SimSim secretly moved to the Canadian border - maybe

I wrote in this blog previously about my own and my husband's fight to get access to our own records in the Committee for Professional Conduct, Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department (New York State).

My husband's records are supposed to be public records because my husband was disbarred without a hearing 3 years ago as a result of the still pending Mokay saga.

My own disciplinary proceeding is pending at this time, based entirely on retaliative sanctions of Delaware County Judge Carl F. Becker.  I removed it to the federal court, the federal court remanded it back stating that:

(1) I could not invoke the removal jurisdiction on the basis that I could not get equal treatment in state courts because I (guess) did not claim racial discrimination (this condition is not in the statute I used for removal, 28 USC 1443);  in other words, because I am white, I cannot claim that I am treated unequally by state courts - makes a lot of sense, as if discrimination is only racial;

(2) another ground was under the so-called Younger abstention because:

(a) there is (allegedly) an important state interest to prosecute me - I wrote about how important that state interest is where the state does not prosecute the worst offenders and instead targets for prosecution political whistleblowers like me and my husband;

(b) the state court is capable of handling my federal constitutional claims.

The point, of course, is not whether the state court is "capable" to handle my federal constitutional claims, but whether it is willing, unbiased and will give me due process of law while handling such claims - yet, the Younger abstention stops in its analysis only at the "competence" of a state court to handle federal constitutional claims.

As soon as the Committee obtained the remand, claiming that the state court is "capable" to handle my federal constitutional claims, the Committee made a motion for a summary judgment without a hearing, claiming collateral estoppel and trying to block me from raising those same federal constitutional claims in state court.

In fact, the Committee very literally stated in their pleadings that I should not be allowed to use the state court as a forum to " air my general grievances about the attorney disciplinary system" - translation - "not be allowed to raise my federal constitutional claims challenging constitutionality of attorney disciplinary proceedings and the applicable law, rules and regulations in the 3rd Department or in New York State".

It got merrier.

When I cross-moved to recuse the court and disqualify the Committee based on irreconcilable conflicts of interest that I quoted in a large affidavit and that I demonstrated in about 100 attached documentary exhibits,  the Committee responded with conclusory claims that my cross-motions to recuse and disqualify are frivolous.

I did not receive Committee's opposition papers.

The Committee claimed it sent it to me, I did not receive them.

It took me strenuous efforts to actual get a copy of the opposition in order to be able to file a reply to it, and not from the Committee - the court finally relented and sent me a copy.

I made an affidavit in reply.

The deadline set by the court to submit any more pleadings by anyone - me or the Committee - was over as soon as I submitted the reply.

We were supposed to be waiting for the decision of the court on the Committee's motion for a summary judgment and my cross-motions to recuse, disqualify, dismiss and for sanctions against the Committee for frivolous conduct, and no more pleadings were supposed to be filed.

The Committee had its say by claiming that my motion to recuse and disqualify was frivolous, I had my say stating that the Committee's conclusory position in making such claims was frivolous in itself and asked for sanctions.  Nobody was supposed to file any more pleadings - if the court's scheduling orders were to be followed, of course.

Yet, when you are an " arm of the court" where you are litigating your claims, like the Committee is, according to the ruling of the  U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit for purposes of immunity of the Committee from lawsuits for misconduct, I guess, you do not have to follow rules that are mandatory for everybody else.

Shortly before my deadline to submit the reply in the disciplinary action, I discovered that I was, likely, investigated in an ex parte manner by the federal court which handled the remand, that a judge of that court, Lawrence E. Kahn, is the president of an Albany chapter of a secret-membership organization where attorneys and judges meet behind closed doors (to promote excellency of the legal profession, as it is claimed), and where judges, according to the scant information available about that secret-membership organization, are wined and dined by the organization for free on a monthly basis, where the tab is paid by influential attorney members, and judges' membership is free - plus judges get perks such as free national and international travel for judges and family members.

I wanted to know (1) whether any of the judges who decided my fate in any way were members of that organization and (2) if they were, who they were wined and dined by, and I believe it is my due process right to know such potentially disqualifying information about a judge who holds my rights in his or her hands.

I filed a federal lawsuit to verify membership in that organization, the American Inns of Court, or in any other similar secret organizations, of all judges (including Judges from the Appellate Division 3rd Department) and as to all attorneys or prosecutors who had ever handled my fate in that organization, because, once again, such a membership is secret and I had no other way to do it but through a lawsuit.

I filed my lawsuit on May 16, 2014.

By the end of May, 2014, counsel for the Committee in my husband's federal action Neroni v. Zayas made a statement that my disciplinary case and my husband's winning federal case are "related cases".

On or about May 29, 2014 I amended the complaint claiming retaliation against me for prosecuting a successful federal case for my husband.

I served over 150 waivers of service in the federal action on June 9, 2014 and June 10, 2014 by certified mail.  It takes a day for the mail to get from Delhi, NY from where I sent them to Albany, NY where the Committee and the 3rd Department are located.

On June 14, 2014 I received an ex parte order from the Appellate Division, 3rd Judicial Department (a full panel decision, not including Chief Judge Peters) dated June 11, 2014, the day the court and the Committee supposedly received the waivers.

The order had a combined caption  " In the Matter of Tatiana Neroni, an attorney (my bar number) and Frederick J. Neroni, a disbarred attorney (my husband's former bar number)".

First of all, disciplinary proceedings of attorneys are not combined, they are individual, and thus combined captions and combined orders of these kind (I believe) are completely inappropriate and not following the court's rules or the law.

Second, no proceedings against my husband are pending in the 3rd Department - he was, as I stated above, disbarred 3 years ago without a hearing and all motions to vacate the disbarment in that court were denied without an explanation.

The order transferred all of our files, inquiries and "proceedings" to the 4th Department and the 4th Department Committee.   The 4th Department Committee has 3 district offices, but the order did not say to which district office the files are being transferred.

There are more catches:

(1) the order was made on an ex parte application of the Committee to allow the "transfer of proceedings" to the 4th Department, which meant recusal of the 3rd Department and self-disqualification of the Committee of the 3rd Department, and that is after the Committee ardently argued that my motion to recuse the court and disqualify the Committee was frivolous, and after all the deadlines to file additional pleadings were over;

(2) the Amended Complaint in the new federal lawsuit, Neroni v. Peebles, specifically charged the court and each and every member of the Committee with retaliation because the Committee's attorney in the federal case, NYS Assistant Attorney General Bruce Boivin claimed in the proposed case management plan in Neroni v. Zayas, the case that my husband's so far is winning against the Committee, that Neroni v. Zayas and my disciplinary case are related cases.    Well, the Third Department compounded that problem by putting me and my husband on the same caption and issuing a one-for-two order on an ex parte application of the Committee to sneak away the files I was seeking access to without showing them to me, 5 hours' drive away from me.

(3) The Committee and the Third Department also compounded the problem even more because I, in good faith, consented to stay discovery in the federal Neroni v. Zayas lawsuit where I could have been allowed access to my husband's file this month.  I consented to the stay of discovery on request of the Committee, the Third Department and their attorney Bruce Boivin, in order to allow these defendants to make a motion on the pleadings.

Bruce Boivin indicated to me in a conversation that he is not aware whether the Committee even has an archive that I am seeking access to.  In other words, what I was seeking access to were the records which were referenced in the Committee's pleadings that the court relied upon when it disbarred my husband, but which were not made part of the record.  I also wanted to see records of who voted for investigation and prosecution of my husband and how those records are kept, while Bruce Boivin indicated those records might not exist, raising another interesting host of issues.

There is no appeal as of right from an order of disbarment in New York, other than on constitutional grounds, so my husband's options in addressing what the 3rd Department did in relying upon references to records that were not provided to him or to the court were limited.

I made such an appeal on constitutional grounds after my husband was disbarred.  The New York State Court of Appeals cavalierly dismissed the appeal without reviewing it on the merits, claiming it does not have jurisdiction because I failed to allege that my husband's constitutional rights were "substantially" violated.

Meaning - one may violate your constitutional rights, but it may be " insubstantial" and the court, where each and every judge takes the oath of office claiming he or she is going to uphold the U.S. Constitution, dares to pick and choose which constitutional violation was "substantial" and which was " insubstantial" for their review  - without any criteria set for such a determination and no authority set in the U.S. Constitution for anyone to make such a determination.

Returning back to our conversation with Bruce Boivin as to access to my husband's file in the Committee, the discovery was stayed, not cancelled.

While the discovery was stayed, and while real issues existed whether the Committee even has the records it claimed to the court it had, and how the Committee maintains its archive, the Committee, in a secret, and I would say, stealthy way, obtained an ex parte order of transfer whatever it had or did not have on my husband to the 4th Department.

There was no proceeding involving my husband at that time from which the 3rd Department would derive jurisdiction to transfer anything anywhere.

The 3rd Department, in transferring my husband's files, acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction, and in clear response to a lawsuit, trying to hide the files.

Moreover, we do not even know where in the 4th Department the files are transferred, because the 4th Department Committee has 3 district offices, and no district office is designated for the transfer of the files in the ex parte order.   

Neither my husband nor I were put on notice that the files are being transferred, otherwise I would have required to have access to the file and to inventory the files before they are transferred.

Now, the Committee can claim that they faithfully had all the necessary files, but - oopsy - they were lost in the transfer or that the other Committee lost it.

My husband has no proceedings pending against him in the 3rd Department.

He is already suing the 3rd Department and the Committee for access to his files.

Bruce Boivin announced to the court just before the ex parte order that he does not know what I am talking about, that the files of my husband are readily accessible to me in the Appellate Division, I only have to make an appointment.  

It is a completely different matter to have to travel to wherever the files are now in the 4th Department, it can be in Rochester, Syracuse or Buffalo where the district offices are located.

Therefore, if any applications are made pertaining to my husband's files, when all proceedings against my husband in the 3rd Department are over, my husband personally or I as his attorney should have been put on notice if his files, especially the files we could not access to for years, are transferred anywhere, with a possibility of loss in transit.

Upon my information, the Third Department does not allow ex parte applications, and any orders to show cause filed ex parte must still be served upon the opponent.

Nor is there any basis for any show cause orders in my husband's case where the court has LOST SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, for God's sake - don't they realize that - at the time it disbarred my husband 3 years ago.

Now the Third Department set a precedent that the Committee for Professional Conduct is allowed to file ex parte applications, especially when it has a design, together with the Third Department - to create circumstances that would allow the Committee to claim that they had files that they may not have had and that they blocked access to to my husband and me for years, while that evidence is sought in a federal action.

How many lawsuits should we file to address all misconduct of these guys?

You wouldn't want a negligent surgeon to operate on your heart - why would you like a negligent judge to decide your fate?

I bet each and every attorney, at least once during his or her practice, came across judicial decisions that indicated to the reader that the judge is:


(1)  incompetent;
(2)  stupid;
(3)  biased;
(4)  is out to get you or your client;
(5) did not read the record at all and/or
(6) all of the above.


Now, a judge wields tremendous power, possibly, the most power of a governmental official.


Yes, I understand that to declare wars on nations and to pass legislation is also tremendous power.


Yet, there is no immediate feedback for legislators or executive officers, such as a judge has.


Judge enters - everybody stands up.


Judge opens his mouth, even to say something exceedingly stupid - everybody smiles and tries to make the judge understand how they liked his pearl of wisdom.


Judge humiliates a litigant in front of him - the litigant must swallow the abuse, for fear of being punished for contempt of court.


Judge writes something exceedingly stupid in a court decision, which is completely against all applicable law - why, there is a right to appeal (in some cases), so "take it up".  With the concomitant costs of the transcript, the record, the filing fees and - for those who do not represent themselves - legal fees.  Even though 95% of criminal appeals and, probably, 85% of civil appeals are affirmed by similarly sloppy judges who (possibly) do not even read your record, their law students/ interns do, and their clerks rubber-stamp the decision. 


And that's what is commonly called "due process of law" and "access to court".


Yet, let me ask you a question.


If you are about to go under the knife and undergo a surgery - wouldn't you want your surgeon not to be negligent.


When a public servant (judges are public servants, you know, which fact they forget, instead having a "sovereign/King/Deity" complex) decides your fate - be it your regarding your property, your liberty, your divorce or custody of your children, wouldn't you want such a person to be equally diligent as a surgeon performing a surgery on you or your loved one?


Why does society does nothing EFFECTIVE to weed out charlatans and bullies in black robes?

I will not allow you to make a motion to recuse without my permission - judicial innovation going backwards

Due process of law requires that a motion addressing the lack of jurisdiction in the court may be made at any time.


In New York, the same applies to motions under Judiciary Law 14.


But not in Judge Kevin Dowd's court.


Judge Kevin Dowd sanctioned me for making a motion (on my own behalf) to vacate my own sanctions because he prohibited to my client (and husband) Mr. Neroni to make motions without judge Dowd's permission.


Yet, if the court lacks jurisdiction, all decisions of the court, including Judge Dowd's decision restricting my access to court - should be void.


But Judge Dowd blocks my own and my husband's access to court to be able to prove it...  It's a chicken-and-egg or a cart-and-a-horse situation...


In law, it is called a "hypothetical jurisdiction", where the court rules on the merits before deciding whether it has jurisdiction, usually for purposes of convenience/expediency.


That's what Judge Dowd did when he ruled that because I made unsuccessful motions in the farcical Mokay case in the past before vindictive Judge Becker and before no less vindictive Judge Dowd who was at that time sued by my husband in a pro se action for, among other things, mental incapacity to preside over my husband's cases, as well as misconduct (and who can be successful when the game is rigged), I may not, without permission of Judge Dowd, make further motions - even if I see clear evidence of disqualification or impropriety in the actions of that same Judge Dowd.


To block a litigant's right to make a motion to recuse and disqualify is something new in jurisprudence - Judge Dowd should congratulate himself on such an "innovation". 


By the way, not that Judge Dowd would care about the U.S. Constitution he took an oath to uphold, the U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled that exercising hypothetical jurisdiction is a violation of litigants' due process of law.


And it is exercising hypothetical jurisdiction where the judge claims that no motions, even no motions challenging jurisdiction of the court, may be filed without his express permission.


Does Judge Dowd understand what a jurisdictional motion is?


Also, it is a really great trick for a judge to allow parties to make a motion to recuse THAT SAME JUDGE only on THAT SAME JUDGE's permission.


Of course, you will have to wait until the hell freezes over for such permission.


But - that is what judicial arrogance allows itself because the judge knows that he can never be sued and, most likely, will never be disciplined, no matter what he does.


And that situation simply has to change.


It is interesting to mention that Judge Dowd, same as Judges Becker and Tormey before Judge Dowd, punished me for "flouting" his order prohibiting something not to me, but to Mr. Neroni. 


I was moving to vacate actually my own sanctions - and Judge Dowd did not prohibit me personally to do that...


Once again my husband's and my own identity were blurred before Judge Dowd's eyes.  When the name "Neroni" is like a red rag, I guess, it does not matter which one of the Neronis to punish.  The story repeats itself...

A case of first impression is a frivolous case

In many courts where I appeared judges are strangely unaware of the text of the U.S. Constitution or what it might mean.


The same I can say about many experienced attorneys.


In fact, some attorneys, when I raised arguments based on my clients' due process rights, openly claimed to the court that the claim is frivolous because I do not quote any case law.


What constitutes due process of law is, admittedly, not spelled out in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.


But, that clause exists, and a similar clause exists in New York State Constitution.


There also exists the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reserving all rights that are not spelled out in other Amendments, to the people.


Thus, if something is not spelled out, and there are no specific cases on a particular issue, it does not automatically mean that the argument is frivolous.


Yet, to many judges - it is.


Such an approach completely destroys development of constitutional jurisprudence, channels it into the existing grooves, stifles any creativity or development of jurisprudence and legal thought and indicates that what is allowed to legal scholars in law schools, is somehow prohibited to raise in the courtroom, for what reason - nobody knows.


Somebody, at some point, must raise a new idea for the society to develop.


And, most likely, raise it again, and again, and again, until it takes root.


Without new ideas tried out in constitutional jurisprudence in the courtroom, no progress in the field of civil rights is possible.   Maybe, that is what the government, including the courts, wants all along? That is my impression - judging by the fact, how fiercely and blindly courts lash out at any new constitutional ideas.


And I raise, again, and again, and again, the simple idea that constitutional jurisprudence is not majoritarian jurisprudence and constitutional issues may not be decided by application of the rules of "frivolous conduct" - which are - how the hypothetical "reasonable" person will view a certain issue.


Had attorneys stuck to the "reasonable person for the time and place" standard, women would still be property of men, African Americans would still have been slaves, contraceptives and homosexual relations would still be criminal, etc. etc. etc....


Constitutional jurisprudence is not majoritarian jurisprudence.


Raising constitutional issues may never be frivolous, no matter what courts say who simply want to lighten up their caseloads and intimidate civil rights attorneys against bringing more cases.


The "floodgate of litigation" approach is never a good reason for denying people access to court.


In this case, though, the floodgate approach simply does not work.  All that courts need to do is - instead of creating multiple frivolous doctrines preventing access to court by civil rights litigants - to actually drop the silly immunity doctrines, abstentions and other bars to federal civil rights litigation and decide cases on the merits.


When government officials know that their collective asses may be whipped up in court, and pretty heavily, and that they may afterwards lose their jobs because they become a liability to their employer, they will think twice before committing the same misconduct - and there will be actually less litigation.


The U.S. Supreme Court decided that same sex intercourse may not be criminalized - and there is no litigation on that subject.


The U.S. Supreme Court decided in principle that contraception is legal - and litigation on that subject is on peripheral issues only (right of notification of parents if a minor asks for contraception, the issue of abortion and at what term it can be done), but not on the issue of legitimacy of contraception as a concept.


The same applies to any other constitutional issue to be raised.


But - if issues of first impression are sanctioned as frivolous, as federal courts started a tendency to do now - civil rights litigation with still be happening, still be deflecting the court's resources, but will be going in circles without any major breakthroughs.


Protective measures in civil rights jurisprudence backfire on all of us.

Attention attorneys against whom disciplinary proceedings are pending in the State of New York - a call for a federal class action

When a disciplinary proceeding is filed against you, it is scary.  Many attorneys with whom I confidentially discussed my husband's proceedings, based on the farce of the Mokay case I described in this blog, and about my own disciplinary proceedings, based on retaliative actions of a judge whom I sued, gave me "big eyes" and stated that disciplinary proceedings are so scary they do not want to know anything about them.


Yet, to learn "on the go", when such proceedings already became a reality, is scarier.  And every bit of information as to how to fight these modern day Torquemadas might help.


In the recent decision in my husband's federal pro se civil rights proceeding Neroni v. Coccoma I found a gem of a case that may help attorneys currently involved in a New York State disciplinary proceeding shape their arguments that such proceedings are unconstitutional.


It is amazing what kind of treasure lays around for years (the case is from 1975) and is not given proper regard by attorneys.   Probably, it is exactly because attorneys are so scared of disciplinary proceedings, they are afraid to fight for their rights, and instead try to concede points and plead to something, no matter whether they are guilty or not, in order to preserve the "prize" - the attorney license.


Ok, in 1975, that is 39 years ago (!) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit in a case Anonymous v. Association of the Bar of City of New York
515 F.2d 427
C.A.N.Y. 1975 -


gave immunity to attorneys for the prosecuting disciplinary body - Committee for Professional Conduct (COPS) - because - wait - the Committee is an arm of the court.  The pinpoint page for this "pearl of wisdom"  within the case is 433.  The federal court equated COPS being an "arm of the court" with a special master in federal proceedings. 


In fact, a federal master is something entirely different - it is an adjudicator appointed on consent of parties, not a prosecutor pursuing an attorney clearly against his or her consent.  But, when a court wants, in a quick decision, without much bother, attain a needed end, especially when it knows that to get a certiorari review from the U.S. Supreme Court is nearly impossible - the court allows itself to be sloppy.


Now, please tell me, ladies and gentlemen, how can a court where investigators and prosecutors are "part of the court", be considered a true court, instead of a court-advocate?


And how would adjudications of a court blended with prosecutors and investigators and necessarily ruling for them, be deemed constitutionally valid?


Just a thought...


As I said before, it is time for attorneys who are either improperly disciplined or improperly targeted for discipline, to unite in action.


And, based on Anonymous that I cited above, I would suggest not only activities toward a legislative action, but a federal class action.

Emotions as legal terms

In my practice of law I have come across terms that are, in usual life, designations of emotions or moral principles.

It is anybody's guess how emotions or moral concepts wormed their way into the legal terminology, but they are there, and they may affect your rights (as well as mine).

Conscience of the court

Here is the Merriam-Webster definition of what "conscience" is.

It is apparent that "conscience" should not be chosen as a legal term defining people's rights, because it is (1) subjective, (2) vague, (3) non-transparent,  (4) unreviewable by an outsider/appellate authority.

Yet, there exists in the American jurisprudence not one, but two terms involving "conscience of the court".



(a) The "shock the conscience of the court" test

This is the test about which I heard one appellate attorney tell another in the hallway of an appellate court - "but that threshold is impossible to meet!".  And then the attorney cautiously turned around to check out who may have heard the statement and apologetically said "well, of course, I do not mean that the court has no conscience"...

The attorney was right.

That test is (nearly) or, realistically, actually impossible to meet, and for a reason. 

A body of government cannot have a conscience.

A panel of several judges cannot have one uniform conscience.

Rights of people cannot rest on whether a single judge does or does not have a conscience that may be shocked.

There is no uniform test as to what a conscience is, whether a certain individual does or does not have it, and what kind of threshold deeds must or must not shock that elusive conscience.

The "test" was frequently criticized by the scholars, but it is still there...

(b) Searching the conscience of the court

This test is used in by New York state judges deciding a motion to recuse filed against them.

They "search their conscience" and announce to the litigants the results - usually the results are, predictably, that the judge, no matter how biased and bent on revenge he is, will never admit that he is biased and bent on revenge and instead says that he "searched his conscience" and found there "no hard feelings" against you or your attorney.

The beauty of it (for the judge, not for you) - is how would you check whether the judge is telling you the truth?  What is conscience? What are uniform standards for the judicial conscience, if any? That he has a conscience?  That he consulted it?  What the conscience told him?  That what his conscience told him was proper and lawful?  That he has actually followed that conscience?

So - searching the conscience of the court is also an exercise that proves that the courts are not really separated from the church.  It is a rather mystical experience, and one must have blind faith to believe the judge in what he says without having any proof of validity of his/her claims, and no guidelines for application of this test.

Since the test is defining a fundamental constitutional right of litigants, the right to a fair and impartial tribunal, my belief is that litigants are entitled to more than having the object of their motion for recusal alleging misconduct or conflicts of interest, or an appearance of impropriety searching their own conscience.   Announcing that your federal fundamental constitutional right to a fair and impartial tribunal, as New York judges do, is, in my view, the height of arrogance and disdain to the rule of law and to the oath of office that they took when they donned their black robes.

And, as I stated earlier in my blog, peremptory challenges to judges instead of motions to recuse that more often than not bring sanctions from those "unbiased" judges who "searched their conscience" and found "no hard feelings" against the moving party, are long overdue in New York.

Also long overdue is a legislation expressly prohibiting judges to punish attorneys and parties for making a motion to recuse and/or disqualify and announcing such decisions, if made, void as a matter of law without necessity to move to vacate them, because such efforts, as I am finding out, will be blocked by the courts on any possible and impossible pretexts.

Contempt of court

Contempt is defined by Merriam-Webster dictionary as follows:

It is a feeling of lack of respect or approval.

At law, it is a lack of "proper" respect to the court or a judge which is demonstrated in speech or actions.

Now, what is "proper" and "improper" is a subjective call.

Whether a certain person is or is not entitled to respect, is a subjective call.

Whether the government is entitled to respect - is, on the other hand, a constitutional issue.

In a classic 1st Amendment case an individual was convicted for burning the American flag.

The conviction was overturned because the American flag is also burned to dispose of old flags.

Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court reasons, what is being punished is the expression, that the flag was burnt in protest against governmental actions - and that is within the core protection of the 1st Amendment.

Well, protest against actions of any branch of the government is within the core protections of the 1st Amendment, and that includes the court.

Thus, the requirement that the court

(1) must be "duly" respected (even though judges self-servingly absolve themselves from suits for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench and retaliate against those who point out their misconduct, which is contemptible conduct not warranting any respect);

(2) that the judge who thinks you are not "properly" respecting him can summarily, as an accuser, prosecutor, judge and jury, punish you criminally if the alleged contempt happened in his presence

should long ago be eliminated out of American jurisprudence.

The government is entitled only to so much respect as it has earned.

In fact, the only thing the government can require from its citizens is for them to abide to the rule of law.

When a judge is violating the law before your very eyes or in a court order, what constitutes the rule of law, becomes fuzzy.

My firm belief that the words "contempt" and "conscience" should be eliminated out of the legal terms of the American jurisprudence and strict constitutional standards must be enacted by the Legislature and enforced as to rights and duties of judges, parties and attorneys in the courtroom - with equal obligations of decorum and deportment.

At this time, a judge can demean and humiliate a party or attorney all he wants, with no recourse, and a party or attorney complaining about it may lose their property, liberty or livelihood.

Isn't that contempt of the rule of law?

Trust/faith/belief in the integrity of the judiciary

Trust is defined by Meriam-Webster dictionary as follows:

The public is expected to trust in the integrity of the judiciary, allegedly so that the rule of law be maintained in the country.

Attorneys are supposed to maintain that trust and not undermine it, at the fear of losing their livelihood.

As far as I could see, the judiciary as a whole makes no efforts to earn that trust and every effort to breach it.  What of self-imposed immunity for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench, what of retaliation against whistleblowers of judicial misconduct that not only I, but other attorneys and scholars are concerned about.

A reasonable person cannot trust in the integrity of an individual who uses his power to proclaim himself immune from liability for malicious and corrupt behavior.   Such a person would cause in reasonable people suspicious and contempt, not trust.

To require trust from the public and maintaining that trust from attorneys is an equivalent, in my opinion, of installing the judiciary as a type of deity which can do no wrong and should be worshipped no matter what.

It appears that the American judiciary has significant narcissistic/mania of grandeur issues, and evaluation and treatment is long overdue.





Judge, can you, please, attach an X-ray of your conscience and a transcript of what it told you? After you search it to decide my motion to recuse?

Yet another judge "searched his conscience", found no bias against me or my husband, and sanctioned us for pointing out his misconduct.


The hero this time is Judge Kevin Dowd of Chenango County Supreme Court, assigned, coincidentally, to the Mokay case that I just blogged about before receiving the "gift" of sanctions from the "unbiased" Judge Dowd.


We made a motion to vacate sanctions against us imposed by Judge Becker after we sued Judge Becker two times.


The "unbiased" Judge Dowd denied the motion and sanctioned me and my husband $1,000.00 each for making it.


The setting of the motion is as follows.


1.  On June 27, 2011 my husband and I sued Judge Becker for misconduct.
2.  Judge Becker sanctioned me or my husband us in 4 different cases after we sued him in state court.
3. We sued Judge Becker in federal court for retaliation.
4. Judge Becker imposed sanctions against both of us in two more actions.


All sanctions were imposed close in time to the lawsuits.


The lawsuits against Judge Becker were dismissed on immunity grounds without reaching the merits.
The Appellate Division affirmed sanctions in Mokay without reaching the issue whether the sanctions were the product of retaliation, because what happened in other cases was not part of the record on appeal from the direct case on sanctions.


We made a motion to vacate sanctions to make the pattern of Judge Becker's misconduct part of the record and to make at least one court review them on the merits.


Judge Dowd presides over the case.  Judge Dowd was assigned to the case under the guidance  and monitoring by the previously recused Judge Coccoma.  My husband sued Judge Coccoma's wife.  Judge Coccoma holds in his hands Judge Dowd's post-retirement financial perks.  Judge Dowd is close in age to mandatory retirement.  Judge Dowd recently gave a monetary favor to Judge Coccoma by refusing to sanction Judge Coccoma's wife in a situation where she concealed the death of her client, made a motion without revealing the fact that she has lost her authority as an attorney, obtained an order on that motion and aggressively continued her attempts to bring my husband to a deposition.


Ellen Coccoma revealed the death of her client (and the resulting abatement of the court's jurisdiction, as well as her own authority) only when I threatened to compel her to produce her client at a cross-deposition.  Only then she revealed the fact, but not the date of the death.  Yet, she has claimed to me in March of 2012 that her other clients' standing in the action is based on their father's  "valid power of attorney". At the time of making the claim, Ellen Coccoma knew that the person who has given the "valid power of attorney" was dead since November 6, 2011, and as of the same date his power of attorney was void.


My husband was disbarred for less.


Ellen Coccoma will never be disbarred.


In fact, Ellen Coccoma will never be even sanctioned - because she is married to a judge, and a high-standing one.


Judge Dowd gave Judge Coccoma a financial favor by not sanctioning Judge Coccoma's wife.


Judge Dowd gave Judge Coccoma a further favor by sanctioning the complainants against Judge Coccoma's wife, using court proceedings to cloak himself with immunity for effecting this conspiracy.


Judge Dowd might be surprised to learn that if the conspiracy arose outside of the courtroom, there is a precedent in federal court in Pennsylvania that provided that where a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights in which a judge engaged was outside of court proceedings, the injury inflicted by the judge who is part of the conspiracy in the court proceedings is not immune, H.T. et al., v. Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al, 3:09-cv-00286-ARC, Document 1510, page 22.


Judge Dowd does not find any conflict of interest or grounds for his disqualification from the case, after "searching his conscience", even though Judge Dowd previously recused from a related case, Neroni v. Harlem and his presiding over a related case is equivalent to re-entry a case after recusal, which is prohibited by New York law.


At the time of presiding over the case, Judge Dowd was sued by my husband for misconduct in Neroni v. Coccoma's, recently dismissed by Judge Sharpe, where judge Sharpe cloaked Judge Dowd with immunity even though Judge Dowd failed to properly restore jurisdiction of the court after it abated due to the death of Ellen Coccoma's client.


My client will certainly appeal the decision, especially that now there is a precedent out of Pennsylvania which breached the armor of judicial immunity for out-of-court actions that resulted in in-court injury.


On May 16, 2014 I sued Judge Dowd in his individual capacity in federal court seeking a disclosure from him whether he is or ever was a part of the secret-membership organization The American Inns of Court. 


On June 5, 2014 Judge Dowd  made his decision in the Mokay case sanctioning me and my husband $1,000.00 each for making "frivolous" motions.


My husband alleged in his dismissed lawsuit, based on a transcript in a proceeding, that Judge Dowd might lack mental faculties because Judge Dowd discussed in a custody proceedings, without any relevance to anything, that a law school in a certain town was building a statue in Judge Dowd's honor which was in fact a urinal. 


Of course, Judge Dowd had no hard feelings against my husband and was completely unbiased.  Only - to believe that we need to do a collective lobotomy.


This judge is now presiding over the Mokay case, which was botched up big time already by a parade of judges to the point of becoming a major farce. 


Of course, Judge Dowd "searched his conscience" and did not find any "adverse feelings" against my husband or myself.


The X-ray of Judge Dowd's conscience was not attached to the decision and will not be part of the record on appeal that will, for sure, follow.


Whether Judge Dowd has a conscience, whether he, indeed, searched it, what that conscience advised Judge Dowd, was it a proper and lawful advice, and did Judge Dowd follow it will remain forever unreviewable by the Appellate Division.


Judge Dowd claimed that there is nothing new in what we are asserting on our motion to vacate.


Judge Dowd apparently has a difficulty reading or is simply and arrogantly hoping that the Appellate Division where judges are similarly sued to disclose their involvement with the American Inns of Court, will do anything to punish me and block my access to court anyway.  And maybe he is right.


In fact, my friend told me that an attorney she knows keeps telling her exactly that - that I should stop filing lawsuits against judges, that I should stop blogging about judges, then I might have a chance to survive as an attorney...  Otherwise I will never win in any court.


So much for the faith in the integrity of the judicial system.


Judge Dowd stated that all the issues pertaining to Judge Becker's sanctions were already decided by other courts.


I wonder which other courts Judge Dowd means because I am not aware of any courts who decided on the merits the issue whether Judge Becker's sanctions imposed upon us after we sued him, were a product of unconstitutional retaliation. 


Judge Dowd must be dreaming, same as he dreamt about a law school building urinals in his favor in that other proceeding that my husband mentioned in his federal lawsuit.


One must give Judge Dowd credit for one thing, though.  He knows the system well.  He knows that he, most likely, will remain unpunished for his egregious retaliation, because to punish one judge for retaliation will open a can of worms and set a dangerous precedent.


You know why?  Judicial retaliation is pervasive in New York.


To eradicate it you might behead many out of the judicial corps of New York state.  And the system cannot afford such a loss of reputation.


The system would rather bend the law past the breaking point and sacrifice the messengers of such misconduct.


So - if you want to get from under the pile of judicial retaliation, the "unbiased" judges will oblige and will mount some more of the same, claiming all the way that they "searched their conscience" and remain unbiased.


As the last stroke of his "unbiased" opinion Judge Dowd struck Plaintiff's note of issue because they were not ready for trial (for the second time), and allowed them to re-file the trial note of issue without a filing fee - and without a time limit.  


They will be ready when they will be ready - that is the new rule of Judge Dowd's court.  Of course, when you are trying to get post-retirement perks from a certain judge you want to please and when you are trying to prevent Mr. Neroni from vacating his order of disbarment (which would have happened had Judge Dowd dismissed, as he was supposed to, the proceedings for failure to prosecute, based on newly created law, because proceedings are asserting a non-existing cause of action, and are prosecuted by irreconcilably disqualified attorneys) - anything is handy and possible.


After all, who would do anything to a judge...  Judge Ciavarella had to take millions of dollars in kickbacks for the feds to "notice" his wrongdoing and for the courts to finally catch up with him and disbar him, and he still escaped liability for his shenanigans which were "judicial acts" - unlawful sentencing of juveniles in furthering of conspiracy (see the quote from the decision giving Judge Ciavarella immunity placed as a general runner on top of this blog).


Judge Dowd's misconduct in comparison with what Judge Ciavarella did is child's play - he "only" gives favors to a judge who holds the keys to financial perks after Judge Dowd (soon) retires by retaliating against us.


So, the Mokay farce goes on.  With an "unbiased" judge at the wheel.