THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.


Saturday, October 31, 2026

What a spectacular disappointment: I AM NOT UNIQUE - in anti-disability discrimination by Chenango County Supreme Court Justice Joseph A. McBride. Part I.

 There are dirty public officials.  And - there are beyond-dirty public officials.

Chenango County Supreme Court Justice (former Chenango County DA Joseph A. McBride) is very, very dirty - that I knew for decades.

I already wrote on this blog that he paved the path to his judicial election by three (3) murder trials against Peter Wlasiuk where, after two (2) reversals, one of them - because he "maligned" (Appellate Division's language, not mine) my husband, the second defense counsel in the first murder trial.

He had no right to (1) bring this case to the grand jury, or (2) try it - any time.

Why?

Because his close blood relative - a brother, I understand, Peter McBride, was the first defense counsel for Wlasiuk in the first trial.

And because his 1st ADA Dunshee was a blood relative of the alleged murder victim - and was nevertheless actively participating in the prosecution.  That was according to Wlasiuk's habeas corpus petition in federal court.

And then comes the year 2014 when I, as a journalist and a then-practicing criminal defense counsel, criticized McBride's DA office's misconduct = ex parte communications with a non-attorney justice court-judge, attempting to influence him and apply pressure upon me after McBride's office missed speedy trial deadlines.  The McBride-office's-influenced judge went so far as to call me ex parte personally attempting to have me waive (forgive) the missed deadlines.  When I refused, the judge, in open court, claimed that I do not deserve respect.  Well, I survived that.  Defense attorneys survive a lot of flack for their clients.  I got for my client a dismissal on speedy trial grounds nevertheless.

And then comes the year 2023 when my husband and I, South Carolina residents, were sued in New York by a New York neighbor for an alleged easement dispute.

McBride was assigned, and, of course, had no dignity or integrity to step down immediately given the years of hatred and malicious gossip spewed by him against my husband in and out of courtroom.

And - what did he do?  But of course - without looking at the record: whether we were served or not (we were not), he ordered us to appear to oppose a motion (also were not served with it) from South Carolina to New York - a 1500 mile roundtrip.  I must add that in another litigation in 2026, McBride repeatedly refused to give me any hearing where I was entitled to it.

But, in 2023, McBride engaged in a classic bait-and-switch.

He FIRST ordered us (again, we were not served with the complaint, or with the motion, McBride had no jurisdiction over us, but anyway) to appear physically, in person, in New York from South Carolina to oppose an unserved motion where it was clear on the face of the motion that it was frivolous.

We did not go - naturally.

We then receive an order saying - because we did not appear (did not have to), McBride granted everything plaintiff asked for (never bothered to look whether the standard of proof was satisfied for those particular types of motion, CPLR 306-b, CPLR 308(5) ).  The pertinent issue was - the order was false and misleading.  It stated on its face that the motion hearing was held at the courthouse at 3 Court Street, Delhi, NY 13753 in person.

So, we had no basis to suspect that it was not true, and we gave McBride, as a judge, the benefit of the doubt, and moved to vacate it on other grounds.

We only asked for certain disability accommodations, and plaintiff's counsel bitterly opposed it, asking McBride to punish us both for my husband's complaint against McBride to the Judicial Conduct Commission - and to deny us ADA accommodations in retaliation.

Well, that was uniquely unlawful.

My husband pointed out that he will simply sue for ADA violations.  So, McBride - thankfully - recused.  

And, even then we did not suspect anything.  We made a motion to vacate before the new judge, and won both the motion to vacate and the motion to dismiss that action for facial insufficiency of service.  And - as I understand it now - that may have been the whole calculation, that we will simply "go away" with the whole controversy of McBride's trying to drag us from South Carolina to New York despite never having been served.

But we do not leave pertinent questions in litigation unanswered.  So we asked for a transcript of that motion hearing before McBride.  What we discovered blew our minds.

The hearing was not - as it was portrayed on the face of McBride's order - held in the courthouse.

It was held virtually, online, by Microsoft Teams.

While there is nothing wrong per se to hold virtual court hearings, in this situation, there was no rescheduling order filed, we were not notified at all, and the order said it was held in the physical courtroom, thus claiming that we knew, we at least were notified by mail (insufficient service where we were not initially served by the complaint, but still).

So, McBride LIED and ALTERED a court document in order to declare a default against us and to order unlawful alternative service by e-mail.  He said we did not appear - which presupposes notification.

There is nothing in the docket showing that (1) McBride rescheduled the hearing to be held on Teams - like it WAS actually held; and (2) that we were notified of the rescheduling.

The interesting thing was though that the plaintiff's counsel WAS there, on Teams - so HE knew, so that means McBride notified plaintiff's counsel ex parte, and then both of them pretended on record that we were notified, but did not appear, in full knowledge we were never notified of the change of the place of the hearing (from physical courtroom to Teams).

Well, ok, he recused, his decision was vacated, the case was dismissed.  It was refiled, a new judge was assigned, we fought and won it now on the merits, a summary judgment dismissing the case.

Nothing prepared me for 2026 when McBride re-entered my case and our (my husband's and my own) other case - with a literal vengeance.

In the case where both of us were plaintiffs, McBride disregarded that I was e-filing and my husband was not, did not send my husband any notifications whatsoever, disregarded the fact that the  defendant did not serve - at all - his pre-answer motion to dismiss upon my husband, disregard my e-filed Notice of Rejection of the motion and notice of default and, acting ex parte and sua sponte, not only granted the unserved motion to dismiss, but also changed the caption protecting the defendant and then claimed that all actions we filed over 3 years (without mentioning them or analyzing them) are frivolous, and imposed a district-wide permanent anti-filing injunction upon us.

That was on June 26, 2026.

On June 29, 2026, I made a motion in another case where McBride was presiding asking him to step down because of pre-judgment of the case - because the pending case squarely fell within the universe of cases he prejudged on June 26, 2026 as frivolous simply because they were filed by either one of us within the last 3 years.

McBride ignored the submitted, unopposed motion to disqualify for prejudgment, ruled against me, dismissed the case and again imposed sanctions and anti-filing injunction, not only upon me, but also upon my husband who - in that court case - was not a party.

After that a complete circus began.  I filed notices of appeal.

I also filed post-judgment notices of motion to vacate - since decisions on sanctions were made without notice, without opportunity to oppose them and without a hearing.

So far, McBride ERASED - simply erased - four of them, one in the first action and three in the second action (made before dismissal, and two made after dismissal, the latest one made on an order to show cause).

Erasing Motion # 1 (addressing prejudging) in Case # 2 (where my husband is not a party) had an additional problem - McBride erased a motion that has become part of the record on appeal of the order of dismissal (he denied the motion in the text of the order).

Thus, I needed to go back to McBride and make motions to restore the appellate record - but he is erasing motions, a circular problem.

Next, since his imposition of sanctions upon us in Case # 1 where both of us were parties and in Case # 2 where only I was a party, was without notice, under New York law such decisions are not appealable as of right and require to first bring a motion to vacate and then appeal from the denial of such a motion.  But, McBride erases motions to vacate, thus foreclosing our path to appeal.

While figuring out how to get out of this situation that McBride put us in, I received documents from Delaware County that were withheld from us for two years, and, lo and behold, within them, I find information that McBride was connected to two of the cases he prejudged on June 26, 2026 as a material witness.

He had to disclose that and to recuse.

But, not for him.

So, now I have in my lap a new set of evidence entitling me to move - again - to vacate and recuse - Motion # 2 in Case # 1 and Motion # 4 in Case # 2 - but he is erasing these motions as they come in.  

And - the question remains, and this is what I am figuring out right now - do I move to vacate, or do I sue the State of New York for ADA discrimination, obtaining all damages that ensued after McBride's dismissal of my meritorious claims?

Because of the way HOW he dismissed them.

What happened is - a motion to dismiss was brought upon a 16-motion calendar.  I had 3 weeks to address those motions.  One of the motions was the defendants' in Case # 2, and defendants based that motion on their own prior case (unrelated to me, so I was not a party and did not know the record), with a record of 2,475 pages (counted based on NYSCEF filings).

That was a humanly impossible workload.  I am also disabled, severely so.  I asked McBride for ADA accommodations - MULTIPLE times.  He brooded, and brooded, and brooded, and I asked, and asked, and asked - at least an answer required by ADA.

Then, he first prejudges Case # 1, then comes to Case # 2, ignores pending motion to recuse based on prejudgment, dismisses Case # 2 as I described above, and imposes ex parte sua sponte sanctions.

But, in order to dismiss Case # 2, McBride had to rule that my pleadings were legally insufficient.

And, to do that, he had to skip over my sworn statement saying that McBride denied me ADA accommodations, did not give me enough time to prepare an opposition, violated my rights set by a 3rd Department  binding precedent that allows me to oppose a pre-answer motion to dismiss with an affidavit, and to prepare that affidavit, I had to have time to read those 2475 pages (that opposing counsel had for nearly 3 years to digest and I had, in my disabled state, 3 weeks, on top of other 15 pending motions for the same motion calendar).

And DID he skip over that sworn ADA statement!

He made a ruling that was UNIQUE in its ... well, be the judge.

In Neroni v. Watershed Agricultural Council of the New York City Watersheds, Inc., Delaware County Supreme Court, Index No. EF2026-106, Justice Joseph A. McBride wrote the following in his Decision and Order dated July 14, 2026, NYSCEF Doc. No. 166, page 6.

After acknowledging my “legitimate requests and needs for certain ADA accommodations,” he stated:

"Given Plaintiff’s background as a licensed attorney in New York, a frequent pro se litigant, her propensity to name several defendants within one action, and her noted journalism activity, it would be reasonable for Plaintiff to anticipate early, and even pre-answer, motion practice that would lead a reasonable person to anticipate this workload and therefore make necessary plans to litigate in a reasonable time period."

Further, in footnote 10, page 6, McBride added:

"The Court wishes to note here that most, if not all, of the cases that Plaintiff cites as contributing to her workload were cases in which pro se Plaintiff, either alone or with her husband and co-plaintiff, Mr. Frederick Neroni, commenced actions before the Court.:

HUH?!

The critical language is McBride's express acknowledgment of my legitimate disability-related accommodation needs, followed by his reliance on my professional background, litigation activity, and journalism in denying my ADA accommodation request.

In other words, McBride has carved an exception to the federally mandated Americans with Disabilities Act by saying - it does not cover disabled pro se plaintiffs, and it does not cover disabled journalists.  If you are a disabled journalist and a disabled pro se plaintiff, you must "make necessary plans" for any impossible workloads an ADA-covered entity (the state court) imposes on you.

And THAT, ladies and gentlement, brings me to the earlier-announced disappointment.

I thought that that crazily unlawful ruling was the result of McBride's crazy and vicious hatred of my husband, developed over many decades of opposition in the courtroom when McBride was DA and my husband was criminal defense counsel and wiped the court floor with McBride - who is NOT a legal whiz.

Yesterday I learnt that it is not so.

Because, yesterday, i learnt that McBride was assigned, EARLIER than to my cases in 2026, to a case of ANOTHER disabled investigative journalist, John Solak, in Broome County Supreme Court, and did in that case the functional equivalent of what he did in my case in regards to discrimination based on disability.

And that story will come next.

Stay tuned.






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