A federal lawsuit has been filed to verify membership of judges and attorneys in the American Inns of Court

I just filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York where, among other things, I ask the federal court to compel judges who presided, are presiding and are likely to preside over my cases in the nearest future, to disclose their potential membership in a secret-membership organization, the American Inns of Court, which is funded by attorney-members (membership for attorneys is also secret) and provides for monthly closed-door meetings with receptions, national and international travel and scholarships.


In March of this year I already wrote about the American Inns of Court and the problems that a secret membership of judges may present as to validity of their decisions.


Membership of one judge out of several judges included into the federal lawsuit as defendants is confirmed because he is listed as a president of an American Inn of Court.


The case name and number is now:  Neroni v. Peebles, 3:14-cv-00584-GTS-ATB.

Judge threatens attorney - revisited

Recently I described an episode as to how a judge of Ulster County Supreme Court Christopher Cahill called an opposing counsel on a case where I represented a party, into his chambers and held there an ex parte conference with her, while his employee blocked me from entering the chambers where the ex parte communication was taking place for a prolonged period of time, and how Judge Cahill threatened me with a complaint to the Professional Conduct Committee when I confronted him after that ex parte communication.


I was recently notified by the New York State Court Administration in response to my FOIL request that the security file from that date was "recycled", in other words, destroyed.  That was despite my timely requests to the NYS OCA through FOIL requests and despite my complaint to the Judicial Conduct Commission specifically pointing out that such a security tape exists and will show evidence of the ex parte communication.


Previously, NYS OCA claimed to me in answer to a similar FOIL request pertaining to another courthouse, that the retention time for such files is 30 days.  I made my FOIL request in much less than that time, asked the Judicial Conduct Commission to obtain that file, too, and the evidence was still destroyed.   Isn't it obstruction of the fair administration of justice? Shouldn't an investigation be in order as to who exactly was instrumental in having the tape destroyed?  Isn't an inquiry in order whether Judge Cahill as one of the court administrators of that particular court building was involved in destruction of evidence implicating him in judicial misconduct?


This is not the first time destruction of such evidence is happening under different pretenses, and it appears to be the policy of the NYS OCA to destroy evidence of judicial misconduct caught on video.


NYS OCA must realize that destroying evidence of judicial misconduct does not enhance public trust in the integrity of the judiciary.

Open, Simsim! Or - do attorney disciplinary archives exist?

I would say "no".


For years I tried to get access to my own allegedly existing file in the Professional Conduct Committee, New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 3rd Judicial Department (hereinafter PCC), and to the file of my husband in that same organization.


By Judiciary Law 90(10), my husband's file must be available to the public anyway, because my husband's license was taken in July of 2011.


Yet, nearly 3 years down the road my husband or I still cannot get access to his own file.


One can get access to his or her own file in the FBI, but not in the Professional Conduct Committee.


There is no discovery in attorney disciplinary procedure, PCC claims, and they are not under Freedom of information law (FOIL) because they are allegedly part of the judiciary (which raises interesting questions as to how can the same judiciary be the prosecutor and the adjudicator - on top of being the legislator of the rules), and as to my requests under Judiciary Law 255 or due process of law, PCC just bluntly denies access, period.


So I had to sue PCC on behalf of my husband for access to his own file, long after disbarment, while the file is presumed now to be public record.


And the lawsuit proceeds in federal court.


And they still do not give access to my husband's own file.


And at this time they still do not give me access to my allegedly existing file, while claiming they are relying on contents in that file which are unavailable to me.


Is it a violation of my due process of law?  Of course, it is.  But who cares?  They know that I have no right of appeal (New York does not give it to attorneys), they know that the NYS Court of Appeals will toss any constitutional claims by stating that my constitutional rights are not "substantially" violated, in one arrogant phrase without explanations, as NYS Court of Appeals always does, they know that there are only 9 elderly people on the U.S. Supreme Court to deal with petitions for a writ of certiorari from 50 states and that my chances of getting in front of the U.S. Supreme court are worse than for a camel to get through the needle's eye.


But - the mystery of the archive of PCC, or of its existence, remains, and, as a naturally curious person, I want to see it.


It is very difficult to give somebody something which does not exist.


New York State Governor Cuomo knows it and is using it or is about to use this wise approach of timely destroying public records to prevent inadvertent nosy citizens from learning what is not safe for their little minds to know, or to keep public records in his employees' private e-mail accounts.


New York State Office of Court Administration also is using the "do not create, stall access or destroy the evidence" approach for quite a while, and that is on my own knowledge.


But - if PCC uses the "Cuomo approach", then maybe, just maybe, my file and my husband's file still exist?  Maybe it is tucked away in the closet of a PCC employee's home? Or in their garage?  Attic? Barn? Shed?  Dog house? Chicken coup?


Can anybody who ever had access to the mysterious Ali Baba's Cave tell me if the treasure (PCC's archive) even exists?


Or do they feed all their documents, if they are even created, into a shredder or a dustbin and then use the fact that the court (which they are part of) always turns a blind eye on any of their shenanigans, no matter how bad, and believes their statements as to the alleged contents of their allegedly existing archive without any evidence of that existence?


Open, Simsim!


Oh, Treasure, do you still exist?

Three times is a pattern, or, if you need evidence of judicial misconduct, you won't get it, but if you claim judicial misconduct, you will be punished for claiming it based on insufficient evidence

The first time when I was denied access to security tapes in a courthouse was in August of 2010.  I was trying to verify which of the three judges who were at that time (upon my personal knowledge) in the courthouse gave an order to the security officer to detain me, an attorney with a security pass, at the time I was LEAVING the courthouse and to ask me to walk through a metal detector, as if I was a very dangerous person, in front of the public and in front of my colleagues.


The New York State Office of Court Administration (NYS OCA) ducked the issue by claiming that they cannot really give me a copy, copies cannot be made, the video-recording equipment does not allow to make copies, that I need to come before or after the court hours (which is illegal under the Freedom of Information Law) and look through the tapes because otherwise I will interfere with the work of the courthouse.  As a result, I was never able to get those tapes.  The three judges who were present in the courthouse at that time were Carl F. Becker, Rita Connerton, Eugene Peckham.  I would exclude Judge Peckham immediately from the candidates who could have given an order because I was in front of that judge right before I was leaving the courthouse, and there was nothing in my behavior or in the judge's reactions that would suggest that the judge was upset or could have given such an order. 


I did not have any cases in front of Judges Becker or Connerton that day, entered the courthouse using my attorney secure pass, was directed by the court officer to the waiting room under the security cameras and stayed there the entire time until I was called into Judge Peckham's courtroom, and after that I headed toward the exit/entrance of the building and was stopped there and asked to go through a metal detector "before I go upstairs".


In fact, I was supposed to go "upstairs" because my husband and I were attorneys of record in a felony criminal trial that was handled on the 2nd floor at that same time before Judge Carl F. Becker.  I was not heading upstairs at that time, but even if I would, there was no point at all to put an attorney of record in a criminal case through a metal detector.   My background was checked through and through by the immigration authorities (I became an American citizen in 2009), I never committed any crimes and I was a perpetrator of violence, so there was no reason whatsoever to do that to me, other than to embarrass and humiliate me in front of the public and other attorneys.


Yet, I will never know who has given such an order because the security personnel was mum, it was unfair to sue security officers while the "big birds" were getting away with their misconduct, so I did not do it.


The second time I was denied access to the security tapes in a courthouse was in November of 2011 when I was trying to confirm the ex parte communication between a presiding judge, James C. Tormey, the Chief Administrative Judge of the 5th Judicial District who has interesting litigation history against him raising questions as to why he is still on the bench, a judge who was a defendant in an action I brought as a plaintiff and attorney for two co-plaintiffs, Carl F. Becker (you can word-search my blog to find out interesting information about this judge) and an Assistant New York State Attorney General representing Carl F. Becker in that litigation.


The New York State OCA ducked the issue by claiming that for that particular day the video-recorder, unfortunately, broke, but refused to provide to me copies of documents proving that payments were made for repairs of that allegedly broken equipment.


The third time I was denied access to the security tapes in a courthouse was yesterday.  I was bluntly told by NYS OCA that the security footage I was requesting is "unavailable", no explanations given.


The interesting part about it was that I sought for security tapes documenting yet another ex parte communication, but this time of another judge, Judge Christopher Cahill of the Ulster County Supreme Court, I wrote about it in March of this year.   Part of the footage was supposed to show the waiting room between the chambers of Judge Cahill and the chambers of the Chief Judge of the Appellate Division Third Judicial Department Karen Peters.


My initial FOIL request made on the day of the occurrence of the ex parte communication to which I was a witness (how attorney Del Seligman was called into the judge's chambers, how she walked into the chambers and closed the door behind herself before I could reach it, how I was not allowed by the judge's clerk or secretary to enter and was told that the judge wanted to see only Del Seligman, and how long Del Seligman was in there with the judge while I was not allowed to enter) asked for the footage of March 25, 2014, I was in a hurry and copied the letterhead template with the previous day's date.


The footage was delivered to me immediately, but, naturally, showed nothing.


I immediately asked for the footage on the correct date, and then silence set in for a month.  In a month's time I was told curtly that the footage will not be given to me because it is "unavailable".

Yet, the happy delivery to me of the footage from March 25, 2014 shows that copies of security tapes may be made, contrary to what I was told in 2010 on the same issue by NYS OCA.  Problems with "availability" of these tapes arise only when you ask for tapes which, most likely, document misconduct of a judge.


It is very interesting to mention that the security tapes became mysteriously "unavailable" at the time when I turned Judge Cahill into the Judicial Conduct Commission and asked them to review the security tapes, and when Judge Cahill threatened me to turn me into the Professional Conduct Commission because I was "out of line".  Security tapes would have been key evidence to show that I was right and the judge was wrong.  That key evidence is now "unavailable".


The interesting part is that recently, law clerk for another judge, Mark Oursler, refused to move his finger and push the button on a digital recorder when attorney Andrew Van Buren was verbally harassing and bullying me during a court conference. 


Then, the Professional Conduct Commission relied upon a hearsay statement allegedly from the same Mark Oursler stating that nothing like that ever occurred and that I am making false statements about good and innocent attorney Andrew Van Buren (who is, coincidentally, upon information and belief, the only attorney who openly supported Judge Becker in his election campaign, while I was, upon information and belief, the only attorney who openly opposed Judge Becker in his election campaign).


If I was making those false statements, why would good old Mark Oursler refuse to push the button and create evidence that would rebut my false statements?


It appears as if that was done for the same reason I was denied security tapes by NYS OCA in August 2010, November 2011 and May 2014, so that no obvious evidence of misconduct of a judge, or a judge's darling attorney could be presented to authorities.


I must add that I was sanctioned, by Judge Becker, for making motions to recuse the same Judge Becker, and the sanctions were claiming that I made false claims against the judge, and that my claims were based on allegedly insufficient evidence or making false claims.  That same judge started a sua sponte frivolity proceedings against me for making FOIL requests against him that, obviously, were reported to him back down the grapevine. 


The sanctions were arrogantly imposed upon me by Judge Becker after the NYS OCA stalled my FOIL inquiry into his financial semi-annual reports and refused to provide to me video evidence of which of the three judges present in the courthouse on that August day of 2010, Carl F. Becker, Rita Connerton, or Eugene Peckham (the latter highly unlikely), has given to the court security officers an order to unlawfully arrest me in the courthouse in front of members of the public and my colleagues, other attorneys, and to put me through a metal detector on my way out of the courthouse, thus conducting a body search and drawing attention to me from the people who witnessed that by the highly irregular procedure, especially as applied to an attorney with a secure pass.  


In fact, the regular procedure for attorneys is that, if an attorney comes to the courthouse with a "secure pass" issued by the NYS OCA after appropriate background check, as it was issued to me, the attorney bypasses the metal detectors.  That's what I did that morning in August of 2010.  There was no reason whatsoever to ask me to go through the metal detector, especially when I was leaving the courthouse, other than to harass, denigrate and intimidate me, which is quite Judge Becker's style of conduct toward me that I observed and experienced in the courtroom.




The order was, most likely, given by Judge Becker who is the administrator of that particular courthouse, who was present at the time of the order (which I heard reported over the radio) and in front of whom my husband and I were trying a felony case.  I also heard from other people that Carl F. Becker was upset about my husband and me "double-teaming", or co-chairing, criminal trials, which allowed one of us to cross-examine witnesses and the other to jot down questions or review evidence provided by the prosecution during the trial.




So, a disciplinary case was concocted against my husband, he was stripped of his license and we are no longer "double-teaming".  Now the task before a certain group of individuals within NYS OCA and certain other public officials against whom I filed FOIL requests and blew whistles on appearances of impropriety, is to strip me of my hard-earned law license, which was even more hard-earned that English is not my native language.


In order to do that, I am denied access to the most convincing evidence, video and audio evidence of people's misconduct, and those same people who deny me access to evidence then claim that what I am saying is somehow false.  If it is false, why not allow me to preserve that false statement or evidence of my own inappropriate behavior?  Wouldn't it sound as a logical to do?  Or doesn't such a pattern of behavior show that it was not my misconduct that would have been preserved by audio- and/or videotaping, but somebody else's?




This is the law of connections in New York in its full glory.   Your case is going to be decided in accordance with your social status and your connections.  Do not for a split second confuse it with the rule of law.

It is not honorable for the U.S. Congress and federal courts to blatantly discriminate against indigent pro se litigants

I've posted this story in two of my blogs, one dedicated specifically to discrimination by American courts against pro se litigants and this one, focusing on judicial accountability and independence of the legal profession.  I believe it is important for the readers of both of these blogs to see this story.


I've got a phone call today from a reader of my blog who has been litigating pro se in federal and state courts, so far unsuccessfully.


The reader, a well respected retired professional, was surprisingly well versed in the mazes of doctrines and rules of federal and state appellate courts, which shows years' worth of litigation.


The cases were still lost, both in state and in federal courts, for reasons well described in my this blog.


Even before I started this blog, I have been contacted by many people whose federal cases were already lost or who had no hope winning those cases because of barricades of judicially created doctrines that block their access to courts.


Yet, one case stood out.  It introduced me to the area of federal law I did not know about and which I am deeply ashamed of, more than of anything else I encountered during my years as a civil rights attorney.


It is statutory discrimination against civil rights litigants in federal courts who represent themselves and who are poor and obtained from the court a "poor person status" with a fee waiver.


The current filing fee in the federal district court where I am practicing is $450.00.  For many people such a price tag on access to justice makes that access impossible.


To alleviate that problem, federal courts allow civil rights litigants to apply for what is called "in forma pauperis" (IFP) status, or a leave to proceed as a poor person, with a waiver of filing fees.


Yet, when an IFP status is granted, the poor (and mostly uneducated) pro se litigants are not told that with the IFP status comes such conditions that they should beware the courts bearing such gifts and instead should struggle, but pay that $450.00 fee, because for $450.00 they are agreeing to egregious discrimination by federal courts, authorized by the U.S. Congress, in 28 U.S.C. 1915.


Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e) a federal court has authority to dismiss a civil rights case of an IFP pro se litigant sua sponte (on its own motion) if the action or appeal is "frivolous or malicious",  28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(B)(I);  fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(B)(ii), or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.


Now, concepts of immunity are not reflected in statutes, most of them (with the exception of judicial immunity from injunctive relief when sued in official capacity, an odd addition to 42 U.S.C. 1983)are judicially created doctrines with multiple exceptions and intricacies of application.


The statute clearly provides that at any time, including the time before defendants are even served with the lawsuit (which was the case for the person who brought to me the description of their case after such a dismissal) a federal court may, on its own motion, not only dismiss the case, but also impose costs upon a poor pro se litigant!


Moreover, if the court does such sua sponte dismissals three times, a prisoner/pro se litigant's access to court as an IFP person will be simply barred, whether he actually remains a poor person or not:


28 U.S.C. 1915(g): 


 


"In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.


 Furthermore, under 28 U.S.C. 1915(h):


" (h) As used in this section, the term “prisoner” means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.


It is apparent that the federal statute makes no difference between a convicted individual and a detained or accused individual who is still covered by presumption of innocence.


Even then, whether a person has been convicted and sentenced for commission of a crime or not, that does not automatically cancel his civil rights, which is what is being presented in this statute.  I draw the readers' attention to the fact that it is presumed that the dismissal is correct.  So, it takes three careless dismissals to block an access to court of an individual who is "detained" (not convicted yet),  "accused" (not convicted yet),  violated "pretrial release" (not convicted yet), or violated diversionary program ( as an alternative to conviction, so not convicted).


Presumption of innocence goes out the door.


Detention is presumed lawful.


Accusations is presumed evidence.


Delinquency which is a sealed proceeding is revealed.


The law is put on its head.


But that is not all that is wrong with this statute.


Normally, after a defendant is served, a defendant must timely file an answer with affirmative defenses or


In IFP cases, the court must serve the defendant.


In the case that was complained about to me by my confidential client, the court dismissed the case on its own motion BEFORE that same court fulfilled its duty to the IFP litigant to serve the defendants.  The defendants were powerful public officials and agencies, judges and courts.


Some defenses upon which the court dismissed the lawsuit, were not jurisdictional, they were affirmative defenses that were for defendants to timely raise, and if they would not be raised, they would be waived.


Plaintiff would have benefited by being allowed to at least argue on her own behalf.


The U.S. Congress allowed federal courts to be advocates for powerful governmental defendants by giving a court to sua sponte dismiss cases before they were even served based on the court's own understanding, on its "own motion" as to what constitutes "frivolous" constitutional claims is, oxymoronic, because constitutional arguments are counter-majoritarian by their nature and what is "frivolous" is a majoritarian argument, moreover, such rules are vague, poorly defined and allow arbitrary enforcement.


American court proceedings are adversarial.


When a court is moving sua sponte to dismiss a case of a poor person, the court acts as that person's opponent and thus completely cancels out the whole idea of access to a fair and impartial tribunal.


Yet, in the even that the IFP pro se plaintiff had money, that plaintiff would have been entitled, with the very same claim, to hire an attorney, have that attorney serve the complaint, declare a default if defendants do not appear in the action timely, oppose any motions to dismiss and bring forth arguments that could change the court's mind and change previous caselaw  if previous cases are decided incorrectly.


An IFP pro se litigant is not only at a disadvantage because, well, the pro se plaintiff is poor, but the pro se plaintiff has no legal representation and no time or opportunity to be heard before the court dismisses the case before the lawsuit is even served and before any affirmative defenses are raised!!!


To add insult to the injury, in my confidential client's case the court not only dismissed the case before serving defendants, but told the IFP pro se plaintiff that if plaintiff takes an appeal from the dismissal, it will be presumed to be in bad faith and frivolous.


IFP pro se plaintiffs often have low educational level.


Yet, the courts and the U.S. Congress which enacted this statute, appear to presume and require that IFP pro se litigants be educated in judicial doctrines without any representation, even while professors, courts and attorneys differ as to the meaning, scope and the very validity of the doctrines that illiterate IFP pro se plaintiffs are presumed to know, "or else" their access to the court will be barred.


The issue of the IFP pro se federal lawsuit that was dismissed sua sponte was, sadly, about access to Family Court files for pro se appellants to prepare a Pro Se Record on Appeal, as well as caps on compensation of assigned counsel on appeal in Family Court cases in New York state.


The plaintiff did not ask for money damages, only for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, and that relief was supposed to be granted, because otherwise the plaintiff would be left without access to state court and without  any remedy at law, despite the obvious fact that her constitutional rights as an appellant were violated.


28 U.S.C. 1915 is an example of shameless discrimination against the poor and the pro se litigants in American courts, leaving poor people without any legal remedies pertaining to violations of their civil rights.

 

Once again on the necessity of full ratification of the International Covenant For Political and Civil Rights by the US

Here is a link to a Russian resource reporting 21 violations by Russia of Article 5 of the European Convention for Human Rights, as established by the European Court for Human Rights.


As a civil rights attorney who regularly feels frustration when the government and the court raise the innumerable doctrines to bar access of a civil rights plaintiff to the court and preclude any meaningful remedy for a victim of governmental abuse, I wonder what would statistics have been like had the U.S. allowed a private cause of action for its own citizens to sue the American officials in the United Nations for civil rights violations...


Right now I do not believe statistics of human right abuses in the U.S. by the state and federal government is even available, as the government, naturally would not be forthcoming with such statistics and private lawsuits, especially on conditions on detention.   How many meritorious lawsuits on conditions of detention are nipped in the bud by the so-called Prison Reform Litigation Act, we do not even know.


The U.S. government created a haven for itself by requiring prisoners who want to complain of conditions of detention to first file a grievance within 15 days (!) of the occurrence of the incident that the prisoner wants to sue for.


And, as you might understand, those grievance forms are hard to get for the prisoners, and if they get them, prison may suddenly become a more dangerous place for them than it was before they filed that grievance.


With no possibility of an outside-of-the-country oversight, prisoners' rights remain unprotected in the United States.


Therefore, as much as I want to criticize my native country, Russia (and I do criticize it a lot, in a Russian blog called Snob.ru), for civil rights violations, here I must admit that Russia is ahead of the United States in providing an extraneous judicial remedy of European Court of Human Rights for violations of civil rights by Russian government against its citizen, a remedy that American citizens could have, but do not have because of "restrictions, understandings and declarations" (RUDs) with which the United States ratified the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).




Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court which recently managed to duck the issue of unlawful detention of "troublemakers" by the U.S. Government, leaving the door wide open for abuses, which, no doubt, will be happening, and are happening as we speak, the Russian government, which is far from being an example of protector of civil liberties within its country, at the very least allowed its citizens lawsuits against itself in a tribunal outside of the country, in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.


What is the effect upon the citizenry of the availability of such a judicial remedy where a person can sue his own country for a violation of his civil rights?


I believe that having such a judicial remedy available builds confidence in the citizenry that your own government is accountable to you and may be made to pay by a power higher than the government at a country level.


That gives the citizenry empowerment and the sense of justice.


When the government, like American state and federal courts, and especially the U.S. Supreme Court, erects barricades of doctrines to block people's access to justice  and precludes them from resolving their grievances against the government, such actions destroy public trust in the integrity of the government in general and of the judiciary specifically.


Lack of public trust undermines legitimacy of the government and may ultimately lead to chaos, where people repeatedly fail to obtain judicial remedies of obvious constitutional violations through courts and may lose their faith in the rule of law.




For that reason, I believe it to be wise and prudent for the U.S. government to enhance respect to itself by its citizenry and allow a private cause of action against the U.S. Government for private citizens and foreigners with standing, in the United Nations.




Below I provide the list of cases which Russian citizens and immigrants to Russia won against Russia, and where in most cases non-pecuniary money damages were awarded against Russia by the European court of Human rights.




Such a record does not establish too high a statistic of civil rights violation, as it establish the statistic of remedying those civil rights violations, something that is completely lacking in the United States in view of barriers that is artificially created by federal courts in civil rights litigation in order to clear the court's busy caseloads.




You be the judge as to whether you would like to have such a remedy here in the United States, for the U.S. citizens against violations of civil rights by the U.S. government, which is currently unavailable because of restrictions in ratification of the International Convention for Civil and Political Rights, the multitude of judicially created doctrines barring access to court and, mostly, the doctrine of judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity and sovereign immunity leaving victims of egregious constitutional violations completely without a remedy.


You can read the full case by clicking on the case names.

No	Case Name	Relevant holdings	What would have been the outcome in the U.S.
1.	Ryabikin v. Russia (2008)	Russia violated Article 5 of European Convention in denial of judicial review pertaining to detention; Awarded  EUR 15,000 (fifteen thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;   awarded EUR 8,299 (eight thousand two hundred and ninety-nine euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses; (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European	No money damages – sovereign immunity   There is no concept in the U.S. of the government paying to the victim of its misconduct non-pecuniary damages, or damages for emotional pain and suffering     No judicial review outside of the country – RUDs to International Convention for Civil and Political Rights  (ICCPR) preclude review of claims of U.S. citizens against the U.S. in the United Nations   No meaningful judicial review inside the country: see, for example, that U.S. Supreme Court recently refused to review the issue of unlawful detentions, see also the list of judicially created bars to federal civil rights litigation
2.	Schebet v. Russia (2008)	1.  Declares the complaints concerning the conditions of the applicant's detention, the lawfulness of her detention and a lack of a procedure to have its lawfulness reviewed by a court, admissible, and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of a legal basis for the applicant's detention from 20 February to 26 March 2007;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the inhuman and degrading conditions of the applicant's detention;   5.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;	Same as above
3.	Ismoilov et al v. Russia (2008)	2. Holds by six votes to one that in the event of the extradition orders against the applicants being enforced, there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;       3.  Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention;       4.  Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;       5.  Holds unanimously that there is no need to examine the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;       6.  Holds by six votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention;       7.  Holds by six votes to one   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:   (i)  EUR 15,000 (fifteen thousand euros) to each of the applicants in respect of non-pecuniary damage;   (ii)  the following amounts in respect of the legal representation:            Mr Alimov: EUR 1,545 (one thousand five hundred and forty-five euros);            Mr Ismoilov: EUR 1,694 (one thousand six hundred and ninety-four euros);            Mr Kasimhujayev: EUR 1,259 (one thousand two hundred and fifty-nine euros);            Mr Rustamhodjaev: EUR 1,165 (one thousand one hundred and sixty-five euros);            Mr Makhmudov: EUR 1,381 (one thousand three hundred and eighty-one euros);            Mr Usmanov: EUR 1,304 (one thousand three hundred and four euros);            Mr Muhamadsobirov: EUR 1,304 (one thousand three hundred and four euros);            Mr Muhametsobirov: EUR 1,235 (one thousand two hundred and thirty-five euros);            Mr Ulughodjaev: EUR 1,370 (one thousand three hundred and seventy euros);            Mr Sabirov: EUR 1,292 (one thousand two hundred and ninety-two euros);            Mr Naimov: EUR 1,221 (one thousand two hundred and twenty-one euros);            Mr Hamzaev: EUR 1,367 (one thousand three hundred and sixty-seven euros);            Mr Tashtemirov: EUR 1,377 (one thousand three hundred and seventy-seven euros);   (iii)  EUR 195 (one hundred ninety-five euros) to Mr Alimov in respect of postal expenses;   (iv)  any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants on the above amounts;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.	Comments will be added
4.	Khudiakova v. Russia	Declares the complaints concerning the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending extradition and the courts’ failure to examine speedily her application for release admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   4.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.	Comments will be added
5.	Eminbeyli v. Russia (2009)	1.  Declares the complaints concerning the lawfulness of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty and the judicial review of his detention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   4.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;	Comments will be added
6.	Muminov v. Russia (2008)	1.  Decides to join to the merits the Government’s objections as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the applicant’s complaints about a risk of ill-treatment in the event of his being expelled to Uzbekistan and the unlawfulness of his deprivation of liberty and rejects them;       2.  Declares the complaints concerning the alleged risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan, the alleged inefficiency of the domestic remedies in respect of the applicant’s complaint of a risk of ill-treatment, the unlawfulness of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty and the unavailability of judicial review of his detention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;       3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s expulsion to Uzbekistan;       4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the authorities’ failure to afford the applicant an effective and accessible remedy in relation to his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention;       5.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of the unavailability of any procedure for a judicial review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention with a view to his extradition to Uzbekistan;       6.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in relation to his detention with a view to his extradition to Uzbekistan;       7.  Holds that there is no need to examine separately the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7;       8.  Holds that there has been no breach of the respondent State’s obligation under Article 34 of the Convention;       9.  Holds that the question of the application of Article 41 is not ready for decision;         accordingly,   (a)  reserves the question;   (b)  invites the Russian Government and the applicant to submit, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, their written observations on the matter and, in particular, to notify the Court of any agreement that they may reach;   (c)  reserves the further procedure and delegates to the President of the Chamber the power to fix the same if need be.	Comments will be added
7.	Fursenko v. Russia (2008)	1.  Holds that the applicant’s mother has standing to continue the present proceedings in his stead;   2.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s pre-trial detention from 14 April to 14 May 2001, from 18 June to 24 September 2001, from 26 February to 26 March 2002, from 25 June to 6 August 2002 and 30 January to 14 February 2003;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s pre-trial detention from 14 to 23 May 2001, from 23 May to 18 June 2001, from 24 September 2001 to 26 February 2002, from 26 March to 25 June 2002, from 6 to 8 August 2002, and from 8 August 2002 to 30 January 2003;   4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;   5.  Holds that it is unable to consider the merits of the applicant’s complaint concerning the failure to examine his complaint of 25 April 2001, as it has been lodged out of time;   6.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of the alleged failure to examine the applicant’s complaints lodged between 13 July and 21 November 2001;   7.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of the failure to examine “speedily” his complaint of 28 February 2002 and to deliver a final judicial decision in this respect, as well as the failure to examine “speedily” his appeal against the decision of 12 July 2002;   8.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant’s mother, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 250 (two hundred and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;	Same as above, PLUS:   The complainant – the mother of the person detained – would have been denied standing in the U.S.
8.	Popov v. Russia (2006)	1.  Declares the complaints concerning the fairness of the proceedings, the conditions of detention and lack of medical assistance in remand prison SIZO 77/1 in Moscow, the conditions of detention in disciplinary cells and lack of medical assistance in the YaCh-91/5 prison in Sarapul, and the interference with the right of individual petition, admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;       2.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention in respect of the alleged defects of the bill of indictment;       3.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the use of the identification reports;       4.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in that the domestic courts refused the motion to admit the applicant's uncle to participate in the proceedings as his representative;       5.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 3 (d) in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in that the domestic courts failed to examine defence witnesses Mrs R. and Mr Kh.;       6.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of conditions of detention and lack of adequate medical assistance in remand prison SIZO 77/1 in Moscow;       7.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of conditions of detention in disciplinary cells and lack of adequate medical assistance in the YaCh-91/5 prison in Sarapul;       8.  Holds that the State has failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 34 not to hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual petition;       9.  Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint concerning the alleged interference with the applicant's correspondence with his representative;       10.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 25,000 (twenty five thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 3,285 (three thousand two hundred and eighty-five euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;	Comments will be added
9.	Starokadomsky v. Russia (2008)	1.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant's detention in Moscow remand centre no. 77/1;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant's transport to and confinement at the Moscow City Court;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention as regards the applicant's detention on 1 and 2 July 2002;   4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;   5.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   6.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 15,500 (fifteen thousand five hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, and EUR 785 (seven hundred eighty-five euros) in respect of legal costs, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, both sums to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   7.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.	Comments will be added
10.	Moiseyev v. Russia (2009)	1.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the Lefortovo remand prison;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant’s transport between the remand prison and the courthouse;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant’s confinement at the Moscow City Court;   4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;   5.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   6.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of independence and impartiality of the Moscow City Court;   7.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of a breach of the “reasonable time” requirement;   8.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention;   9.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 7 of the Convention;   10.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of unjustified restrictions on family visits;   11.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of unjustified restrictions on the applicant’s correspondence;   12.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:   (i)  EUR 25,000 (twenty-five thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage plus any tax that may be chargeable;   (ii)  EUR 3,973 (three thousand nine hundred and seventy-three euros) in respect of costs and expenses plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   13.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.	Comments will be added
11.	Lebedev v. Russia (2007)	1.  Dismisses unanimously the Government’s preliminary objections concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the applicant’s victim status;       2.  Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention on account of the applicant’s unauthorised detention between 31 March and 6 April 2004;       3.  Holds by four votes to three that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention from 3 July 2003 to 28 August 2003;       4.  Holds by five votes to two that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention as regards the delays in the review of the detention order of 26 December 2003 by the Moscow City Court;       5.  Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of the delays in the review of the detention order of 6 April 2004 by the Moscow City Court;       6.  Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of the absence of the applicant from the detention hearing on 8 June 2004;       7.  Holds unanimously that the temporary inability of the applicant to meet one of his lawyers did not amount in the circumstances to a failure by the State to fulfil its obligation under Article 34 of the Convention;       8.  Holds unanimously   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention the following amounts, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable on the date of settlement:   (i)  EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;   (ii)  EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros) in respect of his legal costs;   (iii)  any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts.   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;       9.  Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.	Comments will be added
12.	Bakhmutskiy v. Russia (2009)	1.  Declares admissible unanimously   (a)  the complaint under Article 3 concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention in detention facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don;   (b)  the complaint under Article 13 concerning the lack of an effective remedy for the allegedly appalling conditions of the applicant’s pre-trial detention;   (c)  the complaint under Article 5 § 1 concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention from 12 February 2002 to 17 May 2004;   (d)  the complaint under Article 5 § 3 concerning the length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention;   (e)  the complaint under Article 5 § 4 concerning the alleged ineffectiveness of the judicial review of the applicant’s detention;   (f)  the complaint under Article 6 § 1 concerning the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant;   (g)  the complaint under Article 13 concerning the lack of an effective remedy in respect of the alleged violation of the applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time;   and inadmissible the remainder of the application;   2.  Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant’s detention in detention facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don;   3.  Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective remedy for the applicant to complain about the conditions of his pre-trial detention;   4.  Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention from 12 February to 1 July 2002;   5.  Holds unanimously that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention from 1 July 2002 to 17 May 2004;   6.  Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;   7.  Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   8.  Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the excessive length of the proceedings against the applicant;   9.  Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective remedy for the applicant to complain about the length of the criminal proceedings;   10.  Holds by five votes to two   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:   (i)  EUR 40,000 (forty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;   (ii)  EUR 2,600 (two thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   11.  Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.	Comments to be added
13.	Shteyn (Stein) v. Russia (2009)	1.  Declares the complaints concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention, the lawfulness of one period of detention, the length of the applicant’s detention, the delays in the examination of his appeals against detention orders and the length of the criminal proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention in relation to the detention order of 2 June 2006;   4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;   5.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   6.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;   7.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, and EUR 300 (three hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   8.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.	Comments to be added
14.	Matyush v. Russia (2009)	1.  Declares the complaint concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention from 8 March 1999 to 21 April 2003 in detention facility no. IZ-55/1, the unlawfulness of her detention after 1 July 2002, the excessive length of her detention on remand and the failure of the domestic authorities to decide “speedily” on the lawfulness of her detention in the final instance no earlier than 25 October 2002 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;   3.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention from 1 July 2002 to 17 April 2003;   4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention from 17 to 21 April 2003;   5.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;   6.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   7.  Holds that there is no call to award the applicant just satisfaction.	Comments to be added
15.	Gubkin v. Russia (2009)	1.  Declares admissible   (a)  the complaint under Article 3 concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention in detention facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don;   (b)  the complaint under Article 13 concerning the lack of an effective remedy for the allegedly appalling conditions of the applicant’s detention;   (c)  the complaint under Article 5 § 1 concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention from 12 February 2002 to 17 May 2004;   (d)  the complaint under Article 5 § 3 concerning the length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention;   (e)  the complaint under Article 5 § 4 concerning the alleged ineffectiveness of the judicial review of the applicant’s detention;   (f)  the complaint under Article 6 § 1 concerning the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant;   (g)  the complaint under Article 13 concerning the lack of an effective remedy in respect of the alleged violation of the applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time;   and inadmissible the remainder of the application;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant’s detention in detention facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective remedy for the applicant to complain about the conditions of his detention;   4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention from 12 February to 1 July 2002;   5.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention from 1 July 2002 to 17 May 2004;   6.  Holds  that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;   7.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   8.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of an excessive length of the proceedings against the applicant;   9.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective remedy for the applicant to complain about the length of the criminal proceedings;   10.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 40,000 (forty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   11.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.	Comments to be added
16.	Yudayev v. Russia (2009)	1.  Declares the complaints concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention from 5 to 22 January 2004 and the alleged violation of his right to a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of his detention admissible, and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the period from 5 to 22 January 2004;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in respect of the appeal proceedings against the detention order of 30 April 2003;   4.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in respect of the appeal proceedings against the detention orders of 4 August and 9 September 2003;   5.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   6.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.	Comments to be added
17.	Alekhin v. Russia (2009)	1.  Declares the complaints concerning the excessive length of the applicant’s detention, the alleged violation of his right to a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of his detention and the absence of an enforceable right to compensation for detention in violation of the requirements of Article 5 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention;   5.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   6.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.	Comments to be added
18.	Ananyin v. Russia (2009)	1.  Declares the complaint concerning the inhuman conditions and excessive length of the applicant’s detention and the alleged failure to examine speedily the appeal of 14 April 2005 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;   4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   5.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 30,000 (thirty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   6.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.	Comments to be added
19.	Lamazhyk v. Russia (2009)	1.  Decides to join to the merits the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the applicant’s complaint concerning the excessive length of his detention after 24 December 2003 and rejects it;   2.  Declares the complaints concerning the unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention from 24 September to 24 December 2003, the excessive length of his detention, the failure of the domestic authorities to decide “speedily” on the lawfulness of his detention from 24 September to 24 December 2003 and the length of the criminal proceedings against him, admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention from 24 to 25 September 2003;   4.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention from 25 September to 24 December 2003;   5.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;   6.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   7.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;   8.  Holds that there is no call to award the applicant just satisfaction.	Comments to be added
20.	Nazarov v. Russia (2010)	1.  Declares the complaints under Articles 3 and 5 §§ 3 and 4, as well as the complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention concerning the lawfulness of the applicant's detention between 4 and 16 August 2004 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant's detention;   3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the applicant's unlawful detention between 4 and 16 August 2004;   4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;   5.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;   6.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:   (i)  EUR 15,000 (fifteen thousand euros) to the applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable thereon;   (ii)  EUR 3,500 (three thousand five hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to be paid to the applicant's representatives, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   7.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.	Comments to be added
21.	Isayev v. Russia (2009)	1.  Declares the complaints alleging the ill-treatment of the applicant by police officers, the ineffectiveness of the investigation into the incident, the unlawfulness of the applicant's detention from 6 November 2003 to 9 January 2004 and the domestic courts' failure to examine speedily his applications for release between October 2003 and April 2004 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   2.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment by the police;   3.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the authorities' failure to investigate effectively the applicant's complaint of ill-treatment;   4.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention on account of the applicant's detention from 6 November 2003 to 6 January 2004;   5.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention on account of the applicant's detention from 6 to 9 January 2004;   6.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of the domestic courts' failure to examine speedily the applicant's applications for release lodged in October and November 2003;   7.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention as regards the “speediness” of the review by the domestic courts of the application for release lodged on 17 March 2004;   8.  Holds   (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:   (i)  EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;   (ii) EUR 2,424.16 (two thousand four hundred and twenty-four euros and sixteen cents) in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court;   (iii) any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on the above amounts;   (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   9.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.	Comments to be added