I have written in this blog about the
potential impropriety of judges and attorneys meeting behind closed doors
through the American Inns of Court, a private association with secret
membership where attorneys sponsor judges’ monthly lavish meals, and, according
to scarce information available about this organization, at least some sections
of this organization sponsor national and international travel for judges and
their family members.
I have written in this blog that I have brought a federal lawsuit to verify membership of judges who presided or are
presiding at this time over my personal lawsuits, in the American Inns of
Court, or in any other organization with secret membership where judges and
attorneys have an opportunity to communicate behind closed doors, without
participation of or oversight from the public.
I have also written that my federal
lawsuit, where the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York,
its Chief Judge, and several of its District Judges and Magistrates were named
as parties, in their official and individual capacity, dismissed the case against itself before the lawsuit was served, instead of transferring the case to another venue, as was proper and as
I requested.
In fact, one of the state judges who was
sued through that lawsuit, who did receive the federal form requesting a waiver
of service, was astonished when he tried to make a disclosure about the federal
lawsuit in two motion hearings and heard from me that the lawsuit was dismissed
before he was actually served. To him,
such a procedure clearly appeared as irregular, same as to me.
To me, the sua sponte, ex parte
dismissal of my federal lawsuit, by the court which is a defendant in that lawsuit,
shows to what extraordinary steps the judicial system will go in order to
protect their own members.
My federal lawsuit was covering all
organizations where judges and politically powerful attorneys had opportunities
to meet behind closed doors, those I knew about and those I did not know about.
Now I introduce to the public yet
another organization where membership is not transparent, goals are not
transparent, activities are not transparent and authority upon the organization
exists and is acting is not transparent, but the organization exists, is
powerful , “advises” state and federal courts and is comprised of state and
federal judges and members of the legal profession whose interactions within
the organization are not subject to public scrutiny.
Who appointed them – nobody
knows. But - these attorneys are "advising" federal and state judiciary. About what - also nobody knows. On what grounds - also nobody knows.
How the appointment happened,
what is the procedure of appointment, what is the procedure of advising the
state and federal judiciary before whom attorneys continue to appear in
fee-generating cases – nobody knows or can check.
And, lo and behold, such councils have as
members of “advisory committees” powerful attorneys who appear in front of both
state and federal judges in court proceedings while “advising” those same
judges behind closed doors.
So, since creation of such councils in
1972 no court decision in this country was free from the taint of whether it
was done by a judge who was “advised” by the counsel who appeared in front of
him - or who participated in a “state-federal judiciary council” behind closed
doors where the judge had an opportunity to talk with “state law officers”, including
parties to litigation.
Such “councils” provide a great
opportunity for corruption and/or undue influence on judges behind closed doors
by attorneys practicing in front of those judges, or between judges and
governmental defendants in civil rights cases.
Yet, same as in the case of the American Inns of Court, the
State-Federal Judicial Councils are proclaimed to be “quasi-public” entities
working toward more “efficient” system of justice, and toward “better serving”
the American public.
As I wrote above, my federal lawsuit
which was supposed to take the veil off such ventures and to verify just in
what kind of relationships certain judges and certain attorneys are, was
dismissed by the same court which was the defendant in the action.
It is obvious that neither a person nor an
entity has a power to dismiss a lawsuit against itself, yet, that’s exactly
what happened. What remains to me is to
try to verify what is available from open sources – and to make my findings
public.
Same as the American Inns of Court, the
idea of State-Federal Judicial Councils was introduced by a U.S. Supreme
Court.
Judge Weinstein claims in his law review
that “… the organization of state-federal councils blossomed after Chief
Justice Burger suggested their employment as a method of reducing the tension created in part by increased federal
constitutional safeguards that affected state judicial and criminal procedures”
(citations omitted, emphasis added).
At the very beginning of the law review
article Judge Weinstein announces his
view that the power to coordinate state and federal judicial systems belongs
to:
state and federal
legislators,
executive agencies, and, in
the case of criminal matters,
to prosecuting attorneys and police
personnel.
Now, to me as a criminal defense
attorney and a civil rights attorney, such a view, especially coming from a
Chief Judge of a federal trial court, presents a big problem.
Prosecuting attorneys in criminal
matters are attorneys for a party appearing before the court.
Police personnel, if it appears in
criminal matters, appears only as witnesses in criminal proceedings.
Thus, Judge Weinstein, the Chief Judge
of a U.S. District Court which handled death penalty cases, publicly announced
his view that he actually thought that attorneys for a party and witnesses for
a party have the power to coordinate the federal judicial system.
I do not know how many criminal cases
Judge Weinstein presided over while being a judge – but I do think that such
views require reconsideration of every one of such cases where the criminal
defendant was convicted.
Judge Weinstein makes further comment,
that “cognizant of limitations [of power of enumerated coordinators” “courts
should take whatever steps possible to ensure that the two systems properly
mesh”.
What constitutes “proper meshing”
between the state and federal judiciary, is surely not reflected in the U.S.
Constitution, but that does not deter Judge Weinstein.
Judge Weinstein states that “[t]he
primary responsibility for better
coordination rests with the legislature since it can provide a more rational division of jurisdiction and substantive law.”
Judge Weinstein has what appears to be a
“functional” rather than “constitutional separation of power” approach to the
issue of coordination of the judicial system.
Judge Weinstein goes on by stating that
“[t]he executive branch, moreover, particularly prosecutors and police, must cooperate in allocating prosecutorial roles in order to prevent a breakdown of both
federal and state systems of criminal justice.” What this means, nobody knows.
How a public prosecutor, an elected
public official in New York State and an appointed public official in federal
agencies, whose duty is to prosecute crimes is supposed to “cooperate” to
“prevent a breakdown of both federal and state systems of criminal justice”.
Why would a state prosecutor, once
again, an elected public official usually elected by the voters of a particular
county, “cooperate” in consideration of any goals other than the goal for which
he was elected, prosecuting crimes, is anybody’s guess.
Yet, that prosecutors “must cooperate”
in view of such a goal, is Judge Weinstein’s conviction that was publicly
announced through a law review article in support of activities of
State-Federal Judicial Councils.
Furthermore, while being sworn to uphold
the U.S. Constitution which does not allow federal judges to legislates, Judge
Weinstein, the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York at the time the article was written, states the following: “[o]ccasional
decisions [by federal courts] that slightly
modify the law so as to eliminate
sources of friction between state and federal law officers also may be
helpful” (emphasis added).
It is interesting to mention that in
civil rights actions the “state law officers” are often defendants in front of
federal “law officers”. When that is
occurring, Judge Weinstein’s suggestion that the federal judiciary should
legislate from the bench to eliminate “sources of friction” with parties
appearing before federal judges suggests that not only criminal convictions
where Judge Weinstein presided, but civil rights lawsuits decided for “state
law officers” where Judge Weinstein presided, should be reviewed and verified
as to whether Judge Weinstein applied in those lawsuits is policy to “slightly
modify the law” in order to “eliminate sources of friction” with state
defendants, or, in other words, acted with unconstitutional a bias which was
part of his policy.
Judge Weinstein presents the
unconstitutional “state-federal coordination” of the judicial systems as, of course,
being done to better serve the American people.
“Coordinating” state and federal
judicial systems behind closed doors with the party defendants in civil rights
lawsuits and claiming that prosecutors, attorneys for a party, are coordinators
of state and federal judicial systems, have nothing to do with judges’
constitutional duties.
How acts in violation of the U.S.
Constitution and state Constitutions are supposed to better serve the American
People, is also anybody’s guess.
Yet, what strikes me is the arrogance of
the judiciary to continue this “coordination”, behind closed doors, while dismissing
lawsuits against itself challenging constitutionality of such coordination and
having the audacity of claiming that the judiciary can actually change the law
in order to “eliminate sources of friction” between state and federal courts –
even when state courts are defendants in federal civil rights actions.
If “eliminate[ing] sources of friction”
between “state and federal law officers” are the function of the federal
courts, the courts carry out that function beautifully.
Federal courts increasingly dismiss the
majority of civil rights lawsuits as “frivolous”, or “failing to state a
claim”, or for lack of specific pleadings despite the fact that federal rules
of procedure do not require specific pleadings in a civil right lawsuit, or for
any other judicially invented reason.
I bet a state defendant in a federal
lawsuit may have a lot of “sources of friction” with the presiding federal
judge.
But, for the federal judge to actively
seek to “eliminate” these “sources of friction” is called bias – at the least. And such bias requires the judge who holds
such views to step down from any cases where state “law officers” appear in
front of such a judge.
If such bias amounts to a policy, and to
a policy of the entire court, as it appeared to be in Judge Weinstein’s court, based
on the fact that Judge Weinstein was the Chief Judge of a large federal
district court in New York State, such a policy spells out a crisis of both the state and the federal judicial systems.
It appears that for federal, as well as
state judges, the constitutional oath of office, once taken by a judge, means
absolutely positively nothing, where judges gave themselves immunity from suit
for malicious and corrupt behavior on the bench, where judicial discipline is
non-existent, and where judges openly profess as their goals “eliminate[ing]
sources of friction” with “state law officers” which obviously includes
defendants in civil rights lawsuits in federal court.
Thus, instead of following the mandates
of the U.S. Constitution that judges are sworn to uphold, it appears that all
that judges seek is to (1) clear their dockets and reduce their own
workloads; (2) protect themselves and
the state “law officers” from any kind of liability; (3) eliminate any possibility of stepping on
the toes of the state “law officers”.
In my humble opinion, such goals are not
even close to serving the American people through the judiciary systems.
There is no need for “quasi-public”
“gray cardinal” “co-ordinators” of the state and federal judicial systems.
The public must be assured that judges
presiding over court proceedings have no ex parte communications, involvement
with or potential for influence over them through any social networking or
civic organizations.
I have a firm belief that State-Federal Judicial Councils and
their mysterious “Advisory Committees”, same as the American Inns of Court,
while declaring service to the public, taint integrity of judicial proceedings
with their existence and secret proceedings outside of public oversight.
