I would divide the analysis in the petition in two parts (the petition does not make a division in parts I and II like I do, division in parts in the petition is different, division in Parts I and II is my division based on my own analysis of the petition).
Part I - challenge to legality of the concept of absolute judicial immunity;
Part II (if argument in Part I fails) - challenge to misapplication or failure to apply by lower courts of "tests" invented by he U.S. Supreme Court to analyze whether absolute judicial immunity applies.
Under Part I, analysis covered the following:
1/ The U.S. Supreme Court, by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, is a court of limited jurisdiction (as all other federal courts) and does not have the power to legislate or amend existing legislation. Power to enact and amend legislation exclusively belongs, pursuant to Article I of the U.S. Constitution, to the U.S. Congress.
2/ The U.S. Supreme Court gave itself, in the famous case Marbury v. Madison, authority to interpret - not change - the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes.
3/ Statutory interpretation does not include amendment of interpreted statute.
4/ Only ambiguous terms of a statute are subject to interpretation by courts. If the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts have no authority to interpret the statute, but must apply it "as is".
Having stated these fundamental principles of the law, the petition then applied it to the concept of absolute judicial immunity, with the following results.
1/ 42 U.S.C. 1983, by statutory text, applies to "every person", not to "every person, but judges and people officially connected with judges".
For that reason, 42 U.S.C. 1983, the scope of Civil Rights Act and its reach to "every person" is not subject to statutory interpretation and infusion of "absolute judicial immunity" (I would add - or other doctrines of immunity or deference invented by federal courts to absolve governmental officials from the reach of the statute). Nor, by the way, the Civil Rights Act, is restricted by the so-called "state actors" - once again, it applies to "every person" who, under the color of state law, violate people's federally protected statutory and constitutional rights.
2/ Even if the U.S. Supreme Court WOULD have the right to reach behind the clear and unambiguous text (which it does not because it is, once again, clear and unambiguous, which does not give the court authority to interpret it), reasonable interpretation would have resulted in a decision that absolute judicial immunity does not apply to actions brought under the Civil Rights Act because the Civil Rights Act was enacted as a civil twin of a criminal statute that did not have in it absolute judicial immunity, and that it was a civil twin of the criminal statute, and that it does not make exception for judges based on the concept of absolute judicial immunity, is clearly reflected in the Congressional debates prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act.
3/ The conclusion - "interpreting" absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench as "implied" by Congress in enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is an unconstitutional act of the U.S. Supreme Court, in excess of its Article III power and in violation of the U.S. Congress's exclusive Article I power.
Part II - misapplication and failure to apply tests invented by the U.S. Supreme Court in order to determine whether absolute judicial immunity applies (attorneys always provide alternative arguments in case one of them fails).
So, if the argument that the concept of absolute judicial immunity is unconstitutional, the petition then offers a "misapplication" argument.
There is a case by the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts requiring federal courts to conduct analysis of whether a certain function claimed by the defendant-judge to be protected by the concept of absolute judicial immunity, existed at the time of enactment of the Civil Rights Act, in 1871, was considered a judicial function at that time and was afforded absolute judicial immunity at that time.
The petition points out to cases putting the burden of proof in that issue on the defendant-judge claiming the immunity.
The petition analyzes some cases showing that in the majority of cases where absolute judicial immunity is given, neither defendant-judges even try to analyze the common law in 1871, nor federal courts require such analysis, instead giving absolute judicial immunity for any act that is loosely interpreted as "judicial" NOW. In other words, the petition points out that lower federal courts do not follow, in the analysis of application of absolute judicial immunity, even the "precedents" of the U.S. Supreme Court requiring federal courts to apply absolute judicial courts only when its applicability is PROVEN to them BY THE DEFENDANT-JUDGE, by analysis of the 1871 common law.
The petition points out that certain courts and certain functions, such as:
- the so-called "courts of limited jurisdiction" created by statute - family courts, probate courts;
- function of a court stenographer;
- function of a social worker -