The hilarious (in)competency (and not only) discussion of Delaware County's County Attorney Amy Merklen at her deposition on October 15, 2025

Here is the full deposition of Delaware County (NY) attorney Amy Merklen that was conducted on October 15, 2025 by Biglaw Greenberg & Traurig's attorney Michael Grygiel 

(you can look at the impressive credentials of this attorney on the website of his law firm here) in a federal case Decker Advertisement, Inc. v. Delaware County, 3:23-cv-1531 (NDNY), filed in court as Dkt. # 246-14.

In this blog article, I will cover several points of the deposition: 

(1) the relentless, matter-of-fact exposure of Amy Merklen's stark incompetence in her job as a County Attorney;

(2) exposure of Amy Merklen's stark neglect of her duties; and

(3) expose of Amy Merklen's casual deceit of courts - a criminal offense and a disbarment offence.

Those of the readers who know this personage (Merklen) for a number of years at a professional level will feel vindicated that these three points were finally stated, from the horse's own mouth, under the penalty of perjury, on record, extracted by a Biglaw shareholder attorney who Delaware County cannot dare to mow down by claims of "frivolousness" etc.

I wrote a cautionary article on this blog about Merklen's complete inaptitude for the role of a County Attorney in 2017 and again this year, based on my personal experience as opposing counsel to Amy Merklen in Family Court on a daily basis.

An Albany Law School Professor Patrick Connors testified about stark unethical behavior of Amy Merklen against her own client DSS Commissioner Dana Scuderi-Hunter.

Dana Scuderi-Hunter's counsel has filed a scathing memorandum of law listing Amy Merklen's unethical shenanigans.

Then, in 2022, the NYS Supreme Court, Appellate Division 3rd Department wrote about Amy Merklen's legal abilities quite bluntly:

"We begin by addressing the Board's resolution terminating petitioner's employment, particularly as it relates to the Hearing Officer's finding that petitioner's actions in a Family Court juvenile delinquency proceeding amounted to disloyalty and misconduct. The first "resolved" clause includes the following declaration: "[T]he Board does hereby declare that the testimony of [petitioner] at a Family Court hearing described in the transcripts of this matter is not a factor in this decision but rather that the conduct of [petitioner] in engaging in acts of lack of cooperation, disloyalty, insubordination, conduct unbecoming, and misconduct [form] the basis of this decision as found and recommended by the Hearing Officer." Considering that the Hearing Officer's findings of disloyalty and misconduct are based in significant part on petitioner's role in testifying at the aforementioned Family Court hearing, it is difficult to reconcile the Board's declaration with the Hearing Officer's recommendation other than to conclude that petitioner's role in that matter cannot serve as the basis for any finding 1311*1311 of misconduct. Moreover, it is evident that the charges pertaining to the Family Court juvenile delinquency proceeding reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the statutory roles of the Commissioner of Social Services, the County Attorney and the Probation Department.

By way of background, the Family Court juvenile delinquency proceeding involved a juvenile in foster care (hereinafter youth No. 2) who was under probation supervision and had allegedly engaged in criminal and disruptive behavior. As a consequence, both the Director of Probation and the County Attorney advocated for placement of youth No. 2 in secure detention pending treatment at a substance abuse facility, while petitioner took the position that youth No. 2 should be held in a less restrictive setting. That disagreement and the attendant circumstances prompted the charges of disloyalty and misconduct against petitioner. In our view, the charges relative to this disagreement misperceive petitioner's statutory authority to take the position she did in the matter.

The position of a county social services commissioner is in the noncompetitive class, and appointments are for a five-year term (see Social Services Law §§ 65[4]; 116[1]; County Law § 400[4][b]). A commissioner is subject to removal or other disciplinary action only for incompetency or misconduct in office following due notice of the charges and a hearing (see Civil Service Law § 75[1][c]; Social Services Law §§ 34[4]; 116[2]). The commissioner is "responsible for the administration of all the assistance and care for which the county is responsible" (Social Services Law § 65[2]). As such, petitioner was imbued with authority under state law to provide for the care and custody of youth No. 2 (see Social Services Law §§ 65[2]; 383-c; see generally Matter of Richard UU., 56 AD3d 973, 977-978 [2008]).

At the same time, the Director of Probation was responsible for supervising youth No. 2 while he was on probation (see Family Ct Act § 360.1[2]; Executive Law § 256[1], [4], [5]). The Director of Probation was also authorized to file a violation petition in Family Court based upon "reasonable cause to believe" that youth No. 2 had violated the terms of his probation (Family Ct Act § 360.2[1]). In such a proceeding, the County Attorney serves as the presentment agency (see Family Ct Act §§ 254[a]; 301.2[12]; County Law § 501[1]). Under County Law § 501(1), the County Attorney is the "legal advisor" for the County and its officers, including petitioner. Notably, however, County Law § 501(2) expressly provides: "Whenever the interests of ... the county are inconsistent with the 1312*1312 interests of any officer paid his [or her] compensation from county funds, the county attorney shall represent the interests of the ... county. In such case the officer may employ an attorney-at-law at his [or her] own expense unless the provisions of [Public Officers Law § 18] are applicable" (see County Law § 409; Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rules 1.7, 1.13).

The foregoing statutory provisions illustrate that petitioner, the Director of Probation and the County Attorney each had defined statutory roles in the Family Court proceeding involving youth No. 2. That petitioner opted to promote a less stringent measure than her counterparts does not, as charged by respondents, constitute a breach of loyalty owed to either the County Attorney or the Director of Probation, or vice versa. Accordingly, to the extent that the Board relied, at all, on the Hearing Officer's findings with respect to charge 1, specification Nos. 1.42 through 1.91, its determination is not supported by substantial evidence. It therefore follows that so much of the Board's determination as sustained said specifications are annulled."

Before and after this determination, according to local press reports (The Daily Star in 2020 and The Reporter in 2024) two County Supervisors - Andes' Wayland Gladstone in 2020 and Delhi's Maya Boukai in 2024 voted to not re-appoint Amy Merklen to the position of County Attorney specifically because she is not good for the County - and breeds litigation at taxpayers' expense.

As to Maya Boukai, Merklen's revenge was swift. 

Emboldened by the 3rd Department's support of termination of Dana Scuderi-Hunter on grounds other than insubordination and disloyalty, Amy Merklen simply hired a harasser attorney Facciponte to "investigate" - and harass - Maya Boukai in apparent retaliation for such a vote (after a publicity scandal flourished, he was let go by Hancock Estabrook LLP that was his host law firm at the time).

But, then, the disaster of the October 15, 2025 deposition of Amy Merklen happened.

The deposition is a publicity disaster for Merklen - and Mole who pushes Merklen's disastrous employment with the County - on a completely different level.

In the deposition, Merklen fumes there that she is supposedly improperly "harassed" and put on the spot by the deposing counsel, for incompetence and stupidity (and a couple other things, too, not mentioned by Merklen) - while at the same time DEMONSTRATING incompetence in real time, under oath, and on official court record.

So - here we go.

This is well into the deposition, page 164 - where attorney Grygiel, apparently tired of the stupidity of the deponent, states in the exchange with attorney Facciponte:

Facciponte:  "We all understand, basically, the black letter law about 92 percent of the questions you ask".

Grygiel:  "Apparently your client isn't /sic/"

The client in question, Amy Merklen, explodes:

The Witness (at lines 23-25): "Did you or did you not just call me incompetent and/or stupid on the record?"

Well...  Did he?  And if he did - did he have grounds for that - coming from Amy Merklen's mouth under oath?

I have had many, many, such occasions in the courtroom where Merklen was blundering stupidities in court.  Those stupidities, unfortunately, do not see the light of day as she does it in sealed Family Court proceedings - juvenile delinquency, child abuse and neglect.

Here, finally that stupidity is seeing the light of day - so thank you profoundly, Attorney Grygiel.

Earlier in the deposition, Attorney Grygiel started a hilarious line of questions grilling County Attorney Amy Merklen on her understanding of a core 1st Amendment subject:  is it possible to defame the government in the U.S.:

See here: he is asking her a question:

Grygiel:  Your letter says, "defamatory to the Delaware County Board of Supervisors"?

Merklen:  Correct.

Grygiel:  So my question is, did you consider The Reporter's publication that is the subject of your March 15, 2022 letter defamatory to the Delaware County Board of Supervisors?

Merklen says:  Yes.

Grygiel presses further:  Do you know whether the 1st Amendment allows our government body in our system to be defamed?

Now, ladies and gentlemen, attorney Grygiel was grilling her on 101 1st Amendment topics - 3 years into litigation against the County and herself on the issue of 1st Amendment retaliation.

And, this is THE County Official who is bound by duty to TRAIN County personnel in how NOT to violate the 1st Amendment.  So, she must know 1st Amendment law forwards, backwards and criss-cross.

And yet - here is what she say: under oath.

"If it is a federal practice, I do not do a lot".  "I do not do any federal practice".

This statement is DEVASTATING for an attorney who 

(1) is sworn to uphold the U.S. Constitution - but does not know it, and admits it under oath;  

(2) is a salaried employee of the County tasked to have the County personnel trained and supervised that it does not violate people's constitutional right - but confirms she does not know that law herself, under the penalty of perjury - and 3 years into litigation for a particular constitutional violation; and

(3) has been for nearly 20 years, since 2007, taking away PEOPLE'S CHILDREN and PEOPLE'S LIBERTY - all constitutional rights - without knowing or caring to know whether the rights she is taking away are constitutional rights.

In 2018 I published a book - it is still available on Amazon - listing her little invention, the "A through O" conditions for parents in (fabricated) child neglect and abuse cases that Merklen puts into illegal ex parte court orders from the start of the case, forcing parents:

(1) to talk to DSS despite a parallel criminal prosecution, in violation of the 5th Amendment;

(2) to let DSS search the premises, in violation of 4th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution;

(3) to submit to numerous invasive "evaluations" in violation of rights to privacy recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as part of due process guarantees of the 14th Amendment and part of "penumbras" of the 9th Amendment; and

(4) she actually takes children away - including right in the maternity hospital - and parental rights are core, fundamental constitutional rights.

And here - under oath - we have a casual "I do not do federal law".

And Attorney Grygiel saw the problem - and went for it full speed.

He presses the issue:  

"Do you know whether, under our First Amendment system, it is permissible to defame a government body?" - and look what happens next.

Delaware County Attorney Amy Merklen, 3 years into litigation on 1st Amendment retaliation issues, asks a question instead of answering:

"Can you explain what you mean by "our First Amendment system"?

Well - she is trying to deflect, of course, but looks really stupid.

Note that she is trying to bid her time with answers to questions - forcing attorney Grygiel to go into factual details first:

"you allege, in the first paragraphs of the letter, that this publication of The Reporter defamed the Delaware County Board of Supervisors, correct?"

She confirms.

So - Attorney Grygiel presses her further:

"So my question is, can, under the First Amendment, a governmental body be defamed consistent with our protection for freedom of speech?".

And he has to ask once again, in another way:

"Could the County Board, to your knowledge, as a plaintiff, have sued The Reporter for defamation?"

And there comes the DEVASTATING answer of Merklen:  "I don't practice First Amendment law".

In other words:  "I do not know".

And - attorney Grygiel presses even more:

"Isn't it important for you, as the County Attorney, when you're making representation in your official capacity on official stationary bearing County letterhead to be accurate in the assertions represented in the letter?"

Her answer:  "I would think so".

So Attorney Grygiel presses further:

"So my question is, could the Delaware County Board of Supervisors, to your knowledge, under our First Amendment jurisprudence, bring a defamation claim against The Reporter?

And then she starts to wiggle:

"I did not say that the Delaware County Board of Supervisors was legally defamed.  What I said was defamatory, meaning, in nature defamatory".

But Attorney Grygiel does not buy the deflection and presses on:

"Well, explain to me the difference there".

Merklen still tries to wiggle out of it, and asks:

"In the general sense in, with the layman's understanding of what defamatory means?"

Attorney Grygiel holds her to the task:

"Well, I'm not asking for a layman's.  You're an attorney, correct?".

Merklen:  Correct.

Grygiel: "My question is straightforward.  Can a municipal government body or a County Government entity commence an action as a defamation plaintiff?"

And the answer is - again:

"I don't practice that. I've already said that".

In other words:  "I do not know."

And yet attorney Grygiel is not done with her yet on this issue.

He presses further:

"Yes, but you said the County was defamed here?" - 

and then she says, under oath:

"No, I didn't".  "I did not say that".

And then Attorney Grygiel recites back to her her own words from her letter to The Reporter accusing The Reporter of coverage that is "overwhelmingly false and defamatory to the County Board of Supervisors".

And she says - "right".

So - "no, I did not say that", and "right".

Elsewhere in the deposition (please read it - I interlinked it at the top of this article) Merklen was unable to provide examples of what exactly she meant as "false and defamatory" in her own letter to the newspaper.

And finally, when cornered, she says:

"I don't know what you want me to say".

She, nevertheless acknowledges that she wrote in the letter the word "defamatory".

And then Attorney Grygiel strikes the final blow:

"Ok, you ever hear of a case called New York Times v Sullivan?"  And that is what is called a "landmark", seminal, main US Supreme Court case from 1964 on the 1st Amendment saying the government may not be defamed, and setting very high standards for defamation if individual public officials are suing critics for defamation.

Normally, asking such a question of a reasonably competent lawyer in Merklen's position is an insult.

Not in this situation though.  Attorney Grygiel clearly sees that what is in front of him is not a competent lawyer. 

And he was right to ask the question.

Because the answer came:

"No".

Attorney Grygiel pressures:

"Never?" (and these things are on the bar exam)

And her answer is "I just said so".

And after that the normally eloquent Attorney Grygiel is so stunned with her open incompetence that he only says:  "All right.  Well, fair enough".

Fair enough?

This is a County Attorney who RULES Delaware County, is paid by taxpayers in a POOR county the ever increasing salary that, as of now, is set at $171,000.00 a year.

And she is admittedly, completely incompetent on core issues of law that she is supposed to guide and protect the County on.

Elsewhere in the deposition, there is a discussion that Merklen outsources litigation to outside counsel without supervision or review of what is filed by that counsel in court:

And, last but not least, here is the hilariously devastating testimony of Merklen where Merklen admits to deceiving the court in filing of the formal document called "Answer" to a lawsuit -where Merklen had to answer the Complaint (lawsuit-initiating document) paragraph by paragraph.

In a formal Answer, three main types of answers are possible:

(1) to admit the allegations in the specific paragraph to which the defendant is responding;

(2) to deny these allegations, or

(3) to state that the defendant "lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief" as to how to answer.

All three types of answers must be utilized by defendant in good faith, of course.

It is the # (3) type of Merklen's answer that Attorney Grygiel is focusing on.

Merklen's counsel understands very well what KIND of answers Attorney Grygiel is trying to get out of Merklen - and vigorously tries to prevent that - but Grygiel is asking a relevant question about Merklen's OWN LETTER that she claimed in the Answer not to have "knowledge or information to form a belief" about:

She says, hilariously, that "she would say" that she authored that letter (bearing her signature, put into the court record):

After some more squabbles with Facciponte:

Merklen understands she is caught here in lying to the court (a disbarring offense), she tries to portray the line of questioning as "ridiculous", but she nevertheless answers, under oath:

Here we go: line 22 - "I mean, I guess it's not accurate".

But Grygiel is not done with her.

He presses further - about another paragraph, paragraph 37 of the complaint, and the correspondent "lack knowledge or information to form a belief" in Merklen's answer filed with the court.

And Merklen states, under oath, lines 7-8: "I knew this" - so her claim in the answer that she "lacked information to form a belief" as to paragraph 37 in the complaint was a lie to the court.

Merklen then tries to portray it as a mere mistake - not lying to the court, lines 5-9:

Delaware County taxpayers - this is YOUR County Attorney.

And unless you pressure your government to remove her - she will continue to hit you in the pocket and breed litigation for the County with her raging, admitted incompetence.