I've written today about the common misunderstanding by judges of a distinction between civil and criminal contempt that lead to de facto reinstatement of debtors prisons in New York State without any regard of inability of such a debtor to pay...
Do such judges think what they are doing when they are doing it?
Well, they should, and they are equipped both educationally and personnel-wise not to commit such flagrant constitutional violations.
Another commonly misunderstood concept is when a default occur.
I am aware of several judges having no clue, literally, as to when a default may or may not be granted.
By law, a default may happen only when there is proof on record of two things:
(1) that the action is meritorious;
(2) that the party against whom the default judgment is sought has been properly served, with competent evidence of such service on record, and failed to appear in the action within the statutory limit of time.
As far as I saw, judges skip both of these requirements, instead claiming, based only on oral arguments of proposing party/attorney that - if the opposing party did not show up at the hearing, that alone means a default.
One judge even invented a concept of a "frivolous" default, when there was no affidavit of service of the initial pleadings in the record.
Of course, for something to be frivolous, a person has to knowingly do it, and when there is no affidavit of service in the record, there is no proof the allegedly "defaulting" party knew his or her appearance was required by law, or else they would be in default.
Moreover, the rule of frivolous conduct, 22 NYCRR 130, sanctions only for making arguments which have no basis in law or fact or acting with an intent to maliciously harass or injure a party litigant. Not appearing in court proceedings does not fit any of the elements of this definition.
Yet, for some judges, if they say something, true or not, lawful or not, based on a court rule, statute, precedent, Constitutional provision or not - it is THAH LAW.
How many judges say "it is MY courtroom" and "MY rules in MY courtroom".
Some judges even participate in panels where attorneys are invited, for money and Continued Legal Education credit, to learn about the judges' whims in THEIR courtrooms.
When I hear such things I want to pinch myself to restore in myself the sense of reality.
Am I still in the United States of America? Am I still in a country which claims itself to be the beacon of democracy and which is governed by the rule of law?
What is this "MY courtroom" and "MY rules" about?
Shouldn't the judge at least read the applicable law on defaults and review the record before making pronouncements of default, and especially, of frivolous defaults, whatever that means?
Those judges had 13 years of school, 4 years of college, 3 years of law school and at least 10 years of practicing law before they come to the bench.
If 30 years of education and practice do not teach those judges to read, and then to abide by what they have read, what will?
Saturday, May 24, 2014
Your Honor, she blogged about judges!!! Hang her, please, please, please!
I received recently printouts of my blogs made on color printer by a male attorney who was my opponent in litigation in one case.
The printout looked good, so thank you for your effort, Mr. Paul F. Tomkins of Binghamton, New York.
Mr. Tomkins asked the court not to give me adjournments due to my sick leave from April 22, 2014 to May 8, 2014 because of what I did in my blogs in the days PRECEDING April 22, 2014. Mr. Tomkins even presented to the court one blog that was published on a Sunday.
Mr. Tomkins, thus, presumes that both he and the court can control what I do on Sundays, late at night and during my scarce leisure time. Given also that Mr. Tomkins knows that I have a husband, a family and children.
I also somehow believe that Mr. Tomkins would not have dared to complain about me if I were going to a church on a Sunday, even if I was sick. When I express my beliefs through blogging, Mr. Tomkins thinks it's appropriate to complain to the court.
Your Honor! See! She is blogging about judges! Do not give her an adjournment despite her doctor-approved sick leave! Or better yet - hang her, otherwise she may win against me.
The printout looked good, so thank you for your effort, Mr. Paul F. Tomkins of Binghamton, New York.
Mr. Tomkins asked the court not to give me adjournments due to my sick leave from April 22, 2014 to May 8, 2014 because of what I did in my blogs in the days PRECEDING April 22, 2014. Mr. Tomkins even presented to the court one blog that was published on a Sunday.
Mr. Tomkins, thus, presumes that both he and the court can control what I do on Sundays, late at night and during my scarce leisure time. Given also that Mr. Tomkins knows that I have a husband, a family and children.
I also somehow believe that Mr. Tomkins would not have dared to complain about me if I were going to a church on a Sunday, even if I was sick. When I express my beliefs through blogging, Mr. Tomkins thinks it's appropriate to complain to the court.
Your Honor! See! She is blogging about judges! Do not give her an adjournment despite her doctor-approved sick leave! Or better yet - hang her, otherwise she may win against me.
New York Family Courts reinvented debtors prisons for indigent parents, whether they have a present ability to pay arrears in child support or not - what do NYS Chief Judge Lippman and Governor Cuomo have to say about that?
Even though the difference between a civil and a criminal contempt is pretty straightforward, courts, in its zeal to collect child support, continue to conduct civil contempt proceedings as if they are criminal.
The difference is this: does the parent have a present ability to pay.
Of course, the law somehow presumes that the parent does have a present ability to pay and puts upon the parent the burden of proof that he/she does not have such a present ability to pay.
Existence of such a presumption flagrantly flies in the face of economic realities of poverty and unemployment in the State of New York.
Yet, such a presumption is relentlessly adhered to by the courts.
And even then, recently a case was reported to me that a judge was aware that the parent was indigent (well, the judge has even assigned counsel to that parent), that the parent was homeless, and that the parent has neither the job, nor savings, nor assets.
That is enough to prove present inability to pay.
The parent also presented to the judge an affidavit stating that she has no present ability to pay, which the judge refused to accept into evidence.
The judge did not hear testimony of the parent either.
Instead, the Family Court judge gave the homeless indigent parent 10 days to pay approximately 10 thousand dollars in arrears, and put her in jail for 3 months, determinate, when, no surprises here, the parent was unable to pony up such an amount within 10 days.
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is quite easy.
There is a saying that a civil contemnor holds the keys to his or her own jail cell in his or her own pocket.
That means that the civil contemnor does have the money, but does not want to pay the amount ordered to be paid by the court.
The purpose of incarceration in a civil contempt proceeding is to make the parent pay, not to punish him or her for non-payment.
If the civil contemnor/ parent is indigent and does not have the money to pay the arrears, as ordered by the court, incarceration cannot force such a parent to pay. One cannot get blood from a stone.
Thus, by incarcerating indigent parents for a set period of time, the Family Court acts as a criminal court, without any authority to do so, denies such parents all procedural constitutional rights they are entitled to in such criminal proceedings, starting from the right to remain silent and ending with the right to confront witnesses and for a jury trial.
Given that judges in New York State Family Court are elected only after a minimum of 10 years of practice of law, and indigent parents such judges are ordering into jail are poor and usually uneducated or undereducated, I see no way how such incarcerations, while having clear evidence of the parent's present inability to pay, may be considered an honest judicial mistake.
I cannot state the names of a parent who I know suffered such a fate at the hands of a New York state Family Court judge recently, for obvious reasons. I do know the name of both the parent and the judge who did ordered incarceration of an indigent parent, and, according to my research of appellate decisions, such rulings are a common occurrence - and one must bear in mind that in case of an indigent and incarcerated parent appeals are extremely difficult from logistical point of view alone, and that far from all of such cases are appealed.
Even one wrongful incarceration is one too many, and we do not know how many more are out there.
Will Judge Lippman and Governor Cuomo pay attention to this problem or are they too busy to look into the fates of indigent incarcerated parents and to make sure such wrongful incarcerations do not happen?
The difference is this: does the parent have a present ability to pay.
Of course, the law somehow presumes that the parent does have a present ability to pay and puts upon the parent the burden of proof that he/she does not have such a present ability to pay.
Existence of such a presumption flagrantly flies in the face of economic realities of poverty and unemployment in the State of New York.
Yet, such a presumption is relentlessly adhered to by the courts.
And even then, recently a case was reported to me that a judge was aware that the parent was indigent (well, the judge has even assigned counsel to that parent), that the parent was homeless, and that the parent has neither the job, nor savings, nor assets.
That is enough to prove present inability to pay.
The parent also presented to the judge an affidavit stating that she has no present ability to pay, which the judge refused to accept into evidence.
The judge did not hear testimony of the parent either.
Instead, the Family Court judge gave the homeless indigent parent 10 days to pay approximately 10 thousand dollars in arrears, and put her in jail for 3 months, determinate, when, no surprises here, the parent was unable to pony up such an amount within 10 days.
Civil Contempt
|
Criminal Contempt
|
|
Purpose
|
Remedial (at least that is claimed) – to ensure that
child support is paid for the benefit of the child
|
Punitive – to ensure punishment upon a criminal defendant
for violation of the law
|
Who brings the proceeding
|
Parent who has physical custody –
the civil creditor with a personal interest in the outcome
|
The local district attorney – a public prosecutor who has no interest in
the outcome of the proceedings
|
Burden of proof
|
1.
The Petitioner only has to establish three
facts: that there was a valid order of
support in place, that respondent parent did not comply with it and how much
is owed; willfulness is presumed
2.
The burden of proof then shifts to the respondent
parent who must show his or her present inability to pay (where courts
routinely and erroneously “impute” income that the respondent parent should
have been earning instead of analyzing what he or she presently have in order
to be able to pay the arrears)
|
The burden of proof, in both of its aspects, the burden
of production and persuasion, is on the prosecution at all times of criminal
litigation.
|
Procedure
|
1.
The petitioning parent files a petition for
contempt of court before a support magistrate
2.
The support magistrate conducts a hearing,
usually on the first appearance date, without any discovery or motions, as to
whether the three facts: court order of support, non-payment and amount of
arrears is determined
3.
Responding parent has no right to remain silent
4.
New York Family Courts allow appearances of
petitioners by phone from outside of the state of New York
5.
None of the rules on the right are followed in
Family Court
6.
After the magistrate makes a determination of willfulness,
the case proceeds to a Family Court judge for a confirmation hearing
7.
Judges routinely perceive a confirmation hearing
as an appearance without testimony and send parents to jail based on the
results of a discussion between the court, the parents and their counsel, if
any, without any testimony whatsoever
8.
In civil contempt proceedings, the court may
order incarceration up to 6 months or until the parent pays the arrears
|
A criminal contempt of court is a misdemeanor, or, in other words, a
crime in the state of New York.
A person charged with a crime in the state of New York has the following
minimum rights:
1.
A legally sufficient accusatory instrument
brought against him by the local County District Attorney;
2.
An arraignment in the local criminal court;
3.
An advice by the court that the defendant has a
right to remain silent
4.
A right to attorney
5.
A right to discovery in accordance with Criminal
Procedure Law
6.
A right to disclosure regarding the criminal
defendant’s statements that the prosecution is planning to introduce at trial
– a CPL 710.30 notice;
7.
Right to suppress evidence and confessions
obtained in violation of statutory and constitutional law, and respective
motion practice;
8.
The right to a jury trial where the complainant
must testify under oath before the jury, a contempt may not be found on paper
submissions
9.
At trial, criminal defendant has a right to
remain silent, and his silence may not be held against him by the court or
the jury, usually a special jury instruction is given to that effect;
10.
Failure of a witness to personally appear in
court results in dismissal of criminal proceedings
11.
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right
to confront witnesses against him at trial face-to-face, with such witnesses
testifying under oath
12.
The right to a sentencing hearing
|
Disposition
|
·
Probation,
·
Payment by installments;
·
Civil judgment against the respondent parent
which the petitioning parent has a right to enforce as other civil judgments
are enforced;
·
Incarceration for up to 6 months or until the
parent pays up the arrears, whichever is earlier
|
·
Conditional discharge;
·
Probation
·
Incarceration – paying arrears does not let the
convicted person out of jail earlier
|
Status of incarcerated individual
|
Civil
contemnor, not a convicted criminal, no criminal history is created with a
civil finding of contempt of court, no Department of Corrections rules or
regulations must be applicable, the civil contemnor should not be held
together with individuals convicted for crimes in general population – I have
reports that all of that is ignored and civil contemnors are considered in
jails on par with individual convicted for crimes
|
Convicted
criminal
|
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is quite easy.
There is a saying that a civil contemnor holds the keys to his or her own jail cell in his or her own pocket.
That means that the civil contemnor does have the money, but does not want to pay the amount ordered to be paid by the court.
The purpose of incarceration in a civil contempt proceeding is to make the parent pay, not to punish him or her for non-payment.
If the civil contemnor/ parent is indigent and does not have the money to pay the arrears, as ordered by the court, incarceration cannot force such a parent to pay. One cannot get blood from a stone.
Thus, by incarcerating indigent parents for a set period of time, the Family Court acts as a criminal court, without any authority to do so, denies such parents all procedural constitutional rights they are entitled to in such criminal proceedings, starting from the right to remain silent and ending with the right to confront witnesses and for a jury trial.
Given that judges in New York State Family Court are elected only after a minimum of 10 years of practice of law, and indigent parents such judges are ordering into jail are poor and usually uneducated or undereducated, I see no way how such incarcerations, while having clear evidence of the parent's present inability to pay, may be considered an honest judicial mistake.
I cannot state the names of a parent who I know suffered such a fate at the hands of a New York state Family Court judge recently, for obvious reasons. I do know the name of both the parent and the judge who did ordered incarceration of an indigent parent, and, according to my research of appellate decisions, such rulings are a common occurrence - and one must bear in mind that in case of an indigent and incarcerated parent appeals are extremely difficult from logistical point of view alone, and that far from all of such cases are appealed.
Even one wrongful incarceration is one too many, and we do not know how many more are out there.
Will Judge Lippman and Governor Cuomo pay attention to this problem or are they too busy to look into the fates of indigent incarcerated parents and to make sure such wrongful incarcerations do not happen?
Friday, May 23, 2014
On random drug testing for judges and health disclosures by judges. Do you know whether your judge was out of it when he pressed that big red button of your life?
The U.S. Constitution guarantees to everybody within the U.S. jurisdiction due process of law under its 14th Amendment.
That includes impartial adjudication by a competent court.
Being judged by individuals who do not have any physical or mental disabilities that prevent them from doing their job in adjudicating the matter is a due process right of every individual
Yet, under New York Constitution the only governmental body where one can raise such a problem is the New York State Commission of Judicial Conduct.
The New York State Constitution, Article VI paragraph 22 provides that the Commission may require the judge to retire if his mental or physical disability prevents him from performing his judicial duties.
First of all, if the Commission tosses your complaint, which is what it usually does, you do not have a right to even appeal that decision, because your role in the proceedings in the Commission is only of a "complainant", not of a bona fide party with rights (the so-called "standing").
Second, if you complain anywhere about the judge not being "together" on the bench, you need more than that to prove that he has a mental or physical disability.
He sleeps or nods, or is frequently distracted on the bench during the trial?
He talks gibberish on or off record in your presence?
His decisions clearly contradict what is in the record ? That is, by the way, a polite way to say that the judge looks into a document saying A and states in the decision that it states B - and the appellate division happily affirms, and your further opportunities to appeal are virtually non-existent.
My experience with the NYS Commission for Judicial Conduct which, to me, is a glorified taxpayer funded shredder of complaints against the New York State Judiciary is - "we did not find that your complaint has merit, but thank you for telling us".
What if you pass a judge in the hallway and smell a whiff of alcohol on his breath? During business day?
What if you know that the judge "drinks his lunch" on a regular basis?
Do you really believe that you or your attorney can stand up in court and say - your Honor, I believe you are drunk at this time and should not be presiding over my (my client's) proceeding?
Do you know how fast the judge, even if drunk or under the influence of drugs, will be able to pronounced the words "contempt of court" and lock you or your counsel up?
It has been reported in studies that 7 out of every 10 Americans are on at least one prescription medication and 5 out of every 10 are on two prescription medications.
That number may be even higher in the judiciary.
Why?
Common sense.
First, reports abound of overloaded court dockets and overburdened and overstressed judges. Elementary rules of labor hygiene based on human physiology suggests that a human being can concentrate for only a certain period of time a day. In other words, objectively, requiring a judge to concentrate for longer time than a human being is able to concentrate is a disservice both to the judge who can produce sub-standard decisions and to the litigant whose life may be (and often is) irreversibly and adversely changed by such sub-standard decisions.
I have failed to find much research, if at all, as to whether judicial caseloads fits physiological norms and rules of elementary labor hygiene.
In the case of judges I know and the dockets I know they are handling every day, that physiological limit is grossly overtaxed, and I believe, requiring a judge to concentrate and make life-changing decisions during one given day for longer than a human being is physiologically capable to do, is a violation of litigants' due process of law.
Second, the judiciary is an "old" profession.
The usual age of judges in New York, in my own personal experience, is well over 50 and, in fact, usually is over 60 years of age.
Recently, New Yorkers defeated a state constitutional amendment where judges were hoping to raise their mandatory retirement age to 80, claiming they are still fit to handle the existing unreasonable loads well into their ancient years.
Of course they are, if they are judging in name only and if their law interns/ externs/ clerks are handling their cases for them and instead of them, and if judges are needed only to rubber-stamp decisions made by judicial externs who are law students and by law clerks.
Yet, a knee joint can be replaced, and a heart valve can be replaced, but the dimming brain and the energy level withering with years cannot be replaced.
To show off that the judge can still perform his job, the judge can conceal his disability or resort to stimulating drugs to appear pert.
Yet, one cannot cheat nature and one does not have to conduct a study or be a great statistician to know that, with age, old diseases increase and new diseases are added up.
Look at least at the 10 symptoms of Alzheimer's reported by physicians and advocates for early diagnostics and intervention of Alzheimer's.
When you are dealing with a so-called "cranky judge" who makes gross errors of judgment in litigation and who is visually of an age when Alzheimer starts, what are your assurances that you are dealing with a temperament problem and not a symptom of a disease that affected judgment?
What if your judge is on antidepressants and is having hallucinations as one of the reported side effects of such drugs?
What if your judge is simply taking illegal drugs?
What if your judge is sipping alcohol there on the bench or in his chambers, and you will not be able to even sniff it because the judge may stay up on the bench, away from the public and not allow members of the public near him, and his employees will sure cover him up and not report him, in fear for their own jobs.
Unmanageable caseloads combined with advanced years of judicial officers and combined with virtually non-existent control of accountability of the judiciary plus existence of an abundance of hungry lawyers and law students eager to advance their career and work as "replacement judges" in positions of law clerks and judicial "externs" or 'interns", create a system where a judge can work well into the last stages of dementia as long as he keeps a vertical position and does not say anything that would be absolutely insane. Everything else can be covered by law clerks. Trials may be diverted into encouraged mediation and settlements. Other judges may be assigned for trial terms... Thus, the public may never know that a judge had a problem until it is too late to change consequences of such a judge's decisions.
By confession of a federal judge out of Nebraska in his own blog, 9 out of 10 times it is the judge's law clerk who closely reviews your pleadings and not the judge himself, and Judge Kopf even mocked attorneys for pretending they didn't know about it.
You might know about it, but you might also know that such a state of events is not right. In the case of a federal judge, it is not the law clerk who was confirmed by Senate in a public hearing to review and decide cases.
In the case of a judge in New York, it is not the law clerk who was elected by public vote into office to review and render decisions, and it is my firm belief that it is judicial misconduct for judges to delegate "close review" of cases to their law clerks, relegating their own duties to reading summaries of cases prepared for them by their law clerks and signing decisions that their law clerks submit for their signature.
A New York State judge, an elected public official, you are submitting your pleadings for review and decision to that elected public official and not to his unelected law clerk who may be ineligible to make judicial decisions.
Yet, availability of such a law clerk making decisions for a judge who simply signs prevents recognition of the judge's health or substance abuse problems.
No docket congestion can justify this blatant delegation of duties to law clerks.
Yet, because of that delegation of duties you might not be able to prove, without additional information, that your judge has a mental or medical problem and is unable to handle your proceedings.
Are we entitled to such information?
I believe, we are.
But how to get it?
Various employers routinely and randomly drug-test their employees.
Drivers are regularly stopped and checked by law enforcement whether they are under the influence of alcohol or drugs while driving.
Same is with testing of pilots.
Same is with any other profession where public safety is at stake.
A judge presiding over, let's say, a child custody case, may order a parent to be drug-tested and may refuse to give the custody of a minor into the hands of a parent with a severe drug or alcohol problem. In many states and in federal courts, death penalty is still on the books. Wouldn't the public is entitled to know whether judges who preside over proceedings where people are condemned to death are alert enough to understand what they are doing?
A judge accepting a plea bargain must ask the criminal defendant to answer, under oath, whether he is under the influence of drugs or alcohol and whether he is able to understand what he is being offered and what kind of rights he is waiving.
Yet, that same judge may have a drug or alcohol problem of his own, or may have a physical or mental disability, or a complication from a prescription medication, and you are not even entitled to know what is in the judge's bloodstream when he takes away your property, liberty, custody of your child, etc.
How come?
I believe, judges should be randomly tested for drugs and alcohol, and not by their own personnel, but by rotating committees representing members of the community, and corruption and tips to the judges that a random check is coming should be vigorously prosecuted.
I believe, judges should undergo semi-annual checkups and, like jurors, should be subject to disclosure of their medical and mental health conditions and prescription medications.
There should be no privacy given to judges on the issue of substance use and abuse and medical or mental health conditions and medications which may affect focus, perception, attention, temperament or judgment. Such privacy creates a public safety hazard. A candidate running for judicial office, in my opinion, leaves his privacy when he puts up his candidacy for public vote, long before he dons the black robe.
Therefore, I appeal to the legislatures, state and federal, to introduce mandatory disclosure by judicial officers of health conditions, prescription medications and use and abuse of alcohol and drugs, as well as random testing for alcohol and drugs on the bench.
That includes impartial adjudication by a competent court.
Being judged by individuals who do not have any physical or mental disabilities that prevent them from doing their job in adjudicating the matter is a due process right of every individual
Yet, under New York Constitution the only governmental body where one can raise such a problem is the New York State Commission of Judicial Conduct.
The New York State Constitution, Article VI paragraph 22 provides that the Commission may require the judge to retire if his mental or physical disability prevents him from performing his judicial duties.
First of all, if the Commission tosses your complaint, which is what it usually does, you do not have a right to even appeal that decision, because your role in the proceedings in the Commission is only of a "complainant", not of a bona fide party with rights (the so-called "standing").
Second, if you complain anywhere about the judge not being "together" on the bench, you need more than that to prove that he has a mental or physical disability.
He sleeps or nods, or is frequently distracted on the bench during the trial?
He talks gibberish on or off record in your presence?
His decisions clearly contradict what is in the record ? That is, by the way, a polite way to say that the judge looks into a document saying A and states in the decision that it states B - and the appellate division happily affirms, and your further opportunities to appeal are virtually non-existent.
My experience with the NYS Commission for Judicial Conduct which, to me, is a glorified taxpayer funded shredder of complaints against the New York State Judiciary is - "we did not find that your complaint has merit, but thank you for telling us".
What if you pass a judge in the hallway and smell a whiff of alcohol on his breath? During business day?
What if you know that the judge "drinks his lunch" on a regular basis?
Do you really believe that you or your attorney can stand up in court and say - your Honor, I believe you are drunk at this time and should not be presiding over my (my client's) proceeding?
Do you know how fast the judge, even if drunk or under the influence of drugs, will be able to pronounced the words "contempt of court" and lock you or your counsel up?
It has been reported in studies that 7 out of every 10 Americans are on at least one prescription medication and 5 out of every 10 are on two prescription medications.
That number may be even higher in the judiciary.
Why?
Common sense.
First, reports abound of overloaded court dockets and overburdened and overstressed judges. Elementary rules of labor hygiene based on human physiology suggests that a human being can concentrate for only a certain period of time a day. In other words, objectively, requiring a judge to concentrate for longer time than a human being is able to concentrate is a disservice both to the judge who can produce sub-standard decisions and to the litigant whose life may be (and often is) irreversibly and adversely changed by such sub-standard decisions.
I have failed to find much research, if at all, as to whether judicial caseloads fits physiological norms and rules of elementary labor hygiene.
In the case of judges I know and the dockets I know they are handling every day, that physiological limit is grossly overtaxed, and I believe, requiring a judge to concentrate and make life-changing decisions during one given day for longer than a human being is physiologically capable to do, is a violation of litigants' due process of law.
Second, the judiciary is an "old" profession.
The usual age of judges in New York, in my own personal experience, is well over 50 and, in fact, usually is over 60 years of age.
Recently, New Yorkers defeated a state constitutional amendment where judges were hoping to raise their mandatory retirement age to 80, claiming they are still fit to handle the existing unreasonable loads well into their ancient years.
Of course they are, if they are judging in name only and if their law interns/ externs/ clerks are handling their cases for them and instead of them, and if judges are needed only to rubber-stamp decisions made by judicial externs who are law students and by law clerks.
Yet, a knee joint can be replaced, and a heart valve can be replaced, but the dimming brain and the energy level withering with years cannot be replaced.
To show off that the judge can still perform his job, the judge can conceal his disability or resort to stimulating drugs to appear pert.
Yet, one cannot cheat nature and one does not have to conduct a study or be a great statistician to know that, with age, old diseases increase and new diseases are added up.
Look at least at the 10 symptoms of Alzheimer's reported by physicians and advocates for early diagnostics and intervention of Alzheimer's.
When you are dealing with a so-called "cranky judge" who makes gross errors of judgment in litigation and who is visually of an age when Alzheimer starts, what are your assurances that you are dealing with a temperament problem and not a symptom of a disease that affected judgment?
What if your judge is on antidepressants and is having hallucinations as one of the reported side effects of such drugs?
What if your judge is simply taking illegal drugs?
What if your judge is sipping alcohol there on the bench or in his chambers, and you will not be able to even sniff it because the judge may stay up on the bench, away from the public and not allow members of the public near him, and his employees will sure cover him up and not report him, in fear for their own jobs.
Unmanageable caseloads combined with advanced years of judicial officers and combined with virtually non-existent control of accountability of the judiciary plus existence of an abundance of hungry lawyers and law students eager to advance their career and work as "replacement judges" in positions of law clerks and judicial "externs" or 'interns", create a system where a judge can work well into the last stages of dementia as long as he keeps a vertical position and does not say anything that would be absolutely insane. Everything else can be covered by law clerks. Trials may be diverted into encouraged mediation and settlements. Other judges may be assigned for trial terms... Thus, the public may never know that a judge had a problem until it is too late to change consequences of such a judge's decisions.
By confession of a federal judge out of Nebraska in his own blog, 9 out of 10 times it is the judge's law clerk who closely reviews your pleadings and not the judge himself, and Judge Kopf even mocked attorneys for pretending they didn't know about it.
You might know about it, but you might also know that such a state of events is not right. In the case of a federal judge, it is not the law clerk who was confirmed by Senate in a public hearing to review and decide cases.
In the case of a judge in New York, it is not the law clerk who was elected by public vote into office to review and render decisions, and it is my firm belief that it is judicial misconduct for judges to delegate "close review" of cases to their law clerks, relegating their own duties to reading summaries of cases prepared for them by their law clerks and signing decisions that their law clerks submit for their signature.
A New York State judge, an elected public official, you are submitting your pleadings for review and decision to that elected public official and not to his unelected law clerk who may be ineligible to make judicial decisions.
Yet, availability of such a law clerk making decisions for a judge who simply signs prevents recognition of the judge's health or substance abuse problems.
No docket congestion can justify this blatant delegation of duties to law clerks.
Yet, because of that delegation of duties you might not be able to prove, without additional information, that your judge has a mental or medical problem and is unable to handle your proceedings.
Are we entitled to such information?
I believe, we are.
But how to get it?
Various employers routinely and randomly drug-test their employees.
Drivers are regularly stopped and checked by law enforcement whether they are under the influence of alcohol or drugs while driving.
Same is with testing of pilots.
Same is with any other profession where public safety is at stake.
A judge presiding over, let's say, a child custody case, may order a parent to be drug-tested and may refuse to give the custody of a minor into the hands of a parent with a severe drug or alcohol problem. In many states and in federal courts, death penalty is still on the books. Wouldn't the public is entitled to know whether judges who preside over proceedings where people are condemned to death are alert enough to understand what they are doing?
A judge accepting a plea bargain must ask the criminal defendant to answer, under oath, whether he is under the influence of drugs or alcohol and whether he is able to understand what he is being offered and what kind of rights he is waiving.
Yet, that same judge may have a drug or alcohol problem of his own, or may have a physical or mental disability, or a complication from a prescription medication, and you are not even entitled to know what is in the judge's bloodstream when he takes away your property, liberty, custody of your child, etc.
How come?
I believe, judges should be randomly tested for drugs and alcohol, and not by their own personnel, but by rotating committees representing members of the community, and corruption and tips to the judges that a random check is coming should be vigorously prosecuted.
I believe, judges should undergo semi-annual checkups and, like jurors, should be subject to disclosure of their medical and mental health conditions and prescription medications.
There should be no privacy given to judges on the issue of substance use and abuse and medical or mental health conditions and medications which may affect focus, perception, attention, temperament or judgment. Such privacy creates a public safety hazard. A candidate running for judicial office, in my opinion, leaves his privacy when he puts up his candidacy for public vote, long before he dons the black robe.
Therefore, I appeal to the legislatures, state and federal, to introduce mandatory disclosure by judicial officers of health conditions, prescription medications and use and abuse of alcohol and drugs, as well as random testing for alcohol and drugs on the bench.
Tuesday, May 20, 2014
Trick questions about free legal representation for the high and mighty of the State of New York engaged in constitutional violations
Should taxpayers pay for legal representation of public officials when they are sued for violations of their constitutional oath of office?
Sounds like a dumb question, doesn't it?
Yet, it's the trick question # 1, and the current "correct" answer is - "yes, of course". They should and they do, through their collective noses.
New York State Attorney General, as I wrote earlier in this blog, does represent public officials sued for violation of their constitutional oath of office, represents them against taxpayers, and claims he is doing it under New York Public Officers Law 17.
The way NYS AG and the court which allow such representation read the statute presupposes that constitutional violations by public officials are within their official duties. It cannot be, because it is also a violation of their oath of office, but NYS AG's legal fiction so far prevailed.
Thus, where 80% to 86% of New Yorkers cannot afford legal representation in court, they are still mandated to pay for legal representation of the unworthy public servants that they saddled themselves with which public servants violated their oath of service.
Does it make any sense where the poor cannot pay for their own legal services, but have to pay for the legal services of the wealthy? That's the trick question # 2.
Yet, I have yet another, now, third trick question.
What if a public official is sued in his official capacity and in his individual capacity or in his capacity as a private individual?
Well, even then NYS AG's office invents ways to represent individuals who are, let's say, well-connected. And the answer to this trick question # 3 is below.
Look at Ellen Coccoma and Michael Coccoma.
When my husband sued them, in a pro se federal action, he sued Ellen Coccoma as (1) former member of the attorney disciplinary committee and (2) as a private attorney who obtained an illegal order of deposition in a civil action.
As a disciplinary attorney under NYS AG theory that a public official can be represented at taxpayers' expense, such representation has the questionable legitimacy of being around for a long time, whether such use is constitutional or not.
Yet, no theory, not even Public Officers Law 17, supports representation by NYS AG, for free, of the wife of the Chief Administrative Judge of Upstate New York sued as a private attorney who represented paying clients in a private action.
But, apparently, Ellen Coccoma does not want to pay for legal representation, and her insurance carrier refused to cover her legal fees.
And - Ellen Coccoma and her husband Judge Michael V. Coccoma - considered it ethical and proper to accept from the NYS AG a gift of free legal representation at taxpayers' expense.
And, of course, the disciplinary committee found no fault with such an obvious misappropriation of publicly funded legal services.
By the way, NYS State Comptroler DiNapoli has been notified, but is in no hurry to take action on to make Ellen Coccoma disgorge to the state of New York the cost of her legal representation as a private party by the New York State Attorney General...
Do we have a rule of law and equality under the law in New York? That's the trick question No. 4. I don't recommend you to ask your judge about it when he denies you assigned counsel because you are "not eligible". Remember, attorney Ellen Coccoma, wife of a judge, with a combined family income of at least $200,000.00 a year, is eligible for free legal representation by an army of lawyers in New York State Attorney's Office at your expense...
But who is she and who are you...
Sounds like a dumb question, doesn't it?
Yet, it's the trick question # 1, and the current "correct" answer is - "yes, of course". They should and they do, through their collective noses.
New York State Attorney General, as I wrote earlier in this blog, does represent public officials sued for violation of their constitutional oath of office, represents them against taxpayers, and claims he is doing it under New York Public Officers Law 17.
The way NYS AG and the court which allow such representation read the statute presupposes that constitutional violations by public officials are within their official duties. It cannot be, because it is also a violation of their oath of office, but NYS AG's legal fiction so far prevailed.
Thus, where 80% to 86% of New Yorkers cannot afford legal representation in court, they are still mandated to pay for legal representation of the unworthy public servants that they saddled themselves with which public servants violated their oath of service.
Does it make any sense where the poor cannot pay for their own legal services, but have to pay for the legal services of the wealthy? That's the trick question # 2.
Yet, I have yet another, now, third trick question.
What if a public official is sued in his official capacity and in his individual capacity or in his capacity as a private individual?
Well, even then NYS AG's office invents ways to represent individuals who are, let's say, well-connected. And the answer to this trick question # 3 is below.
Look at Ellen Coccoma and Michael Coccoma.
When my husband sued them, in a pro se federal action, he sued Ellen Coccoma as (1) former member of the attorney disciplinary committee and (2) as a private attorney who obtained an illegal order of deposition in a civil action.
As a disciplinary attorney under NYS AG theory that a public official can be represented at taxpayers' expense, such representation has the questionable legitimacy of being around for a long time, whether such use is constitutional or not.
Yet, no theory, not even Public Officers Law 17, supports representation by NYS AG, for free, of the wife of the Chief Administrative Judge of Upstate New York sued as a private attorney who represented paying clients in a private action.
But, apparently, Ellen Coccoma does not want to pay for legal representation, and her insurance carrier refused to cover her legal fees.
And - Ellen Coccoma and her husband Judge Michael V. Coccoma - considered it ethical and proper to accept from the NYS AG a gift of free legal representation at taxpayers' expense.
And, of course, the disciplinary committee found no fault with such an obvious misappropriation of publicly funded legal services.
By the way, NYS State Comptroler DiNapoli has been notified, but is in no hurry to take action on to make Ellen Coccoma disgorge to the state of New York the cost of her legal representation as a private party by the New York State Attorney General...
Do we have a rule of law and equality under the law in New York? That's the trick question No. 4. I don't recommend you to ask your judge about it when he denies you assigned counsel because you are "not eligible". Remember, attorney Ellen Coccoma, wife of a judge, with a combined family income of at least $200,000.00 a year, is eligible for free legal representation by an army of lawyers in New York State Attorney's Office at your expense...
But who is she and who are you...
What is attorney misconduct in Indiana is business as usual in New York
An Indiana attorney had to resign from the practice of law recently for adding an additional fee requirement to a criminal plea deal. The attorney added $750.00 to his initial $1000.00 fee agreement.
Please, remember these numbers.
In New York, Delaware County, the District Attorney Richard Northrup and a criminal defense attorney, at that time the Vice-Chair of the New York Commission for Judicial Conduct, Stephen R. Coffey, have reached a plea deal under which the legally blind defendant was supposed to indemnify the District Attorney and all county officials, state police and federal actors of all civil claims pertaining to their potential liability for the seizure of his property. It is interesting to mention that Mr. Coffey's co-member on the Judicial Conduct Commission was Karen Peters, the current Chief Justice of Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department who, together with Stephen R. Coffey, dismissed my complaints against Judge Becker and against Karen Peters' court - I guess, no such thing as a recusal for conflict of interest exists in that Commission, and Mr. Coffey's and Justice Peters' own conscience did not mandate such a recusal.
And attorney Stephen R. Coffey had his legally blind client tell the court twice, under oath, at the plea allocution, that he was driving the truck Not only he couldn't do that because he was legally blind, but he didn't actually do that because another person was stopped and convicted for speeding on that same occasion, which was in the record. Judge Becker accepted that allocution, having in front of him the record where the defendant's girlfriend was convicted for driving that same truck on that same occasion.
Attorney Coffey who worked the total of about 3 months on the case, did no discovery, no motions and made an appearance to strike this infamous plea deal, was in a hurry to collect his fee from the bail money, $18,500.00 if he brings litigation to a conclusion. Which is what he was trying to do, fast.
Mr. Carbone was threatened that if he does not abide by all terms of the agreement, including, obviously, the indemnity term, he will be resentenced to the maximum for an A-II drug felony.
It is clear from the signature of Mr. Carbone on the plea agreement that he does not see what he signs. There is no indication in the record that it was read to Mr. Carbone. There is indication in the record that, on the contrary, nobody read the plea agreement to him before he signed it.
It is also clear that, since Judge Becker, according to County Law 400, is a "county officer", he is "so-ordering" the indemnification for himself, too, and judicial immunity does not extend to extrajudicial seizures of property.
The fact that Mr. Carbone was legally blind and signed across the signature line, which means he did not see what he was signing, did not seem to bother the presiding Judge Carl F. Becker.
Not that it bothered the Appellate Division which affirmed the appeal without mentioning these interesting facts.
The judge, Delaware County Judge Carl F. Becker "so-ordered" the "indemnification" plea deal.
The Appellate Division 3rd Department affirmed without reviewing or resolving these issues.
It was obviously inappropriate for a prosecutor to agree to trade criminal plea bargains for his own personal indemnity from civil liability and liability of county, state and federal officials who participated in investigation and seizure of a defendant's property, especially when the defendant is legally blind and especially when nobody, including the judge, has read to him that particular condition.
It was apparent that the criminal defense attorney who was at that time toiling on the case for about three months, was too eager to collect his fee at the conclusion of litigation. When that attorney was replaced before sentencing, he started to send out letters threatening criminal prosecution if anybody would touch "his" bail money.
A 5-year litigation ensued over the bail money, with three appeals so far.
In 2010 the appellate court ordered the Delaware County Treasurer to pay the bail money in the amount of $18,500.00 to the defendant.
Delaware County Treasurer did not appeal to the court of Appeals, but she and her attorney Richard Spinney refused to abide by the court order. Richard Spinney was never disciplined for that refusal.
A contempt of court motion was filed against it.
For some mysterious and undisclosed reasons the presiding judge on that case was "reassigned", and Judge Becker assigned himself to help out his former client of 27 years the Delaware County and his friends Richard Spinney and Beverly Shields who worked there.
During the motion hearing it was revealed by the then Delaware County Attorney Richard Spinney that he has talked on the phone or came to see Judge Becker on the issue of bail money. I have the transcript of this confession. The Appellate Division has the transcript of this confession.
Here is the front page of the transcript and the portion where attorney Spinney confesses to the fact that he called Judge Becker or came over to discuss the issue of bail with him (and who knows what else and in what way the old buddies discussed that issue).
The Appellate Division acted as if the transcript does not exist.
Even before Mr. Spinney's confession, I asked the judge to step down because of his above described actions in federal court, his obvious bias against the Defendant demonstrated in Judge Becker's claim that the Defendant was not as blind as he presented it to be because he could navigate the courtroom, and because Judge Becker represented Delaware County for 27 years before coming to the bench and was friends with the County Attorney.
Judge Becker did not recuse from the case after I asked him to do that.
Judge Becker did not recuse from the case after the County Attorney disclosed the ex parte communication on the record.
Judge Becker instead sanctioned me for raising the issues of his and other participants' misconduct, as described above, and for "threatening the court".
"Threatening the court" sounds like an act of terrorism, like I threatened the court to punch the court in the nose. Did I? Of course, not.
All I did was forewarn Judge Becker that I consider him a witness in the case and intend to call him as a witness to testify at the trial. That was how I "threatened the court".
Was judge Becker a witness? Of course, he was. He talked to the Petitioner's attorney ex parte on the material issue of litigation before he released bail in such an "unusual" decision that the Treasurer mentioned that in the affidavit in the civil court that litigated who the bail money belonged to. Event though the law clearly said that bail money must return to the person whose name was on the bail receipt, Judge Becker refused to do his duty and instead asked the Treasurer to "determine" who the bail goes to. The appellate court later reversed that shenanigan on the law.
The Treasurer, instead of determining who the bail money belongs to, instead filed an interpleader action.
Delaware County was thrown into 5 years of litigation which still continues, because since the fall of 2010 when the summary judgment awarding bail money to Mr. Coffey's law firm was reversed and remanded, Judge Becker and the subsequently assigned judge did not strike a finger to move the case on the calendar.
Mr. Coffey threatened to prosecute anybody who touches defendant's bail money that defendant was entitled to but never received it until today because Mr. Carbone did not release the money despite a court order telling him to return the bail money back to Delaware County Treasurer since October 2012. Mr. Carbone started threatening my husband and the criminal defendant with a prosecution for grand larceny, no less, if they attempt to touch the money.
Was he disciplined for committing the "no-no" of any attorney, specifically, for threatening criminal prosecution in a civil fee dispute situation, while Mr. Coffey's entitlement to the bail money is not resolved in 2014 while he threatened criminal prosecution if anybody attempts to touch the bail money in 2009? Of course, he wasn't.
Was Mr. Northrup the prosecutor disciplined? Of course, he wasn't.
Was Judge Becker disciplined? Of course, he wasn't.
Was Attorney Spinney disciplined for his ex parte communication with Judge Becker? Of course, he wasn't, instead the Appellate Division pretended that the transcript where the confession about the ex parte communication was made does not exist and affirmed the sanctions against me.
After the sanctions were affirmed, Judge Becker sent to my home an election campaign flyer where Treasurer Shields de facto admitted to being Judge Becker close friend.
Was Judge Becker disciplined after that? Of course, he wasn't.
How can one mar reputation of such honorable people? Even if they marred it themselves?
It is better to kill the messenger.
So, Judge Becker sanctioned me for reporting this mess and raising it as an appearance of impropriety in my request for Judge Becker to step down from the case, the Appellate Division affirmed while ignoring the transcript in front of the court which clearly showed that Judge Becker, through his ex parte communication with petitioner's attorney and his friend before the litigation even started, on the material issue of litigation, did make Judge Becker a witness in the proceeding.
Then, Judge Becker turned me into the grievance committee and is trying to get me disbarred based on his sanction. To add insult to injury, this was one of three sanctions imposed upon me by Judge Becker within 45 days from the date when I sued Judge Becker in state court for in and out-of-court misconduct.
Is there a rule of law in the State of New York?
Do you honestly believe that Mr. Northrup, Mr. Spinney, Mr. Coffey and Judge Becker are NOT above the law and I am not below the law in the eyes of New York State courts?
Do you honestly believe justice is possible if you are right and some high-and-mighty person is wrong and you are stating that in court to his face?
By the way, the first attorney who raised the issue of corruption of Judge Becker on the criminal appeal of the legally blind defendant, was first threatened by the prosecution that he is "burning the bridges" by raising the issue of Judge Becker's corruption and then, "coincidentally", disbarred before his appeal was heard... He was at that time and is now, also "coincidentally", my husband.
And finally, do you honestly believe that SUCH attorney regulation is protecting you, the reader, as a member of the public?
You be the judge.
Please, remember these numbers.
In New York, Delaware County, the District Attorney Richard Northrup and a criminal defense attorney, at that time the Vice-Chair of the New York Commission for Judicial Conduct, Stephen R. Coffey, have reached a plea deal under which the legally blind defendant was supposed to indemnify the District Attorney and all county officials, state police and federal actors of all civil claims pertaining to their potential liability for the seizure of his property. It is interesting to mention that Mr. Coffey's co-member on the Judicial Conduct Commission was Karen Peters, the current Chief Justice of Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department who, together with Stephen R. Coffey, dismissed my complaints against Judge Becker and against Karen Peters' court - I guess, no such thing as a recusal for conflict of interest exists in that Commission, and Mr. Coffey's and Justice Peters' own conscience did not mandate such a recusal.
And attorney Stephen R. Coffey had his legally blind client tell the court twice, under oath, at the plea allocution, that he was driving the truck Not only he couldn't do that because he was legally blind, but he didn't actually do that because another person was stopped and convicted for speeding on that same occasion, which was in the record. Judge Becker accepted that allocution, having in front of him the record where the defendant's girlfriend was convicted for driving that same truck on that same occasion.
Attorney Coffey who worked the total of about 3 months on the case, did no discovery, no motions and made an appearance to strike this infamous plea deal, was in a hurry to collect his fee from the bail money, $18,500.00 if he brings litigation to a conclusion. Which is what he was trying to do, fast.
Mr. Carbone was threatened that if he does not abide by all terms of the agreement, including, obviously, the indemnity term, he will be resentenced to the maximum for an A-II drug felony.
It is clear from the signature of Mr. Carbone on the plea agreement that he does not see what he signs. There is no indication in the record that it was read to Mr. Carbone. There is indication in the record that, on the contrary, nobody read the plea agreement to him before he signed it.
It is also clear that, since Judge Becker, according to County Law 400, is a "county officer", he is "so-ordering" the indemnification for himself, too, and judicial immunity does not extend to extrajudicial seizures of property.
The fact that Mr. Carbone was legally blind and signed across the signature line, which means he did not see what he was signing, did not seem to bother the presiding Judge Carl F. Becker.
Not that it bothered the Appellate Division which affirmed the appeal without mentioning these interesting facts.
The judge, Delaware County Judge Carl F. Becker "so-ordered" the "indemnification" plea deal.
The Appellate Division 3rd Department affirmed without reviewing or resolving these issues.
It was obviously inappropriate for a prosecutor to agree to trade criminal plea bargains for his own personal indemnity from civil liability and liability of county, state and federal officials who participated in investigation and seizure of a defendant's property, especially when the defendant is legally blind and especially when nobody, including the judge, has read to him that particular condition.
It was apparent that the criminal defense attorney who was at that time toiling on the case for about three months, was too eager to collect his fee at the conclusion of litigation. When that attorney was replaced before sentencing, he started to send out letters threatening criminal prosecution if anybody would touch "his" bail money.
A 5-year litigation ensued over the bail money, with three appeals so far.
In 2010 the appellate court ordered the Delaware County Treasurer to pay the bail money in the amount of $18,500.00 to the defendant.
Delaware County Treasurer did not appeal to the court of Appeals, but she and her attorney Richard Spinney refused to abide by the court order. Richard Spinney was never disciplined for that refusal.
A contempt of court motion was filed against it.
For some mysterious and undisclosed reasons the presiding judge on that case was "reassigned", and Judge Becker assigned himself to help out his former client of 27 years the Delaware County and his friends Richard Spinney and Beverly Shields who worked there.
During the motion hearing it was revealed by the then Delaware County Attorney Richard Spinney that he has talked on the phone or came to see Judge Becker on the issue of bail money. I have the transcript of this confession. The Appellate Division has the transcript of this confession.
Here is the front page of the transcript and the portion where attorney Spinney confesses to the fact that he called Judge Becker or came over to discuss the issue of bail with him (and who knows what else and in what way the old buddies discussed that issue).
The Appellate Division acted as if the transcript does not exist.
Even before Mr. Spinney's confession, I asked the judge to step down because of his above described actions in federal court, his obvious bias against the Defendant demonstrated in Judge Becker's claim that the Defendant was not as blind as he presented it to be because he could navigate the courtroom, and because Judge Becker represented Delaware County for 27 years before coming to the bench and was friends with the County Attorney.
Judge Becker did not recuse from the case after I asked him to do that.
Judge Becker did not recuse from the case after the County Attorney disclosed the ex parte communication on the record.
Judge Becker instead sanctioned me for raising the issues of his and other participants' misconduct, as described above, and for "threatening the court".
"Threatening the court" sounds like an act of terrorism, like I threatened the court to punch the court in the nose. Did I? Of course, not.
All I did was forewarn Judge Becker that I consider him a witness in the case and intend to call him as a witness to testify at the trial. That was how I "threatened the court".
Was judge Becker a witness? Of course, he was. He talked to the Petitioner's attorney ex parte on the material issue of litigation before he released bail in such an "unusual" decision that the Treasurer mentioned that in the affidavit in the civil court that litigated who the bail money belonged to. Event though the law clearly said that bail money must return to the person whose name was on the bail receipt, Judge Becker refused to do his duty and instead asked the Treasurer to "determine" who the bail goes to. The appellate court later reversed that shenanigan on the law.
The Treasurer, instead of determining who the bail money belongs to, instead filed an interpleader action.
Delaware County was thrown into 5 years of litigation which still continues, because since the fall of 2010 when the summary judgment awarding bail money to Mr. Coffey's law firm was reversed and remanded, Judge Becker and the subsequently assigned judge did not strike a finger to move the case on the calendar.
Mr. Coffey threatened to prosecute anybody who touches defendant's bail money that defendant was entitled to but never received it until today because Mr. Carbone did not release the money despite a court order telling him to return the bail money back to Delaware County Treasurer since October 2012. Mr. Carbone started threatening my husband and the criminal defendant with a prosecution for grand larceny, no less, if they attempt to touch the money.
Was he disciplined for committing the "no-no" of any attorney, specifically, for threatening criminal prosecution in a civil fee dispute situation, while Mr. Coffey's entitlement to the bail money is not resolved in 2014 while he threatened criminal prosecution if anybody attempts to touch the bail money in 2009? Of course, he wasn't.
Was Mr. Northrup the prosecutor disciplined? Of course, he wasn't.
Was Judge Becker disciplined? Of course, he wasn't.
Was Attorney Spinney disciplined for his ex parte communication with Judge Becker? Of course, he wasn't, instead the Appellate Division pretended that the transcript where the confession about the ex parte communication was made does not exist and affirmed the sanctions against me.
After the sanctions were affirmed, Judge Becker sent to my home an election campaign flyer where Treasurer Shields de facto admitted to being Judge Becker close friend.
Was Judge Becker disciplined after that? Of course, he wasn't.
How can one mar reputation of such honorable people? Even if they marred it themselves?
It is better to kill the messenger.
So, Judge Becker sanctioned me for reporting this mess and raising it as an appearance of impropriety in my request for Judge Becker to step down from the case, the Appellate Division affirmed while ignoring the transcript in front of the court which clearly showed that Judge Becker, through his ex parte communication with petitioner's attorney and his friend before the litigation even started, on the material issue of litigation, did make Judge Becker a witness in the proceeding.
Then, Judge Becker turned me into the grievance committee and is trying to get me disbarred based on his sanction. To add insult to injury, this was one of three sanctions imposed upon me by Judge Becker within 45 days from the date when I sued Judge Becker in state court for in and out-of-court misconduct.
Is there a rule of law in the State of New York?
Do you honestly believe that Mr. Northrup, Mr. Spinney, Mr. Coffey and Judge Becker are NOT above the law and I am not below the law in the eyes of New York State courts?
Do you honestly believe justice is possible if you are right and some high-and-mighty person is wrong and you are stating that in court to his face?
By the way, the first attorney who raised the issue of corruption of Judge Becker on the criminal appeal of the legally blind defendant, was first threatened by the prosecution that he is "burning the bridges" by raising the issue of Judge Becker's corruption and then, "coincidentally", disbarred before his appeal was heard... He was at that time and is now, also "coincidentally", my husband.
And finally, do you honestly believe that SUCH attorney regulation is protecting you, the reader, as a member of the public?
You be the judge.
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