19 unconstitutional rules invented by a federal judge Curtis Collier in order to reduce suspended civil rights attorneys to nothing

I am reading a 2008 decision by a federal judge Curtis B. Collier, who was 59 years of age when authoring the decision, so it is a little early for senility.

Here is Judge Collier's biography:

The judge had much-celebrated humble beginnings, but graduated from a prestigious Luke University School of Law and worked as an assistant U.S. Attorney for 16 years whose duty was, among other things, to prosecute criminal contempts of court.

Yet, Judge's decision of 2008, made in his capacity of a Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, regarding the status of a suspended attorney indicates that Judge Collier, who remains on the bench as a senior-status judge, has a problem comprehending the most basic principles about:

1) the nature of occupational licensing;
2) the nature of occupational licensing as it is reflected in the legal profession;
3) the concept of a crime of criminal contempt of court;
4) what is the nature of disbarment from the point of view of occupational licensing;
5) what is the nature of suspension of a law license from the point of view of occupational licensing;
6) what constitutes the practice of law;
7) what constitutes a presumption of knowledge of the law;
8) what constitutes notice of prohibited conduct for purposes of a criminal statute.

Determining this "status" should be simple.

Attorney admission is attorney licensing.  A "suspended attorney" is a legal nonsense, because the law defines an "attorney" as a person licensed to practice law.  If that person's license is suspended or revoked (disbarment), that person is not an attorney by definition, is simply a non-attorney, and has the same "rights and privileges" as he or she had before she or he was admitted to the bar.

Right?

Not so fast in Judge Collier's court.  




In his decision, available here, Judge Collier made interesting rulings that are worth commenting on, because judges, like Judge Collier, continue to demonstrate a complete misunderstanding as to:

1) what the practice of law is;
2) what the unauthorized practice of law is;
3) what a contempt of court, and especially the one pertaining to unauthorized practice of law is;
4) what is a notice in a criminal prosecution for such contempt of court and unauthorized practice of law, and
5) what are the remaining rights of individuals whose law licenses are suspended or revoked.

To see incompetence in a judge is not unexpected (to law experts), but is still scary, and the public should be aware of every instance where a judge displayed such incompetence, especially on issues of constitutional law.

First of all, here is how Judge Collier characterizes the nature of suspension of a law license:

"As a general matter, a suspension from practice is an intermediate sanction between disbarment and lesser sanctions such as reprimands and admonitions."

Judge Collier claims that a suspension of a law license is a "sanction".

If it is a "sanction", then elevated procedure is required before such a sanction can be imposed.

Yet, attorney disciplinary proceedings are claimed to be "remedial" in nature and not punitive - in order not to afford attorneys in such disciplinary proceedings protections that they would be afforded had the proceedings be classified as "punitive" in nature.

So, after stripping an attorney of his or her license, with the use of procedures allowing the attorney low-level procedural protections, if any at all, the court then turns around and claims that suspension of a law license is not a remedy to protect the public, but a "sanction" - penalty - against the attorney.

It is a "remedy" for purposes of denying the attorney procedural protections before the suspension and it becomes a "sanction" after the "remedy" is obtained using substandard procedures. 

This same tactic in business is a type of fraud called "bait and switch".  The judiciary, very obviously, should not be using fraud in proceedings - and especially when the court acts at the same time as a legislator (maker of the rules in disciplinary proceedings), prosecutor (appointing and structuring investigative and prosecutorial bodies, consisting in federal courts of 100% of the disciplined attorney's competitors, in violation of federal antitrust laws), and adjudicator.

But - bait and switch it is, as Judge Collier's decision demonstrates from the outset.

Sweet.

But there is more.

 "A suspension operates to temporarily deprive the suspended attorney from exercising the powers, prerogatives, and privileges of a member of the bar of the Eastern District of Tennessee. "An order of suspension deprives the suspended lawyer from performing any service recognized as the practice of law and which is usually performed by lawyers in the active practice of law." In re Mitchell, 901 F.2d at 1185."

Now, what is the practice of law?  It is not defined by statute, and is claimed by Judge Collier to be "any service recognized as the practice of law and which is usually performed by lawyers in the active practice of law".

No, lawyers who want to protect their turf from competition can claim anything is a practice of law.  I know a lawyer who has practiced for over 30 years (since then retired with an "honor plaque") who claimed that serving papers is unauthorized practice of law.  

Many lawyers eat, drink, have sex and go to the bathroom during the active practice of law, but such acts hardly constitute the practice of law. 

Lawyers also usually read, write and add numbers when drafting pleadings, but that hardly constitutes the practice of law.

So what constitutes the practice of law?  Nobody knows, and Judge Collier does not refer to a statute that would clearly define what the "practice of law" is.  

It refers only to a court case, which means that what is the "practice of law" is defined only on a case-by-case basis by courts, and is thus a violation of due process notice requirement, an ex post facto violation, and a violation on the prohibition to Article III (federal) judges to legislate.

Now, before a person is given a law license, a person can work as a paralegal, or legal assistant.

When his law license is taken away, temporarily or permanently, the individual should have the same rights as he had before he received the law license.

Right?

Not according to Judge Collier:





"In determining the scope of suspension, the Court will following the precedent of In re Mitchell with one exception. The court in In re Mitchell granted permission for a suspended attorney to function as a law clerk or paralegal. The judges of this court have decided to part company with In re Mitchell in this one respect. In considering "the procedures and determinations for those attorneys who fail to adhere to the standards of [the] district court" (Court File No. 69, p. 1), this district court has decided to follow those jurisdictions, including Tennessee, that strictly prohibit a suspended attorney from functioning as a law clerk, paralegal, legal assistant, or similar position".

Note that Judge Collier considers it a matter of his discretion (free right to choose) to prohibit to an individual whose law license was suspended, what people who have never had a law license, are allowed to do.

Judge Collier even included a catch-all provision, the so-called "similar position", which will block an individual whose law license is suspended from positions that do not require a license to practice law - including employment in Judge Collier's court, a public entity that has no right to discriminate in its employment decisions, but undertakes to prohibit some unlicensed individuals, but not others, to work as paralegals, legal assistants, or in "similar positions'.

As to "law clerks", a law clerk does not practice law, and thus, a license for a law clerk should not be required.

So, the statement of Judge Collier that he decided what is prohibited to an attorney AFTER the attorney's license is suspended (so, the attorney had no idea that this scope of suspension will be applicable when he was going through the disciplinary proceedings) is a clear equal protection problem, due process problem, legislating-from-the-bench problem and ex post facto law.

Moreover, Judge Collier announces by this decision, as the administrator of his court (a Chief Judge at that time) his determination to discriminate against individuals who have lost their law licenses, in employment decisions, notwithstanding the individual's knowledge of the law and fitness for the jobs as a law clerk, paralegal, legal assistant, or "similar positions" that do not require a law license from other candidates.

Here is how judge Collier explains away his decision to discriminate in employment decisions against individuals whose law licenses are suspended:

"Permitting a suspended attorney to act as a law clerk or paralegal raises very serious concerns".

And what should those concerns be?

"...the distinction between practicing law and serving as a
law clerk or paralegal is not always so clearly delineated."

Huh?

That is a clear admission that there is no statute that would clearly define what IS the practice of law.

If there is no clear definition of the practice of law, then

(1) regulation of the practice of law is unlawful and unconstitutional, because the government gets to regulate "nobody knows what it is";

(2) prosecution for unauthorized practice of law and for contempt of court for prohibition of unauthorized practice of law is unlawful and unconstitutional because a person lacks a STATUTORY notice as to what the practice of law is, to steer clear of it.

Moreover, Judge Collier recognizes that people who routinely are hired without law licenses by attorneys AND BY COURTS, may in fact be involved in unauthorized practice of law, and thus, that he, as an employer, is routinely engaged in aiding, abetting and even soliciting unauthorized practice of law by hiring unlicensed paralegals, legal assistants, law clerks (interns) and people "in similar positions".

To Judge Collier as an employer, it is apparently ok for a person who has never been licensed to practice law to commit a crime of unauthorized practice of law, but is not ok for a person who has lost his or her law license.  

Judge Collier, naturally, has no authority to grant permissions to violate criminal law to some classes of individuals (including himself as an employer), but not to other classes.

This is an equal protection, vagueness and unconstitutionality problem pertaining to the whole attorney regulation scheme presently existing in the U.S.
 
"The Court cannot be confident the public will appreciate the distinction when the public observes a suspended attorney still functioning in some legal capacity".

First of all, Judge Collier shifts the issue from a constitutional right of a suspended attorney to earn a living, and his right to his constitutional equal opportunities with other unlicensed individuals, with what the public will think.

And, while presenting what the public will think as a priority over the requirement of non-discrimination in employment, Judge Collier makes a confession that the law is so unclear as to what constitutes the practice of law, that the public, which is presumed to know the law (as it is written), will not understand what the law means and what it includes.

Such a pronouncement is an equivalent of a ruling that laws defining the practice of law, unauthorized practice of law, and all criminals statutes and administrative regulations of any kind regulating practice of law and unauthorized of law, are void as unconstitutional.

Yet, Judge Collier goes in an opposite direction, claiming the court's authority to somehow sweep wider in discrimination against individuals with suspended law licenses and prohibit more to them than is prohibited to never-licensed individuals, to prevent the public from seeing that the practice of law is not clearly defined, and are thus void and unconstitutional.

"...nor can the Court entrust maintaining this distinction to a suspended attorney, who has already demonstrated an inability to adhere to appropriate ethical and professional standards."

So, the court precludes an attorney from an employment that is allowed to other unlicensed individuals, as a preventive measure, because the court does not trust him not to violate criminal prohibition on unauthorized practice of law, whatever that is.

But, any non-attorney working in a law firm or for a court in the capacity of a paralegal or legal assistant, is supposed to work under supervision of his or her employer, a licensed attorney.

So, it is not the "suspended attorney" that the court does not trust not to engage in unauthorized practice of law, while the lines of what constitutes that practice of law are not "clearly delineated".

The court actually does not trust licensed attorneys with supervision of an individual whose law license was suspended - while it trusts those same attorneys with supervision of never-licensed paralegals and legal assistants.

Since employment in courts is also prohibited, the court does not trust even itself to be able to prevent unauthorized practice of law by "suspended attorneys" - because the court does not know what it means.

So, it is a prohibition on employment, a punitive one, and a completely unreasonable one.

After this "analysis" that practically recognized that the whole scheme of attorney regulation and prosecutions for contempt of court and unauthorized practice of law against suspended and disbarred attorneys, as well as prohibitions on employment that does not require a law license for suspended and disbarred attorneys are unconstitutional, Judge Collier invented the following 19 rules that a suspended attorney in Judge Collier's court (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee) is required to comply with.

Here they are, with comments.

 Rule No. 1

 A suspended attorney "may not appear in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee in connection with any matter or case (unless he or she is a party in the case), either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

Comment:  the rule does not define what "directly or indirectly" or "in connection with any matter or case" means.

For example, a suspended attorney can be hired as a law expert, and called to testify as a witness.

Testifying as a witness in a case would be prohibited, even if it is not prohibited by ethical rules of disclosure, and would actually benefit parties on whose behalf the suspended attorney is appearing.

Moreover, such a wholesale rule, by its all-encompassing language allowing only one exception (pro se representation) a suspended attorney from serving on a jury "in connection with any matter or case".

Such a prohibition also bans a suspended attorney from appearing in court as an observer and member of the public, a right constitutionally guaranteed to any member of the public without regard to their status as an attorney, non-attorney or a suspended attorney.

Such a prohibition also bans a suspended attorney from appearing in court as a court monitor or investigative reporter/journalist providing coverage of court proceedings in the press - individually (as a blogger) or "in concert with others" (on behalf of a media source as an employer).

Rule No. 1 is, thus, clearly overbroad and unconstitutional. 

Rule No. 2



A suspended attorney, according to Judge Collier "may not have any contact with federal court in this district, its staff, or any litigant, witness, or potential witness involved in any proceeding before a court in this district (unless that suspended attorney—acting as a pro se litigant—is representing him or herself as a party), regarding any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys. 

This rule clearly violates several fundamental constitutional rights of a suspended attorney:

(1) access to court;
(2) access to public records;
(3) freedom of association;
(4) due process right to earn a living - including in the capacity of:

• an investigator (does not require a law license), 
• journalist, 
• interpreter,
• church minister,
• mental health advisor,
• domestic violence advocate,
• police officer,
• friend, 
• neighbor
• relative.

Rule No. 2 is clearly overbroad, unconstitutional and thus void.

Rule No. 3.




According to Judge Collier, a suspended attorney "may not solicit clients regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys. "

What constitutes the word "regarding" is not clearly defined.  A suspended attorney can also be an interpreter.   Soliciting clients as an interpreter pertaining to a court case is not the practice of law, yet, Judge Collier prohibits it - with no reason for it whatsoever, since, once again, it is not the practice of law.

Rule No. 3 is thus vague, overbroad and unconstitutional.

Rule No. 4.

A suspended attorney "may not accept clients regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

 Rule No. 4 has the same problems as Rule No. 3 above.

Rule No. 5.

A suspended attorney "may not accept fees from clients or on behalf of clients regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

Same problems as in Rules 3 and 4.

 Rule No. 6.

A suspended attorney "may not share fees with another attorney for a client with a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys. "

A suspended attorney who is married to a licensed attorney or who works for a licensed attorney would necessarily share in the licensed attorney's fees "indirectly".

Thus, the rule is overbroad and unconstitutional as such.

Rule No. 7

A suspended attorney "may not retain fees for any legal services performed since the time of the suspension for any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

Here is what can happen:

The federal court backdates the suspension (happened to me) and sends the order of suspension by mail, which arrives a week or more after the date of the suspension (happened to me, too).

If an attorney provided valuable legal services during the time he or she does not know of the suspension, he or she is still stripped of a fee earned in good faith.

This problem seem minor, the only big problem with this rule is that what constitutes "legal services" is not clearly defined by statute.


Rule No. 8 

 A suspended attorney "may not retain any fees, expenses, or costs paid in advance that were not earned or expended prior to the suspension order from any client regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

This rule is straightfoward and fair, but overbroad, since the word "regarding" may refer to non-legal services to be provided in connection with or stemming from a court case (interpreting, mental health counseling etc.).

 Rule No. 9.

According to Judge Collier, a suspended attorney "may not have any contact with any client regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

This rule is in direct violation of freedom of association, freedom of speech and due process right to earn a living in a capacity not requiring a law license - such as an investigator, a journalist, a teacher etc.


Rule No. 10

A suspended attorney "may not provide legal services, advice, counseling, or the like to any client regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

What constitutes the practice of law is not defined by statute, so the prohibition on provision of "legal services" is unconstitutional.

As to "advice, counseling, or the like", the prohibition is overbroad and reaches conduct that may have nothing to do with court representation.

Rule 10 is clearly unconstitutional.

Rule No. 11


A suspended attorney "may not hold him or herself out as an attorney capable of rendering legal advice regarding a matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

In fact, a suspended attorney is VERY capable of rendering legal advice as an expert, and often that is exactly why that attorney, especially a civil rights attorney (in federal court) is suspended.

The correct way to put it is that a suspended attorney must not hold out to the public that he or she is LEGALLY capable to render such advice while being ACTUALLY capable to do that as a law expert, often in an area where such an advice is desperately needed, and where there is a shortage of experts willing to work with under-privileged population.

"An attorney suspended from the bar of the Eastern District of Tennessee cannot represent to the public, in any way, that he or she can practice law before federal court in this district. ... "

What is the practice of law, is not defined by statute, so this rule is unconstitutional as overbroad, vague and not based on a statute.

"This includes denotation by sign, stationary, letterhead, business card, telephone and internet listing, advertisement, and any other public or private pronouncement that he or she is permitted to practice law in federal court in this district, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."


There are a lot of internet listings (ratings) about an attorney which the attorney did not place.  Moreover, advertisements work in such a way that an attorney pays for the advertisement for a year in advance, and the advertisement then is picked up and re-published by so many sources that it is physically impossible to clean the Internet off that advertisement once the order of suspension is issued.

This rule is clearly too burdensome and physically impossible to comply with in all respects.



"Furthermore, a suspended attorney is prohibited from any representations, in word or deed which, although do not directly state he or she can practice law in federal court in this district, might reasonably lead a member of the public to infer it."

This portion of Rule 11 is clearly unconstitutional because it puts a burden on the attorney to define what constitutes the practice of law which is not defined by statute and which the court acknowledges "is not clearly delineated", and to steer clear from more conduct than what may constitute the practice of law, simply so that a member of the public who cannot understand what the practice of law is - because it is not defined by statute - would not "infer" that an attorney is engaged in prohibited conduct.

Yet, since this prohibition is a prohibition of CRIMINAL conduct (unauthorized practice of law, contempt of court), the notice requirement works THE OTHER WAY - from the government to ALL members of the public, suspended attorneys or not.

The required due process notice in criminal cases goes FROM the government, THOUGH A STATUTE, TO ALL THE PUBLIC.

Judge Collier who practiced law for decades before he issued this 19-rule wonder, and who worked - gasp! - as a criminal prosecutor - apparently does not know this fundamental principle of criminal law.


"This includes, but is not limited to, 

• presence in the courtroom during proceedings for former clients,  
• accompanying admitted attorneys to federal court, 
• appearing with admitted attorneys in federal court, 
• sitting with admitted attorneys in federal court, and 
• conversing with admitted attorneys in federal court in connection with any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

Aren't we really carried away here?

Presence of any individual at a public court proceeding is a constitutional right, also guaranteed by the 1st Amendment free speech clause, because any member of the public present during a public court proceeding is a potential court reporter.

Moreover, every member of the public present during court proceeding is a member of popular sovereign monitoring performance of the judge as the sovereign's servant - and has a right to be there.  For a servant to shoo his master out of the courtroom at whim is not a very reasonable idea, especially when the proceeding is open to all other members of the public.

Judge Collier is obviously concerned that a suspended attorney - especially if it is a civil rights attorney suspended in order to thwart a civil rights case (such a thing happened to me and is quite a frequent occurrence in federal courts, as far as I know) - will appear in court as a journalist or court monitor and will then blog as to what he or she observed, thus embarassing the court and "connected" attorneys.  This rule is a "damage control" rule that has nothing to do with prohibition on unauthorized practice of law.

Accompanying anybody to any public proceeding is a constitutional right guaranteed by 1st Amendment Freedom of Association clause, and the same applies to "sitting with", "appearing with" (as a secretary or an assistant carrying the file, for example, or as an interpreter), "conversing with".

Judge Collier was either becoming senile at the time he issued these rules, or mentally disabled, because otherwise it is unclear how could he stay a licensed attorney, then a prosecutor, and then a judge when he apparently lacks knowledge of elementary principles of constitutional law regarding access to courts, presence of the public during public court proceedings, freedom of press and freedom of association.



Rule No. 12




According to Judge Collier, a suspended attorney "may not write letters to clients, attorneys, or others regarding any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

 Once again, this is an overbroad prohibition on practicing of more professions than the practice of law.

Under such a rule, a suspended attorney may be prohibited from seeking reimbursement for his or her fee owed to him or her for services provided in a still-pending case, and provided at the time the suspended attorney was a licensed attorney.

In other words, this is an illegal fee-forfeiture rule.

Moreover, it is a rule under which a suspended attorney is prohibited to contact parties or attorneys in ANY federal case in that court, whether the suspended attorney represented clients in that case before suspension or not, and where the suspended attorney is a potential witness and wants to notify of that the parties or attorneys for the parties. 

Such a rule will prevent a suspended attorney to report to the parties or attorneys in a pending civil rights case that the suspended attorney is a witness of governmental misconduct, including misconduct of a presiding federal judge (that would potentially include Judge Collier).

This Rule, thus, constitutes advocacy by Judge Collier on behalf of parties, and federal judges are precluded from practicing law, and such practice of law, by statute, is grounds for impeachment of a federal judge.

Rule 12 is, thus, clearly unconstitutional.

Rule No. 13


A suspended attorney "may not supervise, direct, control, or exercise any direction or supervision over any admitted attorneys regarding any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

The rule is very vague, especially in regards of a "potential" case or a "potential" matter.

This rule is extremely overbroad. 

For example, such a rule would prohibit a directive from a suspended attorney 

• to his own attorney as to how to prosecute or defend his own or his legal ward's (child's, incapacitated relative's), or his business's (corporation's) court case;
• as a police officer against a licensed attorney (including a judge) as a motorist or suspect in a crime, of a suspended attorney who is 
• a fire captain against a licensed attorney who is a volunteer, by a suspended attorney who is 
• an army captain against a licensed attorney who is his subordinate, a directive by a suspended attorney who is an FBI agent to subpoena documents of a licensed attorney of any kind, related or unrelated to present litigation, and possibly related to commission of crimes by high-standing public officials - because any situations in the U.S. litigous society can be a "potential" court case, and when a person is employed in the government, any situation pertaining to gross negligence, insurbordination or violation of rights of 3rd parties is a potential federal civil rights case.

Thus, this rule would prohibit a suspended attorney to faithfully discharge his duties in a setting that does not require a law license, and creates a title of nobility in licensed attorneys who, apparently, cannot be commanded by an individual who is a suspended attorney, even if that would be the individual's duty to do so.

This rule, as others, makes me think that Judge Collier was not thinking much when issuing these rules, that these rules may have been authored by a student intern and not the judge, and that the governing principle in this rules is - "a suspended attorney has no rights, and is not worth thinking much about".

But, if a court of law treats one class of individuals as not worthy of equal protection of laws, and allows itself to pick and choose what will be that class of "outlaws", the next class can be anybody, and a judge acting on such principles is violating his oath of office to act not on a whim or personal prejudices, but pursuant to his constitutional oath of office.

Rule 13 is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional.

Rule No. 14



A suspended attorney "may not solicit clients regarding any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys, then refer those clients to other attorneys. "

The referral service to attorneys (where attorneys are paying clients and not the public) does not require a law license to set up, and advertising a referral service to attorneys as paying clients and to the public as potential clients of those attorneys, does not require a law license either.

If a certain business or conduct does not require a law license from anyone, a suspended attorney cannot be prohibited from engaging in that business, as a matter of equal protection of law.  There is no lawful reason for such a prohibition.

"To the extent a suspended attorney already had clients with matters before a federal court in this district, the suspended attorney is not precluded from suggesting to his or her former client the services of a specific attorney, but cannot collect any referral fee in doing so and must disgorge any fees the client has already paid for the suspended attorney's continued representation."

It is clear that it would be unethical to collect a referral fee for suggesting a new attorney to your own former client after suspension, but the rule does not have to be defined any broader than the last paragraph, and should not prohibit ANY referral services by a suspended attorneys.

Thus, Rule 14 is also overbroad and unconstitutional.



Rule No. 15

A suspended attorney "may not sign any pleading or filing in any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

Rule 15 would prohibit a suspended attorney from providing an affidavit as a witness or law expert, or an expert in any other field in a court case, and would prohibit pro se representation.

Rule 15 is thus overbroad and unconstitutional.


Rule No. 16




A suspended attorney "may not participate in any depositions, conferences, settlement discussions, and the like regarding any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

This is a prohibition on employment of suspended attorneys as:

(1) interpreters at depositions;
(2) law experts;
(3) experts in any field of knowledge (a doctor, an insurance broker, a forensic specialist) other than the law who would assist a non-expert attorney asking questions at a deposition.

Such employment does not require a law license.   Moreover, this rule hinders rights not only of the suspended attorney, but of parties who hire him - as an interpreter, law expert from another jurisdiction, or expert in the field other than law.

This rule is clearly an arbitrary, overbroad and unconstitutional knee-jerk reaction by Judge Collier driven to prohibit anything and any rights once an attorney is suspended, whether such prohibitions do or do not make any sense.


Rule No. 17








A suspended attorney "may not have any direct contact with witnesses or potential witnesses regarding any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."




 Wow.

This is a direct advocacy by a judge and a direct interference with cases and a violation of freedom of association clause of the 1st Amendment.

Anybody may be or become a "potential" witness in a federal case.

Moreover, most often, federal courts handle civil rights cases, and "witnesses" in those cases are public officials, so this prohibition actually bans a suspended attorney to contact any of his state public officials, because they may be witnesses or potential witnesses in federal civil rights cases.

I have never read anything more stupid than this judicial rule.

Other than public officials, that "witness" or "potential witness" can be the suspended attorney's current or former employer, doctor, minister, spouse, child, distant relative, friend, neighbor, former client or a chance travel acquaintance with whom the suspended attorney sat next to on an airplane and chatted.

Moreover, in our social media day and age, anybody's contacts are extended exponentially through the use of the Internet.

To prohibit contacts of "witnesses" or "potential witnesses" in a given court, Judge Collier prohibited to a suspended attorney to function as a human being and a member of society.

 The undertone is clear - when you are a licensed attorney, you are nobility, when your license is taken, you are reduced to less than nothing.  Doesn't work this way in a country that declares itself to be governed by the rule of law.

So, Rule 17 is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional.



Rule No. 18

A suspended attorney "may not negotiate or approve the settlement of any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

This rule prohibits to a suspended attorney:

• pro se representation - there is no exception for pro se;
• acting as a legal guardian (represented by an attorney) of a minor child or an adult adjudicated as an incompetent;
• acting as a representative of a business (corporation);
• acting as a represented party.

Rule 18 denies a suspended attorney multiple due process and access-to-court rights, and is unconstitutional on its face and as appied.

Rule No. 19



A suspended attorney, according to Judge Collier, "may not counsel the acceptance or denial of any settlement of any matter or potential matter, or case or potential case in federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee, either directly or indirectly, either individually or in concert with one or more admitted attorneys."

The rule is unconstitutional, for the same reasons as the Rule 18 above.

This came from an attorney, former prosecutor and present judge who - literally - holds people's lives in his hands, presiding over death penalty cases.

This is a judge who presides and have been presiding for years, over civil rights cases.

This is a judge who, as the Chief Judge of his court for many years, handled employment issues and defined hiring policy of his court.

This judge, very obviously, either does not know the text of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights that he is sworn to uphold, or does not care what is in there, as long as he can sit up on high and craft rules that would allow him to wield his power and stomp on his potential enemies, and attorneys suspended in federal courts are most likely civil rights attorneys who criticize the government.

Judge Collier, as I said at the beginning of the blog, is much celebrated for his "humble beginnings" and for his race.

I assert, time and again, that neither the "humble beginnings", nor the person's race, gender, sexual orientation or any other characteristics - other than (1) knowledge of the law and (2) commitment to follow that law and the judge's constitutional oath of office - matter as a judicial qualification.
Reportedly, "a man [Judge Collier] never met but who yet inspires him was U.S. District Judge Frank Johnson. Johnson, a native Alabamian, ruled on crucial cases during the civil rights era in Alabama.

He was not popular among his neighbors.

"He ruled against Alabama in many cases, not just one," Collier said.

There were threats. Johnson's children couldn't go to public school. He and his family were cut off from the community.

"He followed the Constitution and did what the law required even though he did so at tremendous personal sacrifice," Collier said."

Following "inspirations" for a public servant who took his office based on his oath to protect and uphold the U.S. Constitution is not necessary.

Upholding his oath, every day, and in every part of every decision - is.