I have written on this blog about the "confidential order" of transfer of my own disciplinary proceeding to the Appellate Division 4th Department made in an ex parte manner, while neither I nor my husband (who, for some inexplicable reason was joined into my disciplinary action, even though he is not an attorney since July 7, 2011) are allowed to even see the "application" that was the basis of this ex parte order of transfer.
Apparently, ex parte communication between attorneys or parties and the presiding judge is not allowed.
In this case, apparently, the court is making an exception to the attorneys for the Committee the Court itself appointed - which is, in my opinion, judicial misconduct.
In case of Justice Elizabeth Garry, that misconduct is aggravated by multiple issues of misconduct pertaining to the order of transfer, on top of the two already outlined issues of misconduct - ex parte communication with the Professional Conduct Committee (hereinafter COPS) and blocking my own and my husband's access to the alleged "application" for the ex parte order of transfer.
Here are these issues:
1) Justice Garry was extremely upset immediately before she came to the bench of the Supreme Court (and was assigned to the Mokay matter in 2007) that one of her very well paying clients left her as a private attorney and hired my husband. According to my husband, she was very vocal about it. He did not raise it in the proceedings early on because he did not think at that point that Judge Garry will stoop to ruling against him because of her petty personal grudge. He was mistaken.
2) Justice Garry presided in the court over the Mokay farce, the basis of disbarment of my husband without a hearing while the Mokay case is still unresolved and is currently adjourned without a date. Presiding over the same or related matter in the court below is a strict disqualification for an appellate judge to preside over a case in the Appellate Division. Apparently, Justice Garry does not care about that.
3) One of the members of the COPS, attorney Samantha Holbrook, was Justice Garry's own law partner (as stated in the Judge's biography on the court's website) where Judge Garry toiled immediately before she came to the bench and was assigned to the Mokay saga. Thus, Samantha Holbrook also had a financial grudge against my husband for losing her paying client to him. Thus, Justice Garry presiding over the ex parte order of transfer, where the ex parte communication is between her and COPS where her former, equally disgruntled law partner Samantha Holbrook is a member of the Petitioner,
4) It is interesting to mention that where COPS was called a "Petitioner", there should be "a petition" - as to both individuals named as "Respondents" in the caption. Not only there was no petition naming my husband and served upon my husband at the time the order was made, but the court lost jurisdiction for entertaining any petitions against my husband after the court disbarred my husband as of July 7, 2011, and Justice Garry cannot pretend she did not know that.
5) Justice Garry also cannot pretend that she did not know that in my cross-motion to dismiss and for sanctions against COPS I specifically pointed out disqualification of Samantha Holbrook because she was the law partner of Justice Garry immediately before Justice Garry came to the bench.
6) Justice Garry also cannot pretend that she did not know at the time of her ex parte communication with the COPS where Samantha Holbrook was a member, about a lawsuit filed against her individually in federal court where a waiver of service was served upon her by certified mail upon her where I attempted to discover her networking connections with attorneys in front of her through a lawsuit, because discovery is not allowed before making motions to recuse, judges may sanction you for simply asking them a question pertaining to their potential disqualification (happened to me) and FOILs regarding documents potentially exposing judicial disqualification or potential financial interest in the outcome of a litigation are routinely stalled by the New York State Court Administration (happened to me) and transferred to the object of information sought, the judge, where the judge can retaliate against the FOILer at his heart's desire - as judge Carl F. Becker did, whose sanctions after my FOILs and after my lawsuits for misconduct against Judge Becker are the sole basis of my disciplinary proceedings.
I wrote on this blog that after the ex parte communication and transfer, and after God knows how many more ex parte communications and pressure upon the federal court, the federal court which was a co-defendant in litigation and thus disqualified from presiding, instead of transferring the federal lawsuit to another court, as I asked, dismissed it sua sponte before it was served, and called it "frivolous".
To a wrongdoer sued in a court of law, any allegations of his wrongdoing must seem frivolous, and an institution sued for its wrongdoing is no exception. My lawsuit is frivolous in the eyes of the defendant U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York simply because I sued that defendant, and that defendant considered that it had the power to decide a case against itself, a clear and screaming due process violation - not that anybody in that court cares for the rule of law, as long as a case that may result in embarrassing discoveries, a public scandal and a necessity to massively void many court orders can be squashed before it destroyed careers.
When the Appellate Division 3rd Department appoints every member and attorney of COPS and makes procedural and substantive rules of disciplinary proceedings favoring COPS, that already smacks of disqualification and puts validity of those rules into question.
When the Appellate Division 3rd Department creates rules by which 18 out of 21 members of COPS whose task is allegedly to protect the public from bad attorneys are practicing attorneys who are practically given a tool to eliminate the competitors they do not like, while lay members of the public may not outvote the supermajority of 18 attorneys, competitors to the attorneys subject to discipline - that is already a point of disqualification for both the COPS and the Court and a point to question validity of each and every disciplinary action adjudicated following such rules, which are clearly unconstitutional.
Yet, Justice Garry pushed the envelope even further by presiding over the case related to the case where she was a judge in the court below, and where a member of the COPS is her own former law partner who shared Justice Garry's personal grudge against Mr. Neroni for losing a private client.
Nothing like just a little bit of retaliation, Judge Garry, right? Nothing like abusing public trust and abusing the tremendous power the public put in your hands, right?
Shouldn't the name "justice", the name of your office, be not in name only? Shouldn't you follow and enforce the rule of law, not destroy it for personal reasons?
THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:
"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.
“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).
“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.
It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.
" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.
"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.
“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment