Both of these judges were deciding cases where they had their own personal interest.
Both were allowed to do that, where the appellate court (3rd Department) found that the question of their recusal was within their "discretion".
Judge Becker presided over a motion challenging not just his impartiality, but his legitimacy as a judge - denied the motion and sanctioned the challenger (me).
Judge Becker presided over motions to recuse him for misconduct and conflicts of interest that he believed were designed to harass him as a victim - denied them and sanctioned the challenger (me).
Judge Tormey, on request from a private attorney Jonathan S. Follender (who is also a judge in a justice court in Ulster County), presided over Follender's defectively served motion with a request to sanction me for suing Judge Tormey himself in federal court - granted the motion and sanctioned me.
In all of those above instances, where a judge has a personal interest in the outcome of the matter, and when a judge claims himself to be a victim of an attorney's conduct, he is definitely positioning himself as a victim and a person with an interest in the outcome of the case - the judge definitely is disqualified by due process and by statue, New York Judiciary Law 14, from presiding over the matter.
Did not prevent Becker or Tormey to preside over the cases where they positioned themselves as victims of my alleged conduct, and being the victim, prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner.
The appellate court claimed that in all of those cases, with obvious personal interest of both judges, Becker and Tormey had "discretion" to decide whether to recuse or not to recuse.
Of course, that's not true, but, with the "move up or move on" mentality of American courts, and where the Appellate Division 3rd Department as the last appellate court where the issues of discretion or no discretion may be raised, a party like me is left without a remedy when the court deliberately refuses to follow black letter law, including New York court rules (22 NYCRR 100), statutory law, Judiciary Law 14, and constitutional due process of law requirements.
Yesterday I read about a Texas judge though who is a rival of Becker and Tormey.
Judge Michael Herrera, of El Paso, Texas, was reprimanded (only!) by the Texas Supreme Court for - presiding OVER HIS OWN DIVORCE CASE.
How much remorse Judge Herrera felt is shown in his post-reprimand statement where he reportedly said the following:
"The public reprimand also said Herrera misused his position to satisfy his personal desires in the divorce action.
"That's what the state says, but I was I was very impartial on my own (divorce)," said Herrera, "It is constant lies and lies and lies."
Judge Herrera does not and would not get the difference.
He does not get it that he has no AUTHORITY to preside over his own divorce case - and that whether he was "impartial" or not presiding over his own divorce case, is irrelevant. He was not supposed to be there.
Apparently, abusing his judicial position in such a drastic way did not get judge Herrera judicial discipline, or disbarment.
As abusing their judicial positions did not get judicial discipline to Becker or Tormey.
And, until judges presiding over cases where they have personal interest, do suffer the consequences of their actions, in a real way, nobody can expect real justice in our courts.
Think what other conflicts of interest Judge Herrera, for example, would not be disclosing if he brazenly presided over HIS OWN DIVORCE case - and, even after the reprimand, practically claims he had a right to do that.
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