I've written earlier in this blog that NYS Commission on Judicial Conduct, in my experience and in experience of people who reported it to me, operates contrary to the purpose as to why it was established - it acts as a glorified shredder of complaints against judges, no matter how well supported and no matter how bad is judicial misconduct complained of.
The same sentiments were aired before the so-called New York State Moreland Commission on public ethics and corruption, according to news reports.
There was the testimony before the Moreland Commission in October of 2013.
Crowds of people wanted to testify before the Commission.
Only a handful of those who wanted to testify and petition the government/ the Moreland Commission to review their grievances against corruption in the court system, was allowed to testify.
Moreover, according to the reports as to an "coincidental" arrest of a would-be witness at the Commission, Seema Kalia, questions should be explored by the same Commission whether corruption of public officials was involved in preventing the testimony of at least one of the witnesses who wanted to testify.
Reportedly, representatives of the U.S. Attorney's Office reportedly testified before the Moreland Commission that corruption of public officials in New York is rampant.
Reportedly, witnesses before the Moreland Commission reportedly testified about corrupt court proceedings.
On December 3, 2013, based on all investigation and testimony the Moreland Commission issued a report.
It appears from the report that "the mountain gave birth to a mouse".
While acknowledging that corruption of public officials is rampant in New York, and there are practically no effective laws to fight such corruption, the Moreland Commission's report of December 3, 2013 was silent as to corruption in the court system.
And the question is - why? Why after the testimony about such corruption? What does New York State want? A revolution to change corrupt ways of courts? To make judges actually follow the law they are sworn to uphold?
The answer may be in the identity of the Co-Chair of the Moreland Commission William Fitzpatrick, who is also the Onondaga County District Attorney.
William Fitzpatrick is reportedly a law school buddy and roommate of a powerful judge James C. Tormey,the judge who was sued for retaliating against a court clerk for refusing to engage in political espionage against a judge.
The lawsuit cost New York State taxpayers $600,000.00 to hush down the judge's behavior, even though I do not understand why the taxpayers had to pay for outrageous misconduct of judges in office.
After that, Judge Tormey's co-defendant Judge Hedges was taken off the bench, after his resignation, on allegations of sexual misconduct dating 40 years back and while there was evidence that allegations were untrue.
Why? I think - because Judge Hedges was the one who disclosed to the plaintiff in the Morin v. Tormey litigation that Tormey's office is out to get her, an admission that could have brought Ms. Morin a victory in the event the case would be allowed to proceed to a jury trial, and it was at the door to that trial when it was settled.
Usually, unless there is a court finding of misconduct, the Commission does not strike a finger to do anything against the judge, no matter how bad his or her misconduct is.
Here, all statutes of limitations against Judge Hedges were long gone and he was simply not suable by the alleged victim, while there was evidence before the Commission for Judicial Conduct that Judge Hedges was not engaged in what he was accused of and the victim simply made up the story to get money from the judge for her children's college education (after, according to the victim's e-mail reportedly submitted as evidence to the Commission for Judicial Conduct, sharing portion of that bounty with the Onondaga County District Attorney William Fitzpatrick).
It appears to be a mere act of retaliation by the judicial system and their loyal insiders against one of their own for "slipping up" and violating the unspoken rule of the "black wall of silence" to protect their own black-robed brothers and sisters.
Moreover, as I've written before, the public pleadings submitted to the Commission of Judicial Conduct in Bryan Hedges' case, show that William Fitzpatrick had an agreement with the alleged victim to share in the monetary settlement with the alleged victim that the alleged victim was trying to elicit from Judge Hedges.
When blackmail did not help, William Fitzpatrick turned Judge Hedges into the Commission for Judicial Conduct.
While the Commission is notoriously deaf, blind and otherwise unresponsive to any misconduct of any judges, in this case it took Judge Hedges off the bench despite evidence the charges were bogus, despite evidence Judge Hedges already resigned.
Thus, while the Commission for Judicial Conduct refuses to act to protect people from judicial misconduct, it is readily used as a tool of retaliation of corrupt public officials against enemies of embattled judges.
Therefore, one might affirmatively state that the Moreland Committee is another smokescreen attempting to show people that "something" is being done to address the issue of corruption in New York.
As to judicial corruption - this word combination remains a taboo.
My question is - will anybody, at any time, finally do something about at least judicial misconduct, in view of the fact that the Commission for Judicial Conduct would not do anything, the Moreland Commission would not hearings which would give all citizens who have grievances against corrupt public officials to speak, in an unrestricted public way, on record, before the Moreland Commission?
When will we see some action from the Moreland Commission addressing issues of judicial corruption it is charged to address?
My concern is also whether people who wrote to the Commission about judicial corruption will be retaliated against - and will have no effective legal remedy against such a retaliation under the existing law...
Is it too sticky a task to tackle?
Is it difficult for the Moreland Commission to tackle those tasks because Commissioners are themselves attorneys, at least some of them, and their licenses and livelihoods are in the hands of the very judiciary whose corruption they are charged to investigate - while they know from their own report and ivnestigation that in New York, no laws will protect them from judicial retaliation if they start actually doing their jobs and fighting corruption.
Which brings me right back to the main topic of this blog - to remove attorney licensing from the hands of the judiciary and to restore independence of court representation as one of the cornerstones of American democracy.
Friday, June 20, 2014
Sunday, June 15, 2014
Judges indebted to others...
In my previous blog, about the Blanding saga, I put the Memorandum of Law by NYS Assistant Attorney General Mary A. Walsh.
I would like to re-quote it in a separate post to highlight its importance.
In her Memorandum of Law, p. 9 (see Blanding post) Ms. Walsh said the following:
"If the public is to have confidence in the judiciary, it must make sure that judges are not indebted to others or on someone else's payroll".
To explore who my judges may be indebted to, I filed the Neroni v. Peebles case.
I believe, it is a matter of grave public concern when judges participate in secret membership organizations, where, behind closed doors, they attend receptions paid for by influential attorneys while the judges are allowed to participate for free.
It is improper when judges are allowed free international travel with their spouses as part of the same attorney-sponsored membership.
In the Blanding case, the judge was also doing something in secret - he secretly and self-servingly practiced law and drafted a will bequeathing himself a huge bounty, and then retired early, which the NYS AG's office characterized as a step motivated by the expectation of a bounty and the fear that the testator will die while the judge was still on the bench, so that the secret would be readily revealed.
The judge also, as NYS Assistant AG says in her pleadings, "chose his son, secretary and law clerk, presumably confidants, as witnesses to his misdeeds", Memo of Law of March 24, 2000, p. 4 in the Blanding case.
As Assistant Attorney General Mary A. Walsh said in her Memorandum of Law on March 24, 2000,
"Judges must not be bought, and the public should not think they can be. Judges must be answerable to the public they serve and not to any private benefactor, friend or client. Were it otherwise, the public would be led to perceive that judges would be inclined to act at the behest of their friends and patrons...."
I could not say it any better.
There are some flies in the ointment, though.
The first such "fly" is that, were Judge Harlem to be sued for corrupt behavior on the bench, Mary A. Walsh would have been representing him in court and claiming judicial immunity on his behalf.
The second such "fly" is that the NYS AG's office settled with Robert Harlem without requiring him to forfeit his salaried position as a trustee in the Blanding foundation where he continued to financially benefit for his wrongdoing until he died in 2012, and there were no criminal or disciplinary consequences for the former Robert Harlem for his obvious wrongdoing for which he remained adamantly unrepentant, and even accused the NYS AG's office of inappropriately targeting him for punishment in the wrong forum.
I wonder when NYS AG's office will start to actually prosecute judges and members of their families to the fullest extent of the law, the same way the NYS AG's office would do prosecuting a John Smith off the street who would steal a much smaller amount than what judges and members of their families did.
There is a clear deference in not prosecuting judges or their family members when New York prisons are full with people who are doing hard time for less.
If public trust in the integrity of the judiciary is to be maintained, the judiciary is to be cleansed of their bad apples, not protected from prosecution.
But - I admit that NYS Assistant AG wrote a most impressive Memorandum of Law as to the need to maintain public trust in the integrity of judges.
As she said, once again, "judges must not be bought, and the public should not think that they can be. Judges must be answerable to the public they serve and not to any private benefactor, friend, or client".
Yet, one can only "think" about something when one has information about something. Speculation leads you nowhere.
For that reason, and, of course, to establish whether any judges were disqualified by financial interests in presiding over my cases, I want to make my judges reveal, as discovery in a federal lawsuit, whether they are members of an organizations where they receive perks from attorneys and, if they are, who are attorney members of the organization who wined and dined them (or wines and dines them at present).
And I want to make the State of New York mandate its judges to make such information public.
I would like to re-quote it in a separate post to highlight its importance.
In her Memorandum of Law, p. 9 (see Blanding post) Ms. Walsh said the following:
"If the public is to have confidence in the judiciary, it must make sure that judges are not indebted to others or on someone else's payroll".
To explore who my judges may be indebted to, I filed the Neroni v. Peebles case.
I believe, it is a matter of grave public concern when judges participate in secret membership organizations, where, behind closed doors, they attend receptions paid for by influential attorneys while the judges are allowed to participate for free.
It is improper when judges are allowed free international travel with their spouses as part of the same attorney-sponsored membership.
In the Blanding case, the judge was also doing something in secret - he secretly and self-servingly practiced law and drafted a will bequeathing himself a huge bounty, and then retired early, which the NYS AG's office characterized as a step motivated by the expectation of a bounty and the fear that the testator will die while the judge was still on the bench, so that the secret would be readily revealed.
The judge also, as NYS Assistant AG says in her pleadings, "chose his son, secretary and law clerk, presumably confidants, as witnesses to his misdeeds", Memo of Law of March 24, 2000, p. 4 in the Blanding case.
As Assistant Attorney General Mary A. Walsh said in her Memorandum of Law on March 24, 2000,
"Judges must not be bought, and the public should not think they can be. Judges must be answerable to the public they serve and not to any private benefactor, friend or client. Were it otherwise, the public would be led to perceive that judges would be inclined to act at the behest of their friends and patrons...."
I could not say it any better.
There are some flies in the ointment, though.
The first such "fly" is that, were Judge Harlem to be sued for corrupt behavior on the bench, Mary A. Walsh would have been representing him in court and claiming judicial immunity on his behalf.
The second such "fly" is that the NYS AG's office settled with Robert Harlem without requiring him to forfeit his salaried position as a trustee in the Blanding foundation where he continued to financially benefit for his wrongdoing until he died in 2012, and there were no criminal or disciplinary consequences for the former Robert Harlem for his obvious wrongdoing for which he remained adamantly unrepentant, and even accused the NYS AG's office of inappropriately targeting him for punishment in the wrong forum.
I wonder when NYS AG's office will start to actually prosecute judges and members of their families to the fullest extent of the law, the same way the NYS AG's office would do prosecuting a John Smith off the street who would steal a much smaller amount than what judges and members of their families did.
There is a clear deference in not prosecuting judges or their family members when New York prisons are full with people who are doing hard time for less.
If public trust in the integrity of the judiciary is to be maintained, the judiciary is to be cleansed of their bad apples, not protected from prosecution.
But - I admit that NYS Assistant AG wrote a most impressive Memorandum of Law as to the need to maintain public trust in the integrity of judges.
As she said, once again, "judges must not be bought, and the public should not think that they can be. Judges must be answerable to the public they serve and not to any private benefactor, friend, or client".
Yet, one can only "think" about something when one has information about something. Speculation leads you nowhere.
For that reason, and, of course, to establish whether any judges were disqualified by financial interests in presiding over my cases, I want to make my judges reveal, as discovery in a federal lawsuit, whether they are members of an organizations where they receive perks from attorneys and, if they are, who are attorney members of the organization who wined and dined them (or wines and dines them at present).
And I want to make the State of New York mandate its judges to make such information public.
Saturday, June 14, 2014
The Blanding saga - will these attorneys ever be disciplined? Or their "blue blood" will continue protecting them?
I have written about the Mokay saga which was the basis of disbarment of my husband without a hearing, after 37 years of practice and despite running a free legal clinic in an under-served area.
I also wrote in this blog about the situation where attorney discipline appears to apply in the state of New York only to civil rights attorneys and whistleblowers of official (and judicial) misconduct and does not apply to the most powerful attorneys who can hurt the public the most.
I also described the extraordinary lengths to which courts go in order to absolve attorneys who are judges, retired judges or their friends or members of their families of liability, even when they are clearly wrong. That desire to absolve "members of the pack" of liability for wrongdoing goes to direct misrepresentation of the record, misstatements of the law or simply ignoring the law or portions of the record, as it was done multiple times in my cases by multiple judges, so I can deem it as a pattern and policy of the New York State judiciary to do that.
Well, the class of blue blood attorneys protected by the State of New York from whistleblowing of their misconduct includes politically connected private counsel, especially retired judges and their family members.
While the Committee is spending its scarce budget on prosecuting whistleblowers, it allows the "big fish" attorneys to continue to hurt the public. And if misconduct is not deterred or punished, it will proceed further and will get worse, I do not have to be a legal expert to tell you that.
Below you can see public documents describing what kind of misconduct the 3rd Deparment's Committee for Judicial Conduct allowed to remain unpunished and undeterred.
The documents I publish in this blog will describe how the now late judge Robert Harlem of Oneonta, New York, practice law while on the bench, involved in that secret and unconstitutional practice of law his son, his confidential law secretary (later his wife) Irene Mann/Harlem and his confidential law clerk Denis Dineen.
None of attorneys involved in that scandal were disbarred or publicly disciplined.
Why?
Because when we turned these attorneys in, the law firm Hiscock & Barclays, where the disciplinary prosecutor John Casey, member of the Committee for Professional Standards was and is law partner, chose to (1) allow his law firm to accept attorneys turned in for his investigation and prosecution as paying clients; (2) caused the prosecution to be dropped, (3) resigned from the Committee when I raised this issue in a federal lawsuit Neroni v. Zayas, but (4) allowed his law firm to continue representation of Richard and Robert Harlem anyway, keeping the ill-gained legal fees, and instead (5) disbarred my husband and (6) commenced a disciplinary proceedings against me.
How corrupt is that is for your to judge.
I will simply publish the documents for your information. The records I am publishing here are in open access in Otsego County Surrogate's Court, New York and are also available on Freedom of Information requests from the New York State Attorney General's office.
Robert Harlem also gave a gift to the Beatrice W. Blanding foundation where, upon my research of public records of that non-profit, he was a salaried trustee until his death in 2012.
To conceal the fact that Robert Harlem, a sitting Supreme Court justice, was practicing law, he used two attorneys, his son Richard Harlem and his confidential law clerk Dennis Dineen, to sign codicils (additions) to the will.
Neither of these attorneys were publicly disciplined for helping a sitting Supreme Court judge to engage in unauthorized practice of law.
Richard Harlem still has a private practice.
Denis Dineen is employed by the state of New York, so the taxpayers continue to fund livelihood of this attorney who should have been disbarred for his role in allowing the judge her served as a law clerk to engage in the practice of law prohibited to the judge by the New York State Constitution.
I also wrote in this blog about the situation where attorney discipline appears to apply in the state of New York only to civil rights attorneys and whistleblowers of official (and judicial) misconduct and does not apply to the most powerful attorneys who can hurt the public the most.
I also described the extraordinary lengths to which courts go in order to absolve attorneys who are judges, retired judges or their friends or members of their families of liability, even when they are clearly wrong. That desire to absolve "members of the pack" of liability for wrongdoing goes to direct misrepresentation of the record, misstatements of the law or simply ignoring the law or portions of the record, as it was done multiple times in my cases by multiple judges, so I can deem it as a pattern and policy of the New York State judiciary to do that.
Well, the class of blue blood attorneys protected by the State of New York from whistleblowing of their misconduct includes politically connected private counsel, especially retired judges and their family members.
While the Committee is spending its scarce budget on prosecuting whistleblowers, it allows the "big fish" attorneys to continue to hurt the public. And if misconduct is not deterred or punished, it will proceed further and will get worse, I do not have to be a legal expert to tell you that.
Below you can see public documents describing what kind of misconduct the 3rd Deparment's Committee for Judicial Conduct allowed to remain unpunished and undeterred.
The documents I publish in this blog will describe how the now late judge Robert Harlem of Oneonta, New York, practice law while on the bench, involved in that secret and unconstitutional practice of law his son, his confidential law secretary (later his wife) Irene Mann/Harlem and his confidential law clerk Denis Dineen.
None of attorneys involved in that scandal were disbarred or publicly disciplined.
Why?
Because when we turned these attorneys in, the law firm Hiscock & Barclays, where the disciplinary prosecutor John Casey, member of the Committee for Professional Standards was and is law partner, chose to (1) allow his law firm to accept attorneys turned in for his investigation and prosecution as paying clients; (2) caused the prosecution to be dropped, (3) resigned from the Committee when I raised this issue in a federal lawsuit Neroni v. Zayas, but (4) allowed his law firm to continue representation of Richard and Robert Harlem anyway, keeping the ill-gained legal fees, and instead (5) disbarred my husband and (6) commenced a disciplinary proceedings against me.
How corrupt is that is for your to judge.
I will simply publish the documents for your information. The records I am publishing here are in open access in Otsego County Surrogate's Court, New York and are also available on Freedom of Information requests from the New York State Attorney General's office.
An attorney drafting the will is prohibited to self-deal and to have the testator give any gifts to the attorney in the will that he is drafting.
The drafter here was not only an attorney, but a sitting Supreme Court justice at the time - Robert Harlem to whom the New York State Constitution prohibited to practice law, which included drafting wills.
That did not deter Robert Harlem from either practicing law or bequeathing in the will that he drafted 8,000 shares of the IBM corporation to himself.
Robert Harlem also gave a gift to the Beatrice W. Blanding foundation where, upon my research of public records of that non-profit, he was a salaried trustee until his death in 2012.
Neither of these attorneys were publicly disciplined for helping a sitting Supreme Court judge to engage in unauthorized practice of law.
Richard Harlem still has a private practice.
Denis Dineen is employed by the state of New York, so the taxpayers continue to fund livelihood of this attorney who should have been disbarred for his role in allowing the judge her served as a law clerk to engage in the practice of law prohibited to the judge by the New York State Constitution.
After Beatrice Blanding died, her will was submitted by Richard Harlem and Robert Harlem to the Otsego County Surrogate's Court with the backer above.
The backer clearly shows the name Richard A. Harlem, allowing the court to make an inference that Richard A. Harlem and not Judge Robert Harlem was the drafter of the will.
This is, ladies and gentlemen, fraud upon the court in my humble legal opinion - and it is a crime in the State of New York.
Of course, the statute of limitations for that crime is now over and nobody dared to prosecute a retired judge and his son.
The reason for the lack of criminal prosecution against Richard Harlem and Robert Harlem for fraud upon the court could very well be because the prosecutor himself - now Chief Assistant District Attorney for Otsego County Michael Getman, with his own father, Frank Getman, also a retired judge - was involved in his own trouble with New York State Attorney General who sued Michael Getman and Frank Getman for self-dealing and mishandling funds in another non-profit.
Michael Getman and Frank Getman also got away with it through a mere settlement of the civil lawsuit, with no criminal prosecution and no attorney discipline for either Frank Getman or his son Michael Getman.
I will publish court documents pertaining to Michael Getman that I obtained from the New York State Attorney General's office on a Freedom of Information request in my next blogs.
Next I publish " objections to account" by the New York State Attorney General.
It shows how Richard Harlem inflated his legal fees in an Estate proceedings and claimed as legal fees what he could not possibly claim. Richard Harlem was never publicly disciplined for that either.
Also, it is enlightening to read NYS Attorney General's petition to reconsider the court's decision in the Beatrice Blanding Estate, with a supporting memorandum of law.
The judge Nettie Jean Scarzafava who presided over the Blanding case immediately retired in 2000, allegedly, as I recall from reading local newspapers, to take care of her ailing mother, after refusing to hold Richard Harlem and Robert Harlem liable for their misconduct and misrepresenting what was in the record in her order in the Blanding case.
Judge Nettie Jean Scarzafava apparently had a problem with her reading skills, as other judges do when they try to avoid what is in the record and decide for a favored party or against a disfavored party.
Judge Nettie Jean Scarzafava "found" that the backer which said "Richard A. Harlem" said in fact "Robert Harlem".
Of course, a judge may not "find" what is not in the record.
Of course, Nettie Scarzafava did make such a finding.
Of course, Judge Nettie Scarzafava was allowed to retire without any judicial discipline.
This is a part of New York State Attorney General's petition to Judge Scarzafawa to reconsider her decision in the Estate of Blanding.
And another snippet from the petition.
The Affirmation and Memorandum of Law of the New York State Attorney General are scathing. I do not know how Richard Harlem and Robert Harlem were able to keep their law licenses after this case. Well, I do know that they had to be disbarred, and I do know who was their rescuing angel/ private counsel. His name is John Casey, he is also an attorney, he was the member of the Committee for Professional Conduct until the summer of 2013 and I bet he will never be disciplined either.
Blue blood attorneys are not subject to discipline - whether they hurt the public or not. This is the rule in the State of New York.
Robert Harlem delayed disclosure of who was the drafter of the will for a year, while earning the income on the shares that he was never required to return.
Finally, Robert Harlem disclosed his role as a drafter, but never acknowledged that he did anything wrong, even though the practice of law is prohibited by the New York State Constiutiton and Robert Harlem, as an attorney admitted to practice in 1953 and a judge, surely knew that an attorney drafting a will may not bequeath to himself anything, at least without an affidavit that the client was apprised of the conflict of interest and agreed to proceed.
It is attorney misconduct to self-deal when drafting wills, Judge Harlem who also was a Surrogate at some point, had to know it.
Robert Harlem got away with (1) unauthorized practice of law while being a sitting judge; (2) involving court personnel in aiding him in his unauthorized practice of law; (3) submitting to the court a misleading backer showing the name of his son as a supposed drafter; (4) delaying investigation into who was the drafter for a year.
As did his son, an attorney, who obviously knew what his father was doing, but aided his father in his unauthorized practice of law and fraud upon the court anyway, while at the same time benefiting from the situation and inflating his legal fees, as stated in the "Objections to Account" by the New York State Attorney General (see published above).
To this day, Richard Harlem remains unpunished for what he did in the Blanding case, even though, by the way, there is no statute of limitations for attorney discipline in the State of New York and Richard Harlem can still be prosecuted for his role in the Blanding case - if the Committee wants to stand by its declaration that the purpose for its existence is to protect the public from unscrupulous attorneys.
As to Robert Harlem, in his affidavit that I am publishing below he arrogantly stated that he did not do anything wrong, under oath.
That is the same judge who was sworn to uphold the State and Federal Constitution, while the New York State Constitution, Article VI, paragraph 20(b)(4) clearly and unambiguously prohibits sitting Supreme Court judges to practice law.
Robert Harlem was allowed to practice law until his death in 2012, even though he should have been disbarred in 1999 once he admitted he was the drafter of the will of Beatrice Blanding, along with his son attorney Richard Harlem and his confidential clerk Denis Dineen whom Robert Harlem involved in his unauthorized practice of law.
But, attorneys Richard Harlem, Denis Dineen and John Casey who let these attorneys escape discipline because his law firm accepted Richard Harlem and Robert Harlem as paying clients at the time complaints against them were pending in front of John Casey, are alive, there is no statute of limitations on attorney discipline in the State of New York.
In my opinion, Richard Harlem and Denis Dineen were allowed to practice law 15 years too long.
In my opinion, John Casey should be investigated for his role in failing to prosecute Richard Harlem and Robert Harlem and instead sharing, as a law partner in Hiscock & Barclays LLP in legal fees paid by these two attorneys as private clients of John Casey's law firm.
That investigation must happen, if public is to believe in the integrity of attorney disciplinary proceedings,
- even though John Casey accepted as a law partner (and, no doubt, a shield of protection) M. Cornelia Cahill, the wife of the Chief Judge of the Court of Claims Richard Sise, rescuing her, as he did with Richard Harlem and Robert Harlem, from attorney discipline when she was turned in for her role in the school pension scandal;
- even though John Casey employs New York State Senator Neil Breslin;
- even though, according to the New York State Senate's response to my Freedom of Information request, Richard Harlem is the landlord of many years for New York Senator James Seward's Oneonta district office
It is for the public to now act and protect themselves from these attorneys.
SimSim secretly moved to the Canadian border - maybe
I wrote in this blog previously about my own and my husband's fight to get access to our own records in the Committee for Professional Conduct, Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department (New York State).
My husband's records are supposed to be public records because my husband was disbarred without a hearing 3 years ago as a result of the still pending Mokay saga.
My own disciplinary proceeding is pending at this time, based entirely on retaliative sanctions of Delaware County Judge Carl F. Becker. I removed it to the federal court, the federal court remanded it back stating that:
(1) I could not invoke the removal jurisdiction on the basis that I could not get equal treatment in state courts because I (guess) did not claim racial discrimination (this condition is not in the statute I used for removal, 28 USC 1443); in other words, because I am white, I cannot claim that I am treated unequally by state courts - makes a lot of sense, as if discrimination is only racial;
(2) another ground was under the so-called Younger abstention because:
(a) there is (allegedly) an important state interest to prosecute me - I wrote about how important that state interest is where the state does not prosecute the worst offenders and instead targets for prosecution political whistleblowers like me and my husband;
(b) the state court is capable of handling my federal constitutional claims.
The point, of course, is not whether the state court is "capable" to handle my federal constitutional claims, but whether it is willing, unbiased and will give me due process of law while handling such claims - yet, the Younger abstention stops in its analysis only at the "competence" of a state court to handle federal constitutional claims.
As soon as the Committee obtained the remand, claiming that the state court is "capable" to handle my federal constitutional claims, the Committee made a motion for a summary judgment without a hearing, claiming collateral estoppel and trying to block me from raising those same federal constitutional claims in state court.
In fact, the Committee very literally stated in their pleadings that I should not be allowed to use the state court as a forum to " air my general grievances about the attorney disciplinary system" - translation - "not be allowed to raise my federal constitutional claims challenging constitutionality of attorney disciplinary proceedings and the applicable law, rules and regulations in the 3rd Department or in New York State".
It got merrier.
When I cross-moved to recuse the court and disqualify the Committee based on irreconcilable conflicts of interest that I quoted in a large affidavit and that I demonstrated in about 100 attached documentary exhibits, the Committee responded with conclusory claims that my cross-motions to recuse and disqualify are frivolous.
I did not receive Committee's opposition papers.
The Committee claimed it sent it to me, I did not receive them.
It took me strenuous efforts to actual get a copy of the opposition in order to be able to file a reply to it, and not from the Committee - the court finally relented and sent me a copy.
I made an affidavit in reply.
The deadline set by the court to submit any more pleadings by anyone - me or the Committee - was over as soon as I submitted the reply.
We were supposed to be waiting for the decision of the court on the Committee's motion for a summary judgment and my cross-motions to recuse, disqualify, dismiss and for sanctions against the Committee for frivolous conduct, and no more pleadings were supposed to be filed.
The Committee had its say by claiming that my motion to recuse and disqualify was frivolous, I had my say stating that the Committee's conclusory position in making such claims was frivolous in itself and asked for sanctions. Nobody was supposed to file any more pleadings - if the court's scheduling orders were to be followed, of course.
Yet, when you are an " arm of the court" where you are litigating your claims, like the Committee is, according to the ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit for purposes of immunity of the Committee from lawsuits for misconduct, I guess, you do not have to follow rules that are mandatory for everybody else.
Shortly before my deadline to submit the reply in the disciplinary action, I discovered that I was, likely, investigated in an ex parte manner by the federal court which handled the remand, that a judge of that court, Lawrence E. Kahn, is the president of an Albany chapter of a secret-membership organization where attorneys and judges meet behind closed doors (to promote excellency of the legal profession, as it is claimed), and where judges, according to the scant information available about that secret-membership organization, are wined and dined by the organization for free on a monthly basis, where the tab is paid by influential attorney members, and judges' membership is free - plus judges get perks such as free national and international travel for judges and family members.
I wanted to know (1) whether any of the judges who decided my fate in any way were members of that organization and (2) if they were, who they were wined and dined by, and I believe it is my due process right to know such potentially disqualifying information about a judge who holds my rights in his or her hands.
I filed a federal lawsuit to verify membership in that organization, the American Inns of Court, or in any other similar secret organizations, of all judges (including Judges from the Appellate Division 3rd Department) and as to all attorneys or prosecutors who had ever handled my fate in that organization, because, once again, such a membership is secret and I had no other way to do it but through a lawsuit.
I filed my lawsuit on May 16, 2014.
By the end of May, 2014, counsel for the Committee in my husband's federal action Neroni v. Zayas made a statement that my disciplinary case and my husband's winning federal case are "related cases".
On or about May 29, 2014 I amended the complaint claiming retaliation against me for prosecuting a successful federal case for my husband.
I served over 150 waivers of service in the federal action on June 9, 2014 and June 10, 2014 by certified mail. It takes a day for the mail to get from Delhi, NY from where I sent them to Albany, NY where the Committee and the 3rd Department are located.
On June 14, 2014 I received an ex parte order from the Appellate Division, 3rd Judicial Department (a full panel decision, not including Chief Judge Peters) dated June 11, 2014, the day the court and the Committee supposedly received the waivers.
The order had a combined caption " In the Matter of Tatiana Neroni, an attorney (my bar number) and Frederick J. Neroni, a disbarred attorney (my husband's former bar number)".
First of all, disciplinary proceedings of attorneys are not combined, they are individual, and thus combined captions and combined orders of these kind (I believe) are completely inappropriate and not following the court's rules or the law.
Second, no proceedings against my husband are pending in the 3rd Department - he was, as I stated above, disbarred 3 years ago without a hearing and all motions to vacate the disbarment in that court were denied without an explanation.
The order transferred all of our files, inquiries and "proceedings" to the 4th Department and the 4th Department Committee. The 4th Department Committee has 3 district offices, but the order did not say to which district office the files are being transferred.
There are more catches:
(1) the order was made on an ex parte application of the Committee to allow the "transfer of proceedings" to the 4th Department, which meant recusal of the 3rd Department and self-disqualification of the Committee of the 3rd Department, and that is after the Committee ardently argued that my motion to recuse the court and disqualify the Committee was frivolous, and after all the deadlines to file additional pleadings were over;
(2) the Amended Complaint in the new federal lawsuit, Neroni v. Peebles, specifically charged the court and each and every member of the Committee with retaliation because the Committee's attorney in the federal case, NYS Assistant Attorney General Bruce Boivin claimed in the proposed case management plan in Neroni v. Zayas, the case that my husband's so far is winning against the Committee, that Neroni v. Zayas and my disciplinary case are related cases. Well, the Third Department compounded that problem by putting me and my husband on the same caption and issuing a one-for-two order on an ex parte application of the Committee to sneak away the files I was seeking access to without showing them to me, 5 hours' drive away from me.
(3) The Committee and the Third Department also compounded the problem even more because I, in good faith, consented to stay discovery in the federal Neroni v. Zayas lawsuit where I could have been allowed access to my husband's file this month. I consented to the stay of discovery on request of the Committee, the Third Department and their attorney Bruce Boivin, in order to allow these defendants to make a motion on the pleadings.
Bruce Boivin indicated to me in a conversation that he is not aware whether the Committee even has an archive that I am seeking access to. In other words, what I was seeking access to were the records which were referenced in the Committee's pleadings that the court relied upon when it disbarred my husband, but which were not made part of the record. I also wanted to see records of who voted for investigation and prosecution of my husband and how those records are kept, while Bruce Boivin indicated those records might not exist, raising another interesting host of issues.
There is no appeal as of right from an order of disbarment in New York, other than on constitutional grounds, so my husband's options in addressing what the 3rd Department did in relying upon references to records that were not provided to him or to the court were limited.
I made such an appeal on constitutional grounds after my husband was disbarred. The New York State Court of Appeals cavalierly dismissed the appeal without reviewing it on the merits, claiming it does not have jurisdiction because I failed to allege that my husband's constitutional rights were "substantially" violated.
Meaning - one may violate your constitutional rights, but it may be " insubstantial" and the court, where each and every judge takes the oath of office claiming he or she is going to uphold the U.S. Constitution, dares to pick and choose which constitutional violation was "substantial" and which was " insubstantial" for their review - without any criteria set for such a determination and no authority set in the U.S. Constitution for anyone to make such a determination.
Returning back to our conversation with Bruce Boivin as to access to my husband's file in the Committee, the discovery was stayed, not cancelled.
While the discovery was stayed, and while real issues existed whether the Committee even has the records it claimed to the court it had, and how the Committee maintains its archive, the Committee, in a secret, and I would say, stealthy way, obtained an ex parte order of transfer whatever it had or did not have on my husband to the 4th Department.
There was no proceeding involving my husband at that time from which the 3rd Department would derive jurisdiction to transfer anything anywhere.
The 3rd Department, in transferring my husband's files, acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction, and in clear response to a lawsuit, trying to hide the files.
Moreover, we do not even know where in the 4th Department the files are transferred, because the 4th Department Committee has 3 district offices, and no district office is designated for the transfer of the files in the ex parte order.
Neither my husband nor I were put on notice that the files are being transferred, otherwise I would have required to have access to the file and to inventory the files before they are transferred.
Now, the Committee can claim that they faithfully had all the necessary files, but - oopsy - they were lost in the transfer or that the other Committee lost it.
My husband has no proceedings pending against him in the 3rd Department.
He is already suing the 3rd Department and the Committee for access to his files.
Bruce Boivin announced to the court just before the ex parte order that he does not know what I am talking about, that the files of my husband are readily accessible to me in the Appellate Division, I only have to make an appointment.
It is a completely different matter to have to travel to wherever the files are now in the 4th Department, it can be in Rochester, Syracuse or Buffalo where the district offices are located.
Therefore, if any applications are made pertaining to my husband's files, when all proceedings against my husband in the 3rd Department are over, my husband personally or I as his attorney should have been put on notice if his files, especially the files we could not access to for years, are transferred anywhere, with a possibility of loss in transit.
Upon my information, the Third Department does not allow ex parte applications, and any orders to show cause filed ex parte must still be served upon the opponent.
Nor is there any basis for any show cause orders in my husband's case where the court has LOST SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, for God's sake - don't they realize that - at the time it disbarred my husband 3 years ago.
Now the Third Department set a precedent that the Committee for Professional Conduct is allowed to file ex parte applications, especially when it has a design, together with the Third Department - to create circumstances that would allow the Committee to claim that they had files that they may not have had and that they blocked access to to my husband and me for years, while that evidence is sought in a federal action.
How many lawsuits should we file to address all misconduct of these guys?
My husband's records are supposed to be public records because my husband was disbarred without a hearing 3 years ago as a result of the still pending Mokay saga.
My own disciplinary proceeding is pending at this time, based entirely on retaliative sanctions of Delaware County Judge Carl F. Becker. I removed it to the federal court, the federal court remanded it back stating that:
(1) I could not invoke the removal jurisdiction on the basis that I could not get equal treatment in state courts because I (guess) did not claim racial discrimination (this condition is not in the statute I used for removal, 28 USC 1443); in other words, because I am white, I cannot claim that I am treated unequally by state courts - makes a lot of sense, as if discrimination is only racial;
(2) another ground was under the so-called Younger abstention because:
(a) there is (allegedly) an important state interest to prosecute me - I wrote about how important that state interest is where the state does not prosecute the worst offenders and instead targets for prosecution political whistleblowers like me and my husband;
(b) the state court is capable of handling my federal constitutional claims.
The point, of course, is not whether the state court is "capable" to handle my federal constitutional claims, but whether it is willing, unbiased and will give me due process of law while handling such claims - yet, the Younger abstention stops in its analysis only at the "competence" of a state court to handle federal constitutional claims.
As soon as the Committee obtained the remand, claiming that the state court is "capable" to handle my federal constitutional claims, the Committee made a motion for a summary judgment without a hearing, claiming collateral estoppel and trying to block me from raising those same federal constitutional claims in state court.
In fact, the Committee very literally stated in their pleadings that I should not be allowed to use the state court as a forum to " air my general grievances about the attorney disciplinary system" - translation - "not be allowed to raise my federal constitutional claims challenging constitutionality of attorney disciplinary proceedings and the applicable law, rules and regulations in the 3rd Department or in New York State".
It got merrier.
When I cross-moved to recuse the court and disqualify the Committee based on irreconcilable conflicts of interest that I quoted in a large affidavit and that I demonstrated in about 100 attached documentary exhibits, the Committee responded with conclusory claims that my cross-motions to recuse and disqualify are frivolous.
I did not receive Committee's opposition papers.
The Committee claimed it sent it to me, I did not receive them.
It took me strenuous efforts to actual get a copy of the opposition in order to be able to file a reply to it, and not from the Committee - the court finally relented and sent me a copy.
I made an affidavit in reply.
The deadline set by the court to submit any more pleadings by anyone - me or the Committee - was over as soon as I submitted the reply.
We were supposed to be waiting for the decision of the court on the Committee's motion for a summary judgment and my cross-motions to recuse, disqualify, dismiss and for sanctions against the Committee for frivolous conduct, and no more pleadings were supposed to be filed.
The Committee had its say by claiming that my motion to recuse and disqualify was frivolous, I had my say stating that the Committee's conclusory position in making such claims was frivolous in itself and asked for sanctions. Nobody was supposed to file any more pleadings - if the court's scheduling orders were to be followed, of course.
Yet, when you are an " arm of the court" where you are litigating your claims, like the Committee is, according to the ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit for purposes of immunity of the Committee from lawsuits for misconduct, I guess, you do not have to follow rules that are mandatory for everybody else.
Shortly before my deadline to submit the reply in the disciplinary action, I discovered that I was, likely, investigated in an ex parte manner by the federal court which handled the remand, that a judge of that court, Lawrence E. Kahn, is the president of an Albany chapter of a secret-membership organization where attorneys and judges meet behind closed doors (to promote excellency of the legal profession, as it is claimed), and where judges, according to the scant information available about that secret-membership organization, are wined and dined by the organization for free on a monthly basis, where the tab is paid by influential attorney members, and judges' membership is free - plus judges get perks such as free national and international travel for judges and family members.
I wanted to know (1) whether any of the judges who decided my fate in any way were members of that organization and (2) if they were, who they were wined and dined by, and I believe it is my due process right to know such potentially disqualifying information about a judge who holds my rights in his or her hands.
I filed a federal lawsuit to verify membership in that organization, the American Inns of Court, or in any other similar secret organizations, of all judges (including Judges from the Appellate Division 3rd Department) and as to all attorneys or prosecutors who had ever handled my fate in that organization, because, once again, such a membership is secret and I had no other way to do it but through a lawsuit.
I filed my lawsuit on May 16, 2014.
By the end of May, 2014, counsel for the Committee in my husband's federal action Neroni v. Zayas made a statement that my disciplinary case and my husband's winning federal case are "related cases".
On or about May 29, 2014 I amended the complaint claiming retaliation against me for prosecuting a successful federal case for my husband.
I served over 150 waivers of service in the federal action on June 9, 2014 and June 10, 2014 by certified mail. It takes a day for the mail to get from Delhi, NY from where I sent them to Albany, NY where the Committee and the 3rd Department are located.
On June 14, 2014 I received an ex parte order from the Appellate Division, 3rd Judicial Department (a full panel decision, not including Chief Judge Peters) dated June 11, 2014, the day the court and the Committee supposedly received the waivers.
The order had a combined caption " In the Matter of Tatiana Neroni, an attorney (my bar number) and Frederick J. Neroni, a disbarred attorney (my husband's former bar number)".
First of all, disciplinary proceedings of attorneys are not combined, they are individual, and thus combined captions and combined orders of these kind (I believe) are completely inappropriate and not following the court's rules or the law.
Second, no proceedings against my husband are pending in the 3rd Department - he was, as I stated above, disbarred 3 years ago without a hearing and all motions to vacate the disbarment in that court were denied without an explanation.
The order transferred all of our files, inquiries and "proceedings" to the 4th Department and the 4th Department Committee. The 4th Department Committee has 3 district offices, but the order did not say to which district office the files are being transferred.
There are more catches:
(1) the order was made on an ex parte application of the Committee to allow the "transfer of proceedings" to the 4th Department, which meant recusal of the 3rd Department and self-disqualification of the Committee of the 3rd Department, and that is after the Committee ardently argued that my motion to recuse the court and disqualify the Committee was frivolous, and after all the deadlines to file additional pleadings were over;
(2) the Amended Complaint in the new federal lawsuit, Neroni v. Peebles, specifically charged the court and each and every member of the Committee with retaliation because the Committee's attorney in the federal case, NYS Assistant Attorney General Bruce Boivin claimed in the proposed case management plan in Neroni v. Zayas, the case that my husband's so far is winning against the Committee, that Neroni v. Zayas and my disciplinary case are related cases. Well, the Third Department compounded that problem by putting me and my husband on the same caption and issuing a one-for-two order on an ex parte application of the Committee to sneak away the files I was seeking access to without showing them to me, 5 hours' drive away from me.
(3) The Committee and the Third Department also compounded the problem even more because I, in good faith, consented to stay discovery in the federal Neroni v. Zayas lawsuit where I could have been allowed access to my husband's file this month. I consented to the stay of discovery on request of the Committee, the Third Department and their attorney Bruce Boivin, in order to allow these defendants to make a motion on the pleadings.
Bruce Boivin indicated to me in a conversation that he is not aware whether the Committee even has an archive that I am seeking access to. In other words, what I was seeking access to were the records which were referenced in the Committee's pleadings that the court relied upon when it disbarred my husband, but which were not made part of the record. I also wanted to see records of who voted for investigation and prosecution of my husband and how those records are kept, while Bruce Boivin indicated those records might not exist, raising another interesting host of issues.
There is no appeal as of right from an order of disbarment in New York, other than on constitutional grounds, so my husband's options in addressing what the 3rd Department did in relying upon references to records that were not provided to him or to the court were limited.
I made such an appeal on constitutional grounds after my husband was disbarred. The New York State Court of Appeals cavalierly dismissed the appeal without reviewing it on the merits, claiming it does not have jurisdiction because I failed to allege that my husband's constitutional rights were "substantially" violated.
Meaning - one may violate your constitutional rights, but it may be " insubstantial" and the court, where each and every judge takes the oath of office claiming he or she is going to uphold the U.S. Constitution, dares to pick and choose which constitutional violation was "substantial" and which was " insubstantial" for their review - without any criteria set for such a determination and no authority set in the U.S. Constitution for anyone to make such a determination.
Returning back to our conversation with Bruce Boivin as to access to my husband's file in the Committee, the discovery was stayed, not cancelled.
While the discovery was stayed, and while real issues existed whether the Committee even has the records it claimed to the court it had, and how the Committee maintains its archive, the Committee, in a secret, and I would say, stealthy way, obtained an ex parte order of transfer whatever it had or did not have on my husband to the 4th Department.
There was no proceeding involving my husband at that time from which the 3rd Department would derive jurisdiction to transfer anything anywhere.
The 3rd Department, in transferring my husband's files, acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction, and in clear response to a lawsuit, trying to hide the files.
Moreover, we do not even know where in the 4th Department the files are transferred, because the 4th Department Committee has 3 district offices, and no district office is designated for the transfer of the files in the ex parte order.
Neither my husband nor I were put on notice that the files are being transferred, otherwise I would have required to have access to the file and to inventory the files before they are transferred.
Now, the Committee can claim that they faithfully had all the necessary files, but - oopsy - they were lost in the transfer or that the other Committee lost it.
My husband has no proceedings pending against him in the 3rd Department.
He is already suing the 3rd Department and the Committee for access to his files.
Bruce Boivin announced to the court just before the ex parte order that he does not know what I am talking about, that the files of my husband are readily accessible to me in the Appellate Division, I only have to make an appointment.
It is a completely different matter to have to travel to wherever the files are now in the 4th Department, it can be in Rochester, Syracuse or Buffalo where the district offices are located.
Therefore, if any applications are made pertaining to my husband's files, when all proceedings against my husband in the 3rd Department are over, my husband personally or I as his attorney should have been put on notice if his files, especially the files we could not access to for years, are transferred anywhere, with a possibility of loss in transit.
Upon my information, the Third Department does not allow ex parte applications, and any orders to show cause filed ex parte must still be served upon the opponent.
Nor is there any basis for any show cause orders in my husband's case where the court has LOST SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, for God's sake - don't they realize that - at the time it disbarred my husband 3 years ago.
Now the Third Department set a precedent that the Committee for Professional Conduct is allowed to file ex parte applications, especially when it has a design, together with the Third Department - to create circumstances that would allow the Committee to claim that they had files that they may not have had and that they blocked access to to my husband and me for years, while that evidence is sought in a federal action.
How many lawsuits should we file to address all misconduct of these guys?
Friday, June 13, 2014
You wouldn't want a negligent surgeon to operate on your heart - why would you like a negligent judge to decide your fate?
I bet each and every attorney, at least once during his or her practice, came across judicial decisions that indicated to the reader that the judge is:
(1) incompetent;
(2) stupid;
(3) biased;
(4) is out to get you or your client;
(5) did not read the record at all and/or
(6) all of the above.
Now, a judge wields tremendous power, possibly, the most power of a governmental official.
Yes, I understand that to declare wars on nations and to pass legislation is also tremendous power.
Yet, there is no immediate feedback for legislators or executive officers, such as a judge has.
Judge enters - everybody stands up.
Judge opens his mouth, even to say something exceedingly stupid - everybody smiles and tries to make the judge understand how they liked his pearl of wisdom.
Judge humiliates a litigant in front of him - the litigant must swallow the abuse, for fear of being punished for contempt of court.
Judge writes something exceedingly stupid in a court decision, which is completely against all applicable law - why, there is a right to appeal (in some cases), so "take it up". With the concomitant costs of the transcript, the record, the filing fees and - for those who do not represent themselves - legal fees. Even though 95% of criminal appeals and, probably, 85% of civil appeals are affirmed by similarly sloppy judges who (possibly) do not even read your record, their law students/ interns do, and their clerks rubber-stamp the decision.
And that's what is commonly called "due process of law" and "access to court".
Yet, let me ask you a question.
If you are about to go under the knife and undergo a surgery - wouldn't you want your surgeon not to be negligent.
When a public servant (judges are public servants, you know, which fact they forget, instead having a "sovereign/King/Deity" complex) decides your fate - be it your regarding your property, your liberty, your divorce or custody of your children, wouldn't you want such a person to be equally diligent as a surgeon performing a surgery on you or your loved one?
Why does society does nothing EFFECTIVE to weed out charlatans and bullies in black robes?
I will not allow you to make a motion to recuse without my permission - judicial innovation going backwards
Due process of law requires that a motion addressing the lack of jurisdiction in the court may be made at any time.
In New York, the same applies to motions under Judiciary Law 14.
But not in Judge Kevin Dowd's court.
Judge Kevin Dowd sanctioned me for making a motion (on my own behalf) to vacate my own sanctions because he prohibited to my client (and husband) Mr. Neroni to make motions without judge Dowd's permission.
Yet, if the court lacks jurisdiction, all decisions of the court, including Judge Dowd's decision restricting my access to court - should be void.
But Judge Dowd blocks my own and my husband's access to court to be able to prove it... It's a chicken-and-egg or a cart-and-a-horse situation...
In law, it is called a "hypothetical jurisdiction", where the court rules on the merits before deciding whether it has jurisdiction, usually for purposes of convenience/expediency.
That's what Judge Dowd did when he ruled that because I made unsuccessful motions in the farcical Mokay case in the past before vindictive Judge Becker and before no less vindictive Judge Dowd who was at that time sued by my husband in a pro se action for, among other things, mental incapacity to preside over my husband's cases, as well as misconduct (and who can be successful when the game is rigged), I may not, without permission of Judge Dowd, make further motions - even if I see clear evidence of disqualification or impropriety in the actions of that same Judge Dowd.
To block a litigant's right to make a motion to recuse and disqualify is something new in jurisprudence - Judge Dowd should congratulate himself on such an "innovation".
By the way, not that Judge Dowd would care about the U.S. Constitution he took an oath to uphold, the U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled that exercising hypothetical jurisdiction is a violation of litigants' due process of law.
And it is exercising hypothetical jurisdiction where the judge claims that no motions, even no motions challenging jurisdiction of the court, may be filed without his express permission.
Does Judge Dowd understand what a jurisdictional motion is?
Also, it is a really great trick for a judge to allow parties to make a motion to recuse THAT SAME JUDGE only on THAT SAME JUDGE's permission.
Of course, you will have to wait until the hell freezes over for such permission.
But - that is what judicial arrogance allows itself because the judge knows that he can never be sued and, most likely, will never be disciplined, no matter what he does.
And that situation simply has to change.
It is interesting to mention that Judge Dowd, same as Judges Becker and Tormey before Judge Dowd, punished me for "flouting" his order prohibiting something not to me, but to Mr. Neroni.
I was moving to vacate actually my own sanctions - and Judge Dowd did not prohibit me personally to do that...
Once again my husband's and my own identity were blurred before Judge Dowd's eyes. When the name "Neroni" is like a red rag, I guess, it does not matter which one of the Neronis to punish. The story repeats itself...
In New York, the same applies to motions under Judiciary Law 14.
But not in Judge Kevin Dowd's court.
Judge Kevin Dowd sanctioned me for making a motion (on my own behalf) to vacate my own sanctions because he prohibited to my client (and husband) Mr. Neroni to make motions without judge Dowd's permission.
Yet, if the court lacks jurisdiction, all decisions of the court, including Judge Dowd's decision restricting my access to court - should be void.
But Judge Dowd blocks my own and my husband's access to court to be able to prove it... It's a chicken-and-egg or a cart-and-a-horse situation...
In law, it is called a "hypothetical jurisdiction", where the court rules on the merits before deciding whether it has jurisdiction, usually for purposes of convenience/expediency.
That's what Judge Dowd did when he ruled that because I made unsuccessful motions in the farcical Mokay case in the past before vindictive Judge Becker and before no less vindictive Judge Dowd who was at that time sued by my husband in a pro se action for, among other things, mental incapacity to preside over my husband's cases, as well as misconduct (and who can be successful when the game is rigged), I may not, without permission of Judge Dowd, make further motions - even if I see clear evidence of disqualification or impropriety in the actions of that same Judge Dowd.
To block a litigant's right to make a motion to recuse and disqualify is something new in jurisprudence - Judge Dowd should congratulate himself on such an "innovation".
By the way, not that Judge Dowd would care about the U.S. Constitution he took an oath to uphold, the U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled that exercising hypothetical jurisdiction is a violation of litigants' due process of law.
And it is exercising hypothetical jurisdiction where the judge claims that no motions, even no motions challenging jurisdiction of the court, may be filed without his express permission.
Does Judge Dowd understand what a jurisdictional motion is?
Also, it is a really great trick for a judge to allow parties to make a motion to recuse THAT SAME JUDGE only on THAT SAME JUDGE's permission.
Of course, you will have to wait until the hell freezes over for such permission.
But - that is what judicial arrogance allows itself because the judge knows that he can never be sued and, most likely, will never be disciplined, no matter what he does.
And that situation simply has to change.
It is interesting to mention that Judge Dowd, same as Judges Becker and Tormey before Judge Dowd, punished me for "flouting" his order prohibiting something not to me, but to Mr. Neroni.
I was moving to vacate actually my own sanctions - and Judge Dowd did not prohibit me personally to do that...
Once again my husband's and my own identity were blurred before Judge Dowd's eyes. When the name "Neroni" is like a red rag, I guess, it does not matter which one of the Neronis to punish. The story repeats itself...
A case of first impression is a frivolous case
In many courts where I appeared judges are strangely unaware of the text of the U.S. Constitution or what it might mean.
The same I can say about many experienced attorneys.
In fact, some attorneys, when I raised arguments based on my clients' due process rights, openly claimed to the court that the claim is frivolous because I do not quote any case law.
What constitutes due process of law is, admittedly, not spelled out in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
But, that clause exists, and a similar clause exists in New York State Constitution.
There also exists the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reserving all rights that are not spelled out in other Amendments, to the people.
Thus, if something is not spelled out, and there are no specific cases on a particular issue, it does not automatically mean that the argument is frivolous.
Yet, to many judges - it is.
Such an approach completely destroys development of constitutional jurisprudence, channels it into the existing grooves, stifles any creativity or development of jurisprudence and legal thought and indicates that what is allowed to legal scholars in law schools, is somehow prohibited to raise in the courtroom, for what reason - nobody knows.
Somebody, at some point, must raise a new idea for the society to develop.
And, most likely, raise it again, and again, and again, until it takes root.
Without new ideas tried out in constitutional jurisprudence in the courtroom, no progress in the field of civil rights is possible. Maybe, that is what the government, including the courts, wants all along? That is my impression - judging by the fact, how fiercely and blindly courts lash out at any new constitutional ideas.
And I raise, again, and again, and again, the simple idea that constitutional jurisprudence is not majoritarian jurisprudence and constitutional issues may not be decided by application of the rules of "frivolous conduct" - which are - how the hypothetical "reasonable" person will view a certain issue.
Had attorneys stuck to the "reasonable person for the time and place" standard, women would still be property of men, African Americans would still have been slaves, contraceptives and homosexual relations would still be criminal, etc. etc. etc....
Constitutional jurisprudence is not majoritarian jurisprudence.
Raising constitutional issues may never be frivolous, no matter what courts say who simply want to lighten up their caseloads and intimidate civil rights attorneys against bringing more cases.
The "floodgate of litigation" approach is never a good reason for denying people access to court.
In this case, though, the floodgate approach simply does not work. All that courts need to do is - instead of creating multiple frivolous doctrines preventing access to court by civil rights litigants - to actually drop the silly immunity doctrines, abstentions and other bars to federal civil rights litigation and decide cases on the merits.
When government officials know that their collective asses may be whipped up in court, and pretty heavily, and that they may afterwards lose their jobs because they become a liability to their employer, they will think twice before committing the same misconduct - and there will be actually less litigation.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided that same sex intercourse may not be criminalized - and there is no litigation on that subject.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided in principle that contraception is legal - and litigation on that subject is on peripheral issues only (right of notification of parents if a minor asks for contraception, the issue of abortion and at what term it can be done), but not on the issue of legitimacy of contraception as a concept.
The same applies to any other constitutional issue to be raised.
But - if issues of first impression are sanctioned as frivolous, as federal courts started a tendency to do now - civil rights litigation with still be happening, still be deflecting the court's resources, but will be going in circles without any major breakthroughs.
Protective measures in civil rights jurisprudence backfire on all of us.
The same I can say about many experienced attorneys.
In fact, some attorneys, when I raised arguments based on my clients' due process rights, openly claimed to the court that the claim is frivolous because I do not quote any case law.
What constitutes due process of law is, admittedly, not spelled out in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
But, that clause exists, and a similar clause exists in New York State Constitution.
There also exists the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reserving all rights that are not spelled out in other Amendments, to the people.
Thus, if something is not spelled out, and there are no specific cases on a particular issue, it does not automatically mean that the argument is frivolous.
Yet, to many judges - it is.
Such an approach completely destroys development of constitutional jurisprudence, channels it into the existing grooves, stifles any creativity or development of jurisprudence and legal thought and indicates that what is allowed to legal scholars in law schools, is somehow prohibited to raise in the courtroom, for what reason - nobody knows.
Somebody, at some point, must raise a new idea for the society to develop.
And, most likely, raise it again, and again, and again, until it takes root.
Without new ideas tried out in constitutional jurisprudence in the courtroom, no progress in the field of civil rights is possible. Maybe, that is what the government, including the courts, wants all along? That is my impression - judging by the fact, how fiercely and blindly courts lash out at any new constitutional ideas.
And I raise, again, and again, and again, the simple idea that constitutional jurisprudence is not majoritarian jurisprudence and constitutional issues may not be decided by application of the rules of "frivolous conduct" - which are - how the hypothetical "reasonable" person will view a certain issue.
Had attorneys stuck to the "reasonable person for the time and place" standard, women would still be property of men, African Americans would still have been slaves, contraceptives and homosexual relations would still be criminal, etc. etc. etc....
Constitutional jurisprudence is not majoritarian jurisprudence.
Raising constitutional issues may never be frivolous, no matter what courts say who simply want to lighten up their caseloads and intimidate civil rights attorneys against bringing more cases.
The "floodgate of litigation" approach is never a good reason for denying people access to court.
In this case, though, the floodgate approach simply does not work. All that courts need to do is - instead of creating multiple frivolous doctrines preventing access to court by civil rights litigants - to actually drop the silly immunity doctrines, abstentions and other bars to federal civil rights litigation and decide cases on the merits.
When government officials know that their collective asses may be whipped up in court, and pretty heavily, and that they may afterwards lose their jobs because they become a liability to their employer, they will think twice before committing the same misconduct - and there will be actually less litigation.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided that same sex intercourse may not be criminalized - and there is no litigation on that subject.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided in principle that contraception is legal - and litigation on that subject is on peripheral issues only (right of notification of parents if a minor asks for contraception, the issue of abortion and at what term it can be done), but not on the issue of legitimacy of contraception as a concept.
The same applies to any other constitutional issue to be raised.
But - if issues of first impression are sanctioned as frivolous, as federal courts started a tendency to do now - civil rights litigation with still be happening, still be deflecting the court's resources, but will be going in circles without any major breakthroughs.
Protective measures in civil rights jurisprudence backfire on all of us.
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