Women and minorities should work three times as much (or more)

In my youth I had a revealing experience.  I was studying at a night university, and during day time, I worked as a typist.  Since I became a typist after I became a pianist, typing at the speed of speech was easy for me.  Since I studied at a linguistic university, correcting the author's mistakes, spelling, grammatical and sometimes stylistic, was also not difficult - and garnered me respect of my boss.


Yet, there appeared a problem.


I studied at the evening department of the Moscow Linguistic University.  I had loads of homework.  A language is not something that can be faked, you either know the words and expressions or you don't.  There is no cutting corners in language studies, and anybody who tells you that you can learn in your sleep or in an ultra fast fashion... Well, I don't believe it. 


I worked during day time.  I spent nearly 3 hours in commute every day.  I had to study sometime during the day.  For that reason, I consulted the labor norms for my job (in the Soviet Russia there were such beasts actually) and verified that a typist must type 24 pages a day, and not more.


I typed 25 pages from 9 am  to noon and then opened my textbooks.


Some people in my department started to complain about me to my boss claiming that since I CAN do more per day, I MUST do more per day.  And since the second typist who worked with me can produce only 12 pages a day (!), she should not be pressured for more than that.  For the same salary.


I was lucky that my boss was (1) an intelligent man;  (2) I was the only one who could read his handwriting;  (3) I corrected his spelling mistakes.  For that reason, I could graduate from my night university since he allowed me to work my norm till noon, and then to study. 


When I graduated from the Linguistic University and started to work for a British company as a translator, my British boss, apparently without any bad feelings to anybody, as a joke actually, told me once - "you know about America, women and minorities should work three times as much".  I did not believe him.  Now I do.


Time and again, when I ask for an adjournment of an impossible deadline from a court, a different standard is used than when a male attorney (especially a male attorney working for the government) asks for an adjournment.


I have to pour my soul out to a judge, usually also a male, and I have to account for every hour in all days leading to the deadline, including weekends - and I still get an adjournment denied, and a man may quote simply that he has "other litigation" pending - and will get an adjournment for the asking.


That happened to me both in state and federal courts.


Sometimes I am simply flabbergasted by the callousness of judges who deny adjournments, even though it is clear that they are putting on me deadlines that are physically impossible to accomplish.  No male attorney-opponent was denied adjournments when he asked, and usually such adjournments were granted for the asking, and even if I objected. 


Any attorney is the voice of her client, and if she is not given adjournments when several courts impose the same deadlines on large motions which cannot be done at the same time, her clients necessarily suffer without any fault of hers, because there are 24 hours in a day and a single attorney, no matter how fast she formulates her ideas, how experienced she is on the subject of the motion, how well she researches and how fast she types, is still one solo attorney and simply cannot multiply hours in a day to do what courts sometimes impose. 


I don't believe judges who impose such deadlines do not understand what they are doing, because they do give adjournments freely to male attorneys, for the asking, and judges come to the bench after a minimum of 10 years experience as attorneys - that's a requirement in New York State.  I believe, the double standard in giving adjournments to male attorneys and not giving adjournments to a female, and a foreign-born female, is intentional - and the purpose is to teach that foreign woman who got into the "old boys' club job" - that the old boys still rule the game.


The purpose is also to set the female attorney up for failure - and then claim that she failed and she is incompetent.  I am lucky so far I was able to meet those deadlines anyway.  By working three times as much, or more.


When  I am exhausted, I blog - this way I relax.  When I blog at the end of the day, and a very full day, no matter how much I did that day, how many pleadings I filed that day, I get aggressive comments by opposing counsel that if I blog, I must have some forces left to do some more (even if I put in 14 hour working days every day) and I am not entitled to that adjournment that I am asking for.


When I hear that, I have a flashback right back to Soviet Russia - "if she CAN do more than an average worker, she MUST do more".  Do I, really?


I guess, my British boss was correct.  In America, at least women should work three times as much - and then some.

There is no "good faith" when a judge does not disclose her conflict of interest

Judge Cathryn M. Doyle, a Surrogate's Court Justice, has been removed by the New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct for presiding over cases where her friends appeared in front of her as attorneys and for failure to disclose her conflicts of interest.


In defense of herself, Judge Doyle claimed that she failed to disclose the conflicts of interest "mistakenly" and "in good faith".


Now, how can a person fail to disclose a conflict of interest "in good faith"?  Especially when that person is a judge of many years, and a lawyer of 35 years, admitted since 1979, according to the New York State attorney directory? I do not believe Judge Doyle could pretend she did not know the applicable rules of disqualification or at least of disclosure...


The value of disclosure is for other attorneys and parties to be able to weigh that information and apply for recusal of the judge. 


It was not for Judge Doyle to decide whether to disclose a conflict of interest or not, such a disclosure is mandatory. 


By not disclosing her conflicts of interest, Judge Doyle undermined people's trust in the integrity of the judiciary and does not belong on the bench.


Judge Doyle, as every other judge presiding over people's lives and fates, should be squeaky clean in her performance.  Anything less than that is unacceptable.


I believe that the NYS Commission for Judicial Conduct did the right thing (for a change) by removing judge Doyle. 


NYS Commission should be consistent in its actions, though, and apply the same standard of removal to all judges who fail to disclose their conflicts of interest.


In 2014 Judge Doyle was removed for presiding over cases of (1) her friend, (2) her personal attorney, (3) her former attorney .


In 2013 Judge George was removed for presiding over cases of friends.


Judge Carl F. Becker, the Acting Supreme Court justice of the Delaware County Supreme Court remains on the bench, even though he openly presided over the case of a close friend and failed to disclose his multiple conflicts of interest in multiple cases in that court and in other courts, and he openly presided over the case where his personal attorney was in front of him - and granted the victory to that attorney. 


Why should Judge Becker be given a special treatment by the Commission? He knows somebody who protects him?




And Judge Becker does not even use "good faith" excuses, he arrogantly acts as if the courtroom is his own fiefdom - his and his friends'.

I wonder if a married woman in the state of New York has a separate identity from her husband. It appears that according to Delaware County Supreme Court judge Carl F. Becker, NYS Attorney General and the 2nd Circuit Appellate Court, she doesn't. No matter which Neroni is punished - I do not care, revisited

On May 25, 2014 I have published a blog post indicating that for the Acting Delaware County Supreme Court Justice Carl F. Becker it does not matter which of the Neronis to punish, myself or my husband, and that we were punished by this judge for each other's alleged acts or omissions.

On May 27th and 29th, 2014 several more public officials made assertions indicating that for them, I do not have a separate identity or separate rights from my husband and that whatever my husband does must be visited upon me.

On May 27, 2014, in a federal civil rights action, Neroni v. Zayas where only my husband is the Plaintiff and where I only represent my husband as a civil rights attorney, the New York State Attorney General and the Delaware County Attorney concurred that my own disciplinary case removed to the federal court and made public only after I filed the Neroni v. Zayas action is "related" to my husband's civil rights action against the Professional Conduct Committee and the Appellate Division Third Judicial Department.

To me, it means an admission that I am being prosecuted in the disciplinary case because I sued the Committee and the court on behalf of my husband, and was so far successful in the lawsuit.

On May 29, 2014 in the DEC case I wrote about on May 25, 2014, I requested an adjournment based on the filing of a new federal civil rights lawsuit.

The New York State Attorney General, his assistant Andrew B. Ayers, Esq., opposed the request while claiming that "[o]ver the course of five years of litigation, the Neronis have avoided complying with the Department's order requiring them to restore the protected trout stream on their property.  They should not be permitted any further delay".

Andrew B. Ayers, thus, indicated that he considers that the DEC order was directed at my husband as well as at me, same as Judge Becker did in his sanctions imposed upon me in an unrelated action (Shields v. Carbone) where Judge Becker also engaged in an ex parte communication with Delaware County Attorney and concealed his close friendship with the Plaintiff Beverly Shields.

Yet, the DEC Commissioner's order that Mr. Ayers is talking about had nothing to do with me, and over the "5 years of litigation" Mr. Ayers were supposed to be able to read and know his record, instead of publishing books and advertise his clerkship with the now U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonya Sotomayorm, while claiming to the court that it is the "evil Neronis" who allegedly prevented Mr. Ayers from meeting his deadlines in litigation and not his own publication schedule which was supposed to be done in his free time, if any.

It remains to be explored whether Mr. Ayers prepared, published and marketed his book on taxpayer-paid time while neglecting his cases, and while being paid by taxpayers (including by my taxes).  


I doubt though that anybody at any time will explore that issue because - guess what - NYS Attorney General's office/ Andrew Ayers represents the Commmittee for Professional Conduct and Andrew Ayers represents the Appellate Court which is in charge of attorney licensing, so who in their right mind will prosecute and discipline their own attorney?  I did turn Andrew B. Ayers into the Committee, for lack of other tribunal, not tainted by conflict, they predictably tossed the complaint without investigation and without seeking appointment of a special investigator or prosecutor, in view of the fact that I asked to investigate and prosecute their own counsel.  The rule of law in its bloom and glory in the state of New York...

On the same date as Andrew B. Ayers stated to the court that I did not comply with the DEC order that had nothing to do with me, May 29, 2014, the 2nd Circuit Appellate Court ruled that the appeal in a case Neroni v. Becker, where the Appellant was only my husband and where the appeal was prosecuted by my husband on his own behalf (meaning that I had nothing to do with the appeal, either as an attorney or party), was about "the Neronis", plural, indicating that my ghost is present in and my rights are affected by whatever my husband is doing whether I am part of it or not.

It appears that for the collective mind of multiple public official in New York executive and judiciary branch and even in the federal appellate courts, I have no separate identity from my husband, any orders directed only at my husband are affecting me, too, and I have no separate rights or separate voice from my husband.

When I immigrated to the United States in 1999 I did not know that this country held such caveman views of women's rights.

Due process of law, anyone?

Rights of a separate identity for married women in the U.S., anyone?

Oh, and I forgot that in this country the precedent is still on the books of the U.S. Supreme Court, not overruled, where the U.S. Surpeme Court, in its infinite wisdom, has ruled that married women may not engage in the practice of law, because nothing such a woman does can be binding without consent of her husband, and that denial of a law license to a woman because she is married is not unconstitutional.


The U.S. Supreme Court elaborated in Bradwell v Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) that the U.S. Supreme Court must adhere to the common law of England, that the statute based on which Mrs. Bradwell was denied a law license despite her qualifications was passed at the time common law of England was adopted in the United States, that in England female attorneys were unknown, and, therefore, there should not be any reason to believe that they should be known in the U.S.


Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court, when asked a question whether admitting women to the bar is constitutional or not, relied in answering the question not upon the U.S. Constitution, but upon the common law of England from which the U.S. declared independence specifically because of its lawlessness and tyranny. 


This precedent is still on the books, was not overruled and, as federal courts claim about non-overruled U.S. Supreme Court decisions, constitutes mandatory precedent for the entire country and mandatory interpretation of women's rights in America.


My rights included.


And it appears to me that the aforementioned public officials were following the spirit if not letter of this decision in lumping me together with my husband and denying me separate identity and separate rights.



The rule of law, anyone?

How federal appellate courts unilaterally and without authority transformed themselves into arbitration panels

When a person files a lawsuit, it usually means that the alternative means of dispute resolution did not work.

Litigation is not a fun activity.   It is stressful,  costly and time-consuming.

Yet,  when a person files a lawsuit,  a person expects from the judiciary diligent review of his or her case on equal grounds with other litigants.

That is called "equal justice for all" and is guaranteed by the Equal protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution which every judge in the United States takes an oath to uphold as a condition of taking that judicial office.

Yet, an interesting metamorphosis happens to the judges' readiness to uphold the concept of equal justice for all when a judge is faced with increasing caseloads.

Now,  let's agree on some common premises.

Population of the United States increases.

The number of court cases increases.

The number of federal judges did not increase in proportion with the increase of cases filed and litigated.

There is a physiological limit as to human attention span and ability of any human for intense intellectual work per day.Federal judges are usually advanced in years, which makes their ability for strenuous intellectual work and speedy, efficient and diligent resolution of court cases suspect, no matter how many clerks they employ.
Reports constantly appear that the rule that federal judges serve while on good behavior simply does not work, because it does not cover aging and aging-specific health problems.  Senility among federal judges is a growing concern.  Some federal judges serve into their 80s and even 90s.  Senior judges handle 15% of the caseload of federal courts.

Does all of the above justify unilateral classification of cases by judges into the "worthy" track where full review and analysis is conducted and full opinions are issued and punished and the "unworthy" track where a less-than-diligent review of cases is warranted, according to judges' absolute discretion?

Not if the constitutional concept of access to courts,  due process of law,  equal prison of law and for fair, competent and impartial judicial review is followed.

If there is the same number of judges for increasing number of cases,  the concept of equal protection of law means simply that it will take longer for any given case to be reviewed,  not that the judge is somehow allowed to cut corners and provide a less than diligent review because he is so busy.

Yet, cutting corners is exactly what federal appellate courts are doing by designating over 80% of appellate cases (according to research of Erica S. Weisgerber, footnote 7 p. 624 and accompanying text), without notifying appellants or giving them an opportunity to object before it is too late, for a less than diligent review and production of the so-caller "unpublished opinions" where the courts hardly provide any explanations for their decisions,  finally snaping appellants' lives and practically tarot 80% of appeals as a total waste of time and money,  all in the name of the claimed judicial efficiency, meaning expediency that sacrifices diligence or fairness.

It is appalling that, without notice or opportunity to be heard,  for the courts' own convenience,  over 80% of appellants in federal appellate courts ate denied diligent appellate review,  while the remaining 20% or less of appellants are given such review,  for unlearn reasons,  based on the judges' sole and absolute discretion which is practically unreviewable by any other court.

When federal appellate courts refuse to explain over 80% of their decisions,  they are no different from arbitration.   Yet,  arbitration is not what the appella ts who are denied proper review chose.

The difference between the court of law and arbitration is that,  while arbitration is also binding,  the arbitrator is not required to cite the law or provide his or her analysis or reasoning for the decision. That is exactly what federal appellate courts are doing with their "unpublished opinions".

Yet, arbitration is voluntary, and if litigants chose judicial review in federal courts as of right,  they cannot be forced into an arbitration or arbitration-like review without their knowledge or consent, which is what is happening now in federal appellate courts.

My legal opinion is that such a practice is unconstitutional and invalidates federal appellate courts as entities, where such courts, for their own convenience' sake, unilaterally, voluntarily and without authority started to act as arbitrators and not courts in the overwhelming majority of cases.

New York Judiciary Law 487, fraud upon the court - downed twice by two New York courts since 2009, but still alive?

Blunder No. 1.


Judiciary Law 487 is a criminal statute with a civil portion.  It allows a civil action against an attorney who defrauded a court.


In a civil action, as any first-year law student knows, there is no such thing as an "attempted tort" (see Peter Cane, Anatomy of Tort Law, p. 63), because if the tort has been attempted, but not completed, the essential elements of damages and causation of damages are lacking and cannot be proven.


Attempts are the realm of the criminal proceedings, not of civil actions, where the prosecutor is the state, on behalf of the People, and where damage even from an attempt, is presumed.


Yet, because of the stigma attributable to criminal convictions, prosecution for a criminal attempt must comply with Criminal Procedure Law and constitutional law.


As opposed to a civil case, in a criminal case:

1. The defendant has a right to an arraignment where he may plead "not guilty" and must be advised by the judge of his right to remain silent - there is no such right in a civil proceeding and a civil defendant may be claimed in default for failing to rebut allegations against him.
2. The defendant has a right to a Bill of Particulars, discovery in accordance to a statute, motions to suppress illegally obtained evidence, including illegally obtained confessions, the right to a jury trial on each and every issue of fact, the right to confront his accusers, to have them testify at trial - in a civil action the right to a jury trial may be easily circumvented by a summary judgment.

In February of 2009 the New York State Court of Appeals decided a case Amalfitano v. Rosenberg, where it ruled that in a civil case under Judiciary Law 487 treble statutory damages can still be awarded for attempted, but not completed tort.  In other words, in view of New York State Court of Appeals treble damages can be awarded where no damages or causation of damages be found as a matter of law, because the tort was not completed. 


NYS COA heavily relied in its decision on the intent of attorney to commit a crime of fraud upon the court.  It is apparent that the resulting NYS COA decision is also about an attempted crime, and cannot legally be about an attempted tort, a non-existing concept.  Yet, that's what we have in New York - a civil portion of a statute and its interpretation by the highest court in the state eliminating that civil portion and converting it into a de facto criminal proceeding prosecuted in the Supreme Court of the state by private parties and without indictment of the grand jury.




Since there is no such thing as an attempted tort, only an attempted crime (as any 1st year law student must know), the New York State Court of Appeals, by its decision in Amalfitano, eliminated the civil portion of the Judiciary law 487 and turned all proceedings pending at that time under the civil portion of Judiciary Law 487 into criminal proceedings. 




The starkly incompetent decision by the New York State Court of Appeals ignored statutory and constitutional law distinguishing torts and crimes and related proceedings, ignored that in the Supreme Court criminal proceedings can be brought only by a public prosecutor and only through the indictment of the grand jury, and ignored the fact that it ruled the now treble damages are allowed by the court where no damages can be found by the jury, and thus the Court of Appeals usurped the function of the jury to find or not find damages in certain cases.




Of course, the New York State Court of Appeals has never announced its monumental blunder, did not apologize, did not revise it, did not retract it and vacate it sua sponte.


Thus, when an attorney is sued for attempted tort, in New York he or she can be de facto criminally prosecuted by private parties without following any criminal procedure or constitutional law that is applicable to such prosecution for attempts.


Good job, New York State Court of Appeals.   Nothing like failing your 1st year of law school's finals.




Blunder No. 2.


On December 23, 2013, in an effort to help out a "brother at arms", a judge of a town justice court,  Delaware County Supreme Court, Judge James C. Tormey pronounced that absolute judicial immunity applies to malicious acts of a private attorney during litigation.


The attorney in question was sued for defamation, fraud and fraud upon the court under Judiciary Law 487.


Absolute judicial immunity, the way it has been constantly applied by New York and federal courts for decades, creates a bar to subject matter jurisdiction of the court.


Thus, after Judge Tormey applied absolute judicial immunity to any misconduct of an attorney during litigation, he abrogated the court's subject matter jurisdiction to review lawsuits against attorneys under Judiciary Law 487.


Delaware County Supreme Court, Judge Dowd, refused to acknowledge precedential value of  Judge Tormey's decision, calling it "dicta", even though it was the basis of the judge's dismissal of a lawsuit alleging malicious and fraudulent acts by an attorney, and thus was not dicta.


It is my legal opinion that (1) Judge Tormey's decision is not dicta and has invalidated Judiciary Law 487 in its entirety;  (2) that the leading "precedent" for absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts upon which both Judge Tormey and Judge Dowd relied  in their respective federal civil rights litigation, is dicta, which does not prevent these judges and all courts in the United States, to rely upon it.


Thus, it appears, based on these 2 monumental blunders of New York courts that Judiciary Law 487 was skinned, chopped and thrown away, and yet it continues to be enforced.


This is what we call "the rule of law" in the State of New York.

Precedential value of dicta: yes, if it provides benefits to members of the judiciary and no, if it provides benefits to parties disliked by the judiciary

The concept of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts is not part of the U.S. Constitution.


It has been a creation of the U.S. Supreme Court, which is itself restricted in its authority by the Article III of the U.S. Constitution, and there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that allows the U.S. Supreme Court to amend that U.S. Constitution through interpretation, "imputation" or case law.


That said, the U.S. Supreme Court has still ruled in Stump v. Sparkman in 1978 that a judge is absolutely immune, even for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench.


The catch of the Stump v. Sparkman case was, though, that no matter how egregious the constitutional violations were in the case, the decision did not show that the judge had a personal interest in the case or was bought off by the petitioner, and thus, the expansion of judicial immunity to malicious and corrupt acts based on the record of Stump v. Sparkman was a mere dicta.


Yet, this dicta has become a leading precedent on the issue of application of absolute judicial immunity specifically to malicious and corrupt acts on the bench, and has been used like that for 36 years so far since the Stump v. Sparkman decision came down.


In January of 2012 the Delaware County Supreme Court, Judge James C. Tormey, dismissed a lawsuit of a former attorney Frederick J. Neroni against Delaware County Supreme, Family, Surrogate and County judge Carl F. Becker where Frederick J. Neroni was suing Judge Becker for malicious and corrupt acts, and applied the concept of absolute judicial immunity covering malicious and corrupt acts.   The lawsuit against the judge was commenced by Mr. Neroni when he was still an attorney.


In other words, in January of 2012 the Delaware County Supreme Court dismissed Mr. Neroni's lawsuit against a judge for malicious and corrupt acts on and off the bench because of application of dicta from Stump v. Sparkman, the concept of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts.


In December of 2013 the same judge James C. Tormey applied the concept of absolute judicial immunity to my personal lawsuit against an attorney Jonathan S. Follender for defamation and fraud upon the court, and granted that attorney an absolute judicial immunity.


The catch in that case was that Jonathan S. Follender is also a judge in the Town of Denning Justice Court, Ulster County, and that Judge Tormey was usually assigned only to cases of judges and employees of courts, and was assigned likely in consideration of the court system rescuing him unscathed from a federal litigation against him for retaliation.


When absolute judicial immunity is applied, the courts apply it as a jurisdictional bar to all claims, and dismiss cases without reaching the merits.


Mr. Neroni at that time and at present time had a partial summary judgment on liability made against him on the same statute that was dismissed for Jonathan S. Follender where the court did reach the merits of his case, and his law license was taken based on that partial summary judgment, without a hearing, 3 years ago, while the case still proceeds and may be dismissed for failure to prosecute (the motion is pending) or for failure to prove damages or causation of damages at the jury trial.


Since Judge Tormey now says that absolute judicial immunity applies to attorneys, reasonable application of that decision was that Judiciary Law 487, fraud upon the court, was invalidated by Judge Tormey's pronouncement, and the court has abrogated its own subject matter jurisdiction as to all cases of attorneys sued for fraud upon the court, including my husband's.


I immediately applied Judge Tormey's decision and moved to dismiss my husband's proceedings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in view of newly created law.


Judge Dowd, the presiding judge on the case who was involved in a litigation with my husband, ruled that Judge Tormey's decision is a "mere dicta", that I was collaterally estopped to assert any new law after the summary judgment on liability was granted and that I should have known better than to rely upon the dicta.


I will summarize what I said in a timeline.


1978 - in Stump v. Sparkman the U.S. Supreme Court stated in dicta that judges are absolutely immune for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench, and that dicta has been used to protect judges from such lawsuits for 36 years by federal and state courts;


2012 - Delaware County Supreme Court dismisses Mr. Neroni's lawsuit against a judge based on that dicta


2013 - Delaware County Supreme Court expands absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts to private lawyers (in a case where the private lawyer to whom the benefit was given was also a judge of a justice court)


2014 - Delaware County Supreme Court claims that the 2013 decision was a "mere dicta" and refuses to apply that decision to dismiss the pending case against Mr. Neroni for lack of subject matter jurisdiction


I make a conclusion that the dicta only has precedential value when presiding judges need to protect sued judges from liability, and does not have any precedential value when a disliked party, an attorney who sued judges and is quickly disbarred without a hearing after he sued a judge, is concerned.


A dismissal of Mr. Neroni's case would have resulted in an immediate restoration of his law license, which is what Judge Dowd could not allow to happen.


If one considers that Mr. Neroni's lawsuit against Judge Dowd (Neroni v. Coccoma, 3:13-cv-1340) was pending at the time of his decision, where Mr. Neroni questioned mental capacity of Judge Dowd for claiming that a urinal was built by a law school in his honor, as part of a discussion of child custody/visitation on record, intentional retaliation comes to mind.  Judge Dowd imposed costs upon Mr. Neroni for relying upon dicta in making his motion and verbally admonished me for relying upon dicta also, stating that I should have known better than to do that.


Of course, Judge Dowd is himself relying on dicta in Stump v. Sparkman where he made a motion to dismiss based on absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts defending against Mr. Neroni's pro se federal lawsuit against him.   Apparently, Judge Dowd did not tell his attorney, the New York State Attorney General, as he told me in my husband's case, that his attorney should know better than to rely on dicta in applying absolute judicial immunity.


 Quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi.  It is an ancient Latin phrase about double standards meaning "what is allowed to Jupiter, is not allowed to a bull".  Yet, because double standards for high-and-mighty existed since time immemorial does not mean that they should exist in a democratic society.


In Delaware County Supreme Court, it appears to be a claim of right for the judges.




The decision of Judge Tormey that Judge Dowd claimed to be dicta was not even dicta, but even if it was, Judge Dowd applied a double-standard to his own right to rely on dicta and denied that same right to Mr. Neroni.  That is exactly what Judge Tormey did where he ruled in Mr. Neroni's lawsuit against Judge Becker that only the New York State Attorney General may decide whether he has a conflict of interest in representation of state actors pursuant to Public Officers Law 17, while Judge Tormey (without disclosure to Mr. Neroni or me as his counsel) raised the very same arguments about the conflict of interest of the New York State Attorney General on his own behalf, where Judge Tormey was sued.


Delaware County Supreme Court appears to have a pattern and policy where judges deny litigants appearing in front of them the same rights they are claiming in individual litigation brought against them.




Nothing like sighted justice and result-oriented jurisprudence in Delaware County Supreme Court.


Should Judge Dowd be taken off the bench for his shenanigans with his off and on application of dicta to judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts - with a "yes" if it concerns himself and a "no" if it concerns dismissal of a case and resulting return of a law license to a former attorney who dared to sue Judge Dowd?

I do not care which one of the Neronis did it! I will punish anyway! And don't you tell me I am biased - for I will punish you some more...

On June 27, 2011 attorney Tatiana Neroni, on behalf of herself, her husband Frederick J. Neroni and her client Alecia Bracci, sued Delaware County Judge Carl F. Becker alleging multiple instances of misconduct and retaliation over a period of years, based on his actions in and out of court.


After Judge Becker was served with the lawsuit on June 27, 2011, he punished Tatiana Neroni on the following dates:

• June 30, 2011;
• August 10, 2011;
• August 12, 2011

Moreover, Judge Becker proceeded punishing Tatiana Neroni for actions of her husband Frederick J. Neroni, and vice versa.


On August 12, 2011 Judge Becker punished Tatiana Neroni in Supreme Court case Shields v. Carbone, Delaware County Index No. 2009-440, among other things, for the motion to recuse that her husband Frederick J. Neroni made in a DEC administrative proceeding.


The Appellate Division, after being fully advised of what happened, affirmed the sanctions and stated that there is no reason to believe Judge Becker was biased.


On November 18, 2011, 3 days before his own motion to dismiss Tatiana and Frederick J. Neroni's lawsuit was scheduled to be heard in court, Judge Becker punished Frederick J. Neroni for the statement made by Tatiana Neroni: "I will not allow remediation on my property" (Tatiana Neroni, co-owner of the property, was not included into the administrative proceeding as a party), Martens v. Neroni, Delaware County Index No. 2011-432.


No bias, huh?

See the update on the ongoing confusion as to me-as-my-husband (and vice versa) by the courts as of August of 2016 here.