New York Attorney General: evidence submitted in support of a motion to recuse qualifies as "disruption of court proceedings" and ejection of the litigant out of the public courthouse by force

I wrote on this blog about misconduct of Judge Kevin Dowd of Chenango County Supreme Court and about the federal lawsuit that was filed against Judge Dowd.

Since Judge Dowd ordered an armed court officer, a known Nazi sympathizer who already threatened the litigant out of court, to throw the litigant out of the courthouse AFTER Dowd granted his motion to recuse and AFTER Dowd was out of the case and lost all authority to do anything in the case, Dowd was not covered by any immunity.

Yet, see the version that the New York State Attorney General (a public official sworn to protect New Yorkers) advances in defense of Judge Dowd's reprehensible behavior:

First of all, there was no "disruption" of the court proceedings, nor did Mr. Shtrauch allege that anywhere in his complaint or in his appellant's brief (I drafted that complaint, based on Mr. Shtrauch's words and later confirmed the truth of his words through a transcript of that conferencee, and read Mr. Shtrauch's pro se Appellant's Brief).

Mr. Shtrauch did not say anything even close to that he "disrupted court proceedings".

There was no basis whatsoever for the NYS Attorney General to claim that (1) Mr. Shtrauch behaved disruptively at a court conference, or that (2) Judge Dowd had authority to remove any party from a court conference because the party behaved as Mr. Shtrauch did.

First of all, Mr. Shtrauch showed pictures of the judge's law clerk not in the conference, but as part of a written motion to recuse that he asked the judge to decide on papers and without oral argument.

Second, oral arguments of motions, including a motion to recuse, must be held in open courtroom.  No procedure for "conferencing" motions is presupposed in New York.

Third, a motion to recuse must be supported by evidence.

Pictures of Mr. Shtrauch's children in the judge's law clerk's home publicly posted on her website is not "disruption of the courtroom", it was evidence submitted in writing in support of Mr. Shtrauch's motion to recuse - a motion which Judge Dowd granted - before he ordered an armed officer to throw Mr. Shtrauch out.

Judge Dowd did not provide any reasoning for throwing Mr. Shtrauch not only out of his chambers, but also out of the entire courthouse during business hours, where every other member of the public, including Mr. Shtrauch, were authorized to be.

And of course, whether Judge Dowd would have thrown out a non-Jewish litigant the way he did Mr. Shtrauch, is a matter of pure speculation that Mr. Shtrauch did not have to prove as a matter of equal protection claim.  What he was asserting is that he was ejected out of the courthouse, by use of force, by a judge who was no longer on his case, for no legal reason, while other members of the public had access to the courthouse.

If Dowd would have done the same to anybody else for making a motion to recuse, the NYS Attorney General is simply acknowledging, on behalf of his client Judge Dowd, that Judge Dowd is mentally unstable, does not have the required character for a judge and should not be on the bench.

But, the facts of the case clearly indicate that Judge Dowd's  actions were motivated by anti-Semitism, and for the NYS Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman, who is himself Jewish, to pretend he did not see anti-Semitism in this case is to pretend he is completely stupid and unfit for his own office.

I quoted that transcript here and described the dismissal of the case and reasons for it, here.   It is very clear that courts are trying to protect judges at any cost, and that it is for the people to try to start a vigorous legislative movement in order for judges to be held accountable even for the most egregious misconduct.

Judge Dowd had absolutely no right to issue any orders against Mr. Shtrauch after Judge Dowd left Mr. Shtauch's case.

Judge Dowd had absolutely no right to issue an order to throw a litigant out of the courthouse because of the contents of a motion to recuse criticizing the judge or his law clerk's behavior.

By the way, what constituted the "impugning" of Judge Dowd's character where Mr. Shtrauch simply pointed out the appearance of impropriety and ex parte communications of the judge's law clerk with Mr. Shtrauch's children (who were parties in custody litigation represented by a separate counsel), nobody knows.  The appearance of impropriety was enough for Judge Dowd to recuse, and he did.  But, his character was not at all "impugned", unless he considers himself as one with his female law clerk of many years.

It often happens that governmental attorneys do not think much before they put arguments into an appellant's brief in a civil rights case, especially one against a judge, which they expect to win hands down.

But, here the NYS Attorney General, on behalf of Kevin Dowd, open a whole new can of worms by claiming that a judge can react with violence and use of force to the contents of a motion to recuse.

By the way, that motivation was not part of the transcript in Mr. Shtrauch's divorce proceeding that I read, and was not part of the opposition in the court below.  The NYS Attorney General just gave Mr. Shtrauch a gift to go back and make a motion to vacate the order of dismissal, because Judge Dowd, on appeal, acknowledged that he considered the contents of the motion to recuse (which he granted) as disruption of court proceedings.

Once again, at the time Judge Dowd ordered to throw Mr. Shtrauch (who is an immigrant from Israel, with an accent, around 60 years of age) out of the courthouse, Judge Dowd was no longer assigned to Mr. Shtrauch's case - because he recused.

NYS Attorney General not only misrepresented Mr. Shtrauch's complaint and what occurred in Judge Dowd's chambers, as reflected by the complaint and by the transcript, but now asks the 2nd Circuit to create a very dangerous precedent: that a judge, after GRANTING a motion to recuse, may deem evidence submitted in support of the motion as "disruption of court proceeding" which justifies violence to the litigant and throwing the litigant out of the courthouse.

That's quite a turn on #contentbasedregulation.  I am holding my breath as to (1) whether the 2nd Circuit will consider the topic worthy of its full opinion rather than the usual fast-and-sloppy track reserved for civil rights appeals, and (2) if that extraordinary event happens, how the 2nd Circuit will rule on this interesting argument of the NYS Attorney General, an elected public official, the sworn defender of the people of the State of New York.

And, I must say that, unfortunately, criticizing judges is regarded as falsity and disruption of the tribunal, without regard to the truth of the supporting evidence, not only in New York. 

I wrote about it often on this blog, and very recently, about a Louisiana case where an attorney was suspended for providing truthful evidence in support of motions to recuse - for disruption of the tribunal.

So, NYS Attorney General's Orwellian view that truth is disruption of the tribunal is very well entrenched in the judicial officers of this country and those who are serving them.

I will follow the Shtrauch v Dowd appeal and report on it further.

Stay tuned.

A challenge to attorney licensing by a consumer of legal services

I posted a blog recently indicating that a consumer has filed a challenge to occupational regulation in court, and that it is interesting to see what the court will answer, because the logic of the request is straightforward:

1) the consumer points out to the court that occupational regulation is a form of governmental help to consumers in the choice of providers of certain services;

2) the consumer then says that he is a competent adult and has a right to either accept help from anybody on any subject, or decline it, I already wrote about this aspect of occupational regulation on this blog before;

3) then, the consumer declares to the government that he actually waives the government help and declines to accept it;

4) then, the consumer demands that the government should allow him to hire an unlicensed service provider to provide services that are otherwise heavily regulated; and

5) provides legal arguments as to why he is entitled to such relief;

6) the consumer then says that the provider will be unable to provide services, even if the court allows it, but only to the consumer, and asks the court to specifically give guarantee of non-prosecution to the provider.

That is only one out of several motions included into the bundle that I am publishing at the request of several readers.

The consumer of services is my husband Frederick J. Neroni.

The services he wants to be provided to him are legal services.

The provider he chose is me, an attorney whose license was suspended.

There are, of course, constitutional implications in a person's right to choose a court representative.  My husband quotes precedents allowing not to enforce attorney regulation in some circumstances, and allowing representation by a non-attorney, to ensure constitutionally guaranteed access to court.

I filed an affirmation in support of the request, indicating that, IF the court allows my husband the relief he is requesting, and IF the court guarantees to me non-prosecution (disciplinary and criminal) if I provide such a representation, I am ready, able and willing to do that.

Mr. Neroni had to file the motion by mail because, after I was yanked from his case together with my license, he has also lost e-filing rights, severely inconveniencing him and discriminating against him as a pro se litigant, same as all pro se litigants are discriminated in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York where only parties represented by counsel are given extra time to prepare their pleadings and assurance of free electronic filing, when they are allowed to file electronically at the last second of the day of the deadline, while pro se litigants must print out their pleadings, make several copies of it and send them to the court by overnight mail, while overnight mail can be "delayed", "diverted" or "misdirected" (all happened to us), and courts may manipulate the docket by making an order before the motion that came by mail is filed by the clerk.

My husband called the court and confirmed that they did receive his motion and "are working on it" (preparing it for scanning and e-filing into Pacer.gov, an unnecessary work that clerks have to do because my husband is not allowed to do electronic filing, otherwise he would have done it himself).

Anyway, his confirmation by phone at least means that the court should be prevented now from making any decisions on the pending Rule 60 motion before the supplemental information that comes with this motion is reviewed.

Despite the obvious bias of the court against Mr. Neroni and myself, the argument of the motion to allow opting out of occupational regulation is straightforward:  the government (the court itself acting as an administrative agency) declares that attorney regulation is governmental help to consumers of legal services meant for protection of the consumers.  

The consumer of legal services turns down the help and says to the government (the court) - no, thank you, I do not need your help, I want this person to represent me in court, license or no license (I wrote about that right earlier on this blog). 

The consumer says - because of the topic and because your, the government's, sanctions made it impossible for me to hire anybody else, you, the government, must grant my motion and must grant me the right to choose a provider I want, not a provider the government (my opponent in litigation) approves.  

And not only for that reason.

Mr. Neroni asserts his right to choose his own provider of services, including his own provider of legal services without any help from the government in the form of licensing (approval) of his providers based on his fundamental right to autonomy in making his private decisions in choosing privately retained providers for himself, as any competent adult has.

All Mr. Neroni is looking for is an honest application of the law to the facts and an honest answer from the court - if the answer is "no", he is not allowed to use me for legal representation, then a reasoned explanation must be provided.

I personally would also be interested to see what position Mr. Neroni's opponents will take.  Let's not forget that the defendants in Neroni v Zayas action are judges, attorneys and attorney disciplinary authorities, all of whom are supported by Mr. Neroni's taxes, all of whom are represented in the action for free by the New York State Attorney General.  I will see how, if at all, they will be able to justify opposition to Mr. Neroni's personal and private choice of legal services provider and court representative who he trusts.

Attorneys representing the opponents on this motion are:

• Porter Kirkwood, Delaware County Attorney;
• Eric Schneiderman, New York State Attorney General (Bruce Boivin of counsel)

I am looking forward to see what these government-employed attorneys, licensed attorneys, will say at the notion of a consumer asking the court to disregard attorney licensing and allow him a provider of legal services of his choice, license or no license.

Here is the motion, to read each document, click on the underlined links:

1) Mr. Neroni's Notice of Motion;
2) Mr. Neroni's Memorandum of Law;
3) Mr. Neroni's Affirmation with Exhibits

Exhibit 1	Tatiana Neroni's state order of suspension
Exhibit 2	conviction of Dean Skelos, resignation from NYS senate, John Flannagan as current NYS Senate Majority leader (for substitution of parties)
Exhibit 3	Evidence showing Samantha Holbrook as Chairman of 3rd Department Committee for Professional Conduct + printout that Monica Duffy is Chief attorney for the Committee and no longer its Chairman
Exhibit 4	Evidence that New York Chief Judge Janet Difiore is sworn in
Exhibit 5	Evidence that Richard Northrup is sworn in as a judge, Delaware County DA website printout showing John Hubbard as Acting District Attorney of Delaware County
Exhibit 6	Appellate docket sheet Neroni v Zayas 15-2030
Exhibit 7	Opposition of State Defendants to Mr. Neroni's oversized appellate brief pointing out to the operation of the Statewide Commission for attorney discipline and new facts that occurred and laws that transpired since the dismissal of Neroni v Zayas action in June of 2015
Exhibit 8	Rule 11 (sanctions) notification to Mr. Neroni from Mr. Neroni's then-counsel Tatiana Neroni (shortly before her suspension), Tanya's attorney affirmation
Exhibit 9	FTC Guidelines to Staff regarding supervision of markets regulated by market players (attorneys disciplined by attorneys)
Exhibit 10	NDNY General Order 44 of December 5, 2014 attorney disciplinary panel consisting of 100% of attorneys
Exhibit 11	The "Legal Hand" announcement about an organization where non-attorneys are giving advice to indigent New Yorkers, with a blessing from New York Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge
Exhibit 12	Article about Defendant Karen Peters' (Chief Judge of New York State Appellate Division 3rd Department)  special counsel Christina Ryba being fired
Exhibit 13	Appointment of Christina Ryba to the NYS Commission for Attorney Discipline
Exhibit 14	Removal (without an explanation) of Christina Ryba to the NYS Commission for Attorney Discipline
Exhibit 15	Article about swearing-in of Christina Ryba as a judge
Exhibit 16	Complaint of Tatiana Neroni about Disciplinary attorneys and members of disciplinary committee of the 3rd Department in 2013
Exhibit 17	The still-unfulfilled demand of Tatiana Neroni made in 2012 for documents reflecting the earlier dismissal of Ryan Adams' complaint against Tatiana Neroni based on the same factual situations upon which the Committee were trying to discipline Tatiana Neroni again based on sanctions of Judge Becker
Exhibit 18	Demand for documents from the 4th Department by Tatiana Neroni after her suspension
Exhibit 19	Letter by the 3rd Department Committee's then-Chief Attorney Peter Torncello dismissing complaint against himself
Exhibit 20	Professor Brescia's article in Huffington Post as to how unregulated industries should follow the lead of lawyers in "self-regulation", to avoid "the watchful and intrusive eye of the state"
Exhibit 21	Attorney Registration of Professor Raymond Brescia
Exhibit 22	Former judge Bryan Hedge's attorney registration
Exhibit 23	Attorney Registration of judge Christina Ryba
Exhibit 24	Attorney Registration of former Chief Counsel of the 3rd Department Professional Conduct Committee Peter Torncello
Exhibit 25	Attorney Registration of former attorney for the 3rd Departmetn Attorney disciplinary Committee Stephen Zayas
Exhibit 26	Attorney Registration of the Chief Counsel and former Chairwoman of the 3rd Department Professional Conduct Committee Monica Duffy
Exhibit 27	Attorney Registration of 3rd Department disciplinary attorney Alison Coan
Exhibit 28	Attorney Registration of New York State Attorney General and defendant in the Neroni v Zayas action Eric T. Schneiderman
Exhibit 29	Attorney Registration of attorney Andrew Ayers, appellate attorney for Eric Schneiderman
Exhibit 30	Attorney Registration of Bruce Boivin representing state defendants in Neroni v Zayas
Exhibit 31	Attorney Registration of Dean Skelos
Exhibit 32	Attorney Registration of Sheldon Silver
Exhibit 33	Bryan Hedges order taking him off the bench by NYS Judicial Conduct Commission for sexual molestation of a child
Exhibit 34	Printout from Christina Ryba's judicial biography on the NYS Unified Court System's website showing that, after she was fired by the 3rd Department Chief Judge for unethical conduct, she was still kept on the 3rd Department Committee for "Fairness"
Exhibit 35	Peter Torncello and Stephen Zayas resign among investigation into falsified time sheets
Exhibit 36	Sheldon Silver "Guilty" Jury Verdict Sheet of November 30, 2015, SDNY Case No. 1:15-cr-93-VEC
Exhibit 37	Federal indictment against Dean Skelos
Exhibit 38	The "Guilty" Jury Verdict against Dean Skelos
Exhibit 39	ABA report cited in Professor Brescia's article calling for attorney "self-regulation" (which is a federal antitrust violation)
Exhibit 40	Matthew Holmes' LinkedIn Account, printout as of 11/05/15 - Matthew Holmes is the former "judicial intern" of assigned judge David Peebles who I sued for spying on me on the web outside of court proceedings - the LinkedIn account shows that Matthew Holmes worked as a "law clerk" for private law firms long before his admission to the bar
Exhibit 41	Attorney registration of Matthew Holmes in 2016
Exhibit 42	Article in New York Times about Brian LaRoche, a non-attorney representing people on traffic tickets in New York City
Exhibit 43	Article in New York Times about police officers practicing law and prosecuting traffic tickets as prosecutors
Exhibit 44	Revised order re representation in administrative proceedings by suspended Pennsylvania attorneys Andy Ostrowski and Don Bailey, indicating that their client may hire them, but that, if they agree to a representation which is not practice of law in Pennsylvania, they may be punished as a disciplinary matter for contempt of court and violation of their orders of suspension

4) My Affirmation with Exhibits in support of Mr. Neroni's motion

• Exhibit A - a copy from secret records of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York showing assignment of a case number to my disciplinary proceedings in the NDNY;
• Exhibit B - a printout from NDNY "attorney lookup" indicating my public attorney status as "suspended";
• Exhibit C - a printout from Pacer search indicating that Tatiana Neroni's attorney disciplinary case, not just the filing in the case, but the existence of the case in NDNY, is hidden from view on Pacer;
• Exhibit D - Tatiana Neroni's state disciplinary order;
• Exhibit E - New York state law license of the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York Glenn Suddaby indicating that each judge of NDNY court is dependent on the whims of defendants in Neroni v Zayas action, regulators of the legal profession;
• Exhibit F - state law license of presiding judge Lawrence Kahn;
• Exhibit G - state law license of assigned magistrate judge David Peebles.

As far as I know, this is the first court challenge to occupational licensing in general and to attorney regulation in particular, made by a beneficiary of such licensing, a consumer of services, so both Mr. Neroni's motion and the answer to it that we are awaiting from the court, may be a breakthrough in the history of occupational regulation and attorney regulation.

In the context of this case, it is of course, laughable to expect fairness from the government where the government is up to its ears in actively trying to use attorney regulation meant as a shield for Mr. Neroni as a consumer of my legal services as a sword against the same Mr. Neroni, where the government stripped me of my law license right about the time I was going to make a motion for sanctions against that same government.

In the context of civil rights litigation, to expect the government, the defendant in civil rights actions, to somehow protect the plaintiff's rights for good legal services, is laughable as a general notion.

Yet, for lack of any other forum, Mr. Neroni made the motion where he could - where the action was pending, and we will see what the court is going to do, how it is going to twist reason and logic to deny Mr. Neroni what he asked.

I will publish the court's answer in this blog.

Stay tuned.

Indiana prosecutor Bradley Cooper should be disbarred instead of re-elected

When a prosecutor reportedly published an election flyer that he is "proudly overcrowding" prisons - with people like William Russel who reportedly was convicted for 40 years for breaking into a house to steal $52.

Apparently, the state of Indiana considered 40 years in prison an adequate punishment for the crime.

And prosecutor Bradley Cooper is proud of that conviction and is boasting of it.

That's the same prosecutor who, reportedly, was engaged in unlawful surveillance of a deputy sheriff's home to spy on a woman the prosecutor allegedly had a romantic interest in.

The prosecutor was allegedly spying on the sheriff's deputy's house sitting in a car with a beer in hand - which is enough to charge him with violation of the law prohibiting having open alcoholic beverages in a vehicle, and, if he drank that beer, for driving while intoxicated.

There is a question - how many convictions were drummed up by prosecutor Bradley Cooper out of revenge, retaliation, based on personal grudges or based on evidence obtained by illegal means.

Yet, the prosecutor proudly remains a licensed attorney and continues to brag that he is "proudly overcrowding (!!) the prison system".

Cooper thinks, obviously, that people he puts away are the scum of the earth.

Yet, people who abuse their power and public trust as Cooper does are the real monsters.

Let's see whether any attorney discipline will follow against Cooper for his shenanigans.

Stay tuned.

The public was "protected" by denying a taxicab license to a disbarred 67-year-old attorney with no history of violence. Really?

I wrote on this blog about restrictions imposed on employment of suspended and disbarred attorneys.  If you are suspended or disbarred (by your own competitors), those same competitors hold a death grip upon your future employment.

That is what happened to ex-attorney Joseph C Levine.

According to the February 24, 2016 decision of the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division 2nd Department, Joseph C Levine cannot even be a licensed cab driver (of course, nothing prevents him from working for Uber, to look on the bright side).





By the way, for some God-forsaken reason, the New York State Court administration has published denial of a TAXI license as ATTORNEY discipline for Mr. Levine:

Moreover, the links to prior alleged two orders of suspension of Mr. Levine (2000 and 2001) 

lead to the above screen with the 2007 resignation decision and the denial of a taxi license.

Since both prior orders of suspension are accompanied with links, and all three links lead to just one screen, where orders of suspension of 2000 and 2001 are not available, it appears that there is something in those orders of suspension that the Court Administration does not want the public to see?

It is peculiar when on attorney discipline page, attorney disciplinary decisions are not published, but denial of a taxi cab license is.

The decision to deny the taxicab license to Mr. Levine claims that Mr. Levine, "a former attorney, was suspended from the practice of law for two years, based upon his conviction in federal court of the federal felony of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of 18 USC § 371 (see Matter of Levine, 287 A.D.2d 230), arising from a scheme involving the bribery of insurance adjusters".

The statute of conviction is here, and, since it was a plea bargain, it is not entirely clear, what it was that Mr. Levine has committed that was criminal.  Allegedly it is fraud against the U.S. Government, but "conspiracy to commit mail fraud" without the actual "mail fraud" (which is in itself a statute so vague that it is bordering on unconstitutional)

The referenced order of suspension of 2001 mentions conviction ON A PLEA BARGAIN (there was no trial) for a D felony, "conspiracy to commit mail fraud", in exchange for no jail time.  

As a criminal defense attorney, I know many innocent people who would plead guilty in exchange for being allowed to be free and continue to earn some living for their families.  Conviction on a plea bargain does not have as much value as conviction after a jury trial - even though it is being treated the same way by law.

Moreover, while suspending Mr. Levine for 2 years in 2001, the 2nd Department stated:

"In sum, the respondent submits that he is concededly guilty of serious professional misconduct but emphasizes that his crime involved a single transaction which was not initiated by him, did not compromise the administration of justice, and was not motivated by venality, greed or self-interest."

The court did not punish Mr. Levine for his above position as "not accepting responsibility" or "not expressing remorse", and the court did not disbar Mr. Levine, even though he was convicted of a felony, and felony convictions trigger automatic disbarment in New York, without even disciplinary proceedings.

So, overall, the order of suspension was, I might say, favorable to Mr. Levine.

Within 4 years, despite the felony conviction, Mr. Levine was allowed to be reinstated as an attorney.  So, even after Mr. Levine was convicted of a D felony, the 2nd Department considered him fit to hold a position of trust and be an attorney.

Ok, Mr. Levine allegedly violated that position of trust - again - and allegedly stole from his escrow (trust) accounts, allegedly to satisfy his gambling debts.

The order denying him the right to drive a taxicab as a licensed driver mentions his conviction - again upon a plea bargain - for grand larceny, for allegedly stealing hundreds of thousands of dollars from his escrow accounts.

Mr. Levine did his time in state prison for that conviction:

Note Mr. Levine's date of birth - 04/09/1948.  He is soon to turn 68.

Now, let's see why was Mr. Levine denied a TAXICAB license?  He is not seeking a reinstatement as an attorney - he is seeking a license to earn his living as a licensed taxicab driver, and the trial court thought the reasoning of the taxicab commission to deny him his license was not good.

Yet, the appellate court (also the attorney licensing court) thought that the reasoning of the taxicab commission was good - and even posted that decision as a decision on Mr. Levine's ATTORNEY discipline.  

The appellate court upheld the denial of a taxicab license to Mr. Levine, because granting such a license, in the court's opinion, "would create an unreasonable risk to the public by permitting the petitioner to engage in 'unsupervised financial transactions' with customers."

But, based on this consideration, Mr. Levine should be then blocked from ANY "unsupervised financial transactions with customers", yet, many businesses and professions in the United States still remained outside of the gripping reach of occupational licensing.

For example, Mr. Levine can be an unlicensed sales clerk, an unlicensed contractor (in some states they started licensing contractors, too, but in others, they don't), an unlicensed driver for Uber, or - guess what - an unlicensed driver for a licensed taxicab company.

New York allowed in 2015 an undocumented (illegal) immigrant to become a licensed attorney.

New York announced that it will be issuing teacher and other professional licenses to undocumented immigrants.

When immigrants are undocumented, even if they were granted President Obama's "executive amnesty", there is no way of ensuring their background, and that is a rational public safety issue.

Maybe, just maybe, the state is then issuing licenses to people with a history of violence.

As to Mr. Levine, he was checked through and through and obviously does not have a history of violence, otherwise he would not have been released early on parole, and released early from parole.

Mr. Levine's background was checked out by the attorney disciplinary committee, and there are no findings of violence in his order of suspension or resignation/disbarment.

Mr. Levine's behavior was under constant supervision by his federal probation, for three years after his first conviction on a plea bargain, for a non-violent crime.

Mr. Levine's behavior was under constant supervision by prison authorities where he served his time for non-violent crimes that he has pled to, and then, after an early release, by his parole officer who also released him from parole early.

The bottom line is - he was never convicted of a VIOLENT crime, which would be the major concern for consideration of a candidate for a taxicab driver license.

Since a taxicab driver is not paid in advance, Mr. Levine was not going to be involved, as a taxicab driver, in a "unsupervised financial transaction" jeopardizing his customers.  

When paid at the end of the trip, Mr. Levine would only be receiving already earned money, his own money, and the only danger in that financial transaction would be that the customer would actually cheat on Mr. Levine by leaving without paying him. 

The only thing Mr. Levine was seeking, at his nearly 68 years of age, is his due process right to earn a living, to openly have a lawful business.

As I said above, any business involves "unsupervised financial transactions with customers", when you are simply paid for the job you are doing.

And, being convicted of a crime, even for a crime of grand larceny (a theft from an escrow account) does not mean that you should not be working in your own business which does not deal with any advance payments (which would then trigger the relation to the conviction).  

In other words, there is nothing to steal when you are paid in advance.  I am wondering, what are the backgrounds of judges who ruled against Mr. Levine, and whether those judges can imaging earning a living in any way and not be involved in financial transactions with customers.  In effect, the court foreclosed to Mr. Levine any opportunity to earn a living in a licensed occupation - no matter what the state policy and the state statute the court cited says about state law encouraging issuance of license to people with a criminal record.

Apparently, in New York, the only place where you can work, if you have a criminal record - and if you are not Dean Skelos or Sheldon Silver - is underground, off the books.

Apparently, Mr. Levine did not have political connections, otherwise, no matter which crimes he would commit, he would remain an attorney with "no record of public discipline".

Even if he had a federal criminal conviction like Dean Skelos and Sheldon Skelos.

Even if he was involved in a public scandal and caught after pilfering hundreds of thousands of dollars from public coffers, like the spouse of the Chief Judge of New York State Court of Claims M. Cornelia Cahill was (she now changed her official registration name and is now Mary C. Cahill instead of M. Cornelia Cahill, as she appeared in the scandalous news reports, and manages an Albany law office of a prominent law firm employing judges and recent judicial law clerks - but she retained her original "M. Cornelia Cahill" name on the website of her law firm, in violation of attorney registration rules).

Even if he was a judge and was taken off the bench for commission of a violent crime of child molestation, as Judge Bryan Hedges was.

The only reason why Mr. Levine was denied even a taxicab license is because he did not have political clout as people above did.  There was no "rational basis" to deny him that license.

Mr. Levine was not convicted of robbing people at gunpoint, or of stealing purses left behind in a grocery store.  There is no indication that he cannot be trusted to drive people from place to place, for a fee.

And, it appears that it is not driving without a license, but enforcing of driving with a license that has recently become a public safety problem in New York City - where people's vehicles are seized and they are thrown out of their vehicles in all types of weather by the taxicab commission (TLC) inspectors for:

• picking up a pregnant wife from an airport;
• giving a lift to nuns of a local convent, as a volunteer;
• driving around non-English-speaking friends to show them the city;
• bringing their own child and the child's friend to school etc.

People have their cars seized by TLC officers, have to stay without their personal vehicles for days, suffer inconvenience, humiliation and even life-threatening situation, like the pregnant woman suffered whose husband picked her up at the airport, but then their car was seized and they had to walk home in freezing weather.

The most disgusting of all, not having committing a crime, it is not the TLC officers who had to prove that people whose vehicles they've seized, are operating as unlicensed cab drivers, but people at the wheel of their personal vehicles had to prove that those in their vehicles are friends or spouses or live-in boyfriends and girlfriends.

People have to prove to courts - as an explanation of WHY THEY WERE IN A VEHICLE TOGETHER that they are raising children together.

Yet, how do you prove friendship on site?  We do not have "certificates of friendship" issued by the state yet.

So, while the Appellate Division allegedly protected the public from the dangers of having a senior disbarred attorney with no history of violence drive them around town as a cab driver, without an advance payment, the Nazis from TLC are allowed to jeopardize safety and even lives of people in order to ensure that only licensed drivers are allowed on their turf.

It is disgusting. 

The workings of the TLC Nazis also shows that it is high time to review the whole idea that licensing taxicab drivers protects public safety.  Apparently, in NYC it jeopardizes public safety.

On the need of independently created records of court proceedings

I dedicated a lot of time on this blog to covering issues of preservation of records of court proceedings, not only as to what was said, but also the body language of participants.

I wrote about the fact that my own disciplinary proceedings were adamantly secret, even when it was illegal to close the courtroom after I opened it, by operation of law, through a written waiver of my privacy.

I wrote that I was criminally charged practically for violation of my own privacy, for blogging about judicial and prosecutorial misconduct in cooking the transcripts of my disciplinary proceedings, specifically, for posting both the transcripts and the audio-recordings of the same conferences that did not match the transcripts, including material issues (whether the proceeding was a hearing or a conference, who were the parties present, whether I waived any issues, whether I testified or not).

Judging by my own experience as an attorney, on what my clients and readers reported to me and on my research for this blog, preservation of the record of court proceedings is a problem across the United States.

Of course, fabrication of transcripts is a crime, and not only in New York.

Here is a question of a legal consumer asked on Avvo about fabrication of transcripts, and an answer by a California criminal defense attorney.

Thank you, attorney Marshall, even though I wonder whether the attorney and the court reporter will be prosecuted criminally if the opposing counsel is himself the state Attorney General, like it already happened in California - recently its Attorney General was criticized by a court for fabricating a transcript of confession in a criminal case.  

Yet, I completely agree with Attorney Marshall's determination above.   It is a crime to cook court transcripts, no matter how you look at it.

I will definitely ask disciplinary attorney Mary Gasparini to be disbarred - when the new attorney disciplinary rules will kick in in July of 2016.

I will also ask the New York court system to yank certifications of court reporters who cooked the transcripts, but I doubt that any of what you say will happen to the perpetrators of such fraud will happen.

Because the very court that such attorney Gasparini and two court reporters were defrauding for cooking the transcripts are aware of the fraud and refused to address it or sanction the fraudsters.  After all, that fraud was "for the benefit of the public" - brought in order to bring to heel the much-hated critic of judicial misconduct, so it is totally forgivable.

Here is a petition filed online at change.org 2 months ago by a New York litigant.  The New Yorker is asserting that certain transcripts of a divorce proceedings were inaccurate, in order to protect misconduct of a judge:

I wonder if the alleged serious misconduct of the judge involved (there are two judges in New York by the last name of Cooper, so I do not know which one is meant here), was investigated and addressed.

If allegations are not investigated simply because they are not put together in a refined way, as an attorney would, that is not a good reason to deny investigation, because what is asserted is serious misconduct, that includes condoning fabrication of transcripts.

Reports of alterations of court transcripts were made recently in Pennsylvania (see also here, and see that the reporter in question sued the lawyer for even alleging the alteration of transcripts) and in New York, where, apparently, a whole code language exists indicating that the record should be "cleaned" and what needs to be done with it.

In the same Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court has removed a judge for alteration of transcripts (but did not take her off the bench, disbar her, nor was she criminally prosecuted) for alteration of a transcript in a death penalty case and removing her own disparaging remark from the transcript.

In Ohio, a judge would stop recording of a proceeding because - as the judge claimed - the recording equipment would, coincidentally, "not pick up", and - as the attorney claimed, because the judge wanted to fix the transcript as he saw fit (you will soon see a separate blog about how Delhi Town Court, NY judge Richard Gumo was doing the same - for years).

In Texas, an individual asked a question on Avvo, an attorney rating system where attorneys also answer questions of individuals in exchange for an increase for their rating.  

The question was pretty staight-forward:

 

Yet, the answers given by two Texas attorneys were anything but straightforward.

First, none of them were civil rights attorneys - one announced himself as a "criminal defense attorney" and the other as a "personal injury lawyer".

Yet, the question required an answer from a civil rights attorney, because it involved potential issues of quasi-judicial immunity.

And the answer is - no, there is no judicial immunity given to court reporters, there is, among others, a case on the subject, Antoine v Byers, decided in 1992 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.

 Yet, one of the answerers concentrated on whether the person would be able to prove the alteration and "declined to comment" beyond that point, obviously fearing retaliation for giving a potential advice that the person can, in fact, sue a court reporter for alteration of records, and can even seek that the reporter's certification be yanked and that the reporter be criminally prosecuted (as the California attorney above suggested).

 

The second attorney who answered acknowledged that a "serious injustice" may have been committed against the asker, but tried to channel the asker's efforts first into an appeal.  

Yet, such an approach has two problems.

First, it did not answer the question whether a person can sue the court reporter or not - which is he can, for common law fraud and, possibly, for more.  Suing a court reporter and appealing a case where the court reporter committed a crime are two different things.

Second, appealing based on an altered transcript may make the problem worse and irreversible for the asker, making the advice truly bad and counter-productive.

I did appeal a lot, and I know that, at least in New York and in federal courts (and, I am sure, in any other court), a record on appeal must include a certified transcript of proceedings.

In this case, the certified transcript will have to be the altered transcript perjurously certified by the court reporter.

After the appellant submits such a transcript that the appellant him/herself obtained, while knowing the transcripts were altered, there is a distinct possibility that the appellant will have waived the issue that the transcript was altered.  After all, the appellant him/herself has submitted that altered transcript certified as good, to the court, thus committing the appellant's very own crime. 

Even federal judges were reported to have ordered alteration of transcripts, and retaliation against whistle-blowers who reported such misconduct.
Since in many jurisdictions, audio and video recordings of court proceedings are not allowed, or, to make an audio recording or a video recording of proceedings (security tapes) is made the exclusive right of the court, it is the court and its personnel who can do anything it wants with the transcripts and even with digital files.

See how #JudgePhyllisKeaty of Louisiana handled the issue of court recordings in which she did (her version) or did not (the attorney's version) disclose having a property interest in a real estate firm that handled the sale of the litigants' property.

Note that while what Judge Keaty did reads like a disciplinary or criminal proceeding against her, it is in fact a successful disciplinary proceeding against the attorney whistle-blower Christine Mire who found out and reported Judge Keaty's misconduct:

So, the attorney did what she is supposed to do - due diligence.  She asked for the audio recording.  

By the way, I myself and many of my former clients and of readers of my blogs asked for audio CDs of court proceedings from New York courts, with an invariable answer - NO.  That is not "our procedure".  Our procedure is that you pick a stenographer from an "approved list", agree with the stenographer on the price, tell the court the name of your "chosen" (or, rather, coerced) stenographer, and then the court will send the stenographer the audio-recording (possibly, with instruction of how to "fix" whatever "problems" in that audio tape).

As you see above and below, the stenographer in Chistine Mire's case became initially just "very defensive", and then sued to enjoin disclosure of the audiotape, but Respondent still obtained the tapes and was actually able to prove that the recordings were actually altered.

 

 So, did #ChristineMire get a Citizen of the Year award for her courage, perseverence and due diligence in looking for evidence BEFORE accusing the judge of any appearance of impropriety?

No, she was stripped of her ability to earn a living for a "year and a day", with 2 years "unsupervised probation" during which she should be a good girl and never try to do the same as what she did for which she lost her law license - never to try again to do a thorough job for her client and never again try to seek existing evidence of judicial misconduct and corruption.

And, the judge who should be stripped of her black robe, disbarred and put behind another kind of bars, testified against attorney Mire in her disciplinary hearing.

#JudgePhyllisKeaty testified like that:

So, in other words, Judge Keaty lied as to what was cut out of those court tapes.

While Christine Mire was charged with making "unfounded motions to recuse", thus "delaying litigation", "disrupting the tribunal" and making accusations against a judge that were "false or made with reckless disregard to truth or falsity", 

• Christine Mire was right that the tapes were altered;
• Christine Mire as right that Judge Keaty lied as to disclosure of her interest in the real estate firm;
• Judge Keaty changed her disclosure firm after and as a direct result of Christine Mire's investigation;
• Judge Keaty was ordered off the case, so Christine Mire's motions to recuse were not unfounded, after all.

I do not believe that any of this circus would be possible if one simple thing was done - if proceedings were public, and if any member of the public present at such proceedings, including parties and their attorneys, could videotape proceedings themselves or order videotaping from others.

Then, there could be multiple videotaped versions of the same events and a very good possibility to compare who doctored what, without fighting "very defensive" court reporters to see what exactly is in the record of the court proceeding where the attorney and her client was attorneys of record, and thus had an absolute right to the record of proceeding, in all forms, paper, audio and video, if those records existed.

And, while one of the dissenters in Christine Mires disciplinary case, Judge Weimer, said this:

 

So, for an attorney and a sitting appellate judge, what he just listed above (most scans above were from his dissenting opinion), was enough for a criminal investigation and charges against Judge Phyllis, he refuses to see the facts for what they were and insists that "the standard of review" "does not require [him] to question [his] assumption (he still cherishes assumptions, after reading that record! - TN) that all judiciary members involved are honest, eminently competent and motivated by the noblest intentions, an assumption applicable to each of the judges in this matter".

Judge Weiner (whose own law license, and thus judgeship and livelihood) was in the hands of the same "disciplinary council" that went after Christine Mire, stressed his solidarity with his own brothers and sisters, judges involved in using attorney disciplinary proceedings, designed to protect consumers of attorneys' services, into an institutional vendetta against a whistleblower of judicial misconduct.

Judge Weiner, even as he dissented and thus, tried to do "the right thing" for Christine Mire, stressed twice - at the beginning and end of phrase, I highlighted it in yellow, that he still cherished assumptions of honesty, eminent competency and noble motivations for all judges "involved" in the case, including the one likely engaged in criminal conduct and the ones who were covering her up and going after the whistle-blower.

There was a more honest dissent in Christine Mire's disciplinary case - short and to the point, by judge Hughes.

I applaud to Judge Hughes.

That one paragraph of Judge Hughes' dissent was all that was needed to dismiss the case against Attorney Mire.

The record of attorney Mire's disciplinary proceedings would serve wonderfully as evidence before the grand jury to indict Judge Phyllis Keaty and whoever else was participating in doctoring transcripts and court tapes. 

I guess, the feds need to step in there, as state system, the system of the "honorables" who do not want to see misconduct of their own "brothers and sisters" even when facing evidence of it, will only continue to do more of the same - pursuing not the perpetrators of court corruption, but the whistleblowers, and destroying their lives.

For that reason, I am all for the YouTube revolution.

Allowing any member of the public to video-record court proceedings will be a large step forward to clean up the courts.

It should be done now.  And people, through grass roots movements and through aggressively petitioning their legislators, or voting out of office those who are not responsive to requests for such legislation, can do it.