In that case, the court allowed the Attorney Disciplinary Committee to use materials from a dismissed and sealed criminal court case based on an exception to sealing the records of a criminal proceedings that is apparently contained in Criminal Procedure Law 160.50(1)(c ).
Criminal Procedure Law 160.50(1)(c) requires sealing of all documents of criminal proceedings that ended in favor of the accused, with one exception:
"(c) all official records and papers, including judgments and orders of a court but not including published court decisions or opinions or records and briefs on appeal, relating to the arrest or prosecution, including all duplicates and copies thereof, on file with the division of criminal justice services, any court, police agency, or prosecutor's office shall be sealed and not made available to any person or public or private agency".
Here is what this statute and the court's decision in the Matter of Hennessey means.
First, the procedural history of the case.
- A criminal defendant pled guilty to a felony (I will omit the details, and will state the case in the most general terms, relevant to ALL criminal defendants);
- Notwithstanding the plea of guilty, the criminal defendant appealed the conviction, which was affirmed on appeal.
- After the conviction was affirmed on appeal, the top state court declared the statute upon which the defendant was convicted, unconstitutional - in another case.
- Based on that declaration, the defendant's conviction was vacated.
Seems pretty straightforward so far.
Here is where the complication starts.
The criminal defendant in question was an attorney.
By statutory law in the State of New York, conviction of a felony of an attorney results in an automatic disbarment by operation of law.
By the same logic, when such a conviction is vacated, the automatic disbarment should be automatically vacated and the attorney automatically reinstated, also by operation of law.
Not so fast.
Here is where the CPL 160.50(1)(c ) kicked in.
Attorney disciplinary proceedings are deemed in New York as "civil proceedings".
The 3rd Department did not want to automatically reinstate the attorney's license - even though it was reinstated by operation by law, without permission of the court, same as it was revoked by operation of law on the attorney's conviction, also automatically.
The 3rd Department refused to acknowledge automatic reinstatement.
Moreover, the 3rd Department went to extraordinary lengths to prevent such reinstatement.
- The 3rd Department issued a "confidential order" allowing investigation of the attorney before a petition was filed - even though normally the Committee does not need a court order allowing investigations; the court is not involved at the pre-filing stage in attorney disciplinary proceedings. I will try to obtain that "confidential" order since it stopped being confidential because the attorney in question waived confidentiality in writing (see footnote 1 in Matter of Hennessey);
- The 3rd Department held his reinstatement "in abeyance" - even though it had no authority to do so, because by that time the attorney was already reinstated by operation of law as of the date his conviction was vacated, same as he was automatically disbarred as of the date of his conviction, without any input from the court;
- The 3rd Department denied both the attorney's motion to prevent unsealing of the records of his criminal proceedings and from the Committee to unseal such records by pointing to CPL 160.50(1)(c), saying to the Committee - here, those records are open for your review, even if the criminal case is dismissed and OTHERWISE sealed.
Now, if the 3rd Department Committee wanted to investigate and prosecute an attorney under such circumstances, the CORRECT procedure would be this:
1) the attorney is automatically reinstated when his conviction that resulted in his automatic disbarment, was vacated;
2) the committee files a disciplinary petition, and moves for a temporary suspension during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings;
3) the attorney has a right to oppose;
4) the 3rd Department has a right to grant such a request for interim suspension - IF the grounds for the request are constitutional.
That procedure was not observed in Mr. Hennessey's case.
Moreover, had it been observed, the suspension would still have to be denied, because the underlying conviction was vacated on 1st Amendment grounds - which fully applies to any other prosecution by the state, in criminal or civil proceedings.
==
So, the 3rd Department, and its Attorney Disciplinary Committee wanted a certain result - and got that result.
Mr. Hennessey remains without a license.
They pretend they followed SOME procedure, even though the "procedure" they followed is completely illegal and the grounds they pursue discipline are completely unconstitutional.
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Yet, if we forget for a second that this case is about an attorney, and go back to the generalities of the case, we come to this:
- A criminal defendant pled guilty to a felony (I will omit the details, and will state the case in the most general terms, relevant to ALL criminal defendants);
- Notwithstanding the plea of guilty, the criminal defendant appealed the conviction, which was affirmed on appeal.
- After the conviction was affirmed on appeal, the top state court declared the statute upon which the defendant was convicted, unconstitutional - in another case.
- Based on that declaration, the defendant's conviction was vacated.
Now, what happens next, in general terms, is:
5. BECAUSE the criminal defendant appealed his criminal conviction, after his criminal conviction was vacated, and his criminal case otherwise sealed, the record of his criminal appeal REMAINS OPEN to the public and for use in civil court proceedings.
And this, ladies and gentlemen, is the general rule and a precedent set by the 3rd Department and unrelated to the former criminal defendant's identity as an attorney.
So, now, the rule in the 3rd Department is:
- you have a right to appeal, but -
- if you win on appeal and your case is dismissed,
- your appellate record remain open to the public -
- and MAY BE USED AGAINST YOU in other court proceedings.
Now, had Mr. Hennessey "simply" pled guilty without appealing that conviction by plea, and obtained an identical end result of having his conviction vacated after a later decision in an unrelated criminal case, the record of his criminal case would not have been open for review by the Professional Conduct Committee under CPL 160.50(1)( c).
The only reason why they are is because Mr. Hennessey appealed his conviction.
In other words, Mr. Hennessey is penalized for appealing his conviction - which constitutes a FACIAL equal protection and access-to-courts violation.
In other words,
the State of New York as of the date of enactment of CPL 160.50(1)(c) (the entire statute, CPL 160.50, was reportedly last modified on February 15, 2014)
and the 3rd Department, as of the date of its ruling in Matter of Hennessey, April 7, 2016,
announced to the whole wide world that they are PUNISHING criminal defendants FOR APPEALING their criminal convictions AS OF RIGHT -
and they are accomplishing this punishment
by creating an exception that, even if criminal defendants win a reversal or vacatur of their conviction,
thus expunging their criminal record,
SOME of that criminal record will be still available for OPEN review and
can become a basis of other court proceedings against them - civil or criminal (criminal proceedings on the same subject are precluded by double jeopardy, but introduction of unadjudicated crimes as "prior bad acts" is possible in future criminal proceedings on other charges).
I bet, this one is awaiting a constitutional challenge in federal court, and I will hold my breath to see how the State of New York will be wiggling out of this disgusting "law".
But, I wanted New York State criminal defense attorneys, civil rights attorneys and criminal defendants to be aware of this little rule.
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