Due process of law requires that a motion addressing the lack of jurisdiction in the court may be made at any time.
In New York, the same applies to motions under Judiciary Law 14.
But not in Judge Kevin Dowd's court.
Judge Kevin Dowd sanctioned me for making a motion (on my own behalf) to vacate my own sanctions because he prohibited to my client (and husband) Mr. Neroni to make motions without judge Dowd's permission.
Yet, if the court lacks jurisdiction, all decisions of the court, including Judge Dowd's decision restricting my access to court - should be void.
But Judge Dowd blocks my own and my husband's access to court to be able to prove it... It's a chicken-and-egg or a cart-and-a-horse situation...
In law, it is called a "hypothetical jurisdiction", where the court rules on the merits before deciding whether it has jurisdiction, usually for purposes of convenience/expediency.
That's what Judge Dowd did when he ruled that because I made unsuccessful motions in the farcical Mokay case in the past before vindictive Judge Becker and before no less vindictive Judge Dowd who was at that time sued by my husband in a pro se action for, among other things, mental incapacity to preside over my husband's cases, as well as misconduct (and who can be successful when the game is rigged), I may not, without permission of Judge Dowd, make further motions - even if I see clear evidence of disqualification or impropriety in the actions of that same Judge Dowd.
To block a litigant's right to make a motion to recuse and disqualify is something new in jurisprudence - Judge Dowd should congratulate himself on such an "innovation".
By the way, not that Judge Dowd would care about the U.S. Constitution he took an oath to uphold, the U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled that exercising hypothetical jurisdiction is a violation of litigants' due process of law.
And it is exercising hypothetical jurisdiction where the judge claims that no motions, even no motions challenging jurisdiction of the court, may be filed without his express permission.
Does Judge Dowd understand what a jurisdictional motion is?
Also, it is a really great trick for a judge to allow parties to make a motion to recuse THAT SAME JUDGE only on THAT SAME JUDGE's permission.
Of course, you will have to wait until the hell freezes over for such permission.
But - that is what judicial arrogance allows itself because the judge knows that he can never be sued and, most likely, will never be disciplined, no matter what he does.
And that situation simply has to change.
It is interesting to mention that Judge Dowd, same as Judges Becker and Tormey before Judge Dowd, punished me for "flouting" his order prohibiting something not to me, but to Mr. Neroni.
I was moving to vacate actually my own sanctions - and Judge Dowd did not prohibit me personally to do that...
Once again my husband's and my own identity were blurred before Judge Dowd's eyes. When the name "Neroni" is like a red rag, I guess, it does not matter which one of the Neronis to punish. The story repeats itself...
THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:
"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.
“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).
“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.
It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.
" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.
"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.
“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.
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