Is licensing an executive or a judicial function? It is like a chameleon, it changes colors to match whoever performs it.

Licensing is normally an executive function.


Yet, it is claimed to be judicial function in attorney licensing because the Legislature delegated this executive power to courts.


I claimed that the Legislature did not have the power to delegate what it did not have (the executive power) to courts - but the claim was rejected by federal court under the Younger abstention, thus dumping it to state court, and the state court rejected the same claim without any explanation.


Recently, a federal district court applied absolute judicial immunity to a pistol licensing officer because he is a judge in the particular county in the State of New York out of which the case originated, even though in other counties of the State of New York the very same pistol licensing is handled by police officers who are not judges and are not attorneys.


The judiciary covered itself by the absolute judicial immunity, even for malicious and corrupt acts, without regard that such an immunity from constitutional violations (violations of oath of office) is not and may not be authorized by the U.S. Constitution.


Yet, the judiciary pretended that the rule of absolute judicial immunity is not absolutely arbitrary and has its limitations, that it applies only to "judicial acts" of a judge acting within jurisdiction of the court.


At the same time, courts routinely continuing to expand judicial immunity long beyond its breaking point.


As an example, judges disqualified by conflicts of interest, bias and financial interests are still immune (in federal courts' eyes).


And, as the Judiciary Law 90 and the recent decision by the Northern District of New York on the 2nd Amendment shows, when a certain administrative function is performed by a judge, it is assumed that the function has changed its nature from executive to judicial, and all of that to keep judges absolutely immune from liability, no matter what they do, to preserve absolute power in the judiciary and to preserve judiciary's ability to wreak absolute fear in such power.


Whatever you call such a government, it may not be called a democracy.