I have written in this blog about the phenomenon that I came across in my law practice, that seems to be very established in the culture of the legal profession in this country, but which also seems to be a taboo in the media and especially between attorneys, for fear of retribution.
Yet, I believe that the public, the voters for judges, must know that such a phenomenon exists and is wildly proliferant in the American court system.
The phenomenon is called "the new nobility - sons-of-judges". Of course, the term "sons-of-judges" is general and includes daughters, nieces, grandchildren and other relatives.
What I mean is that relatives, friends, clerks, personnel of judges - whoever is related to judges in any way, shape or form - are immune from real punishment. They are the modern-time nobility in the United States.
As I wrote in this blog earlier, judges in this country are untouchable by judicial discipline, are untouchable by attorney discipline, and invented for themselves absolute immunity for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench - acts in obvious violation of their constitutional oath of office.
This is a quote from the civil rights lawsuit against the former judge who was involved in the "Kids-for-Cash" scandal where the judge was sentencing juveniles to time in a juvenile facility because the judge received kickbacks from the owners of the facility. The judge was actually given immunity for this corrupt sentencing - and it was claimed by the court that granted immunity to be in the public interest and to be the law.
Think about it again - for the judge to commit an unconstitutional act on the bench, in violation of his oath of office to uphold the U.S. Constitution must be for some warped reason protected by common law immunity? Common law now allows judges to violate the U.S. Constitution by covering them with absolute immunity for corrupt acts? While there is no clause in the U.S. Constitution allowing anybody to violate it or absolving anybody from abiding by it?
You know that the strength of any law is in its enforcement.
If the U.S. Constitution cannot be enforced against judges, the most powerful branch of the American government as far as rights of individuals are concerned - constitutional rights of individuals in the U.S. are dead.
Here is the quote of how the federal district court in Pennsylvania wiggles out of the sticky issue of judicial corruption:
“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action.
This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009.
Absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts is a relatively recent invention of the courts: it was only introduced in American jurisprudence in 1978, through a dictum in Stump v. Sparkman, a case dealing with an ex parte order to secretly sterilize a young girl without serving her with a petition for sterilization, allowing her right to counsel or opportunity to be heard and misleading her that the surgery she is undergoing is for appendicitis.
So, it is only for 36 years that America is living in the dark ages while claiming to the world that it is a beacon of democracy.
A judge may not be sued for selling sentences of juveniles for a kickback - according to Pennsylvania District Court.
Now, according to the Federal Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit a judge may not be sued for trading sex for judicial decisions in a child support/contempt case, also involving jail time. And - coincidentally - the 6th Circuit made such an interesting decision in favor of the son of the first African American judge appointed (surprise!) to the 6th Circuit.
Yes, the judge-father is deceased by now. But there is still an appearance of impropriety for the 6th Circuit to handle the case - and to render a decision such as this. And I fully support the attorney for the plaintiff who is planning to appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court in order to loosen (abolish?) this doctrine covering up and protecting self-interest of judges.
In Stump v. Sparkman there was no indication that the judge was bribed or had any personal interest in the case, therefore, the decision in that case covering with judicial immunity malicious and corrupt acts does not have the force of law, constituting the so-called dictum (which the judiciary also is using very selectively - based on the status of who should be protected or punished when a dictum is involved).
In H.T., et al. V. Ciavarelly, Jr. (selling sentencing of juveniles for kickbacks) the judge had a personal financial interest in the outcome of litigation, which absolutely disqualified him from presiding over the case.
In New York, for example, Judiciary Law Section 14 provides a jurisdictional bar for a judge to preside over a case where he or she has a personal interest in the outcome of the case (not that the courts are following that statute, but it is at least on the books).
Of course, it is a due process violation for a judge to preside over a case where the judge has personal interest in the outcome.
If the judge is disqualified from presiding over a case, simple logic prompts that he cannot be immune from suit in a case where he had no authority to preside. Yet, judges continuously rule in favor of immunity for their colleagues.
Let me ask you a question.
Has corruption among the judiciary become so wide-spread by 1978 and into nowadays that the judiciary feels that it must protect itself from such claims by all means?
Wade McCree, the son-of-a-judge, is also an arrogant moron. He has triggered his own investigation by complaining against his lover, a woman who had hundreds of incriminating texts and e-mails from him and who claimed she was carrying his child - he complained about her for allegedly stalking him. He also did that, reportedly, when he was busted by his wife.
The aggrieved lover went to the media - predictably so.
Wade McCree previously mailed his shirtless photo to a married female bailiff. What did he get for that? A censure. Meaning - he was not taken off the bench for engaging in sexual misconduct with a court employee.
"McCreep" did not learn his lesson.
He engaged in sex with the complaining witness in a felony criminal case, agreed with her on a sentence in the same text message where he discussed the scheduling of the next sex session with her.
And he is still immune from lawsuit by the criminal defendant whom the judge - corruptly - injured in that case.
The only reason why this sordid story came to light is because of supreme stupidity Wade McCree. Had he not turned the girlfriend into the police, he could have happily proceeded having sex with her in chambers, deciding with her how to rule on cases and sending to her messages about how he thinks about their nights together to the point of ejaculating while on the bench.
So, immunity for "McCreep" is in public interest - in your interest? How many more judicial creeps are now encouraged and enabled by this immunity decision?
Meaning - any female can now buy her sentence from a male judge for sex and the judge will get away with it even if caught. Or, let's be "gender-neutral" here - any male can buy a sentence from a female judge for sex in her chambers? What is the deterrent - being taken off the bench without being disbarred? Oh, please.
So - criticizing a judge may lead to a disbarment, but putting people in jail in exchange for sex doesn't?
Why wasn't McCree criminally prosecuted?
Why wasn't he disbarred?
Why didn't the court personnel report him for having sex in chambers REPEATEDLY - there is no way they did not know!
Because of fear?
Didn't we get to a point where judicially became uncontrollable because of their self-imposed immunity?
Let's start reversing this situation by demanding that this son-of-a-judge be (1) criminally prosecuted; (2) disbarred, (3) stripped of any immunity from lawsuits, Mr. King's and others, whose cases he discussed with his lover in texts.
To believe that this son-of-a-gun is immune because that is in public interest, we really need a collective lobotomy.
How many other sentences out there were bought for sex?
Easy to pick girlfriends out of litigants and interested witnesses, isn't it? Such a power rush, too...
How can we believe, especially now, after the "McCreep immunity case", that our prisons are not filled by corrupt and sex-hungry judges?
The rule of law has become a joke.
Thursday, July 24, 2014
Do you believe in spirits?
I do want to believe in ghosts after reading the story of the yesterday's execution in Arizona.
Now, in all civilized countries but the United States (if the United States may be called a civilized country in view of its staunch adherence to the death penalty) death penalty is abolished.
I am blessed to live in a state (New York) which imposed an indefinite moratorium on death penalty, hopefully for good.
Yet, death penalty is still "administered" in many states in the United States.
And executions are botched throughout the country, the latest being the execution of Clayton D. Lockett in Oklahoma and the yesterday's execution of Joseph Rudolph Wood in Arizona.
Executions, if the government is to claim that it is a constitutional and not a cruel and inhuman punishment, should at least be quick and the least painful.
Yet, had Mr. Locket and Mr. Wood been simply shot in the head, they would have suffered less than what they had to endure - physically and emotionally. At least they would have died instantly.
The death penalty is taking of a life, not inflicting pain.
Yet, in this country people are fried in electric chairs or suffocated for hours by using unknown lethal injection drugs information about the government refuse to reveal to the public - with the U.S. Supreme Courts' blessing.
The federal Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit has granted Joseph Rudolph Wood, scheduled to death by a lethal injection, an injunction to at least verify what drugs are going to be used to kill him.
That was on July 19, 2014.
Within 4 days the U.S. Supreme Court has lifted the stay and sent Joseph Rudolph Wood to die a horrible death.
That is the same court that denies writs of certiorari to thousands of people whose constitutional rights are violated.
In order to deny a human being a basic human and constitutional right to know whether the punishment that is about to be inflicted upon him may turn into hours of torture, and in order to allow the state government to send a human being to a horrible death, the U.S. Supreme Court has all the time in the world.
Did judges who allowed the execution of Joseph Rudolph Wood in Arizona to proceed without disclosing to Joseph Rudolph Wood the manufacturer of the drugs, the names of the drugs and the batch numbers of the drugs which were going to be used in his execution not know that executions by lethal injections were recently botched in Oklahoma, resulting in suffering of the condemned.
Did those judges not know that the American Civil Liberties Union called for an immediate moratorium on death penalty until an independent investigation is concluded into the causes of the horrible death of Clayton D. Lockett in Oklahoma?
Did they not know that the United Nations which the U.S. is part of has a moratorium on death penalty since 2007?
Did they not know that the United Nations has actually called upon the United States after the previous botched execution, back in May of 2014, to impose a moratorium on death penalty in the entire country?
Did they not know that executions in Oklahoma were stayed due to the botched execution of Clayton D. Lockett?
Did they not know that after the horrible death of Clayton D. Lockett a federal court imposed a stay of executions in Ohio?
Of course they knew it. It was all over the news in the country. The judges of the highest court in the country may not claim ignorance and stupidity defense in a case this important. The botched executions throughout the country were the main reason why Joseph Rudolph Wood's attorneys filed a civil rights lawsuit in the first place. The concerns about botched executions were in the pleadings.
So why did these judges make a decision that has sent a human being, a murderer or not, to at least a possibility of a horrible death by hours of suffocation, a death that even Nazis did not inflict on their victims?
The answer is very simple.
Judicial immunity.
Judges knew that for any judicial decision, no matter how bizarre, no matter how cruel and inhuman, no matter how unconstitutional, their brethren, other judges will always cover them with absolute immunity, to do what they whim from the bench.
The horrible death of Joseph Rudolph Wood was predictable. And it happened.
I am not a believer in God or any Supreme being. I am not a believer in spirits or ghosts.
But in this case I want to believe that the afterlife exists, that judges who made the decision denying the stay of execution and denying to Joseph Rudolph Wood knowledge of what drugs were going to be used to kill him (knowledge that could have served to prevent his horrible death), those judges, all of them, should be haunted by the ghost of Joseph Rudolph Wood suffocating on that gurney day and night, for as long as they live, and should rot in hell after they die.
When Joseph Rudolph Wood murdered a human being, that was wrong and punishment was in order.
When the government suffocated Joseph Rudolph Wood for 2 hours, after denying him the right to know that the drugs to be used in killing him can do just that, that is a punishment long banished from the arsenal of the civilized world. This is murder, too.
What is most concerning to me as an attorney and a human rights defender is that the United States is openly and arrogantly flouting requests of the United Nations to stay clearly inhuman and cruel punishment of its prisoners. That is the same United States of America which presides in the United Nations over cases of other countries violating human rights of their citizens or residents.
Another reason why Americans should push for full ratification of the United Nations Convention on Political and Civil Rights by the United States without any restrictions and allowing Americans remedies against their own government that citizens of countries like Belarus have.
At this time, the only remedy Americans have against their government violating their basic human rights seem to be in the belief in the afterlife, and that the spirits of those wronged by the government would haunt the wrongdoers and condemn them after their death. During our lifetimes - there is no remedy.
Now, in all civilized countries but the United States (if the United States may be called a civilized country in view of its staunch adherence to the death penalty) death penalty is abolished.
I am blessed to live in a state (New York) which imposed an indefinite moratorium on death penalty, hopefully for good.
Yet, death penalty is still "administered" in many states in the United States.
And executions are botched throughout the country, the latest being the execution of Clayton D. Lockett in Oklahoma and the yesterday's execution of Joseph Rudolph Wood in Arizona.
Executions, if the government is to claim that it is a constitutional and not a cruel and inhuman punishment, should at least be quick and the least painful.
Yet, had Mr. Locket and Mr. Wood been simply shot in the head, they would have suffered less than what they had to endure - physically and emotionally. At least they would have died instantly.
The death penalty is taking of a life, not inflicting pain.
Yet, in this country people are fried in electric chairs or suffocated for hours by using unknown lethal injection drugs information about the government refuse to reveal to the public - with the U.S. Supreme Courts' blessing.
The federal Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit has granted Joseph Rudolph Wood, scheduled to death by a lethal injection, an injunction to at least verify what drugs are going to be used to kill him.
That was on July 19, 2014.
Within 4 days the U.S. Supreme Court has lifted the stay and sent Joseph Rudolph Wood to die a horrible death.
That is the same court that denies writs of certiorari to thousands of people whose constitutional rights are violated.
In order to deny a human being a basic human and constitutional right to know whether the punishment that is about to be inflicted upon him may turn into hours of torture, and in order to allow the state government to send a human being to a horrible death, the U.S. Supreme Court has all the time in the world.
Did judges who allowed the execution of Joseph Rudolph Wood in Arizona to proceed without disclosing to Joseph Rudolph Wood the manufacturer of the drugs, the names of the drugs and the batch numbers of the drugs which were going to be used in his execution not know that executions by lethal injections were recently botched in Oklahoma, resulting in suffering of the condemned.
Did those judges not know that the American Civil Liberties Union called for an immediate moratorium on death penalty until an independent investigation is concluded into the causes of the horrible death of Clayton D. Lockett in Oklahoma?
Did they not know that the United Nations which the U.S. is part of has a moratorium on death penalty since 2007?
Did they not know that the United Nations has actually called upon the United States after the previous botched execution, back in May of 2014, to impose a moratorium on death penalty in the entire country?
Did they not know that executions in Oklahoma were stayed due to the botched execution of Clayton D. Lockett?
Did they not know that after the horrible death of Clayton D. Lockett a federal court imposed a stay of executions in Ohio?
Of course they knew it. It was all over the news in the country. The judges of the highest court in the country may not claim ignorance and stupidity defense in a case this important. The botched executions throughout the country were the main reason why Joseph Rudolph Wood's attorneys filed a civil rights lawsuit in the first place. The concerns about botched executions were in the pleadings.
So why did these judges make a decision that has sent a human being, a murderer or not, to at least a possibility of a horrible death by hours of suffocation, a death that even Nazis did not inflict on their victims?
The answer is very simple.
Judicial immunity.
Judges knew that for any judicial decision, no matter how bizarre, no matter how cruel and inhuman, no matter how unconstitutional, their brethren, other judges will always cover them with absolute immunity, to do what they whim from the bench.
The horrible death of Joseph Rudolph Wood was predictable. And it happened.
I am not a believer in God or any Supreme being. I am not a believer in spirits or ghosts.
But in this case I want to believe that the afterlife exists, that judges who made the decision denying the stay of execution and denying to Joseph Rudolph Wood knowledge of what drugs were going to be used to kill him (knowledge that could have served to prevent his horrible death), those judges, all of them, should be haunted by the ghost of Joseph Rudolph Wood suffocating on that gurney day and night, for as long as they live, and should rot in hell after they die.
When Joseph Rudolph Wood murdered a human being, that was wrong and punishment was in order.
When the government suffocated Joseph Rudolph Wood for 2 hours, after denying him the right to know that the drugs to be used in killing him can do just that, that is a punishment long banished from the arsenal of the civilized world. This is murder, too.
What is most concerning to me as an attorney and a human rights defender is that the United States is openly and arrogantly flouting requests of the United Nations to stay clearly inhuman and cruel punishment of its prisoners. That is the same United States of America which presides in the United Nations over cases of other countries violating human rights of their citizens or residents.
Another reason why Americans should push for full ratification of the United Nations Convention on Political and Civil Rights by the United States without any restrictions and allowing Americans remedies against their own government that citizens of countries like Belarus have.
At this time, the only remedy Americans have against their government violating their basic human rights seem to be in the belief in the afterlife, and that the spirits of those wronged by the government would haunt the wrongdoers and condemn them after their death. During our lifetimes - there is no remedy.
A female law professor who teaches how to sue the government for constitutional wrongs should not be protected from sexist comments of male attorneys?
It was reported that a law professor's complaint to disciplinary authorities about allegedly sexist comments on her blog made under a nickname by an attorney was rejected and the investigation against the attorney closed.
The "criticism" that Professor Leong found offensive (and wouldn't you?) was as follows:
“I think she has the right age, gender, credentials, and eager-to-please attitude for an ‘odd job’ I have in mind . . . Basically it involves the girl dressing up as a law professor, bending over, and trying to ask me questions about International Shoe while I spank her with a wet slipper.”
The "critic" also made the following comment about Professor Leong's arguments regarding the so-called concept of "racial capitalism" that she was making: “Now that is what I call a gravy train or, shall I say, a luau train. Law professors enjoying a free Hawaii vacation at some seaside hotel. All they have to do is attend some ‘annual meeting’ of some ‘society’ where they pretend to listen to Leong yap about ‘pragmatic approach[es] of reactive commodification,’ while undressing her with their eyes.”
Both comments were made under a nickname.
Women in this country were taught for an eternity to keep their mouths shut and feel honored when males appreciate their beauty, even when women find such comments extremely offensive and demeaning to them as professionals.
Yet, to me as a female attorney and a professional, the comments above appear portraying Professor Leong as less of a professor and more of a porn star. In other words, it may be perceived as defamation per se. And in this case, Professor Leong had every right in the world to investigate the identity of the person who has made the comment and pursue him.
Defamation of professional character is not protected by the 1st Amendment. People who make online comments about professionalism do run a risk of a defamation lawsuit.
What is worse is that Professor Leong found out that the person who has posted these comments is a public official, a public defender.
Public defenders all over the country are claiming of being overwhelmed with caseloads and having no time for anything. This public defender, on the contrary, has plenty of time on his hands to make wet-dreams comments about Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law and Constitutional litigation professor who happens to be a young pretty female.
When a public official is advertising his wet sexual fantasies about a female law professor online, and is insinuating, as read by an objective observer, that her work is substandard and the attraction to her lectures is the location where they are given and her physical appearance over which male attendees salivate, this is completely beyond the pale and, in my opinion, must be addressed by attorney discipline.
The "criticism" that Professor Leong found offensive (and wouldn't you?) was as follows:
“I think she has the right age, gender, credentials, and eager-to-please attitude for an ‘odd job’ I have in mind . . . Basically it involves the girl dressing up as a law professor, bending over, and trying to ask me questions about International Shoe while I spank her with a wet slipper.”
The "critic" also made the following comment about Professor Leong's arguments regarding the so-called concept of "racial capitalism" that she was making: “Now that is what I call a gravy train or, shall I say, a luau train. Law professors enjoying a free Hawaii vacation at some seaside hotel. All they have to do is attend some ‘annual meeting’ of some ‘society’ where they pretend to listen to Leong yap about ‘pragmatic approach[es] of reactive commodification,’ while undressing her with their eyes.”
Both comments were made under a nickname.
Women in this country were taught for an eternity to keep their mouths shut and feel honored when males appreciate their beauty, even when women find such comments extremely offensive and demeaning to them as professionals.
Yet, to me as a female attorney and a professional, the comments above appear portraying Professor Leong as less of a professor and more of a porn star. In other words, it may be perceived as defamation per se. And in this case, Professor Leong had every right in the world to investigate the identity of the person who has made the comment and pursue him.
Defamation of professional character is not protected by the 1st Amendment. People who make online comments about professionalism do run a risk of a defamation lawsuit.
What is worse is that Professor Leong found out that the person who has posted these comments is a public official, a public defender.
Public defenders all over the country are claiming of being overwhelmed with caseloads and having no time for anything. This public defender, on the contrary, has plenty of time on his hands to make wet-dreams comments about Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law and Constitutional litigation professor who happens to be a young pretty female.
When a public official is advertising his wet sexual fantasies about a female law professor online, and is insinuating, as read by an objective observer, that her work is substandard and the attraction to her lectures is the location where they are given and her physical appearance over which male attendees salivate, this is completely beyond the pale and, in my opinion, must be addressed by attorney discipline.
Moreover, I have no doubt that the complaint would have been granted if the complainant was a judge, so there is no cause for celebration here.
Attorneys are suspended and disbarred throughout this country for criticism of judges, even for criticism in private emails.
But - Professor Leong is (1) an Asian; (2) a woman; (3) teaches students how to sue the government for civil rights violations and (4) is not a judge, therefore, her complaint was dismissed.
Therefore, she is expendable in the eyes of the disciplinary committee.
I wonder if she can still sue for defamation.
Therefore, she is expendable in the eyes of the disciplinary committee.
I wonder if she can still sue for defamation.
Tuesday, July 22, 2014
Do not ask who shall clean the mess of judicial misconduct. You shall.
In the overwhelming majority of books and law review articles I've read I usually see statements that the majority of judicial profession is honorable, but black sheep happen.
When people talk about numbers (majority-minority), they must have statistics.
Statistics on the issue of judicial misconduct is sorely missing.
Why?
Either judicial misconduct is not reported - because of fear of the legal profession, or it is kept under wraps as "private" and discounted by the disciplinary bodies who, as I wrote in this blog before, act more like glorified shredders of disciplinary complaints than as bona fide disciplinary bodies.
I keep getting phone calls from people whose complaints can be grouped in the following way:
1) my attorney refused to file a motion to recuse against a judge, instead referring me to you - because my attorney was afraid to be "blackballed" (apparently, I am expendable in the eyes of multiple attorneys, and I can be hired to do specifically what those attorneys are afraid to do);
2) my presiding judge is biased, but my attorney refuses to report him to the disciplinary authorities (people often include a list of misdeeds of the judge which, if they are true, warrant taking the judge off the bench);
3) I know people against whom the judge committed the same misconduct as in my case;
4) I want to sue my judge/ my attorney/ both.
When attorneys refuse to report judicial misconduct, sometimes parties report it themselves.
Yet, if complaints by attorneys are discarded without review by disciplinary bodies, the probability that a lay individual's complaint will be so discarded is even higher.
It is summarily regarded as sour grapes of a disgruntled litigant.
The usual responses from the disciplinary bodies are:
1) there is nothing in your complaint that warrants our investigation (even though there is, and plenty - but the complainant has no standing to appeal the dismissal of the complaint in New York);
2) what you are describing is judicial discretion, not judicial misconduct.
Apparently, it is judicial discretion to be biased, to preside over cases where the judge has a grudge against a litigant or bias against a class of litigants (immigrants, people with an accent, people of a certain ethnicity or gender).
Moreover, in our neck of woods, if you dig into many judges' background - and people do dig - you can come up with interesting information about glaring conflicts of interest that judges do not report and punish people when they dare to request recusals based on it.
Conflicts reported to me pertain to judge's marriages, relatives of spouses, relationships between litigants (usually opposing parties) and judge's personnel, judge's financial ventures.
All of that raises serious concerns.
All of that requires serious investigation, including funds and time.
Lay individuals usually lack such resources, and especially when judges unite in action and start to consistently sanction the "stubborn" reporter of their misconduct, hoping that he or she will shut up if ordered to pay an N number of thousands of dollars in sanctions.
Attorneys can be quickly turned into disgruntled lay individuals since the judiciary holds in their hands attorneys' licensing and, through that, their reputation and livelihood. Attorneys, therefore, are deathly afraid to bite the hand that feeds them, the duty to their clients be damned.
New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct has neither the resources nor, as far as I know, the budget to handle large-scale investigations of judicial misconduct.
It appears that "serving" on the Judicial Conduct Commission is a type of a line in one's resume to boast of, not a public duty to properly discharge - and discharging such a duty conscientiously can gain a person many powerful enemies, which apparently nobody wants.
Against this background, when anybody says that the majority of the judicial profession is allegedly honorable, and there are rare black sheep, that is an insult collective intelligence of the public.
The public is entitled to know the real statistics of judicial misconduct and how the state of New York is dealing with it.
A person charged with a crime ends up on a police blotter, and whether charges are later dismissed or not, you cannot "unring the bell", the police blotter report remains published, often on the Internet, and that often deals a severe blow to the person's reputation and job prospects.
It is certainly unfair, but that's what is happening to people now in the State of New York.
Disciplinary complaints against judges should be equally reported, so that people would at least have a modicum of control over them and see whether the Commission for Judicial Conduct does its job or should be disbanded and replaced.
Mechanism for disbandment of the Judicial Conduct Commission or replacement of its members or staff because of conflicts of interest, corruption or appearance of the same must be in place.
Legislation should be put in place specifically prohibiting a judge to impose sanctions upon an attorney or party who reported the judge. If sanctions are contemplated against an attorney or party who filed a disciplinary complaint against the judge, a neutral judge from another area should be assigned to review such sanctions.
Legislation should be put in place specifically prohibiting to impose sanctions for filing a motion to recuse, so that attorneys should not be put in front of a choice - to do their duty to their clients and lose their livelihood or to play the coward and keep their livelihood. For many attorneys this situation is a no-brainer and is, predictably, decided against their duty to their clients.
Legislation should be put in place making disciplinary proceedings against judges transparent and giving the complainants a standing to appeal dismissals of their complaints.
I am sick and tired of telling people that they are powerless to do anything about their situations because of immunities and the risk of retaliation from judges if they report them or make a motion to recuse.
Judicial profession should be stripped of any ability of acting as petty tyrants and disregarding both the facts and the law (at the trial and appellate levels, state and federal courts), at the expense of the public and, ultimately, undermining the American democracy.
Yet, until more people start reporting judges - with all possible risks involved - and start addressing these problems to their legislative representatives, including through denial of votes to those legislative representatives who refuse to act on such public concerns - nothing will change, and things will only get worse.
Thus, if you want our courtrooms to be free of favoritism, nepotism, backroom dealings with powerful attorneys etc. - or at least to have the courtroom start stepping on that path to self-cleansing - people need to be more active and less afraid of retaliation.
It is easy for judges to retaliate against people who are not united. It is easy to present people against whom judicial retaliation is exacted and who are still fighting against it as nuts, being "off the wall", being "disgruntled litigants" etc. etc.
When the actual statistics come out, more people come out, more legislative initiatives come out to fight judicial misconduct - only then we will (possibly) see things changing.
As a practical initial step, I request the public to send to me for publication copies of their complaints against judges. I will accept only notarized complaints, preferably with supporting documentary evidence - transcripts, other court or out-of court documents showing the judge's conflicts of interest, favoritism, nepotism or corruption.
My e-mail is Tatiana.neroni@gmail.com, please, forward your questions there.
When people talk about numbers (majority-minority), they must have statistics.
Statistics on the issue of judicial misconduct is sorely missing.
Why?
Either judicial misconduct is not reported - because of fear of the legal profession, or it is kept under wraps as "private" and discounted by the disciplinary bodies who, as I wrote in this blog before, act more like glorified shredders of disciplinary complaints than as bona fide disciplinary bodies.
I keep getting phone calls from people whose complaints can be grouped in the following way:
1) my attorney refused to file a motion to recuse against a judge, instead referring me to you - because my attorney was afraid to be "blackballed" (apparently, I am expendable in the eyes of multiple attorneys, and I can be hired to do specifically what those attorneys are afraid to do);
2) my presiding judge is biased, but my attorney refuses to report him to the disciplinary authorities (people often include a list of misdeeds of the judge which, if they are true, warrant taking the judge off the bench);
3) I know people against whom the judge committed the same misconduct as in my case;
4) I want to sue my judge/ my attorney/ both.
When attorneys refuse to report judicial misconduct, sometimes parties report it themselves.
Yet, if complaints by attorneys are discarded without review by disciplinary bodies, the probability that a lay individual's complaint will be so discarded is even higher.
It is summarily regarded as sour grapes of a disgruntled litigant.
The usual responses from the disciplinary bodies are:
1) there is nothing in your complaint that warrants our investigation (even though there is, and plenty - but the complainant has no standing to appeal the dismissal of the complaint in New York);
2) what you are describing is judicial discretion, not judicial misconduct.
Apparently, it is judicial discretion to be biased, to preside over cases where the judge has a grudge against a litigant or bias against a class of litigants (immigrants, people with an accent, people of a certain ethnicity or gender).
Moreover, in our neck of woods, if you dig into many judges' background - and people do dig - you can come up with interesting information about glaring conflicts of interest that judges do not report and punish people when they dare to request recusals based on it.
Conflicts reported to me pertain to judge's marriages, relatives of spouses, relationships between litigants (usually opposing parties) and judge's personnel, judge's financial ventures.
All of that raises serious concerns.
All of that requires serious investigation, including funds and time.
Lay individuals usually lack such resources, and especially when judges unite in action and start to consistently sanction the "stubborn" reporter of their misconduct, hoping that he or she will shut up if ordered to pay an N number of thousands of dollars in sanctions.
Attorneys can be quickly turned into disgruntled lay individuals since the judiciary holds in their hands attorneys' licensing and, through that, their reputation and livelihood. Attorneys, therefore, are deathly afraid to bite the hand that feeds them, the duty to their clients be damned.
New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct has neither the resources nor, as far as I know, the budget to handle large-scale investigations of judicial misconduct.
It appears that "serving" on the Judicial Conduct Commission is a type of a line in one's resume to boast of, not a public duty to properly discharge - and discharging such a duty conscientiously can gain a person many powerful enemies, which apparently nobody wants.
Against this background, when anybody says that the majority of the judicial profession is allegedly honorable, and there are rare black sheep, that is an insult collective intelligence of the public.
The public is entitled to know the real statistics of judicial misconduct and how the state of New York is dealing with it.
A person charged with a crime ends up on a police blotter, and whether charges are later dismissed or not, you cannot "unring the bell", the police blotter report remains published, often on the Internet, and that often deals a severe blow to the person's reputation and job prospects.
It is certainly unfair, but that's what is happening to people now in the State of New York.
Disciplinary complaints against judges should be equally reported, so that people would at least have a modicum of control over them and see whether the Commission for Judicial Conduct does its job or should be disbanded and replaced.
Mechanism for disbandment of the Judicial Conduct Commission or replacement of its members or staff because of conflicts of interest, corruption or appearance of the same must be in place.
Legislation should be put in place specifically prohibiting a judge to impose sanctions upon an attorney or party who reported the judge. If sanctions are contemplated against an attorney or party who filed a disciplinary complaint against the judge, a neutral judge from another area should be assigned to review such sanctions.
Legislation should be put in place specifically prohibiting to impose sanctions for filing a motion to recuse, so that attorneys should not be put in front of a choice - to do their duty to their clients and lose their livelihood or to play the coward and keep their livelihood. For many attorneys this situation is a no-brainer and is, predictably, decided against their duty to their clients.
Legislation should be put in place making disciplinary proceedings against judges transparent and giving the complainants a standing to appeal dismissals of their complaints.
I am sick and tired of telling people that they are powerless to do anything about their situations because of immunities and the risk of retaliation from judges if they report them or make a motion to recuse.
Judicial profession should be stripped of any ability of acting as petty tyrants and disregarding both the facts and the law (at the trial and appellate levels, state and federal courts), at the expense of the public and, ultimately, undermining the American democracy.
Yet, until more people start reporting judges - with all possible risks involved - and start addressing these problems to their legislative representatives, including through denial of votes to those legislative representatives who refuse to act on such public concerns - nothing will change, and things will only get worse.
Thus, if you want our courtrooms to be free of favoritism, nepotism, backroom dealings with powerful attorneys etc. - or at least to have the courtroom start stepping on that path to self-cleansing - people need to be more active and less afraid of retaliation.
It is easy for judges to retaliate against people who are not united. It is easy to present people against whom judicial retaliation is exacted and who are still fighting against it as nuts, being "off the wall", being "disgruntled litigants" etc. etc.
When the actual statistics come out, more people come out, more legislative initiatives come out to fight judicial misconduct - only then we will (possibly) see things changing.
As a practical initial step, I request the public to send to me for publication copies of their complaints against judges. I will accept only notarized complaints, preferably with supporting documentary evidence - transcripts, other court or out-of court documents showing the judge's conflicts of interest, favoritism, nepotism or corruption.
My e-mail is Tatiana.neroni@gmail.com, please, forward your questions there.
Wednesday, July 16, 2014
You shall not impeach a son of a judge - even if he is obviously lying to the court...
The motion was found frivolous by Judge Dowd, who selectively recused from a related action, but not from the Mokay saga one. That is, of course, a separate ground for disqualification of Judge Dowd, because if a judge recused from one case where Mr. Neroni is a party, he cannot preside over a related case where Mr. Neroni is also a party.
At the same time, Judge Dowd is still a defendant in a federal action, dismissal of which is currently appealed, and where my husband sued him to enjoin (block) him from presiding over my husband's cases due to appearance of a mental instability, specifically for claiming during a child visitation proceeding/divorce action that a law school allegedly built a urinal in Judge Dowd's honor.
During the hearing on legal fees for allegedly making a frivolous motion to vacate, Attorney Richard Harlem, son of the late Supreme Court Justice Robert Harlem, who also was, in his time, the Chief Administrative Judge of the 6th Judicial District (and Richard Harlem reminds every court of his late father's status as a judge by placing it on his letterhead), Richard Harlem answered two questions that I asked on cross-examination.
And, as I believe, answered them falsely.
But - since I do not believe Richard Harlem will ever be investigated, prosecuted or sanctioned for his wrongdoing due to his political connections, I believe that the remaining way to deal with his obvious misconduct is to make it public.
I believe that Attorney Harlem did make two false statements in court on material issues, and that it can be proven through documentary evidence which I present here.
Moreover, in his previous decision Judge Dowd expressed his personal view that it was allegedly inappropriate for Mr. Neroni to even question, through me as his attorney, veracity of statements of attorney Harlem, simply because attorney Harlem is "an officer of the court".
Apparently, Judge Dowd held such a view even if the attorney is the main witness in the case and has a personal interest in the outcome of litigation where all claimed damages are his legal fees.
Now, if attorneys, and thus, officers of the court, in Judge Dowd's view, do not lie, then why a criminal article, Judiciary Law 487, even exists in New York?
Judge Dowd's personal opinion about attorneys being unable to lie, and specifically about Richard Harlem being unable to lie led Judge Dowd to do the following:
1) Judge Dowd refused to see that Richard Harlem lied to the court during the hearing on June 23, 2014 even though Judge Dowd took judicial notice of a case which provided evidence that Richard Harlem lied to the court;
2) Judge Dowd refused me a right to impeach Richard Harlem, by documentary evidence or my own testimony as an expert witness and told me that I am somehow "bound" by Richard Harlem's answer;
3) Judge Dowd found it "mind-boggling" that I even went into a hearing and did not settle - and for that Judge Dowd added attorney's fees for the hearing, the very hearing where Richard Harlem lied to the court.
In other words - Richard Harlem was compensated by Judge Dowd, out of my client's and my family's pocket (my client is my husband) - in the amount of $750.00 that my husband has to pay Richard Harlem for lying to the court.
That is how I understand what has happened.
Now to the facts and documents.
On June 23, 2014, in a court proceeding where Attorney Harlem was the main witness claiming his own legal fees, I asked Attorney Harlem two simple questions:
Question No. 1: is there a common billing practice among lawyers to absorb costs of copying and postage?
Harlem said "no".
My Question No. 2 was - was Richard Harlem ever investigated by the New York State Attorney General for inflating legal fees.
He answered that he wasn't so investigated.
This is the Objections to account by New York State Attorney General showing that not only Richard Harlem and his father, Robert Harlem, were investigated for inflating legal fees, but the New York State Attorney General made such an argument in court, and Richard Harlem cannot claim he did not know about that:
So - it appears that Richard Harlem lied to the court as to whether
(1) there is a common practice of not including postage and copying into legal fees; and
(2) whether he was investigated by the New York State Attorney General for inflating legal fees.
Yet, for Judge Dowd - who took judicial notice of the Blanding case during the hearing - it appeared to be irrelevant that Richard Harlem lied to the court.
Moreover, Judge Dowd told me that I am bound by Richard Harlem's word and am not allowed to impeach him - contrary to what New York State law says.
Now, this is a judge who is going to preside over a jury trial where issues of fact and mixed issues of law and fact, precisely about propriety of Richard Harlem's legal fees as damages is going to be tried.
Judge Dowd delayed the jury trial without a date, on request from Richard Harlem, delayed it twice, in November of 2013 and in May of 2014, and now delayed it without a date - in a case where proceedings are pending since 2007.
Judge Dowd was sued by my husband to get him off the case for talking about urinals built in his honor during child visitation proceedings - which to any reasonable objective observer would be a sign of mental instability of a judge that should result in removal of that judge from the bench.
My husband did not want such a judge, whose actions give appearance of mental instability, to preside over his case.
Judge Dowd sanctioned my husband for allegedly frivolous conduct after that action was filed by my husband. Sanctions of Judge Dowd have all the signs of retaliation for embarrassing him through the federal lawsuit. I did not represent Mr. Neroni in his federal lawsuit, but I was sanctioned by Judge Dowd anyway, along with Mr. Neroni.
And, at the hearing, Judge Dowd has proven just what my husband was trying to prove through his federal lawsuit - that he does not know or does not care about the law, that he decides cases on a whim, that he assigns veracity of witnesses upon people's social and political status (as he did with Richard Harlem), and that he makes me bound by Richard Harlem's word as a witness, even though in New York a witness is impeachable by either his own statements or by testimony of other witnesses and by documentary evidence which is contrary to the testimony of the witness, irregardless of the witness's political or social status.
Moreover, this is a judge who told my husband and I that we can only make motions upon an Order to Show Cause - which in layman terms means that we need to prepare the motion, pay the motion fees, but there is no guarantee that Judge Dowd will agree to hear the motion.
In other words, even though based on Judge Dowd's behavior at the hearing, a new motion to recuse and disqualify is clearly in order - I have no assurance that such a motion, if prepared, filed and filing fee paid - will ever be heard by the very judge whose misconduct I will be addressing in such a motion - and who holds in his hands the claimed right to punish me for making such a motion on behalf of my client.
As Judge Dowd said in that same hearing - it is mind-boggling, mind-boggling...
It is mind-boggling that Judge Dowd is still on the bench.
Can an attorney bill for legal services of a non-attorney? Judge Dowd says he can - and for the judge it is mind-boggling to even contest that
I have written about the "mind-boggling" hearing that I had in the "Mokay saga" case where Judge Dowd ruled that our motion to vacate Judge Becker's sanctions and all decisions of Judge Becker (based on Judge Becker's pattern of misconduct spanning many court proceedings and out-of-court actions, conduct that to date escaped judicial review on the merits - and still escaped review because Judge Dowd did not want to review it) is somehow frivolous.
The motion was one of the five motions I made, to vacate sanctions imposed by Judge Becker upon me and my husband after we sued the judge. Elementary due process of law allows people to challenge decisions made by judges who are engaged in a pattern of misconduct before and after sanctions were imposed, misconduct that shows egregious bias of the judge against an attorney and a party - which Judge Becker cogently demonstrated. Apparently, due process of law is not applicable in Judge Dowd's court.
Judge Dowd decided to punish my client and husband for making the motion.
I recently received the transcript of the hearing and will start publishing it, portion by portion, with comments.
It appears that I will need to publish portions of the transcript issue by issue, as there are so many and all of them deserve be presented to the public separately.
I view this post as my service to the public - because many times, litigants appearing in front of Judge Dowd are either represented by timid attorneys who do not want to take the judge on for fear of being "blackballed", or not represented at all, lack funds to obtain transcripts, lack funds to hire an attorney to analyze the judge's mistakes.
The public needs to know about possible incompetence of a public servant, especially with the tremendous power that a Supreme Court justice has in New York.
So - the first cluster of issues that I will analyze in the series of posts about Judge Dowd's evidentiary rulings is whether an attorney can bill a client for legal services of a non-attorney, and do it without the client's knowledge or consent.
In the evidentiary hearing on counsel fees, attorney Richard Harlem presented to the court an exhibit showing that he charged his 6 clients, at $100.00, for legal research and for drafting of legal documents, done by a Patrick Orr, who was at that time not admitted to New York State bar.
I contested legality of such billing.
Mr. Harlem claimed that Patrick Orr's work in doing legal research and drafting legal documents was "beneficial" to Mr. Harlem's clients - and apparently, to Mr. Harlem everything else is irrelevant.
Moreover, attorney Harlem further claimed that in an application for attorney fees the only issue that a court must consider is whether the fees are "fair and reasonable",
and that was in rebuttal to my argument that to be fair an reasonable, the fees claimed must also be legal and in compliance with applicable law and rules:
The motion was one of the five motions I made, to vacate sanctions imposed by Judge Becker upon me and my husband after we sued the judge. Elementary due process of law allows people to challenge decisions made by judges who are engaged in a pattern of misconduct before and after sanctions were imposed, misconduct that shows egregious bias of the judge against an attorney and a party - which Judge Becker cogently demonstrated. Apparently, due process of law is not applicable in Judge Dowd's court.
Judge Dowd decided to punish my client and husband for making the motion.
I recently received the transcript of the hearing and will start publishing it, portion by portion, with comments.
It appears that I will need to publish portions of the transcript issue by issue, as there are so many and all of them deserve be presented to the public separately.
I view this post as my service to the public - because many times, litigants appearing in front of Judge Dowd are either represented by timid attorneys who do not want to take the judge on for fear of being "blackballed", or not represented at all, lack funds to obtain transcripts, lack funds to hire an attorney to analyze the judge's mistakes.
The public needs to know about possible incompetence of a public servant, especially with the tremendous power that a Supreme Court justice has in New York.
So - the first cluster of issues that I will analyze in the series of posts about Judge Dowd's evidentiary rulings is whether an attorney can bill a client for legal services of a non-attorney, and do it without the client's knowledge or consent.
In the evidentiary hearing on counsel fees, attorney Richard Harlem presented to the court an exhibit showing that he charged his 6 clients, at $100.00, for legal research and for drafting of legal documents, done by a Patrick Orr, who was at that time not admitted to New York State bar.
I contested legality of such billing.
Mr. Harlem claimed that Patrick Orr's work in doing legal research and drafting legal documents was "beneficial" to Mr. Harlem's clients - and apparently, to Mr. Harlem everything else is irrelevant.
Moreover, attorney Harlem further claimed that in an application for attorney fees the only issue that a court must consider is whether the fees are "fair and reasonable",
and that was in rebuttal to my argument that to be fair an reasonable, the fees claimed must also be legal and in compliance with applicable law and rules:
I made my arguments not only based on the law, but on my own and my client (and husband)'s personal experience with how that law is applied.
My husband had to sue the disciplinary committee to get off his back and stop prosecuting him for unauthorized practice of law for merely sitting at his desk in his own home and talking to a visitor - and the inquiry specifically included whether my husband, a disbarred attorney, talked to my clients and drafted anything at all.
If my husband, who does not have a law license because he lost it, is not authorized to practice law by doing legal research and drafting legal documents for me, an attorney, in my legal practice - why Patrick Orr who did not have a law license because he did not get it yet can still practice law and do what my husband is not allowed to do?
And why I was personally investigated for the mere suspicion of allowing my husband to do exactly what Richard Harlem not only allows a non-attorney to do - but bills for those legal services - and is blessed for that by Judge Dowd?
Attorney Harlem confirms that he allowed Patrick Orr to draft "a portion" of the combined affirmation and memorandum of law - and that he billed his clients for it.
Yet, Judge Dowd denied my request to strike any fees out of the exhibit for unauthorized legal services of a non-attorney.
And, to strengthen his decision legitimizing Attorney Harlem's billing for legal services of a non-attorney, while Attorney Harlem did not provide a retainer agreement to the court and "did not recall" whether, in the retainer agreement, his clients agreed to be billed for services of auxiliary personnel, Judge Dowd simply offers his own unsworn testimony on behalf of Mr. Harlem - in violation of the "judge advocate" rules and Canons of judicial conduct.
Of course, working for a District Attorney, where practice of law by legal interns is officially allowed by rules of the Appellate Division, and allowing a private counsel to bill for legal services of an intern who was not admitted to practice law are two different things - but not to Judge Dowd.
Judge Dowd appears to be thinking that he is the only law in his courtroom - and acts that way.
To the judge it is "mind-boggling" that I even went into a hearing instead of settling with Mr. Harlem - and he punished my client for not settling by awarding against him fees for legal services services of a non-attorney.
So, I guess we have a double standard for people who are themselves disbarred attorneys or who are wives of disbarred attorneys and for attorneys who are sons of deceased judges, as Richard Harlem is...
At least, in Judge Dowd's court...
So much for access to court;
So much for the rule of law;
So much for equal protection of laws to all.
New York Appellate Division 3rd Department - when the Neronis are concerned, ex parte communications, soliciting unauthorized practice of law, soliciting unethical behavior from the court's own attorney, denying access to the file and engaging in "selective recusals" are business as usual
I already wrote in this blog about the disciplinary proceedings that were started against me based on sanctions of a judge imposed by the judge upon me after I sued him.
By the time the disciplinary proceedings were commenced against me in January of 2013, my husband was disbarred for a year and a half, since July 7, 2011.
In my own proceedings, I moved to disqualify the Appellate Division based on bias against me and to transfer my proceedings to another court, the Committee opposed my motion and called it frivolous - until suddenly the Committee made a secret ex parte application for the same relief and had it granted without having me served. The Committee, by the way, had the audacity of serving me with the Notice of Entry of the order obtained based on its ex parte application - without sending to me the application or papers upon which it was granted.
My disciplinary proceedings which commenced in January of 2013 had, at least by reading the disciplinary petitions, nothing to do with my husband's disciplinary proceedings which concluded on July 7, 2011.
There is no law or rule allowing the Appellate Division to engage in ex parte communications with the Disciplinary Committee.
There is no law or rule allowing the Appellate Division to re-start court proceedings against an attorney after he was disbarred. At the time of disbarment, the Appellate Division, as a licensing authority, simply loses authority to do anything to Mr. Neroni.
There is no law or rule allowing the Appellate Division to merge several disciplinary proceedings against several attorneys.
Here is the order of the Appellate Division, 3rd Department dated June 11, 2014 with a caption "In the Matter of Tatiana Neroni, an attorney (registration number) and Frederick J. Neroni, a disbarred attorney (still with an attorney registration number).
Such a caption normally indicates to a reasonable attorney reading this document, as to Frederick J. Neroni, the following:
(1) that there are court proceedings in the Appellate Division, Third Department, against Frederick J. Neroni;
(2) that these court proceedings are merged/consolidated with court proceedings against Tatiana Neroni.
In reality, none of that was true.
There is no law or rule allowing the Committee, a Petitioner and party in an attorney disciplinary proceeding, to communicate with the presiding court ex parte, and there is no authority in the presiding court to review and grant ex parte applications and then deny access to such applications to the parties affected by them.
That's exactly what happened in my husband's case.
The confidential order clearly states that it was granted the Committee's application to transfer "all inquiries, complaints and/or disciplinary proceedings involving Tatiana Neroni and/or Frederick Neroni to a different Judicial Department".
Now, such an "application" should have been in writing, as any motions.
The usual motion practice of the Appellate Division is that even applications made on an ex parte basis (for an Order to Show Cause) must be served upon the opposing party.
I have attended hearings (on the phone) on such motions made on an Order to Show Cause in this same Appellate Division in other civil cases and know its rules and practices.
I was not served with the Committee's "application" for a transfer as either my husband's attorney in the concluded disciplinary proceedings, or as my own attorney in my own disciplinary proceedings.
Moreover, motion practice in my case has concluded, and deadlines for filing extra pleadings without a leave of court has long ended.
The confidential order makes no mention of an application by the Committee on an Order to Show Cause, for a leave of court to make another motion. It appears that the Committee opens the door of the Appellate Division with their feet any time they want, for any reason they want and without any rules governing such "applications" - and the Appellate Division grants the Committee, on an ex parte basis no less, anything the Committee wants.
My husband asked for a copy of the application and all documents upon which the ex parte application was granted, and for a list of documents transferred to the Appellate Division, 4th Department.
I also asked for the same.
On July 10, 2014 the Appellate Division sent to us two letters.
In a letter to my husband, below, the Appellate Division indicated that his disciplinary proceedings were concluded, no court proceedings were transferred to the 4th Department and what was transferred is only currently pending inquiries and complaints.
My husband was not served with any pending inquiries and complaints against him, and the Committee is already being sued by my husband for conducting any investigations against him post-disbarment and for denying him access to his file.
If what was transferred (allegedly) is inquiries and complaints against other attorneys filed by my husband with the Committee, the Committee still continued to review inquiries and complaints by me, as demonstrated by a letter of the Committee dated June 25, 2014, two weeks after the confidential order of transfer of June 11, 2014, where the Committee rejects my complaint against an unnamed attorney.
One thing that is readily noticeable in the letter: that the Chairman of the Committee, Michael St. Leger, Esq., is no longer listed on the Committee's letterhead - I wonder whether it was the result of my lawsuit against him that was dismissed by the court which was itself one of the defendants in the same action. The lawsuit was dismissed by the court before I had the opportunity to even serve the lawsuit, but I certainly plan to appeal the dismissal. Appears that Mr. St. Leger resigned from the Committee after the lawsuit. It is interesting to know the reason of such a resignation...
By the way, since the letter regarding my inquiry does not show the name of the attorney the inquiry was about, nor even an inquiry number, the letter of rejection is useless. It also shows that there is no real archiving procedure existing in the disciplinary Committee where no indexation of inquiries even exists. Since no indexation of inquiries exists, there is no way to say which inquiries or complaints were subject to the order of transfer of June 11, 2014.
Moreover, since both Mr. Neroni and I complained against attorneys for the Committee, the rejection letter could just as well mean that the Committee investigated itself and is rejecting the complaint against itself and their own attorneys and attorney members - which the Committee has no right to do, as a due process point, and because such actions would be in violation of the "confidential order" of the court dated June 11, 2014.
So - as to Mr. Neroni - the Committee had no authority to investigate or prosecute any inquiries or complaints against Mr. Neroni after his disbarment, Mr. Neroni was not served with any new complaints or inquiries against him, and the Committee continued to investigate inquiries made by us after the date of the confidential order of June 11, 2014.
Moreover, in the letter of July 10, 2014 to Mr. Neroni, the Appellate Division indicated that only new and pending inquiries were transferred, but refused to even consider releasing the list of documents transferred to the 4th Department, which raises all kinds of issues whether any documents were transferred at all, and for what reason the application and the order was made - especially that during the time of the application and granting of the ex parte order both the Committee and all of its members and attorneys, and the Appellate Division 3rd Department, and all of its judges, were defendants in my lawsuit to explore their potential (surprise!) ex parte communications through American Inns of Court and similar "quasi-public" or networking organizations.
At the same time, Mr. Neroni was suing the Committee and the court for (surprise!) denying him access to his file.
Well, as to me, the Appellate Division was even more harsh and arrogant.
It stated to me, basically, that I do not know how to read their decisions and said nothing about why the decision was granted ex parte, and said nothing about giving me access to papers upon which the order of transfer was granted.
Should I also mention that James S. Ranous was an individual defendant in the just dismissed (sua sponte, by the court-defendant) federal action about the American Inns of Court?
Now, reading together the above four documents - the confidential Decision and Order of June 11, 2014, the Committee's letter of June 25, 2014, and the court's letter replies to Mr. Neroni dated July 10, 2014 and to me dated July 10, 2014, it appears that the inquiries and complaints that are transferred are not by us against attorneys, but against both of us.
Therefore, it is even more interesting to see the ex parte application of the Committee for the Decision and Order of June 11, 2014, as, in my humble opinion, if the Committee deems itself disqualified to consider complaints against us, how can the Committee be still deemed impartial in considering complaints against other people, including the Committee's attorneys, by us?
It is interesting to mention that in May of 2014, shortly before the "confidential order" of June 11, 2014, in a federal civil rights lawsuit where I was an attorney of record for two indigent plaintiffs and not a party, the 3rd Department, through its attorney, asked the court to make me sign a settlement agreeing to dismiss the federal lawsuit with prejudice (without the right to re-file), where such a settlement was negotiated with the 3rd Department's counsel, New York State Attorney General, by an attorney not admitted in federal court, and not an attorney of record in federal court for the plaintiffs, behind my back...
Thus, it was apparent that the 3rd Department, a court prosecuting me for allegedly attorney misconduct, and which disbarred my husband for allegedly attorney misconduct, does not care whether it is engaging itself and engaging its counsel NYS AG and the attorney who was not admitted to the federal bar, in attorney misconduct - as long as the result suited the 3rd Department.
And this appears to be the motivation of the court in its dealings with Mr. Neroni or myself.
On June 20, 2014 I have filed several letters requesting recusal of the Appellate Division 3rd Department from cases where Mr. Neroni or I were parties and where appeals were pending in the Appellate Division 3rd Department.
At the time the letters were sent it was clear that the Appellate Division 3rd Department
(1) engaged in an ex parte communication in regards to Mr. Neron's and my case - based on confidential order of June 11, 2014; and
(2) attempted, through federal court, to put malpractice liability upon me and demonstrated that the court does not really care whether it condones and engages attorneys in unethical behavior - based on the court's request to make me settle in a federal case on the basis of negotiations between NYS AG and a non-attorney of record and a non-attorney in federal court.
The 3rd Department arrogantly answered me that I must make a motion of recusal in every single appellate case.
With every motion comes a motion fee of $45.00 and hours of work.
I am already in a disciplinary proceedings specifically for making motions to recuse which a judge (whom I sued) considered improper and sanctioned me, so by directing me to make a motion to recuse, the 3rd Department invited me to fall on my sword - several times, and at our own expense.
So much for fairness, justice and the rule of law in the Appellate Division 3rd Department in New York.
By the time the disciplinary proceedings were commenced against me in January of 2013, my husband was disbarred for a year and a half, since July 7, 2011.
In my own proceedings, I moved to disqualify the Appellate Division based on bias against me and to transfer my proceedings to another court, the Committee opposed my motion and called it frivolous - until suddenly the Committee made a secret ex parte application for the same relief and had it granted without having me served. The Committee, by the way, had the audacity of serving me with the Notice of Entry of the order obtained based on its ex parte application - without sending to me the application or papers upon which it was granted.
My disciplinary proceedings which commenced in January of 2013 had, at least by reading the disciplinary petitions, nothing to do with my husband's disciplinary proceedings which concluded on July 7, 2011.
There is no law or rule allowing the Appellate Division to engage in ex parte communications with the Disciplinary Committee.
There is no law or rule allowing the Appellate Division to re-start court proceedings against an attorney after he was disbarred. At the time of disbarment, the Appellate Division, as a licensing authority, simply loses authority to do anything to Mr. Neroni.
There is no law or rule allowing the Appellate Division to merge several disciplinary proceedings against several attorneys.
Here is the order of the Appellate Division, 3rd Department dated June 11, 2014 with a caption "In the Matter of Tatiana Neroni, an attorney (registration number) and Frederick J. Neroni, a disbarred attorney (still with an attorney registration number).
Such a caption normally indicates to a reasonable attorney reading this document, as to Frederick J. Neroni, the following:
(1) that there are court proceedings in the Appellate Division, Third Department, against Frederick J. Neroni;
(2) that these court proceedings are merged/consolidated with court proceedings against Tatiana Neroni.
In reality, none of that was true.
- There was no motion to consolidate (merge) proceedings against me and against my husband, at least, I as an attorney for myself and an attorney for my husband, was not served with such a motion.
- The appellate court had no jurisdiction to merge proceedings which are pending with proceedings which are already concluded.
There is no law or rule allowing the Committee, a Petitioner and party in an attorney disciplinary proceeding, to communicate with the presiding court ex parte, and there is no authority in the presiding court to review and grant ex parte applications and then deny access to such applications to the parties affected by them.
That's exactly what happened in my husband's case.
The confidential order clearly states that it was granted the Committee's application to transfer "all inquiries, complaints and/or disciplinary proceedings involving Tatiana Neroni and/or Frederick Neroni to a different Judicial Department".
Now, such an "application" should have been in writing, as any motions.
The usual motion practice of the Appellate Division is that even applications made on an ex parte basis (for an Order to Show Cause) must be served upon the opposing party.
I have attended hearings (on the phone) on such motions made on an Order to Show Cause in this same Appellate Division in other civil cases and know its rules and practices.
I was not served with the Committee's "application" for a transfer as either my husband's attorney in the concluded disciplinary proceedings, or as my own attorney in my own disciplinary proceedings.
Moreover, motion practice in my case has concluded, and deadlines for filing extra pleadings without a leave of court has long ended.
The confidential order makes no mention of an application by the Committee on an Order to Show Cause, for a leave of court to make another motion. It appears that the Committee opens the door of the Appellate Division with their feet any time they want, for any reason they want and without any rules governing such "applications" - and the Appellate Division grants the Committee, on an ex parte basis no less, anything the Committee wants.
My husband asked for a copy of the application and all documents upon which the ex parte application was granted, and for a list of documents transferred to the Appellate Division, 4th Department.
I also asked for the same.
On July 10, 2014 the Appellate Division sent to us two letters.
In a letter to my husband, below, the Appellate Division indicated that his disciplinary proceedings were concluded, no court proceedings were transferred to the 4th Department and what was transferred is only currently pending inquiries and complaints.
My husband was not served with any pending inquiries and complaints against him, and the Committee is already being sued by my husband for conducting any investigations against him post-disbarment and for denying him access to his file.
If what was transferred (allegedly) is inquiries and complaints against other attorneys filed by my husband with the Committee, the Committee still continued to review inquiries and complaints by me, as demonstrated by a letter of the Committee dated June 25, 2014, two weeks after the confidential order of transfer of June 11, 2014, where the Committee rejects my complaint against an unnamed attorney.
One thing that is readily noticeable in the letter: that the Chairman of the Committee, Michael St. Leger, Esq., is no longer listed on the Committee's letterhead - I wonder whether it was the result of my lawsuit against him that was dismissed by the court which was itself one of the defendants in the same action. The lawsuit was dismissed by the court before I had the opportunity to even serve the lawsuit, but I certainly plan to appeal the dismissal. Appears that Mr. St. Leger resigned from the Committee after the lawsuit. It is interesting to know the reason of such a resignation...
By the way, since the letter regarding my inquiry does not show the name of the attorney the inquiry was about, nor even an inquiry number, the letter of rejection is useless. It also shows that there is no real archiving procedure existing in the disciplinary Committee where no indexation of inquiries even exists. Since no indexation of inquiries exists, there is no way to say which inquiries or complaints were subject to the order of transfer of June 11, 2014.
Moreover, since both Mr. Neroni and I complained against attorneys for the Committee, the rejection letter could just as well mean that the Committee investigated itself and is rejecting the complaint against itself and their own attorneys and attorney members - which the Committee has no right to do, as a due process point, and because such actions would be in violation of the "confidential order" of the court dated June 11, 2014.
So - as to Mr. Neroni - the Committee had no authority to investigate or prosecute any inquiries or complaints against Mr. Neroni after his disbarment, Mr. Neroni was not served with any new complaints or inquiries against him, and the Committee continued to investigate inquiries made by us after the date of the confidential order of June 11, 2014.
Moreover, in the letter of July 10, 2014 to Mr. Neroni, the Appellate Division indicated that only new and pending inquiries were transferred, but refused to even consider releasing the list of documents transferred to the 4th Department, which raises all kinds of issues whether any documents were transferred at all, and for what reason the application and the order was made - especially that during the time of the application and granting of the ex parte order both the Committee and all of its members and attorneys, and the Appellate Division 3rd Department, and all of its judges, were defendants in my lawsuit to explore their potential (surprise!) ex parte communications through American Inns of Court and similar "quasi-public" or networking organizations.
At the same time, Mr. Neroni was suing the Committee and the court for (surprise!) denying him access to his file.
Well, as to me, the Appellate Division was even more harsh and arrogant.
It stated to me, basically, that I do not know how to read their decisions and said nothing about why the decision was granted ex parte, and said nothing about giving me access to papers upon which the order of transfer was granted.
Should I also mention that James S. Ranous was an individual defendant in the just dismissed (sua sponte, by the court-defendant) federal action about the American Inns of Court?
Now, reading together the above four documents - the confidential Decision and Order of June 11, 2014, the Committee's letter of June 25, 2014, and the court's letter replies to Mr. Neroni dated July 10, 2014 and to me dated July 10, 2014, it appears that the inquiries and complaints that are transferred are not by us against attorneys, but against both of us.
Therefore, it is even more interesting to see the ex parte application of the Committee for the Decision and Order of June 11, 2014, as, in my humble opinion, if the Committee deems itself disqualified to consider complaints against us, how can the Committee be still deemed impartial in considering complaints against other people, including the Committee's attorneys, by us?
It is interesting to mention that in May of 2014, shortly before the "confidential order" of June 11, 2014, in a federal civil rights lawsuit where I was an attorney of record for two indigent plaintiffs and not a party, the 3rd Department, through its attorney, asked the court to make me sign a settlement agreeing to dismiss the federal lawsuit with prejudice (without the right to re-file), where such a settlement was negotiated with the 3rd Department's counsel, New York State Attorney General, by an attorney not admitted in federal court, and not an attorney of record in federal court for the plaintiffs, behind my back...
Thus, it was apparent that the 3rd Department, a court prosecuting me for allegedly attorney misconduct, and which disbarred my husband for allegedly attorney misconduct, does not care whether it is engaging itself and engaging its counsel NYS AG and the attorney who was not admitted to the federal bar, in attorney misconduct - as long as the result suited the 3rd Department.
And this appears to be the motivation of the court in its dealings with Mr. Neroni or myself.
On June 20, 2014 I have filed several letters requesting recusal of the Appellate Division 3rd Department from cases where Mr. Neroni or I were parties and where appeals were pending in the Appellate Division 3rd Department.
At the time the letters were sent it was clear that the Appellate Division 3rd Department
(1) engaged in an ex parte communication in regards to Mr. Neron's and my case - based on confidential order of June 11, 2014; and
(2) attempted, through federal court, to put malpractice liability upon me and demonstrated that the court does not really care whether it condones and engages attorneys in unethical behavior - based on the court's request to make me settle in a federal case on the basis of negotiations between NYS AG and a non-attorney of record and a non-attorney in federal court.
The 3rd Department arrogantly answered me that I must make a motion of recusal in every single appellate case.
With every motion comes a motion fee of $45.00 and hours of work.
I am already in a disciplinary proceedings specifically for making motions to recuse which a judge (whom I sued) considered improper and sanctioned me, so by directing me to make a motion to recuse, the 3rd Department invited me to fall on my sword - several times, and at our own expense.
So much for fairness, justice and the rule of law in the Appellate Division 3rd Department in New York.
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