam.  But - when you already made it to the bench, competence is not important any more, is it, as long as you can wield your power they way you want it?

The interests that the attorney disciplinary proceedings are sought to protect is - to protect the public from attorneys who are unfit to practice.  The lawyer was disciplined, on the opposite, for attempt to protect  his client and assure for his client an impartial judge.  Shielding judges from criticism, rightful or wrongful, is not within the purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings and attorney disciplinary proceedings should not be used as a sword wielded by the judiciary against its critics rather than for the true protection of the public.

An attorney should never be disciplined for attempting to do his job right, the way he understands it.

Independence of court representation is the cornerstone of democracy, much more important than super-sensitive sensibilities of judges who should not take this office if their temper cannot withstand criticism without lashing out against critics.