EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This
case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not
affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission.
For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the
qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the
rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic
course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines
these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his
principles at any cos
t.



It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the
law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is
not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a
group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to
humiliate and degrade it.”
In
Re Anastaplo,
18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429
(1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong
dissent
,
366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan,
dissenting.



“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

Saturday, March 11, 2017

The 4th Circuit further victimizes a homeless victim of a police dog mauling by denying him a constitutional remedy in an inhumane and openly fraudulent decision. The dissenting judge is a good candidate to be nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court though. Courageus and honest.


The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, a federal appeallate court that covers several southern states:


made a decision in 1998 ruling in favor of a woman mauled by a police dog.

In its decision


the 4th Circuit has found that:

1) the Fourth Amendment governs cases of police dogs mauling civilians;
2) the police officer and other defendants are not entitled to the so-called "qualified immunity" for their actions because 4th Amendment rights of the victim in that case were clearly established.




The 4th Circuit has ruled that it was clearly established back in 1995 that a police officer releasing a dog upon a civilian must give the civilian a verbal warning indicating that the dog is being released, apparently giving the civilian an opportunity to surrender without such release of a dog.

The 4th Circuit ruled that a summary judgment could not be given to the police officer on the 4th Amendment claim regarding mauling of the victim by the police dog, and the case was reversed and remanded for trial.




So, in the 4th Circuit claims of victims mauled by police dogs under the 4th Amendment were clearly established and police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity since 1995.

Yet, 22 years after that precedent, the same 4th Circuit has ruled in an "unpublished" plurality opinion (where one judge out of three wrote the "majority" opinion, the other wrote a "concurring" opinion and the third wrote a dissenting opinion) in a diametrically opposite way, now giving a police officer who did not recall a dog from mauling an innocent homeless man and let him maul him some more, a qualified immunity, claiming that 4th Amendment rights of the victim were not "clearly established law" in the 4th Circuit.





The homeless victim of mauling by a police dog, where the officer intentionally delayed to recall the dog, allowing the dog to maul the victim some more, the court addressed its prior decision of 1998 - and refused to follow it:


The court reviewed its own refusal in 2010 to apply the 1995 and 1998 precedent on the subject when the 4th Circucit granted qualified immunity to a police officer after a police dog mauled a child:





The 4th Circuit recognized that that distinction was not good - giving the child victim in the 2010 case will now be able to vacate that decision:



Yet, after recognizing that its refusal in 2010 to follow its own 1995 and 1998 precedent as to police dogs mauling people was wrong, the court now refused to comply with that same 1995 and 1998 precedent on other grounds.

The court first described how the qualified immunity was denied - in a case dealing with suspects of an armed robbery:

The court then proceeded comparing the case where the same court gave suspects of an armed robbery their right to a remedy under the 4th Amendment against the police officer for mauling by the dog:


as a justification of not giving the same remedy to an innocent man mauled by a police dog:




Of course, the 4th Circuit engaged in what is called "intellectual dishonesty" in claiming that "there is no indication that Appellee gratuitously prolonged the biting after determining that Appellant was unarmed and surrendering" - because the victim was specifically asserting that in the lawsuit.

Moreover, in the very first paragraph of his "majority" opinion, judge Thacker did confirm that the police officer ordered the victim, who was protecting himself from being mauled to death with his hands, to show his hands as a condition to call the mauling off - even after the officer realized that the man before him did not match the description of the suspect he was seeking.



The dissent, in fact, pointed out that the mauling by the dog was a deliberate decision of the police officer - the mauling was meant as a tool to rule out that the victim did not pose a threat:



Judge Harris pointed out that the police officer had no basis even for a brief investigative stop under the circumstances of the case, and seizure of the victim, much less a seizure by a mauling dog, was not justified, and that it was the police officer who was supposed to give the "clearly established law"-warning of the dog attack, which he admittedly failed to do:


Judge Harris then points out the obvious:


Judge Harris pointed out that, since Terry in itself is a questionable application of the 4th Amendment, an EXCEPTION from the 4th Amendment requiring only "reasonable suspicion", instead of a "reasonable cause" for the stop, the stop should be minimally intrusive - being mauled by a dog so that the victim suffered serious injuries, was delivered to a hospital in critical condition and required large grafts of skins to be replaced on his skull - does not qualify as a "minimally intrusive investigative stop":



This case shocks with both the heartlessness of the court to the homeless victim of a crime committed against him by a government official and as to how shadowy our rights supposedly guaranteed to us by the U.S. Constitution really are.

We have the 4th Amendment, it prohibits unreasonable seizure by the government.

But, the U.S. Supreme Court and federal courts changed that, changed the text of the 4th Amendment - changed the U.S. Constitution without authority to do so - and now claim that there may be "qualified immunity" to violate the U.S. Constitution with impunity under certain circumstances.

Then, when those same circumstances, and those same rules set by the courts are satisfied, they refuse to apply them, and carve out new rules that deny the victim a remedy anyway - as it was done in the 2010 precedent cited by the court in the 2017 precedent.

Let's look at the timeline of these police dog-mauling cases in the same court, the 4th Circuit.

In 1995 - the law was "clearly established" that mauling by a police dog is a 4th Amendment violation, a seizure, and the police officer after that will not be entitled to qualified immunity if that happens.

In 1998, the same court adhered to its 1995 precedent, granting a remedy to a woman victim of police dog mauling.

In 2010, the same court refuses to follow its own 1995 and 1998 precedents and denied a remedy to a child victim of police dog mauling.

In 2017, the same court said that its refusal to apply its 1995 and 1998 precedent in 2010 was wrong, but refused to apply these same 1995 and 1998 precedents anyway, on new (and contrived) grounds.

The result is the same - an innocent victim of police misconduct, mauled nearly to death by a vicious animal, was denied a remedy.

That denial of remedy is aggravated by the fact that the man is homeless and his health was his only protection from the elements.  Now he was stripped of his only treasure, his own health, by the government, without any compensation, for no fault of his.

In addition to being a heartless decision, it is a clearly unlawful decision.

The 4th Amendment was clearly violated.

A remedy is clearly allowed for the victim under the circumstances, by the 4th Amendment and by the Civil Rights Act enforcing it.

Courts have no right to amend either the U.S. Constitution or the Civil Rights Act in order to take away the right to a remedy from those they do not like.

What a disgusting case!

Here is the initial report in the North Carolina press about the incident - the police department (1) denied that the officer did anything wrong (of course, who would acknowledge that he would let the dog maul an innocent homeless man some more before officer would call him off); and (2) even offered the victim to pay his medical bill - not that it would have restored his health that they robbed him of.


Then, lawyers stepped in, went all the way to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals and had the court deny the homeless man any remedy whatsoever.   No more compassion, I guess.

And here are the "heroes".

The author of the majority opinion, the heartless bitch Judge Stephanie Dawn Thacker, a recent Obama nominee, who twisted facts and law in order to deny the remedy to a homeless person nearly mauled to death by an intentional order of a police officer:







The "concurring opinion" judge William Byrd Traxler, Jr, a Bill Clinton nominee.






And this is the only voice of reason in this whole mess, Judge Pamela Harris:







With her knowledge of the law, clear reasoning, courage and honesty, Pamela Harris would be a good nominee to SCOTUS instead of fishing-with-Scalia tail-wagging "originalist" Neil Gorsuch.

But I know, I know.  Who would nominate an honest person to SCOTUS.  Even the supposedly bold President Donald Trump wouldn't dare.




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