EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This
case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not
affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission.
For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the
qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the
rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic
course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines
these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his
principles at any cos
t.



It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the
law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is
not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a
group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to
humiliate and degrade it.”
In
Re Anastaplo,
18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429
(1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong
dissent
,
366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan,
dissenting.



“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

Monday, August 29, 2016

A sort of "civil double jeopardy" in disciplinary proceedings claimed in North Carolina - by a judge - and the fates of corrupt judicial decisions

Imagine.

An attorney is sued for fraud, and the court partially finds on liability against the attorney, but the case continues to trial on damages.  And the court may award, by statute, PUNITIVE damages against the attorney. 

And a federal court recently ruled that a state court lawsuit for fraud brought by private parties is entitled to be treated as a proceeding brought by the state - because when private parties are suing in tort for a "wrong", that is a "matter of public interest", transforming a private action into a state action - and so the federal court dismissed a civil rights lawsuit based on a Younger abstention usually applied only to proceedings brought by the government against individuals.

That decision was made by former Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York Gary L. Sharpe in Neroni v Becker (my husband's case) - and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit affirmed in a summary order for the "thoughtful and well-reasoned decision".

"Great" logic, shown here:


 The "logic" was -

  • since private parties sought "punishment" for a "wrong" in a civil action;
  • since the civil statute under which private parties brought the lawsuit has a criminal element - even though not used by the state, and
  • since a disciplinary proceedings was commenced during the pendency of the private action (by a committee where one of the members was representing the attorney for those private parties) -

a private action is "AS IF" a state proceeding and entitled to the Younger protection.

If you are interested to read about the Mokay saga - you can type "Mokay" or "Mokay saga" in the search window on the right, I wrote a lot about it, and especially about the affidavit provided by one of the "Mokay children" (alleged plaintiffs) after the Mokay Children "won" a $300,000 judgment after an ex parte hearing where public was not allowed (and where exhibits were admitted without reading by boxes and disappeared from the record on directions of the trial judge, who was subpoenaed as a hostile witness to the trial, but quashed subpoena against himself).  In that affidavit, an individual put as a plaintiff in the Mokay action, for 7.5 years, claimed he never was a plaintiff and that he was added to the lawsuit by fraud of an attorney, son of a judge Richard Harlem of Oneonta, New York. - but courts so far are refusing to recognize the affidavit and the doom that it spelled to the entire Mokay case, and court decisions based on Mokay.

Too many careers are riding on legitimacy of the Mokay decisions - and derivative decisions - to vacate any decisions "simply" because the were brought about by fraud - like the 2nd Circuit court did with a 9 billion dollar judgment against Chevron for poisoning people's water in Ecuador.  Nope - we can't punish a corporation for poisoning people's water because that court decision was obtained - of course - by fraud.  If a Joe Doe from the street claims the same about an American court - Joe Doe will simply be sanctioned, and the corrupt court decision will remain "in full force and effect".  After all, what was Joe Doe thinking - that he was Chevron?

But wait - if the person is ALREADY disciplined - or sought to be disciplined in a future damages trial in a civil proceeding that is likened to a "state proceeding" (see Neroni v Becker above), where punitive damages are sought - can the attorney be disciplined additionally, through an attorney disciplinary proceedings?


In other words, can two civil courts impose discipline for the same conduct?

No, this issue did not creep up into my "always frivolous", "crackpot" and "misguided" mind (I am just citing to characterization of my legal arguments that came from attorneys and judges in pleadings and decisions over the years).

This issue has actually crept into the mind of a judge and attorneys representing him in North Carolina where "North Carolina’s highest court is scheduled to hear arguments this week on whether Senior Resident Superior Court Judge Jerry Tillett can be disciplined by two different state regulatory agencies for the same conduct".

Of course, Judge Tillet framed his issue a little differently - can two DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES sanction a judge at the same time for the same conduct?

But wait - is a disciplinary court in attorney disciplinary proceedings now an AGENCY?

That is yet another of my "frivolous issues" that caused the same U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York to impose an anti-filing injunction for frivolous conduct on my husband (again) - and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit affirmed in a summary order the "thoughtful and well-reasoned decision of the trial court".

I raised that particular issue, that "court" disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are in fact administrative disciplinary actions by agencies and are not entitled to the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar in federal court.

I raised that issue on behalf of my husband, in Neroni v Zayas, Case No. 3:13-cv-127-LEK-DEP.

LEK means Senior U.S. District Court judge Lawrence Kahn - who confuses me with my husband and vice versa, as I recently discovered.

DEP is U.S. Magistrate David Peebles who recently held an ex parte oral argument of an ex parte motion about me without notice to me or my presence, and sealed the transcript of that argument immediately, but an attorney who "lacks a filter" emerged out of that hearing with knowledge that

I was suspended from the practice of law for my own civil rights lawsuits AND FOR MY HUSBAND's lawsuits against political figures in New York State and Northern District of New York.

Yep - and that's while my husband sued those "figures" pro se (without me representing him) from 2011 to now, (Neroni v Coccoma, see my blog about "assigned counsel for the rich"Neroni v Mayberger).  Apparently, the suspending court - without telling me - has found my evil mind lurking behind my husband in these pro se actions.

But - when people see things that are not there, isn't it some kind of mental disability?

As to how many "political figures" my husband sued in his legal career from 1974 to 2011, including for 24 years before I even met my husband and was living in another country - I cannot tell, but attorney Carroll tells me my law license was suspended for my husband's lawsuits, and since attorney Carroll was not yet sanctioned for telling the court a lie, I must believe him that I was suspended for was the truth - that I was suspended for whatever grudge whichever "political figure" who my husband sued from 1974 to 2011 (and pro se from 2011 to now) developed and retaliated against me.

After all, wife and husband are one.  So when a wife's law license is suspended for a grudge against the husband - it is perfectly lawful.

Right?

Back to Neroni v Zayas.

Remember judge Tillet's claim that a disciplinary action against an attorney is an administrative action?


When I, on Mr. Neroni's behalf, raised the same issue in NDNY court - arguing against application of the Rooker-Feldman "jurisdictional bar" to a decision in attorney disciplinary proceedings, because they are administrative in nature (because a court revoking an attorney's license is an administrative agency no different than an administrative board revoking any other occupational license), the NDNY judge Lawrence Kahn did apply the Rooker-Feldman bar in March of 2014 though, deeming revocation of an attorney's occupational license a "court action" while revocation of a medical occupational license would be an administrative action in the same blessed state of New York - go figure.

In October of 2014, without waiting for the end of proceedings in Neroni v Zayas, Judge Sharpe (a different judge from the presiding judge Kahn) imposed an anti-filing injunction upon Mr. Neroni for his (actually, his attorney's - mine) "frivolous" arguments that an attorney disciplinary action is an administrative proceeding, not a court proceeding, because all other revocations of occupational licenses, of doctors, teachers, taxi-drivers are all administrative.

The 2nd Circuit affirmed the anti-filing injunction against Mr. Neroni, specifically indicating that it is protecting defendants in the "types of cases" my husband was filing - civil rights cases against the government - from "frivolous" arguments - such as that attorney disciplinary proceedings are administrative in nature and that appellate courts who are joined at the hip with attorney disciplinary boards constitute one body, and decisions of such a "blended body" are not lawful.

Enter Judge Jerry Tillet, of North Carolina, with the exact same "frivolous" argument to the North Carolina Supreme Court, advanced by the judge's lawyers - that attorney discipline is imposed by administrative "agencies" (while discipline is imposed by the Court).  Sounds funny, "judge's lawyers", right?

Judge Jerry Tillet is a judge - well, obviously.

And, judges of Jerry Tillet's level in North Carolina are also licensed attorneys.  And Judge Tillet is a licensed attorney - obviously.

So, Judge Tillet first became an attorney, subject to rules of professional conduct of attorneys, and then ADDED to that the position of a judge, and rules of judicial conduct.

When Judge Tillet committed misconduct - to which the judge agreed in a judicial disciplinary proceeding (with a reprimand), the North Carolina State bar pursued the judge also with an attorney disciplinary proceedings, because the judge's conduct violated not only rules of judicial conduct, but rules of attorney conduct, while the judge (see above) is a licensed attorney, agreed to follow those rules, and his judicial position is CONDITIONED on the judge being a licensed attorney - and following those rules.

That's logical, isn't it?

I mean - for the North Carolina bar to pursue a judge who is a licensed attorney and who admitted to violating rules of judicial conduct, where his conduct is also a violation of the rules governing his attorney license is lawful and logical, right?

Yet, the North Carolina Supreme Court so far STAYED the disciplinary proceeding of North Carolina State Bar against Judge Tillet - pending determination whether it can allow a disciplinary action by two "state agencies".

Meaning, the North Carolina Supreme Court is an agency?  And as a court (or an agency?), it is stopping its own action as an agency against a judge because there cannot be two disciplinary actions against a judge for the same conduct, but for violation of different sets of rules?

But wait - even with criminal cases, the same conduct can be subject to the reach of two different statutes - state and federal for example, and courts regularly deny CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS double jeopardy because the same conduct can violate one statute in state law and another in federal law.

Ok, we are not in criminal proceedings, I remember that.  Vaguely.  Because civil and criminal, court and administrative actions have become so confused lately due to decisions of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York in my husband's cases. 

Or wait - did those courts also confuse my husband with me?  They did, didn't they?  Judge Kahn recently denied my husband's motion as mine, and the State of New York stripped me last year of my law license, hard earned when I already had three children, one of them adult, and while I studied for three years away from home and my children, and passed the extremely hard New York State bar on a first sitting in a language that was not my native language - so, why again was I stripped of my law license?

As recently was revealed to me - based on my lawsuits in my professional capacity as a civil rights attorney whose job is - surprise! - sue the government, for suing the government, and for lawsuits of my husband (who practiced law since 1974 when I was 11 years old and happily went to school in Russia),  and for alleged actions of my husband before I was admitted to the bar (my disciplinary Charge I Specification I), and for sanctions imposed upon me by a judge who was my husband's rival and law school classmate for actions of my husband in a court case in 2008 and in an administrative environmental case in 2001 to 2008, also before I was admitted to the bar.

Right, so where were we?

Oh - a North Carolina judge targeted at the same time by judicial disciplinary proceedings and attorney disciplinary proceedings - and claiming it is wrong.

By the way - why was Judge Tillet reprimanded in the judicial disciplinary proceedings in the first place?

Please, don't laugh - for interference in the affairs of a town and a District Attorney's office in the town - I asked you not to laugh, remember? - called Kill Devil Hills.

Yep.

Do not interfere with the devil, the devil will bite' ya.

Seriously, I will look into how did Judge Tillet hurt the feelings of the Kill Devil Hills town officials and especially of the District Attorney and will blog about it separately.

For purposes of this blog - I often write on this blog about how courts' decisions and perspectives suddenly shift when an issue is raised by a powerful party - and then by a more powerful party.

Let's face it - in the eyes of many of my new compatriots, American lawyers, judges and lay individuals I, an immigrant female attorney, after 18 years in this country, 7 years as a citizen, 7 years as a sworn officer of the court - still remain a glorified prostitute, that's exactly how Russian women are stereotyped in American moves.

And, while some people express that idea openly, see comments directed at me here in retaliation for coverage of a story of arson and attempted murder upon three people in retaliation for a born-American woman's stand against judicial misconduct:



others simply act upon deeming me "stupid mail order bride bitch", and a Russian "stupid mail order bride bitch" who teaches them - THEM! the "political figures"! - how to live and who raises those frivolous constitutional arguments.

I already had a view of one judge, Judge Mary Rita Connerton of Binghamton, expressed to me in a court opinion where Judge Connerton had to mention my "furrowed brow, hurried speech and disrespect to authorities" - while dismissing a fabricated child neglect case against me and my husband.

"Furrowed brow and hurried speech" are actually signs of stress and concentration of a person speaking on an important issue, under stressful condition and not in his or her native language.  Judge Connerton did not mention my accent - which was very evident when I spoke - but instead chose to replace the accent (which would be a basis for a complaint against the judge for discrimination) by "furrowed brow and hurried speech", which was essentially the same if it is a characteristic of speech of a non-native speaker.

So, when I, who is (see above) raised a constitutional issue in federal court on behalf of my husband, a career criminal defense, family court and civil rights attorney - disbarred in proceedings rigged by son of a judge and his attorney who was on the disciplinary board (do you follow me still? one can lose oneself in this maze of crookedness) - the system of the powerful "locals" retaliated, and my law license was suspended.

Yet, my clients - with, maybe, two exceptions over 7 years of practice - were all American citizens.  By the way.

And, I was told about the real reasons of my suspension over 8 months after my suspension, only accidentally, and only because an attorney who "lacks a filter" (the media's words, not mine) and who offered $100,000 to my former client to make a false affidavit against me in court (I have incontrovertible evidence on file as to that), was so pissed with me because I wanted to be paid for 3.5 years of my work and not just allow that "filterless" attorney to be paid for my work (do you still follow me?) - and the real reasons for suspension of my law license is that somebody who my husband may have sued when I went to school in another country as a child, may still hold a grudge against my husband, and that grudge travelled to remove my law license.

Again - do you follow me?  Makes perfect sense, doesn't it?

It is all documented, by the way, I am not delirious.

And, as I said above, an anti-filing injunction was imposed upon my husband for my frivolous arguments - which became good meritorious arguments once they are voiced by a judge in North Carolina, obviously.

Now I am reading that those same frivolous arguments, when raised by Judge Tillet's attorneys in North Carolina court - or administrative? - proceeding are deemed as valid, at least to impose a stay on the court - or administrative? - attorney disciplinary proceedings - because a judge asked for it.


So, maybe - just maybe - the 2nd Circuit did something  very good by doing something very bad - denying relief to poisoned people because the judgment in favor of poisoned people was obtained allegedly through a corrupt judicial decision - in Ecuador, and a poor dear corporation that poisoned those people suffered.

But, in our country with precedential law, a precedent is now created that corrupt court decisions are not entitled to full faith and credit?

Right?  Applicable to all corrupt judicial decisions?  Right?

And the decision in the 2nd Circuit is not just tailor-made because some judges needed some sponsorships for some trips from some corporations?

And yes, I do realize that I am not even a Joe Doe, I am simply a Russian "stupid mail order bride bitch" - and, as a Texas American-born attorney Ty Clevenger targeted for disbarment for exact same reasons as the immigrant low life me was suspended, expressed in his blog, "such a peon as" a whistleblower against judicial misconduct is is not entitled to the same treatment in courts as the "golden boys and girls" who are ruining the whistleblower's lives.

But still.

People are not stupid.

People see judicial corruption happening across the United States.

And for how long can the blatant judicial corruption when the same idea expressed by a Tatiana Doe ends the Doe's livelihood, but is considered meritorious if coming from the lips of a judge can survive without people going out into the streets?


When courts play yoyo with the law, judges who "author" decisions that contradict every legal principle in the book, each other, logic, fairness or evidence in the record - not only look like candidates for an insane asylum, they invite the public not to consider their decisions as serious - or lawful.

And why did we have the judiciary (all those expensive court buildings, equipment, personnel salaries funded by taxpayers) in the first place?

So that some rich boys have a place and time (paid by us) to decide cases for their friends and to revenge against whoever step on their toes?

I don't think so.

We have the judiciary as an alternative, not a way to promote, personal vendettas.

If the country cannot believe in reasonableness and legitimacy of decisions of its courts because - obviously, as it is shown above, those decisions sway like a wind driven only by personal grudges and personal feelings of judges - we don't have a judiciary and we don't have enforceable laws.

And that means - the country can sink into chaos any day.  It is already happening.

We need enforceable laws.

And we need honest judges to enforce them.  Otherwise this country sooner or later will sink into bloodshed.

We need to clean up the act of our judiciary for them - because they themselves won't do it - and we need to do it yesterday.













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