The State Court system suspended my law license in order to prevent my filing of a motion for sanctions for frivolous conduct against Chief Judge Lippman, New York State Attorney General and 3rd Department Chief Judge Peters. How predictable.

Yesterday, the New York State Attorney General's office, specifically, attorney Kenneth Gellhaus who falsely accused me of UPL in July of this year, but suffered no attorney discipline because of his status, gleefully notified me of my suspension - before the court or opposing attorney did.

So, halleluja, on November 16, 2015 the Appellate Division 4th Department has filed a backdated order effective November 13, 2015 which was not filed on the effective date (I checked the website of the court on November 13, 2015, Friday and throughout the weekend).

I was suspended for 2 years, and not for "frivolous conduct in 'three client matters'", as the court fraudulently stated in the court order (below), but, a I wrote in this blog before, as a continuous penalty for suing the now retired Judge Carl F. Becker of Delaware County court, for actually working FOR my clients in making motions to recuse Becker because of his corruption and misconduct.

And, in deciding the two out of three sanctions on appeal, the 3rd Department has actually ignored the whole motions 
(M&C Brothers, motion to compel production of identity of Plaintiff's expert at the un-noticed deposition that happened before I was admitted to the bar and entered this case ONLY for purposes of a motion to vacate based on misconduct of attorney Follender, who is - what a surprise - a judge in the town of Denning, Ulster County, the County where Chief Judge Peters of the 3rd Department is from) and the whole transcript (Shields v Carbone, admission to an ex parte communication between Becker and Delaware County Attorney Richard Spinney).

I was suspended without a hearing by a referee which - as the order below says - was appointed to hold a hearing, but refused to do so because, after reviewing THE PLEADINGS (which was NOT the referee's job) the referee "concluded" that collateral estoppel is applicable.

In other words, the 4th Department allowed the referee to decide a motion instead of to hold a hearing.  And motions in the appellate division, by New York State Constitution, can only be decided by appellate judges, and only by a quorum of appellate judges, and certainly not by referees.  Nor is there a procedure for referee to even CONSIDER pleadings and issue "advisory opinions" ON THE PLEADINGS - without conducting evidentiary hearings that the referee was appointed to conduct.

So - the referee was appointed to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

The referee refused to hold such a hearing.

I continued to press to have such a hearing.

The court suspended me without ever giving me such a hearing that the court appointed the referee to conduct, and without ever opening my proceedings to the public and the press as I requested - because the court was afraid that it will not be able to control the damage if I start to call witnesses.

And, the court held against me that I did not appear at the illegal pre-mature "mitigation hearing".

And, the held against me that I did not "acknowledge my misconduct" - of making a motions to recuse Becker because of his legendary misconduct, and because I moved to vacate because attorney Follender defrauded the court and my clients by hiding testimony and even identity of his expert who testified at an un-noticed deposition.

You can check the file - a transcript of a deposition, by law, must be filed with the court, it is not there, nor the name of the testifying expert.

So, the fraud remains unpunished.

But the person who exposed fraud and misconduct has been suspended from the practice of law and precluded from providing services to the indigent people, including pro bono, as a civil rights attorney.

How appropriate.

How predictable.

One more interesting point.

Collateral estoppel does not apply between the adjudication of a violation of a court rule of frivolous conduct in a court proceedings and frivolous conduct in Rule 3.1 in attorney disciplinary proceedings, because the standards of proof are different.

The court rule (Becker's sanctions) were decided under the so-called "objective standard".

Rule 3.1 is to be decided (in a normal court, of course), under a "subjective standard", a much higher standard of proof.

Therefore, since there was a discrepancy between the standards, the evidentiary hearing was initially ordered by the court.

But, apparently, somebody from "up high" signaled to the court that that was not a good decision, that an evidentiary hearing in my case will expose to many "good people" in their, let's say, questionable conduct, and the court thwarted its own order of an evidentiary hearing and instead allowed a referee (a retired mentally and physically frail county court judge) to decide the motion for a summary judgment.

Another sweet fact is that "I did not express remorse".

I wholeheartedly agree.

I did not express remorse.

I did not do anything wrong.

Moreover, I pledge to continue to do the very same, for what I was suspended - expose judicial misconduct, as much as I can.

It is funny how the court claimed as an aggravating circumstance my alleged "pattern" of "abusing legal process" without actually pointing out what exactly constituted that "pattern".

The court actually has no authority to rely upon any mysterious and undisclosed "patterns" without first putting me on notice that certain evidence is presented against me as aggravating circumstances, and no such evidence was ever presented to me by the opposing party.

I also wrote on this blog that the 3rd Department and 4th Department Committees do not keep proper archives and do not have files, which I checked and ascertained through a federal lawsuit on behalf of my husband.

My access to my own alleged "file" was also blocked by the 3rd and 4th Department committees, so what kind of mysterious "pattern" of "legal abuse" the 4th Department relied upon as an aggravated circumstance, is anybody's guess.

And reliance of unknown and speculative (and possibly, non-existent) evidence without a notice and opportunity to be heard to the disciplined person is - that taboo word - unconstitutional.

I draw my readers' attention to some highlighted portions of the order of suspension.

The disciplinary court did not use, in the entire order, the word "Constitution" or "constitutional", and that is a SCREAMING omission.  The court was simply afraid to discuss those issues, because I was right and the petition had to be dismissed as unconstitutional infringement on free speech and a violation of my due process of law.

I, a victim of judicial misconduct of Judge Becker, and an attorney for victims of judicial misconduct of Judge Becker who sued Judge Becker in my professional capacity for his misconduct IN and OUT of court (out of court misconduct is NOT covered by judicial immunity, no matter how judges try to stretch that concept), and the lawsuit was dismissed without reaching the merits because of Becker's alleged absolute judicial immunity FOR MALICIOUS AND CORRUPT ACTS.

In other words, Becker escaped liability in a lawsuit only because of immunity, and the court did not even review or decide the issues whether Becker IN FACT engaged in malicious and corrupt acts on and off the bench.

Yet, Becker was allowed to assign himself to my cases, and, after I sued him, to sanction me in those cases in retaliation for my lawsuit.

And I, a victim of Becker's misconduct, was punished by revocation of my livelihood for exposing that misconduct.

Very logical.

Very just.

And very predictable for the New York "justice system".

As to the "screaming omission" by the disciplinary court - that the court was afraid to put into the order of suspension the word "constitutional". 

That is done not to create a precedent, to prevent further research, requiring the public to actually go to the court in Rochester, NY and look through the actual denied motions, which most people will not do.

Also, all motions that were denied, were raising meritorious constitutional issues that the corrupt prosecution could not contest, and a reasonable explanation of the denial of such constitutional motions was simply not available and not possible. 

The court denied ALL of those motions WITHOUT AN EXPLANATION OR REASONING.

Including my request to disqualify the prosecutor, on constitutional grounds, because the prosecutor appeared as a witness against me in a dismissed criminal proceeding.


So, as of November 13, 2015, the "effective date" of my order of suspension, the following law in the State of New York is official:

1) you have to request a court by motion to waive your own privacy in a proceeding that is sealed only to protect your privacy (even if the New York State Court of Appeals says the contrary);

2) making a motion to recuse a judge is a death sentence for an attorney, so, dear readers, DO NOT expect that ANY attorneys - after this order of suspension - will yield to your requests to make a motion to recuse on your behalf, no matter how bad the judicial misconduct will be.

You will tell your attorney - but you MUST make such a motion.

And your attorney will tell you - do you know what happened to attorney Tatiana Neroni?  I do not want that to happen to me.  So, no, I won't make that motion.

That means, ladies and gentlemen, that you are now STUCK with biased judges in your cases.

That is the true meaning of my order of suspension - intimidation of the legal profession to NEVER try to make motions to recuse a judge, to NEVER try to sue the judge, because ALL THREE sanctions for which I was suspended were imposed upon me by Judge Becker IMMEDIATELY AFTER I SUED HIM on behalf of myself and my clients.

And, as an icing on the cake:

My constitutional motions that the disciplinary court mentions, without mentioning the word "constitutional", and which the court consistently denied without an explanation - those denied motions raised the EXACT SAME ISSUES that were raised in the Final Report and Recommendations of the NYS Statewide Commission for Attorney Discipline filed on September 24, 2015, and in 4th Department Court Clerk participated.

So, on September 24, 2015, the 4th Department asserted to Judge Lippman, as a point of legal reform the very same things that it denied to me in "various motions", without an explanation.

And, the very last, but certainly not least.

The super-majority of the disciplinary committee were practicing attorneys, acting to eliminate me as their competitor, without any appropriate control from a neutral state body - a federal antitrust violation, acknowledged as such as of February 25, 2015 by the U.S. Supreme Court in the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission.

So, the criminal cartel struck my license.

For not feeling remorse in front of that criminal cartel for doing nothing wrong, for doing my duty to my clients.

I do not feel remorse.

And the order was made by a criminal cartel.

And, the order was done on the eve of a federal court deadline when I was supposed to file a Rule 11 (sanctions) motion against - guess who - Chief Judge Lippman - for frivolous conduct in two courts.

So, they suspended my state law license right before the deadline, and now the New York State Attorney General is trying to intimidate me by claiming that the motion to recuse the court that I filed yesterday was unauthorized practice of law - even though suspension of a state law license does not automatically lead to suspension of federal law license, and I am still on "active" status in federal court.

As to the hilarious order of suspension, here it is.

==

Quote
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department MATTER OF TATIANA NERONI, AN ATTORNEY, RESPONDENT. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEES OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, PETITIONER. -- 

Order of suspension entered. Per Curiam Opinion: Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in 2009 by the Appellate Division, Third Department, and formerly maintained an office in Delhi. 

Her office address currently on file with the Office of Court Administration is a post office box located in Pawleys Island, South Carolina. 

In 2013, a petition was filed in the Third Department asserting four charges of misconduct against respondent. 

Charges I through III allege that she engaged in frivolous conduct in three client matters, resulting in the entry of three trial court orders imposing against her monetary sanctions in the total amount of $5,000. 

Charge IV alleges that respondent failed to comply with the sanctions orders because she did not pay the sanctions to the Lawyer’s Fund for Client Protection. 

Respondent filed in the Third Department an answer denying certain allegations of the petition and asserting several affirmative defenses. 

With respect to Charge IV, respondent asserted that she had deposited in escrow with the Delaware County Clerk funds in payment of the sanctions, which were remitted by the County Clerk to the Lawyer’s Fund in October 2013. 

The Committee on Professional Standards for the Third Judicial Department thereafter filed a motion for an order declaring that the pleadings raise no issues of fact, sustaining Charges I through III, pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and sustaining Charge IV based on the assertion in respondent’s answer that she had paid the sanctions to the Delaware County Clerk, rather than to the Lawyer’s Fund. 

Respondent opposed that motion and cross-moved for an order, inter alia, dismissing the petition, recusing the Third Department and disqualifying the Committee on Professional Standards on various grounds. 

By order entered June 11, 2014, the Third Department transferred the matter to this Court for disposition pursuant to the rules of this Court. 

Although respondent filed in this Court certain motions for an order vacating the transfer order, recusing this Court and disqualifying the Grievance Committees for the Fourth Judicial Department on various grounds, this Court denied those motions and appointed a referee to conduct a hearing on any issues of fact raised by the pleadings and to make advisory findings on the collateral estoppel effect, if any, of the sanctions orders set forth in Charges I through III. 

The Referee has filed a report making an advisory finding that the pleadings raise no issues of fact requiring a hearing in relation to Charges I through III because the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes respondent from relitigating the issues that were determined against her in the prior sanctions proceedings, namely, that she had engaged in frivolous conduct in three client matters. 

The Referee further found that no hearing was necessary on Charge IV because that charge was established by respondent’s assertion in her answer that she had paid the sanctions to the Delaware County Clerk, rather than to the Lawyer’s Fund. 

The Grievance Committee moves to confirm the report of the Referee, and respondent moves for an order, inter alia, disaffirming and vacating the report of the Referee, recusing this Court, disqualifying the Grievance Committee, and dismissing the petition on numerous procedural and substantive grounds. 

This Court scheduled the matter for an appearance on May 26, 2015, to hear oral argument of motions directed to the report of the Referee and to afford respondent an opportunity to be heard in mitigation. 

Respondent, however, did not appear on that date and, in the notices of her aforementioned motions, she stated that she was moving the Court on a “submitted basis.” 

Respondent additionally wrote to the Clerk of this Court contending that the Court was without authority to hear matters in mitigation without first determining whether she had violated any disciplinary rules. 

We confirm the advisory finding of the Referee regarding the collateral estoppel effect of the sanction orders underlying Charges I through III. 

The record establishes that whether respondent engaged in frivolous conduct is an issue that was raised, necessarily decided, and material in those prior proceedings (see generally Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500) and, in each proceeding, the court imposing sanctions issued a written decision specifying the objectionable conduct and why it was frivolous. 

Furthermore, respondent has failed to establish that she did not have a full and fair opportunity to contest those prior determinations. 

The Third Department affirmed on appeal the sanctions underlying Charges I and III (see M&C Bros., Inc. v Torum, 101 AD3d 1329, 1329-1330; Shields v Carbone, 99 AD3d 1100, 1102-1103), and respondent did not appeal the sanctions underlying Charge II, thereby indicating her willingness to be bound by that determination (see Matter of Capoccia, 272 AD2d 838, 846-847). 

With respect to Charge IV, we dismiss it as a matter of law because it fails to allege a cognizable violation of any disciplinary rule. 

The petition alleges that respondent “failed to comply with a ruling of a tribunal” and violated rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct when she failed to pay the monetary sanctions to the Lawyer’s Fund. 

Rule 3.1, however, prohibits a lawyer from engaging in frivolous conduct and does not concern a lawyer’s alleged failure to comply with the ruling of a tribunal. 

In our view, the disciplinary rule most relevant to the substantive allegations in Charge IV is rule 3.4 (c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Although that rule provides that a lawyer shall not “disregard” a ruling of a tribunal, the petition alleges only that respondent “failed to comply” with the sanctions orders. 

Based on those circumstances, we conclude that Charge IV fails as a matter of law and must be dismissed. 

As a matter of procedure, we reject respondent’s contention that this Court has engaged in “gross continuing judicial misconduct” by, inter alia, refusing to enter an order unsealing all records relating to the charges herein and opening the disciplinary proceeding to the public based on her waiver of confidentiality submitted to the Clerk of this Court. Judiciary Law § 90 (10) empowers only the Justices of this Court, by written order and “upon good cause being shown,” to permit disclosure of all or any part of confidential disciplinary records. 

In this case, the Clerk of the Court advised respondent that only the Court had authority to unseal the disciplinary proceeding and, therefore, a motion to the Court was required to unseal disciplinary records or open the proceedings to the public. 

Respondent, however, never made the necessary application to the Court to obtain that relief. We have considered respondent’s remaining contentions and conclude that they lack merit. 

Based on the record herein, we dismiss Charge IV, deny respondent’s motions seeking dismissal of the petition, disqualification of the Grievance Committee and other relief, confirm the Referee’s advisory determination regarding the collateral estoppel effect of the sanctions orders underlying Charges I through III, and conclude that respondent has violated rule 3.1 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0). 

In determining an appropriate sanction, we have considered that respondent has failed to acknowledge or express remorse for the misconduct. 

We have additionally considered that the frivolous conduct at issue herein was not an isolated incident and involved a pattern of abuse of the legal process. 

Accordingly, after consideration of all of the factors in this matter, we conclude that respondent should be suspended for a period of two years. PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, VALENTINO, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. (Filed Nov. 13, 2015.)

Unquote
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My story has been brought up by somebody else as an example of discrimination by the federal court, NDNY, on the basis of my Russian origin

As I said before on this blog, Pacer.gov is a good and affordable source of research.

Yesterday, I was doing research on Pacer.gov - and voila! I obtained an extremely interesting piece, a Memorandum of Law by a suspended attorney Leon Koziol (Mr. Koziol is of Slavic origin), who argued that the fierce discrimination directed by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York against him is a reflection of the court's bias against people of Slavic origin.

And brought up the story of how state and federal courts in New York persecute me for publicly exposing and criticizing judicial misconduct, pointing out that I, too, am of Slavic origin.  That I am Russian.

Which is what I was trying to prove all along.

Judges who occupy benches at this time were mostly raised in the Cold War era when a Russian was an equivalent of a communist, a spy and an enemy.

Such embedded notions do not go away easily.  Sometimes such notions simply do not go away.

But, at least somebody other than myself is point out that NDNY is discriminating based on ethnicity of people.

I agree.

Caught the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York in unprecedented misconduct

I was checking out my husband's pro se appellate case on Pacer.gov (where any person can obtain, for a small fee), copies of public records of court proceedings.

Boy, what did I find.

I found that, as of November 12, 2015 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit has designated the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York as a party in a lawsuit the court filed against my husband back on October 20, 2014.

The kicker was that the lawsuit was for an anti-filing injunction, and that it was based on two THEN-PENDING, COUNSELED cases.

Counseled by me.

And in one of those cases, I was also a party-co-Plaintiff.

So, what the NDNY court did, was - it pre-judged the two pending proceedings as frivolous before they were actually decided.

And when one of such proceedings was brought by me as a party while the court's pre-judgment was only filed against my husband, and was never served upon me, as a counsel in that pending case.

The judge who pre-judged the proceedings was the then-Chief Judge of the NDNY court Gary L. Sharpe, I criticized him multiple times on this blog for his misconduct, including failure to read and comprehend the U.S. Constitution (he sanctioned me for a correct reading of the 11th Amendment and directed me to re-read it - I did and the Amendment did not change since the time it was enacted).

Here are the rules of judicial conduct, the ones that the court violated in starting - as a party, as the 2nd Circuit said - an anti filing injunction against my husband based on two pending counseled cases.

1) When a judge is assigned to a case, that judge and nobody else, must decide that case, following the required procedure.  The pair of judges assigned to the Neroni v Grannis and Neroni v Zayas cases were Judges Lawrence E. Kahn and David E. Peebles.

The anti-filing proceedings were commenced by Judge Gary L. Sharpe, over the head of Judge Kahn, parties and counsel in those two pending cases.

An unprecedented misconduct.

2) When a person appears in a case through an attorney, as it happened in both of these cases, the court cannot, directly and indirectly, communicate with a represented party other than through his or her attorney.

I was Mr. Neroni's attorney in both Neroni v Grannis and Neroni v Zayas, and I was not notified of the parallel proceeding based on cases pending in front of a completely different pair of judges.

3)  When a "related" case is filed in a federal court concerning several parties, all of those several parties and their counsel have to be notified.

There were no official notifications made to the state defendants in Neroni v Grannis or Neroni v Zayas, of course, I do not know whether ex parte communications could be occurring, especially that Judge Sharpe's son works in the New York State Attorney General's office which represented defendants in both of these cases.

Throughout all this time, since October 20, 2014 and even after November 12, 2015 when Northern District of New York was clearly designated as a party in a proceeding that was filed when Neroni v Grannis and Neroni v Zayas were pending, Neroni v Grannis in full, Neroni v Zayas with some claims dismissed, some ongoing - throughout all this time, judges of the Northern District of New York failed to notify me, attorney of record for Mr. Neroni in both Neroni v Grannis and Neroni v Zayas that these cases were already pre-judged through a parallel ex parte proceeding.

Neroni v Grannis, by the way, is the related federal case to a state case where Judge Leslie Stein was bribed by the New York State Governor with nomination to the New York State Court of Appeals while she was in the process of deciding the case where New York Department of Environmental Conservation was a party.

It took her 6 days to decide for the DEC.  Ethics in the judiciary are not needed when promotions can be available.  I wrote about such situations on this blog again and again.

So, a motion was filed to vacate decisions in Neroni v Grannis and Neroni v Zayas and disqualify the court because it injected itself into those cases through unprecedented parallel ex parte proceedings, and pre-judged the cases, long Judge Lawrence Kahn rubber-stamped them by a full dismissal in Neroni v Zayas and a partial dismissal in Neroni v Grannis.

The motion is very large, it involves 43 documentary exhibits and two affirmations, so it will take me some time to publish it, but I will, soon.

Stay tuned.

Michael Coccoma's stop-gap job offer to Christine Ryba: for a senior high-ranking male judge, ethical misconduct of a pretty-face female attorney who has ties to the government is grounds for promotion. Again.

I wrote on this blog multiple times about misconduct of Judge Michael V. Coccoma, the Chief Administrative Judge of upstate New York, and the tendency of New York government to protect him in all of his unethical behavior and outright misconduct and to elevate him instead of punishing him.

I also wrote on this blog about Michael Coccoma employing, as a special counsel, an attorney who was booted from the bench by the New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct which removed her from a position of a judge of the Town of East Greenbush court for attempting to fix a traffic ticket for the wife of another judge.

The extraordinary beauty of the booted former judge, Coccoma's special counsel Diane L. Schilling, is undeniable.

I also wrote on this blog that at first, after she was booted from the bench, Schilling was embraced as a partner by the firm Maguire and Cardona where Anthony Cardona, the son of the late Chief Judge of the Appellate Division 3rd Department (and Albany County Assistant DA) and Amanda Kuryluk, the beloved niece of the U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of New York Mae D'Agostino are partners.

These two judicial relatives considered it possible to drum up business by advertising in Schilling's biography posted on the law firm's website that she was a judge - as a proof of her experience and credibility - but failed to post information that she was booted from the bench for unethical behavior.

Of course, Schilling was never disciplined, nor were the judge's son Anthony Cardona or  niece after I blogged about their false advertisement of Schilling.

No doubt that immunity to attorney discipline despite the apparent false advertising and misrepresentation-by-omission of credentials of their new partner Diane L. Schilling, as well as blood ties with state and federal judges allow the firm to "excel" and get victories in all kinds of courts and ratings.  Of course, who would dare oppose the flesh-and-blood of top-ranking state and federal judges.

Yet, Schilling left Maguire and Cardona after I blogged about false advertising, compare:

1)  The May 10, 2012 notification in the Albany Times Union that Schilling was booted from the bench for unethical conduct;

2)  The gleeful news release by Maguire and Cardona on December 7, 2012 that Schilling joined the firm;

3)  My blogs of about Schilling as partner in Maguire and Cardona and Maguire and Cardona's false advertisement here and here in September of 2014; and again in August 2, 2015 raising the issue as to why attorneys favored by judges or their relatives are not disciplined for misconduct in the State of New York;

4)  where Diane L. Schilling works now.

Apparently, attorney discipline does not apply to attorneys who are relatives to judges, were judges themselves, work for law firms of relatives of judges, or worked for high-ranking judges like Michael V. Coccoma.

Two days ago, Albany Times  Union has announced that Michael V. Coccoma has made a job offer to the embattled attorney Christine Ryba who was booted from the NYS Supreme Court Appellate Division 3rd Department for unethical behavior during her judicial campaign, 1 day before she got elected based on her unethical behavior.

I blogged about Ryba's elections and fraud upon the voters in those elections, here and here, where I covered her unethical conduct in detail.

Of course, those who voted for her, did not know that she was booted for unethical behavior, and thus, voting without this essential information is void and election is based on Ryba's failure to provide such information to the voters and, instead, continuing to parade on her Facebook page how "highly qualified" and "eligible" she is, amounted to fraud upon the voters.

Such a job is a promotion, as compared to her job with the 3rd Department.

Announcement of such a job offer is also a not-so-subtle warning to disciplinary authorities that Ryba is under protection of a high-ranking judge and should not be touched by attorney or judicial discipline, especially considering the lightning speed the job offer arrived after Republican committees of three counties asked for an ethical probe against Ryba.

Out of hundreds of thousands of attorneys in New York state, honest, competent, eligible for such a job, the job offer went to an attorney who was just booted for unethical behavior.

The offer announced to everyone, including those seeking the probe, loud and clear:  Ryba is still part of the pack, do not touch.

Moreover, the job offer also included a congratulations to Ryba for her election (fraudulent as it was), thus announcing loud and clear the endorsement of Ryba's fraudulent and unethical methods involved in her election campaign. 

The job offer was extended to Ryba just for 6 weeks before she comes to the bench.  It was very clear that Coccoma did not need a stop-gap "special counsel" for those 6 weeks and that the job was offered simply as an endorsement of Ryba and a warning to those who want to have her held accountable for her misconduct.

Coccoma did not even try to conceal the fact that the stop-gap job offer was personal, where the letter offering the job stated that the job offer was made "in order to avoid the personal difficulties that a short separation from service sometimes entails".

Not to mention the nature of the "short separation", and not to mention that disciplinary authorities, and criminal prosecutors may choose to make that separation a very long separation, from any "service", as well as from liberty and a law license.

It is nice to through money around when it's not yours.

And it's nice to know that for some attorneys, being booted for unethical behavior causes compassion and monetary infusions from the higher echelon of the judiciary instead of discipline.

Now, that is the same judge who in May of 2008 separated a criminal defendant from his wife and two children for 1 1/3 to 4 years by sending him to the state prison for pointing out to the judge that he was not a sex offender (which was correct as a matter of law).

Judge Coccoma did not consider the "personal difficulties" that such a LONG separation from the person's family entailed.

Of course, the guy was a male, and not handsome.

Let's sum up, with pictures.

This is Michael V. Coccoma.

Not exactly a Mr. Universe.

This is Diane L. Schilling, Coccoma's former "special counsel" who has never been disciplined for her unethical conduct.

Schilling is an extraordinary beauty.

This is Christine Ryba.

A very pretty young woman.

And this is attorney registration information for Judge Coccoma.

The year of admission (usually at 25-26) puts Judge Coccoma's age at 61 or more.

Ryba is 39.

Coccoma's appreciation of young beautiful females is evident, even though it may raise issues as to his consistent gender-discriminative, to put it mildly, choice of his "special counsel".

But, putting a nice piece of furniture or an object of art in your chambers is not the same as hiring screamingly unethical female employees for their young and pretty faces.

It is a slap in the face of other attorneys and further justifies public distrust of integrity of New York judges.

And, it is a slap in the face of New York taxpayers, and in my face, personally, where Coccoma throws our money around on pretty faces, unethical pretty faces and uses our money and the trust of the voters who elected him to enforce the power of the judiciary to act as kings, without regard to law, ethics or common decency.

Three judges of the 9th Circuit, each with a prosecutorial background, reinstated death penalty in California - as a matter of whim

In July of 2014 the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Judge Cormac J. Carney, has declared post-conviction death penalty procedure in California unconstitutional as being in violation of the 8th Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

You can read the decision of Judge Carney here, and an 18-page supplement to the decision here.  The supplement shows the length of time the death row inmates are waiting for review of their cases. 30+ years is not an infrequent figure in the supplement.

Today, three judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, as a matter of "discretion" (they had an option to agree with Judge Carney or not to agree) disagreed with Judge Carney, on procedural grounds only, and reversed his decision, thus reinstating the death penalty in California.

The names of these judges are:

Here is the biographical information of Judge Susan P. Graber (see also this link for fuller information):

Judge Graber is 66 years old, graduated from two privileged schools, Wellesley College in 1969 and Yale Law School in 1972 and has a prosecutorial background.

Judge Graber is a white female.

Biographical information of Judge Johnie B. Rawlinson (see also fuller information at this link):

Judge Rawlinson is 63 and has a prosecutorial background.

Judge Rawlinson is an African American female.

Biographical information of Judge Paul J. Watford (see fuller information here):

Judge Watford was a law clerk to the "movies-with-booze-in-the-federal courthouse" Judge Kozinski, and also has a prosecutorial background.

Judge Watford is a Hispanic/African American (looking) male.

I wrote today about election by fraud of an African American judge Christina Ryba in New York.

I wrote on this blog about election of a female judge Lisa Fisher (Greene County Supreme Court, NY) and of a female homosexual judge Elizabeth Garry (Appellate Division 3rd Department), in the same State of New York.

Those elections were heralded as proclaiming "diversity on the bench".

We have diversity here.

And, this diverse panel uniformly refused to do its duty and review a federal constitutional claim presented to them by the death inmate.

This diverse panel refused to even look whether the State of California is, indeed, violating constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in how it handles post-conviction death penalty procedures (that same "exhaustion of state remedies" that Judge Watford cited as a reason of his rejection of a federal constitutional claim that he was sworn to review).

The summary of the decision (you can read the full text of the decision here) where three judges refused to consider "novel" constitutional issues raised on an appeal from a death penalty habeas corpus petition, is contained in three short paragraphs:

Note in the first paragraph that judges had "discretion" (option) to deny the claim on procedural grounds.  So, it was really a matter of judge's choice whether to let death penalty in a huge state to be reinstated or not.

In my legal opinion, judges should not be given discretion to decide issues of such a momentous impact upon people's life or death.

The "choice" of two judges to refuse to reach the merits of the constitutional claim and reverse it without review of the merits was based on a case Teague v Lane, "imposing" a bar invented by the U.S. Supreme Court, and not contained in the statute, meaning, an unconstitutional bar.

I already wrote on this blog many times that Article VI Paragraph 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the so-called Supremacy Clause, does not include U.S. Supreme Court decisions, so Teague v Lane was not "discretionary", it was an unconstitutional bar to a constitutional review on the merits.

Article VI paragraph 2 puts the U.S. Constitution as the Supreme Law of the land, and thus there cannot be any "procedural bars", especially discretionary bars, for violation of the U.S. Constitution.

Yet, two judges decided that the death penalty inmate, and all other death row inmates in the State of California, are not entitled to a review of cruel and inhuman punishment issue - because of the "Teague v Lane" bar allegedly giving federal courts an option to deny review of "novel constitutional issues" in a habeas corpus petition from a death penalty case, and because the death penalty inmate allegedly did not exhaust all state remedies in the state that wants to use a cruel and unusual system of punishment in order to kill him - because of these reasons that are completely irrelevant to the issue that any federal court had an obligation to review, constitutionality of state law and of state government's action.

So, on procedural grounds and because of the choice or whim of three people in power, the death penalty in the huge State of California was, as of today, re-established.

And that decision alone should show that the death penalty as a mode of punishment should go where it belongs, into the garbage.

The life or death of the tens of people should not be decided as a matter of "discretion", choice, option or, let's face it, whim of three people in power.

Look at these three smiling faces.  

These are the faces of the cruel and unusual punishment.

These are the faces of horrible and cruel death.

There is a ray of hope though for the death penalty claimant here.

Discretion that the three-judge panel cited belongs to the TRIAL court, not to the appellate court.

The trial court, U.S. District Court Judge Cormac J. Carney, already exercised his discretion, reviewed the case on the merits and declared California post-conviction death penalty procedures unconstitutional as violative of the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

The ONLY standard of review that the 3-judge appellate panel could use was "abuse of discretion" by Judge Carney.

You will not find these words in the decision of the 9th Circuit.  The mandatory appellate review standard was not used.

Instead, the 3 judges, all with prosecutorial backgrounds, decided to USURP Judge Carney's discretion in reinstating the death penalty in the State of California on their whims, without following the required standard of review on appeal.

For that reason alone, the U.S. Supreme Court should take this case - and reverse it again, reinstating the discretionary decision of Judge Carney.

Once again, the discretion was already exercised - by Judge Carney.  

No more discretion is allowed on appellate review.

This is Judge Cormac J. Carney - the face of life. 

The mainstream media coverage of judicial corruption - we wag our fingers, but we endorse the crooks all the same

Here is a beautiful piece in the Albany Times Union about Christine Ryba, an attorney for Chief Judge Karen Peters, an attorney who advised the court on its decisions, including decisions on disciplining attorneys for misconduct, and a member of the NYS Statewide Commission for Attorney Discipline.

Ryba was booted by Peters on November 2, 2015 for unethical conduct, without public disclosure of termination, which allowed Ryba to get elected the next day to the position of a New York State Supreme Court justice.

So, Ryba was thrown out the window, but will ride a white horse back through the doors of the New York State courthouses, with fanfares. 

Here is a very interesting paragraph from the yesterday's article of the Times Union about the obvious judicial corruption:

"There are still absentee votes to count in the race, and it's highly unlikely that Ryba's alleged conduct would be enough to warrant more than a wagged finger from state judicial disciplinarians. If she's the eventual winner, Ryba could turn out to be an eminent jurist, and there's no doubt that her election as the first African-American woman to sit on the bench in the 3rd District would add much-needed diversity to this corner of state Supreme Court.

Even so, the controversy is another reminder that the system we use to select Supreme Court justices ought to be scrapped."

The paragraph says three things, let's start from the end.

1/ "The controversy" shows that "the system we use to select Supreme Court justices ought to be scrapped".  

So, there is a recognition that the way Ryba was elected was fraught with impropriety, right?  

Yet, why such drastic measures to correct that misconduct?  

Why the whole system of ELECTIONS OF JUDGES should be scrapped because one candidate chose to engage in unethical conduct and abuse her employment within the court system?

2/ Yet, there is lamentation that, probably, the NYS Judicial Conduct Commission will not do more than "wag a finger" at Ryba.  That is a recognition that the system of judicial discipline in New York is not effective.

3/ Despite 1/ and 2/, the "Times Union", in its editorial no less, makes an astounding pronouncement:

If Ryba makes it to the bench come January, and be awarded a judicial position that she obtained by fraud and unethical conduct, after she was booted as an employee from the court system (of which fact voters who voted for her were not notified), TWO GOOD THINGS will happen, in "Times Union"'s opinion:

1) Ryba may make an "eminent jurist", and

2) there's no doubt that her election as the first African-American woman to sit on the bench in the 3rd District would add much-needed diversity to this corner of state Supreme Court.

That is:

A) even though Ryba's election was obtained through fraud and unethical conduct;  and

B) even though the only reason Ryba's election might stand is ineffectiveness of the system of judicial discipline in the state,

I already wrote on this blog earlier this year in connection with the election of a white female judge Lisa Fisher who propounded diversity in gender as her winning election strategy, that NOTHING, absolutely, positively nothing, justifies election of an unethical person to the bench, not her gender, not her race, not her sexual orientation, not anything else that contributes to the so-called "diversity".

Because all you care about as a litigant and attorney is the judge's integrity and competence.

Ryba lacks integrity, thus, her election-by-fraud does nothing to her race than a disservice.  We have enough allegations that African Americans get benefits, including high positions in the government, only through affirmative action.

There should not be an affirmative action, or even a trace, a shadow, a merest shade of it, in judicial elections.

Out of hundreds of thousands of deserving attorneys to occupy judicial positions in the State of New York, many of those attorneys are African Americans, and many of them are female African Americans.  And the reason they did not run is because they did not have the backup such as what Ryba had - from the Appellate Court.  

Ryba had enough to fight honestly in the judicial elections.  Yet, she chose to fight dishonestly.

Once again, she is a DISSERVICE to her race and her election by fraud should not be paraded as a contribution to diversity.

Once again, misconduct in judicial elections cannot be justified and especially glorified and explained away by the need for diversity on the bench.

What "Times Union" said is an insult to deserving African American attorneys.

And, it is also a good example as to how corruption in the judiciary, and in judicial election, is presented by mainstream media - a lot of puffing up and then a cowardly statement lest the criticized judge will be presiding over the newspaper's case at some point.

Right?

GOP wants an ethical probe of Christine Ryba who was elected as judge one day after she was terminated from an appellate court for unethical behavior

Republicans from Albany, Rensellaer and Ulster Counties reportedly issued a statement demanding an ethical probe against Christina Ryba who, as knowledgeable sources alleged, was terminated from her position as attorney for the Appellate Division 3rd Department and for its Chief Judge Karen Peters for using the influence of the court and its e-mail system to get an advantage in her personal judicial election campaign.

"If the presiding justice does not believe Ms. Ryba should continue as a court employee and ordered her to be fired from the state court system, then how is it appropriate for Ms. Ryba to now serve as state Supreme Court judge?" Rensselaer County Republican Committee Chairman John Rustin said in a statement.

The ethical inquiry will also need to be made into the behavior of 3rd Department's Chief Judge Karen Peters who terminated Ryba one day before the elections, even though her behavior was ongoing since as early as September of 2015, without disclosing termination before the election and thus preventing the voters from getting full information about the candidate for judgeship.

First, it shows that the judge is not in control of the court's computers and does not have an effective system in place to prevent abuse of the court's position for personal gain.

Second, it shows that the judge may be in cahoots with Ryba, after all.  Booted her for show, but in a way that did not prevent her election.   Ryba will be without a salary for 2 months before starting to get - what - $167,000 a year?  It is called "thank you for your generous (even if corrupt) gift, Karen Peters".

I would also contest validity of Ryba's judgeship based on such fraud.

My concern is that it is only Ryba's not appearing at work on November 2, 2015 that garnered her a termination, otherwise Karen Peters was going to allow her to peacefully resign, thus concealing the issues behind her misconduct.

As Peters allowed attorney Steven Zayas from the disciplinary committee to resign in 2013, after he was implicated in falsifying time sheets (a prosecutor of attorney misconduct committing fraud upon taxpayers!!!).

Steven Zayas and attorneys booted together with him, are still not disciplined, 2 years down the road.

I wonder if GOP's push for inquiry will end up the same way - nowhere.