"No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause,
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity,"
Andrew Madison, The Federalist, No 10, at 79.
That brought me back to the issue of judicial recusals in the State of New York, and throughout the U.S. state and federal judicial systems, since rules of recusals are similar throughout the United States.
I've researched the law of recusal, through case law, professional literature and my own motion to recuse and resulting actions by judges, for years.
So far, I've conclusively established for myself the following facts:
1/ that motions to recuse are rarely made;
2/ that such motions are rarely made not because they are rarely warranted, but because attorneys refuse to make them out of fear of retaliation from the judge (there is a popular adage amongst the legal profession that making a motion to recuse a judge is a career suicide), and pro se parties are either not educated enough to make them, or are similarly afraid of retaliation;
3) that usually the judge who is subject of the challenge decides the motion;
4) that more often than not a motion to recuse is denied by the judge who is being challenged, and that the judge claims that he "looked into himself, consulted his conscience, and concluded that he is and can continue to be impartial" - which is unreviewable and uncheckable for obvious reasons, you cannot X-ray a judge's conscience, and conscience is an intangible concept;
Yet, let me once again quote from the Founders - since the U.S. Supreme Court and federal and state courts like so much to rely upon "tradition" in their decisions.
I've made so far many motions to recuse, the cases warranted it.
It is apparent that when you challenge impartiality of a judge, and especially when you point out to the judge that he has committed misconduct that is likely to affect the case, a judge who remains on the case to decide the motion to recuse is "a man judging his own case".
Yet, New York appellate courts stubbornly hold that it is within the "discretion" of the judge to decide whether to recuse or not, even though the Code of Judicial Conduct at the same time requires the judge to recuse if his impartiality may reasonably be questioned, and the "reasonable" part is obviously from the point of view of a neutral, impartial reasonable observer.
Absent an "out of body" experience, a judge cannot possibly be impartial reviewing a motion challenging his own self.
Just how "impartial" a judge is in reviewing such motions is easily shown by:
1) the number of sanctions imposed by judges in retaliation for a motion to recuse (I was sanctioned several times by the judge who was the subject of the motion);
2) that attorneys are afraid to make such motions, obviously not believing any such thing as a presumption of judicial integrity and impartiality, no matter what kind of motion is in front of the judge and how it affects him personally;
3) the recent case Shtrauch v Dowd in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed based on an overstretched concept of absolute judicial immunity which, in the opinion of the federal district court, applies even after recusal of the judge, a judge yelled at a pro se litigant who made a motion to recuse that he is a very dangerous person to dare to "impugn the judge's integrity" by making a motion and then ordered an armed court officer to throw him out of the courthouse.
In my practice, one motion to recuse made in 2009 against a judge on behalf of a client resulted in:
1) a fabricated child neglect proceeding against me and my husband;
2) disbarment of my husband based on fraudulent civil case prosecuted by a retired judge and his son where all applicable law, as well as the record, were in favor of my husband, and were summarily disregarded nevertheless;
3) several sanctions against me for frivolous conduct, including "harassment of the court" (in plain English - harassment of Judge Becker, who was the prosecutor, the victim, the witness and the judge in commencing the sanctions proceedings and imposing the sanctions) which resulted in a disciplinary action against me, I am waiting for its results any day now;
4) several judgments against my husband based on retaliatory decisions of Judge Becker who stuck to our cases like glue, got himself assigned to all cases in all courts and ruled against us in every one of them, in gross violation of applicable laws and in contradiction of the record in front of him - which decisions the Appellate Division, where judges had their own conflicts of interest, eagerly affirmed.
5) vicious rumors spread about me in the community, where judges and their friends were discouraging people from retaining me claiming that I was "nuts", incompetent specifically because I am "suing judges" and because I will soon be disbarred.
I received phone calls from people referred to me by their attorneys for the only purpose of making a motion to recuse (I refused), and in one case, the referring attorney clearly stated to his own client that the referring attorney will not make the motion to recuse himself, because he did not want "to be blackballed", while I, on the other hand, "already have nothing to lose".
So, once again, going back to "history and tradition", as many judges so like to do - what about practice the statement made by Andrew Madison (quoted above) and confirmed as a due process right of every litigant by the U.S. Supreme Court and the New York State Court of Appeals - a man may not preside over his own case.
So, why judges preside over motions to recuse made against them?
Why judges preside over actions in contempt of court where they are initiators, prosecutors, alleged victims, witnesses and adjudicators?
Why judges preside over "frivolous conduct proceedings" where they are, once again, initiators, prosecutors, alleged victims, witnesses and adjudicators?
I guess, those are rhetorical questions.
Because "the rule of law" is a smoke screen for the the plebs and is not supposed to apply to the insiders, stupid.
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