Bribery through donations in a judicial election campaign resulted in a class action in Illinois

In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court made a seminal decision, Caperton v A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.

Here is how the U.S. Supreme Court described the situation that triggered the decision:

Let's note that the judge who received a $3,000,000 campaign contribution from a party refused to recuse from the case - three times, - reversed a jury verdict of $50,000,000 and filed a "concurring opinion" explaining his refusal to recuse.

The U.S. Supreme Court considered the case important enough to review on a writ of certiorari, and held:

So, the U.S. Supreme Court held in 2009 that there is an unconstitutional potential for bias where a judge is given such a large monetary "incentive" that, for any reasonable person, the "incentive" has a potential to sway the judge's opinion and prevent the judge from being impartial.

Since 2009, state and federal courts, including those in New York state, turn the blind eye on this case, claiming that recusal of a judge is a matter of the judge's absolute discretion - and punishing people who say otherwise.

By the way, while the U.S. Supreme Court clearly stated in its holding that a contempt proceeding cannot be handled by a judge who was "reviled" by the alleged contemnor's conduct, New York yanked licenses of two criminal defense/civil rights attorneys - John Aretakis and my own - without a hearing and based on sanctions imposed specifically by judges "reviled" by motions to recuse them.

And, no references to precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court helped.

John Aretakis was suspended a year before Caperton, and I was suspended 6 (!) years after Caperton - and both attorney Aretakis and I remain suspended, even though the suspension is clearly unconstitutional.

Information I am getting through research and feedback on this blog from other states indicates that in other states courts treat Caperton v A.T. Massey with the same disdain as New York.

Moreover, as it was recently revealed, yet another case is making its ways through the federal court system with allegations nearly identical to Caperton.

In Caperton, the case involved refusal to recuse of the West Virginia appellate judge Brent D. Benjamin

who accepted campaign contribution from a soon-to-be appellate litigant in the amount of $3,000,000, and then stuck like glue to the case, refused to recuse and overturned a $50,000,000 verdict.

In a federal class action in Illinois allegations are that State Farm insurance company "recruited" Lloyd A. Karmeier

to run for judicial elections and replace the judge who would be presiding over an appeal, organized and funded the campaign of Lloyd A. Karmeier to the order of $4,000,000, and then, when elected, State Farm reportedly deliberately lied as to the extent of its financial support of Judge Karmeier's election campaign - see all that, and more, reflected in the federal court order. 

The federal court order reflects that the investigation that led to the federal class action was inspired by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Caperton:

Only the amount of money that this man - Brent Benjamin - was paid to be elected to overrule (50 million dollars):





was mere peanuts as compared with what State Farm paid this man, Lloyd Karmeier



to reverse - a $1.05 BILLION judgment.

So, Judge Lloyd Karmeier and his obvious misconduct is the reason for a class certification of the following class against State Farm Insurance:

Note that Professor of Law Erwin Chemerinsky is now a court-appointed class counsel.  That's the same Professor Chemerinsky who lectures for BarBRI, an organization that was sued for shady conduct in how BarBRI courses are put together and how competition is squeezed out, including educators with better and more efficient ways of teaching for bar exams. 

One thing that bothers me to no end.

Both "heroes" of bribery-through-elections, Judge Benjamin in West Virginia, and Judge Karmeier in Illinois, are very much on the bench, have their law licenses intact and were not disciplined for their misconduct.

Yet, at the very same time, two attorneys were suspended in these same states for criticism of judges:

• Lanre Amu in Illinois - who criticized judges for corruption and case-fixing, posted an open letter to the Illinois appellate court accusing certain judges of racism and corruption, and accused specific judges of specific ways of case-fixing;  and

• Stephen Hall in West Virginia - a lawyer who accused judges, in legal pleadings, of racism and corruption.

I recently wrote about an example in New York where an attorney's grand theft of client funds from a trust account is treated as a lesser offense than truthful criticism of a judge.

Obviously, in West Virginia and Illinois accepting a multi-million dollar bribe (disguised as a "campaign contribution") to get elected for a lucrative and highly-paying position of power, and abusing governmental authority in return for that bribe, is not a disciplinary violation at all.

Criticism of such action by an attorney is, nevertheless, a suspending offense in the same states.

What comes to mind is the dissent in Caperton voiced in 2009 by four U.S. Supreme Court Justices:

• Roberts;
• Alito;
• Thomas; and
• Scalia

In that dissent, these four justices claimed that it is not accepting the obvious bribe in return for overturning a multimillion dollar verdict that is the problem.

The problem is, in their opinion, that public trust in the integrity of the judiciary will be undermined if a judicial decision caused by such bribery will be overturned.

In other words, these four justices held the public for idiots - that despite the obvious bribery, the public's trust in the "presumptive" integrity of the judiciary will be unshaken.

In other words, these 4 U.S. Supreme Court justices (one deceased now) believed that there is a presumption of integrity in judges because they took an oath of office - even if a particular judge very obviously broke that same oath, for money.

Yet, if judicial corruption was not a problem, and was not a liability concern for the judiciary, the judiciary would not have bent over backwards, as it is doing now, to create, enforce and expand beyond any breaking point the concept of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and CORRUPT acts on the bench.

So, we undoubtedly have case-fixing in the judicial system.

As the case in California recently revealed, case-fixing may be ongoing and involve a lot of people.

Yet, such corruption is usually swept under the rug unless really big numbers are involved - and even then judges who were involved in the obvious corruption, like Judge Brent Benjamin in West Virginia or judge Lloyd Karmeier in Illinois, these judges remain on the bench, untouched by judicial or attorney discipline, or by state or federal criminal prosecution.

Instead, whistleblowers of judicial misconduct are viciously persecuted and stripped of their livelihood.

Since the subject of judicial corruption is taboo in mass media, we the bloggers, we the People, we through social media, should be exposing every single instant of it, big or small, fixing a case worth 1.05 billion dollars, or a family court custody case.

Corruption is corruption, and people suffer from corruption whether it is money that they have lost as a result of that corruption, or liberty, or custody of children.

So, will Judge Karmeier be disciplined or criminally prosecuted, now that a class action under the Rackateering and Corrupt Organization Act statute was instituted based on his corrupt behavior?

Let's see what happens.

Social media is a powerful news source nowadays, making many things possible - maybe, sharing and expressing outrage in the media will finally prompt authorities to prosecute judges who fix cases in exchange for campaign contributions.

I will continue to follow up on this case and report it here.

Stay tuned.