I wrote about e-filing discrimination against pro se (civil rights) litigants in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, about a motion made by a pro se party in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York for a right of such e-filing, and about a decision made in another federal court actually explaining why pajama discrimination is good discrimination.
The "good pajama discrimination" happened in one of the U.S. District courts in Ohio where the court told an out-of-the-country litigant that (1) they have a rule by which pro se litigants must file on paper and by mail, while only those represented by counsel file electronically and that (2) the pro se litigant in question filed by mail before in the same lawsuit and such filing did not appear to deter him from filing, so he can just as well continue to file it the same way in the future.
After posting the blog about the "good pajama discrimination" in a federal court in Ohio, I found a case in the U.S. District Court in the District of Oregon where an e-filing application by a pro se litigant was granted - without a word of opposition or reproach.
Kudoz, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon - at least on the issue of e-filing, this court leads the country in non-discrimination against pro se litigants.
But, so far that I could find, only one federal court only that I have found so far sees absolutely no need to burden their own clerks with scanning and e-filing on behalf of pro se litigants when such pro se litigants are perfectly capable to do that themselves, while other courts prefer to create unnecessary work, give pro se litigants less time and make it more costly for them to litigate in federal court, while the others insist on discriminating against pro se litigants as their "discretionary right"?
So, do judges have discretionary rights to discriminate and make access to court more difficult to one class of litigants over others?
THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:
"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.
“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).
“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.
It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.
" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.
"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.
“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.
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