Should these 14 New York Senators be impeached for voting in favor of a legislation that benefited them financially and protected the market of their professional services?

Recently a legislation was passed in New York State enhancing unauthorized practice of law from a misdemeanor to a felony.


According to my research of public records, 14 New York Senators whom I name in the table below voted for this legislation, legislation that enhanced restrictions to the market where they continue to provide professional services. 


Therefore, these New York Senators had a material interest in the legislation they were voting for - to restrict competition to their business - and should not have voted at all.


It is interesting to mention that what exactly constitutes the practice of law remains undefined, and thus is subject to selective and arbitrary enforcement. 


Yet, these 14 attorney-senators made sure that this vague and undefined activity must be now punished as a felony (1 1/3 to 4 years in state prison + fines and prohibition to vote and have firearms) rather than a misdemeanor (up to 1 year in the local jail + fines).

The data in the table below was compiled by me from two public websites - the website of the New York State Legislature as to the voting records for this particular statute, and the website of the New York State Court Administration as to registration statuses and information for senators-attorneys.


It is for the public to decide whether the senators who use New York Legislature to get benefits for their business should be impeached, thrown out of office and disciplined as attorneys for conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession.

No.	Name of Senator-attorney	Attorney Reg. No.	Admitted to practice law in NY	Judiciary Committee Vote - Mar 1, 2011	Floor Vote, Mar 7, 2011	Judiciary Committee Vote  – Jan 18, 2012	Floor Vote – May 1, 2012
1.	Breslin,Neil D. ( in private practice, Hiscock & Barclay)	1431972	1972	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye
2.	DeFrancisco, John A. (private practice, DEFRANCISCO & FALGIATANO) (co-sponsor)	1374495	1972	Aye		Aye
3.	Flanagan, John J., (in private practice, FORCHELLI, CURTO, DEEGAN, SCHWARTZ, MINEO, COHN & TERRNA, LLP.)	2433803	1991	Aye		Aye
4.	Gianaris, Michael N.	2598399	1994	Aye		Aye
5.	Lanza, Andrew J.	2550093	1993	Aye		Aye
6.	LaValle, Kenneth P (in solo private practice)	2554574	1993	Aye		Aye
7.	Little, Elizabeth E. (in private practice, LITTLE & O'CONNOR ATTORNEYS, P.C.)	2528818	1993	Aye		Aye
8.	Nozzolio, Michael F. (in private practice, NOZZOLIO LAW OFFICES C/O HARRIS BEACH PLLC)	1818814	1980	Aye		Aye
9.	O’Mara, Thomas F. (in private practice, DAVIDSON & O'MARA, P.C.  243 LAKE ST)	2479269	1992	Aye		Aye
10.	Perkins, William P. (in private practice, WILLIAM PHILLIP PERKINS   SEYFARTH SHAW LLP)	2843191	1997	Aye		Aye
11.	Ranzenhofer, Michael H. (in private practice, FRIEDMAN & RANZENHOFER PC  PO BOX 31)	1765411	1980	Aye		Aye
12.	Saland, Stephen M. (co-sponsor, in solo private practice)	1634526	1969	Aye		Aye
13.	Zeldin, Lee M. (in solo private practice)	4195053	2004	Aye		Aye
14.	Adams, Eric R. (in solo private practice)	1786243	1978			Aye

Ethical obligations and sweet dreams of Attorney James Ranous, the Deputy Clerk of the Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department

My first question to Mr. Ranous, the Deputy Clerk of the Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department - do you sleep well at night?

Does your conscience bother you?

At least a little bit?

Well, it should.

The Rules of Professional Conduct, applicable to all attorneys, including you, Mr. Ranous, provide that an attorney must (I stress it, must, this is not a discretionary option) report attorney misconduct or judicial misconduct that an attorney knows about.

That may just as well include misconduct of the attorney's employer, no matter how powerful, no matter what consequences to the attorney.

That is a duty that the Rules of Professional Conduct impose upon the members of the legal profession for the protection of the public.

I've written in this blog that the NYS Appellate Division Third Department engaged in an ex parte communication with the Committee for Professional Conduct the moment I mentioned in federal court on my husband's behalf that I am seeking to see the voting record in my husband's disciplinary case and engage an authenticity expert, especially in view of the recent "resignation"of three attorneys from the Committee among investigation regarding investigation for allegedly filing false time sheets.

When the court employing Mr. Ranous engaged in an ex parte communication with the Committee about a CLOSED case and transfer documents sought through a federal lawsuit, what did Mr. Ranous do?

Did he report attorney misconduct?

No.

Did he report judicial misconduct?

No.

Here is the entire correspondence between my husband and the Appellate Division (posted with my husband's permission) that started after the Appellate Division suddenly transferred an long-closed case to the 4th Department, "coincidentally" did it right after I raised in federal court the issue of authenticity and availability of documents in the Committee and did it without showing the application for such an order of transfer to my husband or myself as his attorney.

Document 1.  The ex parte order of transfer.  My husband's case was concluded on July 7, 2011 with the resulting loss of jurisdiction by the court and the Committee.  My case was commenced in January 2013.  My husband's case and my case were never merged (consolidated).  Neither my husband nor I were ever served with the application for this order.

Document 2.  My husband's first letter in response to the ex parte order requesting to disclose authority upon which the order was made and to provide copies of documents upon which the order was granted and documents which were transferred to the 4th Department.

Document 3.  First obnoxious answer by Mr. Ranous ignoring the request for copies of documents.

Document 4.  My husband's second letter to Mr. Ranous repeating his request for copies of documents upon which the ex parte order was granted and copies of documents which were transferred

Document 5.   Mr. Ranous's second obnoxious reply to my husband arrogantly telling Mr. Neroni that Mr. Ranous "was directed to advise" Mr. Neroni that his request "for a copy of all proceedings resulting in this Court's order of June 11, 2014 and for copies of documents transferred has been denied".  

Just like that - denied without an explanation who "directed" Mr. Ranous to answer in this manner, on what grounds or for what reasons.

Today I've read the new lawsuit by Leon Koziol against the Appellate Division Third Department and the Committee for Professional Conduct a portion of which I publish herein (parts of pages 1 and 25):

Document 6.  The first page of Mr. Koziol's federal lawsuit showing names of defendants.

Document 7.   Part of page 25 of Mr. Koziol's federal lawsuit showing that the Appellate Division Third Department engaged in an ex parte communication with the Committee, attorneys Duffy and Zayas, in 2012 and denied Mr. Koziol access to the important documents upon which the court relied in denying him his application for reinstatement of his law license, a constitutionally protected interest.

Document 8.  Part of page 25 of  Mr. Koziol's federal lawsuit showing that Mr. Koziol's second application for reinstatement of his law license was denied because of his political activity protected by the 1st Amendment, posts on his website and anti corruption testimony before the Moreland Commission. 

Document 9.  Part of page 19 of Mr. Koziol's federal lawsuit referenced in Document 8 above.

Document 10.  Part of page 9 of Mr. Koziol's federal lawsuit referenced in document 9 above.


Statements by Mr. Koziol, together with documents from my own and my husband's cases, including my husband's federal lawsuit for access to his own disciplinary file, show clearly that the 3rd Department and the Committee for Professional Standard treat disciplinary proceedings as their own personal fiefdom, do not feel restricted by any rule of law, engage in ex parte communications as a matter of custom and engage in retaliation for pubic criticism of misconduct within the court system also as a matter of custom.

An attorney working within the system, knowing of such misconduct, is obligated by Rules of Professional Conduct to report such misconduct.

In my husband's case Mr. Ranous did the opposite.

He participated in the cover-up and arrogantly told my husband that he was "advised" by an unknown individual that my husband's request of access to the ex parte application to transfer his file 5 hours away from him was denied (see Document 5 above) - no explanations, no grounds, no authority - denied and that's it.

One more example showing that the Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the government or friends or relatives of government officials. 

One more example of why attorney licensing do not protect the public, but only protects public officials for accountability for misconduct by giving them power to quash investigation and prosecution against themselves, as well as instill fear in the legal profession and the public by retaliation targeting critics and exterminating their reputation and livelihood.

Once again, so much for the rule of law in the state of New York.

And Mr. Ranous - I return to my initial question - how do you sleep at night?  Any pangs from your conscience?

Didn't think so.

Does it matter who is standing in front of the court when the court decides the issue of standing? In NYS Appellate Division 3rd Department, it does.

On December 13, 2012 the NYS Appellate Division Third Judicial Department decided a case O'Sullivan v. Hallock.


One of the defendants in that civil court case between private parties, siblings, for the allegations of wrongful death of their father and fraud in connection with the estate of their father, was Peter Bracci, political supporter of Delaware County Judge Carl F. Becker, the then Supervisor of the Town of Delhi and the then Supervisor in the Delaware County Board of Supervisors of the Department of Social Services, Judge Becker's pet and client of 27 years.


Another defendant, Mary Bracci Hallock, was Judge Becker's former client herself.


Representing the defendants was the then Assistant Delaware County Attorney (and now the Delaware County Attorney) Porter Kirkwood who was seen engaging in conversations behind the courthouse with Judge Becker during the pendency of the O'Sullivan v. Hallock proceedings.


Porter Kirkwood was at that time a full-time employee of Delaware County and represented these private defendants in court on county time.


It is the same Porter Kirkwood who appears in front of Judge Becker on behalf of the County in child neglect and abuse cases in Delaware County Family Court.


It is the same Porter Kirkwood who, according to witnesses and federal court litigation, controls access of citizens to their own files in Delaware County Family Court and to the files of applicants for gun licenses, something that Porter Kirkwood cannot control but which he nevertheless controls.


Carl F. Becker nonchalantly presided over the case where he had glaring conflicts of interest and ruled that Barbara O'Sullivan has no standing to sue because she was not the executor of her father's estate.


Admittedly, Barbara O'Sullivan was not the executor of her father's estate when she sued.


Nevertheless, Porter Kirkwood who represented Barbara O'Sullivan's siblings, neglected to raise the issue of standing in his pre-answer motion to dismiss or answer, and thus, under the existing New York State law, waived the issue.


Judge Becker rescued a paying case for his former colleague, subordinate attorney and, apparently, friend, by dismissing Barbara O'Sullivan's case for lack of standing where the issue was obviously waived through the neglect of Porter Kirkwood as an attorney.


The Appellate Division affirmed Judge Becker's dismissal on the grounds of standing.


That was on December 13, 2012.


On July 3, 2014 that same Appellate Division 3rd Department reversed the decision of Judge John F. Lambert, of the same Delaware County Supreme Court, on the same issue of standing.


In its decision, Town of Delhi v. Telian, the Appellate Division correctly stated that the issue of standing is waived unless raised in an answer or pre-answer motion to dismiss, which the respondent allegedly failed to do.


Of course, the difference was that, according to the federal lawsuit filed by Mr. Telian on July 29, 2014 in the Northern District of New York, Mr. Telian was not the record owner of the property in question and could not possibly be sued for filing to obtain building permits, on that property so Judge Lambert was indeed correct in dismissing the action - even though the dismissal would be not for lack of standing, but for failure to state a claim.  The Appellate Division could, in its own discretion, dismiss that case as against Mr. Telian, for failure to state a claim, even if Judge Lambert did not dismiss it on that particular ground, simple as a matter of justice, due process and judicial economy.


Instead, the Appellate Division reversed Judge Lambert's dismissal and remanded the case for consideration of a motion for a summary judgment against Mr. Telian, a completely frivolous motion in view of the fact that Mr. Telian was not the owner of the property in question.


Now - the Appellate Division follows the law of standing, to a fault, when somebody who is attacking a judge's friend is involved.


The same Appellate Division would not follow that same law when following it would expose that same friend of that same judge to an embarrassing lawsuit.


Why am I not surprised?

A new civil rights lawsuit was filed in NDNY court by a suspended attorney alleging secrecy and ex parte communications between the Appellate Division Third Judicial Department and its Attorney Grievance Committee. Why am I not surprised?

On July 29, 2014, a federal civil rights lawsuit has been filed by a suspended attorney Leon Koziol in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York.


In the lawsuit Mr. Koziol, a former successful civil rights attorney (what a coincidence! - do they suspend any attorneys other than civil rights attorneys?) alleged that when he applied for reinstatement, the following occurred:


1) the Attorney Grievance Committee sent a secret report opposing his reinstatement to the App. Div. 3rd court, which was in itself an attorney disciplinary violation - but who will prosecute them?  themselves?


2) the court considered that ex parte report which was a disciplinary violation for all judges involved in such a consideration;


3) the court relied upon the ex parte report of the Committee;


4) the court denied the application for reinstatement in reliance on a secret report of the Committee;


5) the court refused to give Mr. Koziol a copy of the report, based on which reinstatement of his law license, a liberty and property due process interest, was denied.


Mr. Koziol's case was handled (coincidentally?) by the same attorney who handled my husband's case and who was handling my own case, up until the time when that attorney, Mr. Zayas, had to resign from the Committee among investigation that he allegedly falsified time sheets.


Since the Committee and the court denied and continue to deny access to the Committee's files to me and to my husband, and since the Committee and the court engaged in an ex parte communication regarding my disciplinary case and regarding my husband's closed disciplinary case (and likely, to thwart his so far successful federal civil rights lawsuit against the court and the Committee), the ex parte communications between the court and the Committee which deems itself a branch of that court, appears to be a pattern.


Now, a question arises.


Where are all those attorneys, including attorneys who are court clerks in the Appellate Division 3rd Department, as well as attorneys who work for the Committee and who are members of the Committee.  Isn't it their duty to report attorney misconduct and judicial misconduct, such as ex parte communications?


Or their duties are only to cover up the assess of their colleagues and persecute critics of judicial misconduct and of misconduct of politically connected attorneys?


And, Mr. Koziol claims in his lawsuit that Mr. Zayas staunchly opposed his reinstatement pointing out at Mr. Koziol's public posts on his website and his testimony before the now disbanded Moreland (ethics in the government) Commission.


It is sad irony that Mr. Koziol was denied reinstatement of his law license for his testimony regarding corruption in the court system before the ethics Commission while now the feds are looking into whether corruption was involved in disbanding the commission that was created by Governor Cuomo allegedly to fight corruption in the government, but was disbanded by Governor Cuomo when the Commission turned its focus on Governor Cuomo's buddies.


Will the feds be able to uncover the full scope of corruption in how the anticorruption committee was created, functioned and was disbanded?


One does not have to have a crystal ball to predict with 100% precision that the New York State Attorney General, this declared protector of the public from fraud, will defend the lawsuit against Mr. Koziol on behalf of the App. Div. 3rd and the Committee, and will defend the unconstitutional actions of the court and the Committee, actions in violations of the oath of office of the judges and attorneys representing the Committee and who are members of the Committee.


The NYS AG will defend engaging in ex parte communications between the Court and the Committee, relying upon the secret report by the Committee to the Court that Mr. Koziol was not even allowed to see and denying a constitutional benefit to Mr. Koziol for simply doing his job as a citizen and exposing corruption in the government - both on his website and before the Moreland Commission.


To defend these indefensible actions and to protect government officials involved in these corrupt acts, the NYS AG's office will expend YOUR money, New York taxpayers and will throw into the defense the resources of the government against the resources of Mr. Koziol, already depleted by years of oppressive litigation.


That is - oppressive litigation to stifle a person who was a civil rights attorney who fought for YOUR rights, New Yorkers, something that the NYS AG should have helped him do, not thwart him in doing.


And, presiding over this lawsuit is - what a coincidence once again! - Judge Gary L. Sharpe, whose son Michael Sharpe, Attorney Registration No. 2731784 is employed by the NYS Attorney General's office.


And the judge's other son Robert A. Sharpe, Attorney Registration No. 2661239 - what a coincidence! - works for the U.S. Attorney General's office.


Thus, the law firm of one son of the presiding judge will defend unlawful actions of the court and the Committee against the victim of their corrupt behavior, among others, denying reinstatement of a law license because of Mr. Koziol's testimony before the Moreland Commission.


The law firm of the other son of the presiding judge will be investigating the corruption in the New York State government that led to disbandment of the Commission before which Mr. Koziol testified - and denied reinstatement of his license because of that testimony.


And the judge, of course, will remain impartial at all times, and there is no way to get him off the case despite his glaring conflict of interest.


How sweet.


First Amendment, anyone?


The rule of law, anyone?


Equality under the law, anyone?


The right to an impartial judicial review, anyone?


Right of access to court, anyone?


Blind justice without regard to people's statuses, anyone?


Yeah, right.

Judges for the rich and for the poor in New York State

Whenever this topic comes up in a conversation even with lawyers who are not practicing in upstate New York towns and villages, the information that judges in such courts are not required to be lawyers comes as a shock.




After all, a judge in a local "justice court" in towns or villages in upstate New York has the power to evict people from their homes, to resolve breach of contract claims up for contracts up to $3,000.00, and to conduct jury trials in criminal proceedings and to put people behind bars for a year per count, or for several years if there are more than one count charged against them, to be served consecutively (one after the other) in the local jail.




Moreover, since felonies are charged a lot less than misdemeanors, and misdemeanors are handled by the local justice courts, it may be said that the majority of criminal proceedings in New York are handled by judges who are not required to be lawyers.




Additionally, while the caseloads of such judges are high and the stress levels are similarly high, their annual salaries are, let's say, nominal.




The Sidney Town Court justice reportedly received $2,250 in one recent year and $1,750 in another recent year, according to seethroughny.net.  Sidney Town Court is a very busy court.




As a comparison, a County Court justice was earning $125,000 before the increase and will be earning $160,000 after the increase.


The average salary in New York State is $41,673.83 in 2010 and I doubt that it raised too much over 4 years.


If $125,000 for a county court judge is not enough, what motivates judges in local justice courts to work for under $2,000 to $4,000 a year?  Do they come to decide disputes for friends?  To settle their own grudges? To pursue their rush for power, which is what former police officers turned justice court judges often do - at least it appears that way?


Imagine - there is NO requirement for ANY level of education to be elected a judge to the local justice court in New York.  Not the ability to read, or write, or count, or reason - not anything!


Since this situation has continued for decades in New York, it appears acceptable for the New York state government that the mostly poor and uneducated people in upstate New York are judged this way.


Abuses of power in local justice courts were reported in New York 8 (!) years ago through a series of articles in New York Times.  The call for reform of those courts was not heard. and everything remains as it was.


What is the difference between the local justice courts, where judges are not required to be lawyers, and the higher courts where judges are required to be lawyers, to justify the distinction?


Is it complexity of cases?


Not really, misdemeanor cases can be as complex as felony cases.  Eviction cases can involve complex evidentiary issues as well.  The complexity of the breach of contract cases is not determined by the amount of money in controversy, and local justice court judges do resolve breach of contract cases for under $3,000 in controversy.


The types of cases handled?


Not really, for example, sex offender cases are equally handled by the local justice courts (misdemeanors) and by the County Courts (on indictments or superior court informations). 


The time served by a convicted criminal defendant?


As I stated above, a local justice court judge may convict a person for several misdemeanors at the same time and commit him to jail for several years, served locally, but consecutively.   That decision may be right or wrong, but the judge has the power to make it. And to do that, a judge does not have to have any education.


In upper court judges decide issues for juveniles that require them to have education in law - is that what allegedly distinguishes the requirement for, let's say, a Family Court judge to be a lawyer  as opposed to a local justice court judge?


Not really.  Local justice court judges routinely handle the so-called "youthful offender" cases which legally transform criminal proceedings into a sealed civil Family Court juvenile delinquency proceeding - without the benefit of a law-educated Family Court judge.


Is it the knowledge by the County, Family or Supreme Court judge as a lawyer that controls the distinction?


Not really.  While there is a requirement for a County Court or Family Court judge to be a lawyer for 10 years before coming to the bench, there is no requirement for that judicial candidate to be a practicing attorney in criminal or family law, or in any other areas of the law he is supposed to handle as a judge, and by the time he or she steps on the bench, the judge who may never have practiced law may have forgotten everything he ever learnt about the law. 


Thus, a judicial candidate can be a person with a heartbeat and a law license - but with no knowledge of the law he or she is supposed to apply in the courtroom. 


It can be a rich man's wife who sat on her law license without using it for 10 years - and then, when her children are grown - suddenly felt the urge to re-enter the workforce, at a prestigious level of a judge no less, while she has forgotten by the time of running for a judge anything she was taught in law school.  It can be a lawyer of either gender who had practiced in a completely different area of the law and having no clue as to what he or she has to do in the courtroom.


It can be a transactional attorney who has never set his or her foot into the courtroom.


It can be a lawyer with a failing practice.  It is not a big secret in the legal profession that often people are running for judgeships not because their law practice is good, but, on the opposite, because it is bad and because they want to secure a stable salary, medical benefits and a pension where otherwise their outlook for a comfortable retirement is bleak. 


So - what is the distinction justifying the lack of a requirement in local justice courts for a judge to be a lawyer and a requirement for all upper courts for the judges not only to be lawyers, but to be lawyers for over 10 years before coming to the bench?


That in upper courts more money is involved in civil cases, cases are decided for richer parties, and judges who preside over those cases are supposed to be "higher quality" judges than "judges for the poor" in the local justice courts, at least by their educational credentials? 


And such "judges for the rich" who survived for 10 years without criticizing the judiciary and thus keeping their license intact are expected to be properly entrenched with the system and to rule they are supposed to rule - for the government and for the rich?


In New York, it appears that way.

Delaware County will bear "some costs" of the new family court judge - how does it mesh with the idea of the County being a party in front of that new judge?

The County of Delaware finally got its with to get a 2nd judge, a dedicated family court judge for Delaware County, by 2016.


It is reported by the same source that some costs of that new judgeship are to be borne by the county.


The county is the petitioner in child neglect and abuse cases in Family Court in front of the same judge whose "costs of judgeship" the County, at least partially, will bear.


If I would be a parent whose children are threatened to be taken away by that new judge, I would be concerned about the conflict of interest that such a situation presents.


An attorney for that parent, would be concerned both for the issue of the judge feeling obligated to the County in his or her rulings, and for his or her license if the attorney raises that issue in court - because, as I have written in my blog before, judges react to such "sensitive" issues with retaliation against the attorney that can cost the attorney his or her livelihood, and there is no recourse through the appellate process where appellate courts usually endorse whatever the trial judge does in retaliating against the attorney for pointing out the judge's conflict of interest.


Family court proceedings are considered civil proceedings subject to the New York State Court Administrations' frivolous conduct rule allowing judges, in their sole discretion, to impose upon parties and their attorneys sanctions of up to $10,000.00, often without a hearing, plus legal fees of the opponent, also often without a hearing. 


Such sanctions may be immediately followed by a disciplinary action against an attorney.


Thus, any attorney representing a parent in a child abuse or neglect case may ponder whether it is worth it to raise the obvious conflict of interest where the costs of a "judgeship" are "partially" borne by a party in front of the judge.  It might be too costly for the attorney to do his or her job for the client and raise this issue.


For that reason, I feel compelled to raise this issue in a blog, without any regard to any case in Family Court, as a general issue of public concern.


A judge simply may not be dependent on the funds from a party which appears before him or her, however "minor" the cost sharing may be.


That must be a given.