Independence of Representation in Court and Judicial Accountability in the United States

THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Friday, April 25, 2014

Is it proper for a judicial "extern" who "drafts reports and recommendations/bench memoranda and reviews decisions for form and accuracy" for the U.S. District Court (NDNY) Judge David Peebles to seek extrajudicial information about an attorney who appears before that same judge in several current civil rights actions?

Now, this one took me by a complete surprise.
Between April 19, 2014 and April 22, 2014 my LinkedIn profile was visited by a "judicial extern" Matthew Holmes who "externs" at the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York:

I visited the LinkedIn Profile of Matthew Holmes and found that Matthew Holmes is a judicial "extern" for the magistrate judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York the Hon. David E. Peebles, with the duties that Matthew Holmes describes himself below:

Here is my problem.

WHY would a judicial extern for Judge Peebles visit my LinkedIn profile, and especially when Judge Peebles is scheduled to hear two motions with my participation, and when I am about to appear at an additional conference in the third case. All of my cases are civil rights cases, in one of the cases a high-ranking judge is a defendant. Did Judge Peebles ask Matthew Holmes to get extrajudicial information about me? I cannot know for sure and I have a funny feeling nobody will ever give me an answer to that question, but there is an appearance of such a possibility, because it is otherwise simply too much of a coincidence, as to why a judicial extern for Judge Peebles would have a desire to visit a LinkedIn page of an attorney of record before Judge Peebles in 7 civil rights cases.

On my LinkedIn profile there are references to my blogs where I raise issues of judicial misconduct of different judges. That is my political activity done in the public interest and outside of court.

Judge Peebles was not the subject of my blog until this day when I found out his "judicial extern" is seeking and obtaining extrajudicial information about my personal and political activities, through my LinkedIn page, as well as my associations.

I have associations with people from other countries, and I do not know whether and how that can be used against me in lawsuits, but a judge is not supposed to know anything about an attorney or party that the record does not contain.

Here is the list of my current cases with Judge Peebles as an assigned magistrate (see last 3 letters DEP in the case name/number):

Argro v. Osborne, 3:12-cv-00910-NAM-DEP;

Aron v. Becker, 3:13-cv-00883-TJM-DEP;

Gray v. Stoop, 3:13-cv-01269-GTS-DEP;

Neroni v. Becker, 3:12-cv-01226-GLS-DEP;

Neroni v. Grannis, 3:11-cv-01485-LEK-DEP;

Neroni v. Zayas, 3:13-cv-00127-LEK-DEP;

Weaver v. Lambert, 3:13-cv-00882-GTS-DEP.

To me, a judicial extern, or, in other words, a confidential law clerk working for a judge is bound by the same restrictions as the judge. When such a judicial extern seeks extrajudicial information about an attorney of record in several pending cases, to me it is an extraordinary occurrence. I've never had anything like that before.

A judge must be constrained by the record of the case in front of him. Seeking, obtaining or using extrajudicial information about a case is improper. Matthew Holmes is part of Judge Peebles team, drafts Judge Peebles' decisions and, thus, when Matthew Holmes seeks and obtains extrajudicial information about my political activities pertaining to judicial misconduct and accountability, it is my belief that Judge Peebles may be presumed to have obtained that information, too.

Was it improper for Matthew Holmes to seek extrajudicial information about me as an attorney while I was attorney of record in 7 cases before the magistrate that Matthew Holmes was serving and drafting decisions for? You be the judge.

Tuesday, April 15, 2014

The conundrum of thoughts your New York attorney faces when deciding whether to make a motion to recuse a biased judge: to help you or to protect his own livelihood....