If the NYS Commission of Judicial Conduct has no jurisdiction to discipline a former judge discharging judicial functions, then who does?

I received an instant response to my complaint about Referee Sirkin who refused to provide to me a court-ordered hearing and instead "granted the motion" to the prosecution.

To preside over a fact-finding hearing and make findings of fact (that is what Referee Sirkin appointed by the court to do) is a clearly judicial function - that is what judges to in bench trials, make findings of facts.

Referee Sirkin (without authority) "granted a motion" and thus "resolved" the liability stage of my disciplinary proceeding - that is a clearly judicial function, even though Referee Sirkin is only a "former judge".

If a former judge is appointed by a court  as a referee in a court proceeding to discharge at least SOME judicial functions (preside over a fact-finding hearing and report as to his findings of fact, for further confirmation of the appellate court that appointed him), shouldn't then that former judge be amenable to discipline?

Here is what the New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct answered to my complaint - answered instantly, I must note:

The letter is marked "confidential", but, if the Commission does not have jurisdiction to discipline Referee Sirkin, then there is no confidentiality.  Moreover, non-amenability of individuals who discharge a portion of a court's judicial functions to judicial discipline is a major issue of public concern requiring amendment of the legislation pertaining to judicial discipline.

Which brings me to the subject I raised early on in my blog - there exist in New York also "secret" judges, the so-called "judicial hearing officers" whose names are not openly declared on court's websites, but who discharge FULL FUNCTIONS OF JUDGES.

A federal court recently tossed my challenge to the fact that courts conceal names of these judges, thus allowing the law firms where such hearing officers who are at the same time practicing attorneys, are partners, to continue to practice in courts where judicial hearing officers are appointed, creating conflicts of interest that opposing counsel and parties may not even know about, while such behavior constitutes judicial misconduct.

It has been established that it is judicial misconduct for a judge to allow his partners to practice in the judge's court.

By the way, a long-time member of the current Attorney Disciplinary Committee Alan J. Pope was involved in practicing in Binghamton City Court where his partner Judge Murphy was a part-time judge of that court.  

The part-time judge was disciplined for that, even though it can hardly be called discipline for the judge to simply serve out his term and not seek judicial officer after that.

Alan Pope or his partners were not disciplined as attorneys because - surprise! - how could one discipline oneself when Alan J. Pope is a member of the very disciplinary committee that is supposed to discipline him and his partners?

  
There is a fine example as to how disciplinary attorneys consider the committee their own fiefdom when it turns to complaint against themselves.  Instead of recusing from investigation and prosecution of THEMSELVES, they fight and dismiss complaints against themselves claiming that the complainants should not complain to the disciplinary Committee as a state body officially authorized to accept such complaints, but should speak to their "litigation attorneys" only.

 By the way, Alan J. Pope is right there on the letterhead on the left as a member of the Committee when the letter was written - and all letters attorneys for the Committee write are written on behalf of the Committee and on behalf of each one of its members.  It's official business.

So, Peter Torncello, on behalf of Alan J. Pope, an attorney prosecutable for attorney misconduct to which no statute of limitation apply, but who does not prosecute himself, writes a letter to me and advises me that I need to address Peter Torncello's litigation counsel, while my complaint against ALL attorneys and attorney members of the Committee (for filing and prosecuting false charges against me) must be instead sent to Peter Torncello's litigation counsel.

Nice job, isn't it?  To be able to deflect official complaints sent against you without recusal?

Peter Torncello resigned soon after writing the above letter, together with two other attorneys for the Committee, Steven Zayas and Elizabeth Devane, allegedly "amid investigation pertaining to filing false timesheets".

Peter Torncello was never suspended or disbarred for either filing false charges against me, or for filing false time-sheets which, if it was confirmed, constituted a crime or several crimes.

Which begs the question as to why people are appointed to these disciplinary committees - apparently it is not only to quash competition and eliminate critics of judicial misconduct, but also to guard the door from discipline against yourself and your law firm, partners buddies and attorney clients.

By the way, I was told time and again by the Committees and the courts that there is no statute of limitations for attorney disciplinary prosecutions.  If that is true, why wouldn't the Attorney Professional Conduct Committee of the Appellate Division 3rd Department prosecute Alan J. Pope and his partners for misconduct in connection of events that resulted in discipline of Alan J. Pope's partner Judge Robert Murphy?

Below are charges against Judge Murphy, Alan J. Pope's partner, and Judge Murphy's stipulation not to seek judicial office once his judicial term expired in 2008 because of the stated misconduct.
 

Yet, attorney Robert Murphy was never disciplined for engaging in conduct prejudicial for administration of justice which attorney Murphy admitted to the Judicial Conduct Commission, and I wonder why.

This is what happens when at least it is known by the public that a certain individual is a judge.

With secret judges, it is not even known - and the federal court recently told me that I, as a member of the public, do not even have a right to know.

A lawsuit to simply declare that actions of the court administration not to publish names of judicial hearing officers as part of the list of judges on the court's websites is a violation of a litigant's civil rights was recently dismissed by a federal court.  Apparently, the court found no right of the public to know of all the names of judicial hearing officers to know potential conflicts of interest where law partners of such judicial hearing officers would appear in court.

Here is also an interesting excerpt from yet another order of a federal court stating how much judicial immunity covers.  The name of the case is Neroni v. Peebles:

 Moreover, so many people other than judges were also granted absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts by federal courts that one scholar wrote a law article called "The Black Robe is not a Big Tent".

So - there is an absolute judicial immunity not only for money damages, but even as to your right to declare that the judge violated your constitutional rights.  

So, you cannot sue the judge in civil court.

Yet, you can turn the judge in for criminal prosecution or for discipline in the Commission for Judicial Conduct and hope that discipline will be available.

Now that the Commission indicated that it does not have jurisdiction over "former judges", even if they are acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, the only recourse for me now to obtain any kind of justice against Referee Sirkin is to turn him into criminal prosecution?

But, it can be interpreted as a separate act of attorney misconduct as trying to get an advantage in a civil litigation by the use of criminal prosecution.

So - it appears that NO recourse is available for me as a citizen whose constitutional rights were obviously violated by a "former judge".

An injury without a remedy - in a country that boasts that it is based on the "rule of law"?

A lot of good things start with a bad thing

I am positive it will be a bestseller.

Persecution of attorneys in retaliation of criticism of the judiciary, as well as unbridled judicial misconduct and corruption are hot topics in the country at this time.  

Not everything will be reflected in the records of disciplinary proceedings that are supposed to be released once my license is pulled, but I am sure will never be released, no matter what the law says (my husband has been disbarred 3.5 years ago, and we had to sue to get him access to these allegedly "public records", his own disciplinary file).
 
Media can contact me with offers for rights to my story for books and movies based at tatiana.neroni@gmail.com.

I am getting a lot of feedback to the posts about the actions of my disciplinary Referee Steven R. Sirkin who was appointed by the New York State Appellate Division 4th Judicial Department for a specific purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing on liability in my discipinary case, but instead flaunted that court order to the winds and refused to conduct that hearing.

What is amazing that people of different backgrounds, educations and walks of life who personally commented to me on the recording that I made of my conversation with Referee Sirkin picked up one and the same thing:  how calm Referee Sirkin's voice was when he was announcing to me that he is not going to comply with the court order and that he refuses to hold the hearing that he was ordered by the court to conduct.

I also content to note that people are outraged not only for my sake, but for their own, too.

People who contacted me with the feedback, asked me a question - if the judicial system is so callous that a judicial hearing officer, a referee can arrogantly tell me that (1) he knows that he was appointed to conduct a hearing and report factual findings from the hearing, but (2) that he is not going to conduct a hearing and instead decided against me without a hearing, while he had no authority to decide anything at all, so in other words the referee refused to do what he was ordered by the court to do and instead did what he had no authority to do and if I am practically without recourse on this - what recourse against similar judicial misconduct do majority of people dealing with the judicial system (state or federal) have who are not trained as lawyers, as I am, and who do not have resources to fight the system through motions and appellate process?

And, people also told me that the tone of Referee Sirkin's voice upset them more than anything else - and the tone of a judge's voice does not get recorded into the transcript.

Yet, it is the tone of the judge's voice - arrogant, disrespectful, sure that I cannot do anything about his adamant refusal to obey the law - that showed people how far did the judicial system come with the lack of accountability and transparent and effective judicial discipline.

And, people who contacted me did tell me that they now want to do something about it, in terms of pressuring their representatives for a legislative action, in terms of organizing the public to amend the state Constitution, if necessary - to put an end to the situation where the rule of law came to be non-existent, and is squashed by the very people who are sworn to uphold that law.

People also raised the 100-million-dollar question.  If the recording shows so much of aspects of the proceedings that a transcript does not, why should the court system pay for an army of stenographers instead of install a proper video equipment and allow video recording of proceedings by citizens in the courtroom? 

That question is quite reasonable.  With the advancement of technology, now that video recorders have become so cheap, I personally see no reason whatsoever why the court system should be clutching to the outdated and obsolete mode of court reporting through stenographers who may not even be capturing the words right when the whole proceedings can simply be videorecorded.

It will save a lot of money and a lot of paper.  Instead of  paying court reporters 4 dollars per page of transcripts of hearings - which is exactly what prevents people from appealing their cases - all people can ask for is to put the video on their own thumb drive that can cost them 20 bucks.

Then, in the Appellant's brief, people will be referring not to page and line of the transcript, but to the minute and second in the video. 

Yet, a big business of court reporting will then be eliminated and a lot of people will be laid off.

I foresee that what I am suggesting will cause a lot of outrage from court reporters, but we have to move with the times and people have a right to demand for the recording in court proceedings the mode of recording that truly reflects what is happening in those court proceedings.

Then, it would be a lot easier to spot and prove judicial bias and misconduct, by the tones of voice, facial demeanor and body language of the judge or judicial hearing officer presiding over the proceedings.

So - I suggest that the first order of things is to push the New York State Legislature to introduce a legislation (1) repealing New York Civil Rights Law 52 making it a crime of misdemeanor to videotape court proceedings; and (2) introducing a statute mandating courts in the state of New York to videotape court proceedings and provide files to people for the cost of transferring the files to people's own digital carriers or for no cost and to allow the use of such files as official records in appellate proceedings.

Sunlight is not only the best disinfectant, but replacing court reporting by stenographers with videotaping will save the State of New York taxpayers a lot of money and will provide better access to justice to litigants.

The difference between having a transcript and a video file of the proceedings will also make a difference for many people between having and not having and opportunity to appeal their cases.

I am also sure that if mandatory videotaping of court proceedings is introduced, judicial discipline for misconduct will become much easier to impose since any act of judicial misconduct at least in public hearings will have an instant "Youtube effect".

So - people who want to support my stance with the New York State Legislature to replace court reporting with video recording in court proceedings are welcome to contact me.   Let's start things moving.

Attention to the media. I offer for sale my story and movie rights as to what was happening in my disciplinary case after it is resolved

I am positive it will be a bestseller.

Persecution of attorneys in retaliation of criticism of the judiciary, as well as unbridled judicial misconduct and corruption are hot topics in the country at this time.  

Not everything will be reflected in the records of disciplinary proceedings that are supposed to be released once my license is pulled, but I am sure will never be released, no matter what the law says (my husband has been disbarred 3.5 years ago, and we had to sue to get him access to these allegedly "public records", his own disciplinary file).
 
Media can contact me with offers for rights to my story for books and movies based at tatiana.neroni@gmail.com.

What will the disciplinary court do? Will it hold the referee in contempt of court?

My disciplinary court, by orders of September 30, 2014, December 8, 2014 and December 17, 2014 ordered the referee to hear the evidence in my case at the liability stage of the litigation, in other words, to hear the evidence whether I did conduct attorney misconduct.

The Referee acknowledged his obligation to conduct that hearing and to report findings of fact from that hearing to the court (in a recorded conversation with me in the presence of the prosecutor), but refused to abide by those 3 court orders and refused to conduct the hearing.

I wrote a letter to the disciplinary court informing it that the referee refused to obey the court's three orders and refused to conduct the hearing that was court-ordered.

In view of the refusal of the referee to abide by the court orders and to do what the court authorized and ordered him to do, I demanded to appoint another referee, a competent referee who will abide by the court orders and will conduct a hearing on liability, as ordered by orders of my disciplinary court dated September 30, 2014, December 8, 2014 and December 17, 2014.

I am waiting for the written answer from my disciplinary court and will post it on my blog.

A collateral issue will be - will the disciplinary court hold its own court-appointed referee in contempt of court for refusal to abide by three orders ordering him to conduct a hearing on liability and instead for usurping the court's functions of resolving legal issues in the case - without any hearing?

Please, stay tuned as this bad legal thriller keeps developing.

How secrecy proves the true purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings against a critic of judicial misconduct - to prevent evidence of judicial misconduct from being aired in public

I just put in a blog about Judge Mary Work of Ulster County who has a history of representing the Ulster County Department of Social Services.

When a social worker appeared in front of Judge Work (represented by a local counsel who has likely been a law school schoolmate of Judge Work, one year apart), Judge Work did not disclose her employment with the Ulster County Department of Social Services or whether her employment and representation of the Department overlapped with the employment of the party.

Yet, Judge Work amended and disregarded multiple statutes and acted outside of her authority multiple times in order to benefit the social worker as a party in one proceeding and as a beneficiary in a related proceeding.

This is not the first time when a judge who came to the bench after representing the local department of social services fails to provide disclosures required by rules of judicial ethics and presides over proceedings as a factfinder.

Another shining example is Judge Carl F. Becker who has actually talked to Judge Work after the transfer of the case, even though the case he transferred was from Family Court to Family Court, yet Judge Becker called Judge Work about proceedings that were pending not in Family Court, new proceedings.  It was not Judge Becker's business to call Judge Work, and Judge Work expressed surprise in open court on record as to the reasons of the call.  

Judge Becker has his own skeletons in the cupboard regarding non-disclosure of his prior representation of social services which he refuses to disclose despite existing rules of judicial ethics - because he was never sanctioned for violations of ethical rules.

In 2009 I was asking Porter Kirkwood, now Delaware County Attorney and at that time attorney for Assistant County Attorney for Delaware County Department of Social Service, whether social services had a file on my client at that time and whether they contributed to any "indicated reports" against my client.  Porter Kirkwood denied it.

In 2013, in an administrative proceeding in another county, I was served with an exhibit showing that Porter Kirkwood has lied to me in 2009, that there was a file on my client in the Delaware County Department of Social Services, that Delaware County Department of Social Services investigated my client and contributed to the indicated report rendered by this other county (and since reversed and sealed).  Moreover, in the casenotes of social workers from the Delaware County Department of Social Services I found references to the indicated report of my client's mother, dating back to 2001, when Judge Carl F. Becker was an attorney representing the Delaware County Department of Social Services.

On consent of my client, I notified her mother, who never knew she had an indicated report, but Judge Becker by that time ruled adversely against my client specifically refusing to recognize credibility of her mother who testified in a custody proceedings (that was a year before I started to represent my client).

By 2013, Judge Becker made yet another adverse determination against my client on the custody case, once again making derogatory statements against her mother and imposing a prohibition upon my client from letting her mother (the subject child's grandmother) see the child.

At no time did Judge Becker disclose that his agency in 2001 has made an indicated report against my client's mother. Well, that information was private and undisclosable, but then Judge Becker had to recuse instead of presiding over proceedings where he had adverse extrajudicial knowledge about a witness which was not available to anybody else in the proceedings, because he was clearly making his determinations in a custody proceedings based on evidence outside the record.

Recently a local judge, Delhi/Walton Town Justice Richard Gumo was admonished by the New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct because Judge Becker reported Judge Gumo for writing to Judge Becker (appellate judge on the case) a letter informing him of evidence outside of the record of the case.

Apparently, Judge Becker applies a double standard, secretly using such evidence against people he dislikes, but requiring other judges not to rely (or ask him to rely) on evidence outside of the record.

Moreover, in Judge Becker's re-election campaign I received a flyer, contents of which, no doubt, was authorized by Judge Becker, which said that 

I made 5 motions to vacate Judge Becker's sanctions against me, made in proceedings where he presided without disclosure of his disqualification pertaining to his extrajudicial knowledge that was not discoverable at the time sanctions were imposed.

All 5 motions were denied as having "no basis in law or in fact", and in 4 cases, on "collateral estoppel grounds", which applies only if information claimed in the motion was available at the time of sanctions, which it was not.

Affirming the motions was important for the judicial system to allow disciplinary proceedings against me to proceed which are based exclusively on sanctions of Judge Becker imposed upon me, starting with the case where he failed to disclose his extrajudicial knowledge, after I sued him.

The referee in the disciplinary proceeding hastily decided against me on liability, refusing to conduct the evidentiary hearing that was ordered by the court.

I was planning to call Judge Becker, and other actors who participated in his misconduct at that hearing, and have it held in Delaware County, publicly, so, while the disciplinary authorities seek to protect the public of Delaware County and beyond from me as an attorney, the public at whose expenses the disciplinary proceedings against are conducted would be allowed to see how the alleged "protection" proceedings are handled and why I am prosecuted.

Since the hearing on liability, after being ordered by the court, was denied to me without an explanation, there will be no testimony taken from Judge Becker that would have shown how corrupt his judicial performance was over the years.

If my license is pulled, all disciplinary proceedings in my case will become public record, Judiciary Law 90(10).  That would have included testimony of Judge Becker and his cronies at the hearing in such proceedings, had such a hearing occurred, whether the hearing was conducted secretly or in public.   

At this point the disciplinary court has blocked me from opening my disciplinary proceedings to the media and public "as of right" (on my own wish, without the court's permission), requiring that I first obtain the court's consent "on good cause shown".

I was given a "permission" by the disciplinary court to make a motion for such consent of court to open my proceedings to the public until February 6, 2015.

Yet, before I could make a motion, the referee refused to conduct the court-ordered hearing at all.  Thus, I was unable to make use of the court's "permission" to make a motion to open my court-ordered hearing on liability that never occurred to the public.

Then, I understand that the realization dawned upon whoever is concocting the case against me behind the scenes that even a secret hearing will not protect Judge Becker and his cronies enough, because when (rather than if) my license is taken, which is what Judge Becker wanted, his testimony would then become public.

I believe, that is the reason why the referee refused to conduct the court-ordered hearing at all, instead deciding the issues of attorney misconduct, instead of the court, and without the court-ordered hearing, which was contempt of court by the court-appointed referee, imagine that.

All of those tricks to protect Judge Becker and the crew that is working the strings to have my license pulled, from justice or at least exposure through testimony as witnesses.  

That indicates that the court system operates as advocates for my hostile witnesses, because it was for the witnesses, when called to testify, to try to hire attorneys of their own and attempt to prevent me from calling them to the witness stand. 

Nor was or is at this time an order from my disciplinary court rescinding or vacating its order to conduct a hearing on liability (not on mitigation that comes after the issues of liability are already heard and decided BY THE COURT, not referee, against the attorney).

To me, it is unbelievable that the prosecution would not jump at the opportunity to showcase its proceedings to the public in an otherwise confidential case and fought tooth and claw to prevent me from making the proceedings public when I waived my privacy as a matter of right.

Yet, at least the cards are in the open now - the judicial system protects their own, that is the main purpose of the disciplinary proceedings against me and will do ANYTHING, break any laws, to prevent evidence of judicial misconduct from coming to light, to the point of barring the public that is allegedly being protected in the attorney disciplinary proceedings, from attending and observing the process of this "protection", while the attorney clearly asked the court to allow public access to her proceedings.

Judge Mary Work changes the statutory law for the benefit of her former schoolmate and former client?

Judge Mary Work of Ulster County continues to harass me with demands to come to proceedings from which I withdrew by operation of law, after satisfying all conditions under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, or CPLR 321(b).  She sent me a letter order ordering me to appear in court on January 16, 2015 and represent a person who I no longer represent, even though by statute, CPLR 321 (b) the judge has absolutely no right to do so, and I continue to wonder what kind of ties exist between Judge Work, attorney "Delice" Seligman and Seligman's client so that the judge would be at her beck and call to the point of unlawfully attempting to drag an attorney back into a proceeding the attorney withdrew from.  

That Judge Work is harassing me at Seligman's request is unquestionable to me, as Seligman has harassed me with an e-mail hinting that Judge Work "might not consent" to my withdrawal after I withdrew from the case and Seligman received my former client's notarized consent to change counsel and before Judge Work "refused to consent" to my withdrawal when the court's approval or disapproval of my withdrawal is irrelevant under the applicable statute.

   CPLR 321(b) provides:

                        (b) Change or withdrawal of attorney.  1. Unless the party is a person

                        specified in section 1201, an attorney  of  record  may  be  changed  by

                        filing  with  the  clerk  a consent to the change signed by the retiring

                       attorney and signed and acknowledged by the party. Notice of such change

                       of attorney shall be given to the  attorneys  for  all  parties  in  the

                       action or, if a party appears without an attorney, to the party.

            CPLR 1201 provides:

                       "§  1201. Representation of infant, incompetent person, or conservatee.

                       Unless the court appoints a guardian ad litem, an infant shall appear by

                       the guardian of his property or, if there is  no  such  guardian,  by  a

                       parent  having legal custody, or, if there is no such parent, by another

                       person or agency having legal custody, or, if the infant is married,  by

                       an  adult  spouse residing with the infant, a person judicially declared

                       to be incompetent shall appear by the committee of his property,  and  a

                       conservatee  shall  appear  by the conservator of his property. A person

                       shall appear by his guardian ad litem if he is  an  infant  and  has  no

                       guardian of his property, parent, or other person or agency having legal

                       custody,  or  adult  spouse with whom he resides, or if he is an infant,

                       person judicially declared  to  be  incompetent,  or  a  conservatee  as

                       defined  in  section  77.01  of  the mental hygiene law and the court so

                       directs because of a conflict of interest or for other cause, or  if  he

                       is an adult incapable of adequately prosecuting or defending his rights.

My former client, a competent adult, not an infant, incompetent or conservatee of the court, released me from the case on notarized consent.

The consent was filed and served as required by CPLR 321(b).

Judge Mary Work's clerk's office confirmed receipt of the consent and of the affirmation of service of the consent on opposing counsel.

The only exception to CPLR 321(b), CPLR 1201, does not apply because my former client, on the date she released me from the case by notarized consent, was a competent adult.

CPLR 321(b) does not allow the court to approve or disapprove withdrawal of counsel from the case on notarized consent.

Yet, in front of Judge Mary Work Attorney "Delice" Seligman.  That is the name this lady puts on her pleadings since August of 2013 when I had the displeasure of first meeting her.

Of course, there is no registered attorney in the State of New York by this first and last name, there is only a "Delores Felice Seligman", and New York rules require attorneys to report their change of name or address within 30 days of the change, which "Delice" Seligman did not do since August of 2013 that I know her.

Of course, there is no such law school as "NY" in New York.  There is a school though called "New York University School of Law".

 Yet, Delores Felice ("Delice"?) Seligman did not put into her registration the correct name of her law school, yet another violation of the registration rules.

But apparently nobody gives a damn about compliance with attorney registration rules if the attorney in question is....

Let us figure out who "Delice" Seligman and her client are for Judge Mary Work.
Judge Work is a judge since 1999 (for 16 years), practices law since 1973 (for 42 years).

Likely, Judge Work and Delores Felice ("Delice"?) Seligman graduated from the same law school, one year apart, and were likely acquainted since then.

"Delice" Seligman represented in the proceeding a person who is a former employee of the Ulster County Department of Social Services.

Judge Work represented the Ulster County Department of Social Services as an attorney in 1988-1990.

I do not know whether the time of employment for the Ulster County Department of Social Services Judge Work's and "Delice" Seligman's client overlapped or not, but Judge Work's partiality to "Delice" Seligman and her client in court is staggering.

The judge does not notice frivolous conduct of "Delice" Seligman and her clients from two proceedings that can fill a book on attorney misconduct, but instead changes laws and allows "Delice" Seligman to:

(1) win a motion for a subpoena duces tecum without serving the custodian of the record, despite the requirements of TWO statutes in New York providing that:

      (a) the custodian of the records must be served when a motion for a subpoena duces tecum on the records by the government is made;

      (b) a motion in New York is made only when it is served - so if it was not served, it has not been made.

Judge Work granted to "Delice" Seligman a "motion" for a subpoena duces tecum, seeking records protected by state and federal privacy laws, while the motion has not been properly made under the existing STATUTORY law.

(2) Judge Work refused to vacate a judgment obtained by "Delice" Seligman in another court by misconduct and in violation of several other statutory laws, including the law precluding a divorce action to be filed in one court when it was previously filed and is still pending and not withdrawn in another court.  

The refusal to vacate the improperly obtained judgment of divorce and stalling a motion to vacate in the divorce court for 9 months in order to allow a related action (relying on validity of the judgment of divorce) to proceed was clearly benefiting "Delice" Seligman's client, the Ulster County Social worker.

No disclosures were made by Judge Work as to her knowledge of the social worker.

The social worker in question, judging by her age, could be working in Ulster County Department of Social services at the same time as Judge Work represented that department in 1988-1990. 

Rules of judicial ethics require that Mary Work should disclose her representation of a party in front of her, even if representation was over 2 years prior.

If "Delice" Seligman's client was a social worker at the time Mary Work represented the Ulster County Department of Social Services, Judge Mary Work may have extrajudicial knowledge about a witness in a case where she is deciding the witness' credibility determinations.

I asked for a jury trial, which request Judge Mary Work denied claiming that there is no right to a jury trial in proceedings in that particular court.  In fact, by statute, there is.  But, Mary Work disregards statutes that work in my former client's favor.

 Now, on request of "Delice" Seligman, Judge Work refused to recognize yet another statute, under which I withdrew from the case on a consent to change counsel and issued an unlawful "letter order" for me to appear in the case despite the fact that,  by law, I am no longer attorney of record.

I will not be surprised that WHEN (not if) I do not appear on January 16, 2015, "Delice" Seligman will also ask her pet judge to impose sanctions upon me, and that the judge may just as well either sanction me for frivolous conduct or put me in civil or criminal contempt of court, both have a possibility of me ending up in jail.

• Knowing the judicial system in New York the way I do, knowing that I was already prosecuted for "frivolous conduct" by another judge, Judge Becker, in a case where I was not an attorney of record, behind my back, 
• Knowing that my standoff with the judicial system has reached the temperature where I was denied even a trial on liability that the court previously ordered, without any authority or reasoning given, 
• Knowing that so far the courts were completely comfortable to violate applicable laws when sanctioning my husband and myself, no matter what those laws said in our favor

I will not be at all surprised if on January 16, 2015 I will be sanctioned, possibly put in jail, by Judge Work for not coming on behalf of a person who is no longer my client by operation of law.
I am just making the public aware of that, of the applicable law, circumstances and possible connections of Judge Work to the party and attorney who are pushing for it to happen.

A complaint was filed against Referee Steven R. Sirkin, of the Appellate Division 4th Judicial Department

Here is, once again, the link to the recording of my conversation with Referee Sirkin (my opponent was present at Referee Sirkin's end).

The rest, as Referee Sirkin told me in the recording, is "self-explanatory".