The decision to suspend Giuliani’s law license: jurisdictional basis fabricated by the licensing court

 

The decision to suspend Giuliani’s law license:

jurisdictional basis fabricated by the licensing court

 

Tatiana Neroni, Juris Doctor

Initial publication in Russian on Academia.edu – September 7, 2021 ©

 

 

In its decision to preliminarily suspend the law license of Rudy Giuliani, lawyer to 45^th US President Donald J. Trump, the New York licensing court has reviewed and rejected Giuliani’s protest against court’s regulation of his political speech in and out of court and suspended Giuliani’s law license, before the formal charges were filed and without any hearing, because of his political statements about results of presidential elections 2020 in 4 states:

1.     Arizona,

2.     Georgia

3.     Michigan

4.     Pennsylvania[1].

In asserting its right to regulate political speech of attorneys in and out of court the New York licensing court relied upon two U.S. Supreme Court cases:

1.     Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030, 1051 (1991), and

2.     Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 US 447, 465 (1978).

The reality is that neither one of these precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court contains permission to any governmental bodies, courts included, to regulate political speech of lawyers – with very narrow exceptions that did not apply in Giuliani’s case.

On the very opposite, in the former of the two precedents cited by the New York licensing court in Giuliani’s case, Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 US 447, 465 (1978), the essence of the case was about regulating of purely commercial speech of a lawyer – the so-called “ambulance-chasing”, imposing of the lawyer’s paid business to patients of hospitals without their consent.

Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has been very cautious not to regulate political speech of lawyers in Ohralik, and not to even appear as if it is attempting to do that – it stated specifically in Ohralik that the speech regulated in that case was not political in character. 

In the latter of the two precedents cited by the New York licensing court in Giuliani’s case,  Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030, 1051 (1991), the essence of the case was disciplinary punishment of a criminal defense attorney who has won a jury trial for his client.  The punishment was for the lawyer’s press-conference before the formal charges were brought against his client, where the lawyer has publicly accused the local police of criminal activities, fabrication of a criminal case against his client and mishandling of the drugs seized by the police elsewhere.

The U.S. Supreme Court has actually vacated the attorney’s punishment, stating that

1.     An attorney may need to make out-of-court public statements on behalf of his client in the course of a court case if the attorney decides that the client’s interests so demand;

2.      An attorney may publicly criticize the government out-of-court despite a pending court case, which is political speech that the government may not regulate, with two exceptions – if the attorney has used in his/her political speech

1)     Information obtained through a mandatory court discovery process, and

2)     Information subject to a pre-trial court gag order.

The court in Giuliani’s case never mentioned that Giuliani used in his statements information falling into either of the above two exceptions, therefore, the New York court had no authority to regulate Giuliani’s political speech – in or out of court.

Therefore, Giuliani was correct in his protest that the court lacked authority to regulate his political speech through a license regulating procedure.

Moreover, the court in Giuliani’s case acknowledged that at all times when making his statements Giualiani acted in a representative capacity, as the voice of his client, 45^th US President Donald J. Trump.

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated more than half a century ago that the government may not do in an indirect way what it may not do in a direct way[2].

Donald J. Trump is not an attorney licensed by the State of New York to practice law, nor does he purport to practice law in the state of New York, and thus is not subject to regulation by New York State court regulating attorneys[3].

New York attorney licensing court had no authority to regulate political speech of 45^th US President Donald J. Trump – not directly and not indirectly, through regulating his representative, lawyer Giuliani.

Nor did the court have authority to regulate Giualini’s speech had that speech been on Giuliani’s own behalf, in view of the true holding and reasoning of the two US Supreme Court cases Giuliani’s court has (deliberately) misquoted.

Therefore, the Giuliani court had no jurisdiction over proceedings, its decisions are null and void and the continuing proceedings must be barred as unconstitutional.

 

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[1] Matter of Giuliani, 2021 NY Slip Op 04086 (1^st Dept, June 24, 2021).

[2] Speiser v.Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).

[3] See New York State Judiciary Law § 90(2) (“The supreme court shall have power and control over attorneys and counsellors-at-law and all persons practicing or assuming to practice law”).