THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:
"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.
“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).
“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.
It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.
" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.
"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.
“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.
Tuesday, July 15, 2014
The elevated duty of appellate courts at the time of trial courts' self-forgiveness
With increased caseloads in courts, on the one hand, and cut budgets, on the other, it is no surprise that many court cases are decided in a rush.
While every litigant is (theoretically) entitled to due process of law, diligent review of his or her case, application of the law and the law only, and not of judicial whims, any attorney or party who has ever went through New York court system knows that what the judicial system actually delivers and what it is expected to deliver are two different things.
Time and again I was told as an attorney, during off-the-record conferences, of course, that my client "had better settle, or else". Sometimes we settled, sometimes we didn't, but the incentive and the fear put into litigants by judges, and unnecessarily put, is real. I do not believe a judge even has a right to threaten harsher determinations against a litigant if the litigant refuses to settle.
"Or else" meant the so-called "exercise of discretion" in such a way that my client will lose more than he or she could afford to lose.
This way innocent people are coerced into guilty pleas, parents who did not neglect their children are coerced into saying they did, and agreeing to years of abusive and humiliating "supervision" by social services...
And that was happening because the judge, who was not supposed to prejudge the case before all evidence was in, "theorized" that in the event that my client is convicted/ found liable for child neglect, the judge will then convict him for a longer number of years, as opposed to probation and being free, or, in the case of child neglect, a person's child will be kept in foster care longer and will likely be adopted out while the parent is appealing the case and spending his last penny on the appeal.
Moreover, there are a number of trial court judges in front of whom I appeared who view their discretion so broadly as to encompass open disregard of the law and the record.
Their remedy for litigants whose rights judges blatantly violate by openly not following the written law, the case law or the record of the case - "take it up" (appeal).
Of course, what was pled (settled), cannot be appealed - but that is the risk litigants take when settling.
If they do not settle, not many of litigants appeal adverse court decisions - usually because (1) an appeal is prohibitively expensive; (2) overwhelming majority of appeals are affirmed.
Because of a cavalier attitude of the lower court to disregard applicable law and contents of the record, and because of the high costs of appeals involved, I believe that the appellate courts owe litigants an elevated duty of care - which must have some mechanisms of enforcement.
Instead, appellate judges in New York do not even sign their decisions, a clerk of the court does, and there is no assurance that the judges even decided those cases instead of allowing law students/ interns/ law clerks to do that for them, as quickly as possible, and with a directive to affirm as many cases as possible, even if that means further misrepresentation of the record and further disregard of the law.
I believe that new legislation should be in order imposing a higher responsibility upon appellate judges, higher requirements to their qualifications, requirements to their presence and holding offices where the appellate courts are located, and providing for enforceable and transparent public discipline if the appellate courts, the last hope for many litigants to resolve their cases, blatantly disregard their duties and rule as if they never read the case - which happens often, as any appellate attorney knows...
On the virtue of anonymous case-handling in court
I have more documents to be posted in the near future on the same subject.
At this time, I wanted to throw into the "marketplace of ideas" just a simple idea - wouldn't it be better if court cases are decided the same way as SAT scores or bar exam scores are decided - where the applicant does not know the identity of the grader and the grader does not know the identity of the applicant?
This way, there is no incentive for the grader to appease a politically powerful applicant or to go against an unpopular or an unattractive litigant?
It is simply an idea.
I know it is imperfect.
I know it would require much to be implemented.
I know it has flaws.
But - wouldn't it be nice to eliminate the incentives to exert political influence on the court and to eliminate nepotism, favoritism and corruption from the court system, or at least to make a major step in that direction?
Of course, there will have to be public oversight over such a system, so that assignments of numbers to cases and graders to cases are truly anonymous and are not "helped" from the within.
There will have to be special rules and adjustments made then to evidentiary rules, rules pertaining to witnesses and jury trials.
But - something needs to be done with the pervasive favoritism in the court system which makes the claim that this nation is ruled by "the rule of law" a joke.
Thursday, July 10, 2014
To law students - how sound is your investment in legal education?
I am not making any startling revelations by saying that investment in a legal education, especially with a view to practice law, is an investment of a lifetime.
Not only the prospective law student denies himself or herself other opportunities in the workforce for 7 years (4 years of college and 3 years of law school), but legal education is increasingly expensive, while the employment market is increasingly tight.
On top of that, a law license can be revoked based simply on lawyer's criticism of a judge, and most defenses that such criticism is actually a constitutionally protected activity are rebuffed and rejected by the judicial system.
Sometimes there are cases where such criticism cannot be avoided - not if the lawyer wants to remain loyal to his oath of office, to maintain and uphold the Constitutions and the laws of the State he or she is practicing in and of the United States.
To make a motion to recuse in most states exposes the lawyer to the risk of retaliation from the judge. If the judge retaliates for a motion to recuse, he is virtually untouchable, either by the virtually non-existent judicial discipline, or by a civil lawsuit because of the judicially created concept of absolute judicial immunity, even for malicious and corrupt acts.
Law students are not being told that, simply by doing their jobs and maintaining their oath of office they may set themselves on a path to destroy their careers, reputations and investments of a livelihood - because if a law license is lost, the former lawyer will, most likely, not be employed in any position of trust or be licensed for any other profession.
All that training, all those skills, all those endless hours of study and research, both in law school and in law practice, all the money invested in the legal education and post-graduation training, all those hours that you have taken from yourself and your family to train yourself to be a good lawyer will go down the drain because a lawyer, at one moment, stepped on the toes of a judge, most likely, rightfully criticizing that judge for mistakes, bias and lack of competence and integrity.
Just think about it - it takes well over a hundred thousand dollars to get a legal education.
It takes one corrupt or biased judge who developed a grudge against you - because you were doing your job - to take away a law license and eliminate all the benefits of that legal education.
You will have no right to appeal when you lose your license.
You, most likely, judging by statistics, will never get that license back.
Imagine yourself with a spouse, young kids to support, a mortgage, car and student loans (including student loans from law school) - thrown out of your profession for criticizing the judge, on behalf of a client.
What will you do knowing that your investment of a lifetime lies in the hands of, possibly, a despicable, immoral and biased judge?
Will you still criticize him or her, as your oath of office may require, in order to uphold the laws and the Constitutions of the state where you are going to practice and of the United States? Or will you start scraping and bowing - as the majority of the legal profession does - in order to keep feeding your family?
Do you really want to spend your life bowing to dishonorable people on the bench, simply because nobody told you when you were about to spend that money on your legal education that your investment may disappear because of a decision (possibly, incorrect) from one judge who did not like your criticism?
Do you want to spend your lifetime avoiding the so-called sensitive topics in the courtroom, even when your clients' case requires addressing such topics head-on?
Do you want to spend your life catering to people on the bench who came there not because of their skills, but because of their political connections? In a system where such catering became so rampant and such an accepted practice that continued legal education courses are openly offered to lawyers, to pay money to learn how to cater to specific judges better?
The links in the blog about the CLE seminar teaching about judge's "pet peeves" are now leading to nowhere - possibly, because of my blog and its high readership. Unfortunately, by removing the content about this seminar from the web, the practice of catering for the "pet peeves" of judges at the cost of preserving your law license is not removed. As I see it happening every day in the courtroom, this practice thrives and constitutes the way of life for many, if not the majority, of lawyers.
Of course, some people thrive in the environment where they can bow, scrape, cater and brown-nose to the high-and-mighty of this world.
A law student simply has to be forewarned about the real strings attached that come with his or her investment into the legal education - before he or she makes that investment. In my view, that is what any law school luring new students must do, and that is what law schools - heavily supported by donations from the legal profession that needs new recruits and free or nearly-free interns to get their costs down - fail to do. At least, my law school never really made it clear to me that my investment into the legal education may hinge upon my criticism - or lack thereof - of a judge.
I wouldn't call it a sound investment - and I think that law schools must teach law students about what they are actually going to face in the real world of practicing law, including the fact that their livelihood, as well as the livelihood of their families, is completely dependent on arbitrary or retaliatory actions of the judiciary.
Wednesday, June 25, 2014
Attorney disciplinary proceedings - a way for prosecutors to get rid of competition?
How tough the market for legal services in the country really is may be seen in the news of an attorney who was turned from a paralegal position as "not meeting the minimum requirements" - for a paralegal.
Now, the members of the disciplinary committee, including attorney members, are unpaid.
Their income, unlike the income of other public prosecutors, does not come from a salary, it comes from their practice of law.
In other words, the disciplinary prosecutors depend on their practice of law for their livelihood, and in that practice of law they are direct competitors to attorneys they investigate and prosecute (for free) on behalf of the Committee.
In my husband's case it already resulted in the situation where three attorney members of the committee had pending cases with Mr. Neroni while prosecuting him, and one attorney, John Casey, chose to not prosecute attorneys who Mr. Neroni turned in for John Casey's prosecution, accept those attorneys as paying clients and instead prosecute and disbar Mr. Neroni, the whistleblower against those paying clients.
So, the fight for the shrinking market of legal services causes unpaid attorney members of the disciplinary committee to accept financial incentives in exchange for a certain exercise of their prosecutorial discretion and a certain outcome of a disciplinary case.
At least, what it appears to be.
And the public is supposed to be protected by such process? What a travesty.
The rules of law for sons of judges - and the billing practices of sons of judges which so far escaped public review
POD - that's the code for his employee, and answering a follow-up question, no, the employee is not admitted to practice law;
ZLS - that's a code for the legal secretary
- Lack of itemized billing - to all other attorneys in New York State it is a disciplinary violation;
- Billing for services of auxiliary personnel without authorization of the client;
- Billing for legal services of an individual who was not licensed to practice law - which is a disciplinary violations, if not a crime, for all other "mere mortal" attorneys in the state of New York;
- Billing for notary services at $100/hr;
- Billing for postage, copying and mileage - that the NYS AG's office claimed back in 1999 is usually absorbed by law firms, but Mr.Harlem did not learn the lesson and continues to bill for it;
- Failure to comply with the requirements for a specific retainer agreement and clients' bill of rights under 22 NYCRR 1400 while bringing a case of enforcement of a contract to make a will out of a judgment of divorce;
- Failure to have proper retainer agreements justifying hourly rates of attorneys and law firms' personnel;
- Failure to get approval of legal fees from the clients before presenting them to the court.
Yet, the entire judgment of divorce was submitted to the court by Mr. Harlem as part of his 2nd Amended Complaint.
Moreover, if it was "just" an enforcement of the contract to make a will, which is what Mr. Harlem argued to the court in 2007, before joining the Estate as a co-plaintiff, and arguing AGAINST giving the properties to the Estate, Mr. Harlem's first-in-time client (an outrageous conflict of interest), why the Estate was even joined?
I keep asking this question, and I keep getting sanctioned by the court for asking this question.
In my husband's order of disbarment the Appellate Division has already ruled that my husband "devised a plan with his client that would circumvent, in part, the intended purpose of a judgment of the Supreme Court that respondent had participated in constructing."That makes the Estate a Co-Defendant in the action. It is a Plaintiff in the action, and is represented by Mr. Harlem, as well as the the decedent's children claiming that their father violated the contract to make a will together with his then attorney, Mr. Neroni.
2/ Judge Molly R. Fitzgerald of Binghamton, NY;
3/ Judge Carl F. Becker of Delhi, NY;
4/ Judge Kevin M. Dowd of Norwich, NY, and
the following appellate panels:
Disbarment panel:
5/ Judge Mercure (former acting Chief Judge of the 3rd Department);
6/ Judge Peters (current Chief Judge of the 3rd Department);
7/ Judge Spain;
8/ Judge Kavanagh;
9/ Judge McCarthy;
Panel who affirmed the partial summary judgment on liability upon which the order of disbarment was made without a hearing:
10/ Chief Judge Cardona (at that time);
Judge Peters (present Chief Judge);
11/ Judge Malone
12/ Judge Stein
13/ Judge Lahtinen
Recent sanctions decision which rejected the issue that Mr. Harlem and his law firm was disqualified and that the Estate had no standing
Judge Lahtinen
Judge Stein
Judge Spain
14/ Judge Egan
14 judges chose to consistently overlook the applicable law in order to allow for a retired judge and his son's frivolous lawsuit to proceed
Are these judges law school dropouts?
Yet, back to what happened at the June 23, 2014 hearing, and in view of that hearing it is interesting as to what will happen in the future of the Mokay saga.
At this time, Judge Dowd did not allow me to file any other motions in the Mokay action, including motion addressing the court's jurisdiction or validity of prior decisions based on new evidence, which are motions authorized by statute without leave of court.
I must make such motions only on an Order to Show Cause to Judge Dowd.
Judge Dowd has a history of ignoring my Orders to Show Cause. He did that in a Supreme Court civil action where I was asking for an emergency relief, based on evidence that my client (not my husband) would suffer irreparable harm if at least a preliminary injunction is not granted.
Yet, since Judge Dowd was assigned to that case at the same time my husband sued him in a pro se federal action, my client had to suffer, and my application for an Order to Show Cause was simply ignored.
In other words, Judge Dowd expects me to pay $45.00 filing fees into court and have my show cause applications directing right into the garbage bin. That is his concept of access to court for me and my clients, of course, after "searching his conscience" as he stated in his decision where he refused to step down from the Mokay case.
And of course, if Judge Dowd does sign an Order to Show Cause and allows the motion to proceed, since Judge Dowd disregards the law and instead regards his own reminiscences as evidence against my client and in favor of Mr. Harlem, Judge Dowd may (and, probably, will) sanction me once again for any motions that I may make to vacate the summary judgment because of Mr. Harlem's statements at the June 23, 2014 hearing.
But - Mr. Harlem did allow himself an important "slip of the tongue" in the hearing on June 23, 2014 that, in my view, does require a vacatur of the summary judgment of liability against my husband, and since I am effectively blocked from access to court on my client's and husband's behalf, I will air my opinion on what happened here, since what I raise here are issues of public concern, corruption in the court system.
When I cornered Mr. Harlem that he is enforcing a judgment of divorce while he did not comply with 22 NYCRR 1400 and thus is not entitled to one penny in legal fees (while legal fees is all that Mr. Harlem asks in actual and TREBLE damages in the action, under Judiciary Law 487), Richard Harlem claimed that he is "only" enforcing against my client a contract to make a will, not a judgment of divorce.
Yet, Mr. Harlem has so far obtained a partial summary judgment on liability against my client and husband for FRAUD UPON THE COURT - for defying a COURT ORDER, specifically, a judgment of divorce.
Based on the partial summary judgment on liability under Judiciary Law 487, enforcing the judgment of divorce, my husband was disbarred WITHOUT A HEARING, after 37 years of practice and despite running a de facto free legal clinic in the county for the indigent, for years.
When it came out in court that Mr. Harlem did not comply with 22 NYCRR 1400 for purposes of legal fees in actions enforcing such JUDGMENTS, Mr. Harlem suddenly claims that his clients are "only" enforcing a contract to make a will as 3rd party beneficiaries? Under Judiciary Law 487? In a fraud upon the court action?
A fraud upon the court action NECESSARILY relied upon the entire JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE, not upon a contract to make a will.
Now what? Will Judge Dowd and all appellate court brush a would be motion to vacate because my husband is just a "disgruntled disbarred attorney" who is below the law while Mr. Harlem is a son of a judge who is above the law? No matter what he does?
When hearing that argument from Mr. Harlem, Judge Dowd should have instantly struck the summary judgment on liability against Mr. Neroni sua sponte, without waiting for my motions.
Yet, instead, Judge Dowd reminisced about his own internship in a District Attorney's office where he was drafting indictments, reprimanded me for not settling with Mr. Harlem and awarded to Mr. Harlem everything Mr. Harlem asked in his billing statement.
It is clear to me from my own experience as an attorney in the Mokay and other cases that in New York there emerged a new body of law - a law for sons of judges (and other attorneys affiliated with judges) which defies and disregards any other law.
Tuesday, June 24, 2014
URGENT: I am seeking help from law professors, lawyers and civil rights organizations in the form of amicus curiae briefs in support of my planned petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in an attorney free speech case
The issue of attorney right to criticize the judiciary and be free from punishment for that criticism has been raised in multiple law reviews.
Yet, no case recently has reached the U.S. Supreme Court on the issue, although there are enough cases in the court below where attorneys are in fact punished for their criticism of judges, including rightful criticism.
At this time, I have a case that was dismissed on the level of the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, the appellate dismissal was without even a full review, by a summary "no publication" order.
I've never practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court. The issue of sanctions against an attorney by a judge in retaliation for the attorney's criticism against the judge and, in my case, a lawsuit against the judge in state court, may set the precedent on this issue for the whole country and may help both the legal profession and the public - if it gets before the eyes of the U.S. Supreme Court.
I appeal to my colleagues in the entire U.S., professors of law and non-profit civic organizations like ACLU and others who would want to support this issue.
What I would greatly appreciate would be amicus briefs for the case Bracci v. Becker out of the 2nd Circuit.
I will send the case file promptly to attorneys, law professors or civic law organizations who would express an interest in filing an amicus brief in my support.
Thank you in advance for your help.
Sunday, June 22, 2014
Assigned counsel for the rich and powerful and their expensive champion, attorney James Gleason of Binghamton, New York
On 10/28/2013 my husband Frederick J. Neroni sued several defendants, among them attorneys Ellen L. Coccoma, Otsego County Attorney, special counsel to a large and powerful law firm Hinman, Howard and Kattel, LLP, former disciplinary investigator and prosecutor who was a member of the Professional Conduct Committee for the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department who refused to investigate and prosecute politically connected attorneys whom Mr. Neroni turned into the Professional Conduct Committee and who instead prosecuted investigated and started the prosecution of Mr. Neroni, which ultimately resulted in his disbarment.
The sticky part was that Ellen Coccoma's husband Michael Coccoma recused from Mr. Neroni's case in 2007 that led to his disbarment, Mokay v. Mokay, which is not finalized and adjourned without a date at the request of the plaintiffs and at Mr. Neroni's objection to this day.
While her husband recused from that case, Ellen Coccoma did not recuse from investigating and prosecuting the same case, but who am I to question propriety of actions of the blue bloods of the State of New York.
Ms. Coccoma is the spouse of the powerful Deputy Chief administrative judge of New York State Courts and the chief administrative judge of upstate New York Michael V. Coccoma who, by the rules created by the New York State Court administration, gets to decide which of the retired judges get lucrative well-paid positions of judicial hearing officers post-retirement.
Mr. Neroni sued Ms. Coccoma and the law firm where she worked as special counsel on two grounds:
(1) Mr. Neroni had a standing as a taxpayer and landowner in Otsego County.
Mr. Neroni did not like the fact that Ms. Coccoma, a full-time county employee, a County Attorney earning reportedly $74,702.00 a year, is also employed as a special counsel in HHK and represents private client on Otsego county time funded, in part, by Mr. Neroni as a taxpayer.
That was a claim against Ms. Coccoma as the Otsego County official, based on taxpayer standing of waste of public funds - a state claim under supplemental jurisdiction of the federal court.
(2) Mr. Neroni did not like the fact that:
- in 2010 Ms. Coccoma, Mr. Neroni's investigator and prosecutor, who had access to Mr. Neroni's allegedly existing records in the Committee (to which Mr. Neroni could not get access before his disciplinary proceedings commenced, during those disciplinary proceedings and after his disciplinary proceedings, and up to now), now represents private clients and makes claims of impropriety against Mr. Neroni as a former corporate officer, in other words,
- that Ms. Coccoma is using or may use for private gain information obtained against Mr. Neroni through her investigative or prosecutorial activities in the Committee.
Mr. Neroni was suing Ms. Coccoma for violation of his due process rights and deprivation of the honest services of a neutral and impartial investigator and prosecutor.
Only a portion of this claim was targeting Ms. Coccoma's conduct when she was part of the Committee.
Most of the claim was targeting Ms. Coccoma's private conduct when she left the Committee, but still held confidential information from Mr. Neroni's record which she was about to use for her personal gain in a proceeding for a private client.
That was a federal claim for violation of federal civil rights by a private actor who is using the delegated power of the state and engages in acts with other state actors in order to deprive Mr. Neroni of his constitutional rights to due process of law and to be free from unreasonable seizures (court-ordered depositions).
(3) Mr. Neroni did not like the fact that on November 8, 2011 Ms. Coccoma, instead of notifying the Delaware County Supreme Court, the Hon. John F. Lambert, of the death of her client which resulted in these three consequences:
(a) the court has temporarily lost jurisdiction over the proceedings (jurisdiction abated, CPLR 1015);
(b) Ellen Coccoma and her firm HHK lost authority to represent the deceased client;
(c ) Ellen Coccoma and her firm HHK lost authority to represent the deceased client's children who were acting in litigation on a power of attorney from their father, and powers of attorney become invalid when the person who gives them dies;
- made a motion to that same court to compel appearance of Mr. Neroni at a deposition,
- argued that motion,
- obtained a void court order to compel such a deposition,
- aggressively tried to enforce the order, and
- revealed that her client died only when, after repeated efforts of opposing counsel to bring her dead client to a deposition, the opposing counsel warned Ms. Coccoma that her client will be brought to that cross-deposition by a motion to the court to compel her client's appearance.
Only then, in April of 2012, Ms. Coccoma disclosed to the opposing counsel the fact, but not the date of death of her client.
Mr. Neroni, naturally, was not happy with this fraud and fraud upon the court, and especially with the fact that
- Ms. Coccoma manipulated the court, during the court's absence of jurisdiction and when her own and her law firm's authority to represent the deceased client and his children stopped, and
- unlawfully caused the court to compel violation of Mr. Neroni's due process and 4th Amendment rights - his appearance at a court-ordered deposition without his consent.
Mr. Neroni was also not happy that Ms. Coccoma
- further moved to substitute the legal representative of her deceased client, but did not claim, as it was required by law to restore jurisdiction of the court, that causes of action in the original lawsuit survived her deceased client's death, and
- adamantly relied upon the void decision of Judge Lambert made without the judge's knowledge of the death of Ms. Coccoma's client, as on the "law of the case", and that Ms. Coccoma
- won that motion in front of judge Kevin M. Dowd, a judge who is, upon information and belief, close to retirement, and thus has a financial interest in the outcome of litigation, because if he would please Ellen Coccoma, he can look at a blessing from Ellen Coccoma's husband to be appointed as a judicial hearing officer, a financially lucrative position.
In New York, private attorneys are still considered " officers of the court" and, unlike private pro se parties, are delegated by the state its police power in issuing witness subpoenas.
Ms. Coccoma was enforcing against Mr. Neroni such a subpoena issued by her before the death of her client, but was enforcing it, obviously illegally, after the death of her client and after her own authority ceased, without notification of either Mr. Neroni or the court.
The third claim was a private claim against a private attorney who, acting on a delegated state power to issue subpoenas, under the color of state law, and jointly with several other state actors (a judicial hearing officer of the court, the presiding judge of the court, her own husband, a high-ranking judge), violated Mr. Neroni's constitutional rights.
Now - didn't Mr. Neroni have a point that what Ms. Coccoma and HHK did was in fact a violation of his constitutional rights?
Of course, the presiding judge Gary L. Sharpe did not share Mr. Neroni's opinion, and made so far intricate and unique mistakes in favor of Ms. Coccoma and her co-defendants.
In the lawsuit, HHK was representing itself through its partner James Gleason.
It is the representation of Ellen Coccoma which was tricky and sticky.
On the one hand, Ellen Coccoma was supposedly a competent counsel who could handle self-representation.
On the other hand, HHK could represent Ellen Coccoma, as well as itself.
Neither of these options suited Ellen Coccoma.
Ellen Coccoma did not want to represent herself and did not want to pay for her legal representation.
Ellen Coccoma came up with three options as to how to do it, and I am saying that based only on public records which I retrieved from a public website Pacer.gov.
I do not know how much telephone activity happened and at what levels to help smooth Ms. Coccoma's way to a free representation by New York State Attorney General.
This we may never know, because the lawsuit was dismissed and I do not see any eagerness in any state or federal agencies to investigate Ms. Coccoma, her husband or other powerful player in this sordid story.
In New York, as I have written in this blog before, according to repeated announcements of NY Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, over 80% of litigants cannot afford legal representation.
In New York, as in other states, the legal profession has a monopoly for representation in court, and practicing without a license has recently become a felony, thanks to the voting of multiple attorneys-Senators (I checked, voting in NY Legislature is public record) who blatantly disregarded the conflicts of interest involved in such a voting.
I get reports from indigent people who get denied assigned counsel by judges on different grounds, such as that they got a tax refund - and judge would not hear that the tax refund already went to satisfy other obligation, such as a mortgage or arrears in child support, so people remain without counsel.
It is against this background that Ellen Coccoma,
- a private attorney,
- a County Attorney who, when sued as a County attorney, was entitled only to representation by an attorney hired by the County insurance carrier, but not by the NYS Attorney General;
- a special counsel for HHK,
- the wife of an influential judge,
- president of Otsego County Bar Association,
- former member of a disciplinary body, where for 5 years she investigated and prosecuted attorney misconduct and unethical behavior,
decided to get free legal representation at the expense of New York taxpayers, including those who themselves get denied assigned counsel because of tax refunds, as I described above...
I do not know the sequence of which avenues Ms. Coccoma explored to get to that result, to create for herself a "class of one", an assigned class for the rich and powerful entitled to free legal representation at the expense of taxpayers.
Yet, I know that suddenly Mr. Neroni received a letter from Ms. Coccoma's liability insurance carrier notifying Ms. Coccoma that she is ineligible to receive legal representation at the expense of the insurance company.
But not until the case was dismissed by Judge Sharpe and HHK applied for legal fees did it become obvious to what extent Ms. Coccoma's law firm went in order to help her obtain taxpayer-funded legal representation.
Now, I would like to remind the readers that HHK represented in the action Neroni v. Coccoma, 3:13-cv-1340-GLS-DEP only itself, HHK. Below you can see a snippet picture from the docket report of the case indicating just that.
Yet, according to Mr. Gleason's own submissions to the court in Docket 63, application for attorney's fees, Mr. Gleason has engaged in a vigorous campaign on behalf of Ellen Coccoma since 11/05/13 to broker free legal representation for Ellen Coccoma, and charged his client (and is trying to shift that fee to a pro se civil rights plaintiff at this time) $ 4, 985.50 in legal fees for that campaign.
As a disclaimer, I made this calculation based on the fee list of Mr. Gleason, and where Mr. Gleason commingled different activities with activities to support free representation for Ms. Coccoma by the New York State Attorney General and did not provide a breakdown as to how much time was expended on each of the commingled activities, I assigned the entire value of the claimed commingled activities to Mr. Gleason's campaign to support free representation of Ms. Coccoma by the NYS Attorney General's office at taxpayer expense.
Nowhere does it appear that Mr. Gleason offered his colleague and employee his own pro bono services or services of his law firm. After all, Ms. Coccoma was representing her client on behalf of HHK.
And I remind the readers once against that, throughout this entire campaign on behalf of Ellen Coccoma and to the end of this litigation, Mr. Gleason never appeared on behalf of Ellen Coccoma as an attorney and, thus, had no right to claim one penny in legal fees for his advocacy on her behalf.
Yet, since Mr. Gleason proudly announces that he advises state and federal judges on "joint issues" through a "State-Federal Judicial Council", he can count on support and understanding from both state and federal judges to rescue him from any ethical pits he throws himself and his law firm into.
The existence and operation of this "Council" is even more interesting in the context where state judges are sued in federal court... Really, "joint issues" may arise...
But back to the story...
This is the relevant timeline of the Neroni v. Coccoma litigation and a summary of Mr. Gleason's legal fees Mr. Gleason found possible to put on his client (his own firm HHK) and to claim against a pro se plaintiff in a civil rights litigation - legal fees generated in the advocacy of taxpayer-backed free representation of a politically connected attorney Mr. Gleason did not represent:
Event
|
Date
|
Attorney fee charged by Attorney
James Gleason to his client (own law firm – Hinman, Howard and Kattel, LLP [“HHK”])
and claimed against the Plaintiff
|
Lawsuit Neroni v. Coccoma
et al. was filed
|
10/28/2013
|
|
Summons issued for Ellen
Coccoma
|
10/29/2013
|
|
Summons issued for HHK
|
10/29/2013
|
|
Summons issued for Eugene
Peckham
|
10/29/2013
|
|
Summons issued for LGT
|
10/29/2013
|
|
Gleason's initial contact
with Ellen Coccoma about the lawsuit
|
11/5/2013
|
$ 737.50
|
Gleason's initial contact
with New York State Attorney General about the lawsuit
|
11/6/2013
|
$ 737.50
|
Gleason's e-mail exchange
with Ellen Coccoma about indemnification
|
11/7/2013
|
$ 206.50
|
Gleason's follow-up with
Ellen Coccoma regarding letter requesting defense/indemnification under the
Public Officers Law to the Attorney General's Albany Office
|
11/8/2013
|
$ 118.00
|
Telephone conference
between Gleason and Kevin Hickey of NYS AG about free representation of Ellen
Coccoma by NYS AG
|
11/13/2013
|
$ 354.00
|
Notice of Appearance of
Hiscock & Barclay on behalf of Levine, Gouldin and Thompson, LLP and Margaret
Fowler, the law firm and a law partner of Eugene Peckham, former Acting
Supreme Court justice and the hearing officer in Delaware County Supreme
Court at the time of representation of clients in a case where Eugene Peckham
previously presided as a judge
|
11/18/2013
|
|
Discussion with Kevin
Hickey of Ellen Coccoma's status for free representation by NYS AG's office
|
11/19/2013
|
$ 1,003.00
|
Exchange of e-mails
"with counsel" regarding status of representation for Ellen Coccoma
and Eugene Peckham
|
11/22/2013
|
$ 177.00
|
Notice of Appearance of
New York State Attorney General on behalf of State Defendants with the
exception of Ellen Coccoma and Eugene E. Peckham
|
11/28/2013
|
|
Initial appearance of
Attorney James Gleason (HHK) on behalf of HHK only, not on behalf of either
Ellen Coccoma or Eugene Peckham
|
12/02/2013
|
|
Gleason’s discussion with
NYS AG’s office of the status of representation of Ellen Coccoma
|
12/2/2013
|
$ 1,327.50
|
Refusal letter from Ellen
Coccoma's insurance carrier
|
12/4/2013
|
|
Gleason's telephone
conference with NYS AG regarding status of representation of Ellen Coccoma by
NYS AG
|
12/9/2013
|
$ 88.50
|
Personal service of the summons
upon Ellen Coccoma
|
12/10/2013
|
|
Gleason's follow-up
e-mail to NYSAG regarding Ellen Coccoma's request for indemnification/defense
under the Public Officers Law
|
12/16/2013
|
$ 59.00
|
Gleason's exchange of
e-mails regarding NYS AG's agreement to represent Ellen Coccoma and Eugene
Peckham
|
12/17/2013
|
$ 177.00
|
Notice of Appearance of
NYS AG on behalf of Ellen Coccoma, Eugene Peckham
|
12/18/2013
|
|
TOTAL CHARGED BY
ATTORNEY GLEASON TO HIS
CLIENT (AND OWN LAW FIRM) HHK AND CLAIMED AGAINST A PRO SE CIVIL RIGHTS
PLAINTIFF FOR ADVOCACY REGARDING TAXPAYER BACKED FREE REPRESENTATION OF ELLEN
COCCOMA AND EUGENE PECKHAM (BOTH NON-CLIENTS)
|
$ 4,985.50
|
Below are snippet pictures from Mr. Gleason's own statements of fees to the court in Neroni v. Coccoma, 3:13-cv-1340-GLS-DEP in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, Docket 63-1, pages 7 to 12.
Please, note that Mr. Gleason values his advocacy for taxpayer-backed free legal representation of a politically connected attorney who was not his client, at $295/hr.
On November 5, 2013, a week after the lawsuit was filed, Mr. Gleason calls Ms. Coccoma for the first time about this litigation (at least, that is what he claims in his list of legal fees).
On November 7, 2013, the relentless Mr. Gleason exchanges e-mails with Ms. Coccoma pertaining her " eligibility for indemnification under the Public Officers Law and even has a telephone conference with Jeffrey Devorin of the New York State Attorney General's office in Albany.
On November 8, 2013 Mr. Gleason follows up with Ellen Coccoma regarding her request to the New York State Attorney General to represent her for free.
On November 13, 2013, Mr. Gleason has a telephone conference with the New York State Attorney General's office on the same subject, and accurately bills all of the above to his client (and law firm) HHK, even though he did not step into representation of HHK in the federal action yet, and did not (and never did in the future) step into representation of Ellen Coccoma in that lawsuit.
Mr. Gleason's campaign on behalf of Ms. Coccoma to get her taxpayer backed representation by the Attorney General's office continues.
On December 9, 2013 Mr. Gleason holds yet another telephone conference with the Attorney General's office on the same subject of legal representation of Ellen Coccoma.
- In 2013 Ellen Coccoma had a salary of $74,702.00 as a full-time Otsego County employee, a County Attorney, and an unknown amount paid to her as HHK special counsel;
- In 2013 Ellen Coccoma's husband Michael V. Coccoma had a salary of $ 175.592 as the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge of the State of New York
To say that the public is protected by blocking lay individuals from court representation and by installing a monopoly for the practice of law for the likes of Mr. Gleason, Ms. Coccoma, Mr. Peckham and people supporting them in their endeavors to get taxpayer-backed freebies for the wealthy and powerful, is to be a hypocrite of the highest order.