Menaces to society are not entitled to the rule of law

I described in this blog that I removed my disciplinary case to federal court, and it was remanded back on grounds of "lack of jurisdiction" (because the unfairness I was claiming was not racially-based) and because of the so-called "Younger abstention" (meaning that the federal court considered that the state court is competent and able to resolve my federal constitutional issues).

How the "competent court" has resolved my federal constitutional issues, I also described in this blog, but I will provide a brief summary once again.

The initial disciplinary court, the 3rd Department, entered into an ex parte communication with the prosecutors, issued an ex parte order of transfer of my disciplinary proceedings combined somehow with my husband's disciplinary proceedings (which concluded 3 years ago) to the 4th Department and blocked my access to the prosecutor's "application" for such a transfer that was never served upon me or my husband, for that matter.

The ex parte order with a caption including both me and my husband was the first time I saw my husband's name included into my disciplinary proceedings.  Apparently, the court does not have a clear picture who is being prosecuted, and it did not care.

The 4th Department court, after not receiving the full record from the 3rd Department and refusing to stay proceedings until the full record is provided by the 3rd Department, denied my federal constitutional claims without an explanation, once on a cross-motion, and the second time on a motion as of right to vacate, renew and reargue.  

After my motion to vacate, renew and reargue demanding, among other things, a reasoned decision on my cross-motion raising federal constitutional claims that were remanded on the Younger abstention from federal court, the 4th Department not only once again denied my motion without an explanation, reasoning or analysis, but also imposed upon me an anti-filing injunction without an explanation, reasoning or legal analysis - meaning that I may not, without court's permission, make another motion to the court.  

Enough of my pesky motions.  Enough of those pesky constitutional claims.  And enough of my pesky claims that I am entitled at least to a reasoning as to why my well-researched and pled constitutional claims are denied.

Now I am faced with a hearing.

Of course, it is a wonder as to how that hearing was even ordered since the prosecutor's motion for a summary judgment is still pending and is unresolved. 

I will have a hearing under the following conditions:

(1) the referee who the court refused to disqualify, is old, in my perception based on how he handled a trial conference, he has memory problems, and, most importantly, is not qualified by statute providing for clear requirements to qualifications of referees;

(2) I am not entitled to discovery;

(3) I am not entitled to send out witness subpoenas;

(4) the Department where the hearings are going to be held is located over 100 miles away from where the main witnesses are located, thus blocking for me any possibility for calling them even if I had subpoena power;

(5) New York State and 4th Department do not explicitly provide that evidentiary rules apply to such proceedings;

(6) I am not entitled to a jury trial;

(7) I am not entitled to even a public proceeding, as the court records were sealed under the statute that is supposed to protect my privacy, but, when I waived it, is now used by the court to protect itself and the prosecution from embarrassment and to intimidate me with the threat of contempt of court if I do publish the "sealed" court records, including those records which are in public domain and were not sealed are they were originally filed.


The federal court which was remanding the case back to the state court for a "fair determination", knew all of that.

Of course, in a federal civil rights litigation, I would have been entitled to:

(1) full discovery;
(2) a public trial by jury;
(3) rules of evidence fully applicable to all proceedings;
(4) reasoned decisions on constitutional issues
(5) strict rules as to how motions for a summary judgment can be brought (here, the prosecution first brought a motion for a summary judgment, without providing proof for their claims, and then the court rescued the prosecution by ordering a hearing while the motion for a summary judgment is still pending, which would NEVER have happened in federal court).

Attorney disciplinary proceedings are considered civil proceedings in New York.

There is no question that in other civil proceedings, litigants are entitled to public hearings, discovery, applicability of evidentiary rules and the CPLR, and to reasoned decisions on fundamental issues.

Since I am an attorney - and, "coincidentally", an attorney who criticizes judicial misconduct, and has been doing it for years - I am not entitled to any of the due process protections that normally must be afforded to litigants.

It is beyond the point to list attorneys who were engaged in: 

• "robo-signing" in foreclosures;
• ex parte communications with judges;
• filing (like my prosecutors) fraudulent charges and prosecuting them, with vigor, in several courts.

As long as you do not "cross the line", do the "taboo" thingy, say the "taboo" words "judicial misconduct" and especially if you do not make motions to recuse judges, do not speak out against pervasive judicial misconduct in our court system, contribute to election campaigns and private seminars of judges, wine and dine judges through "mentoring" programs, marry and befriend judges - you will be just fine with your law license.

The only attorneys that the public apparently must be protected from, and at its own expense (consider over 2 years of my disciplinary proceedings on fraudulent charges), appear to be civil rights attorneys seeking to protect that same public from official misconduct, including misconduct of judges and powerful attorneys.  

That is the same public where 80% of it cannot afford an attorney.  Yet, the same public can afford funding disciplinary proceedings on fraudulent charges to eliminate those few attorneys who are not afraid to do their jobs, be faithful to their oath of office and zealously and independently protect constitutional rights of their clients, and, as one of the most important of those rights - their right to an impartial judicial review.

To these menaces to society, such as I am, no normal rules of litigation should apply - because, if such rules would apply, prosecution would have to lose, and that cannot be tolerated.