Are your judge and your opponent communicating through American Inns of Court?

As a practicing attorney, I've had my moments after receipt of some judicial decisions when I was wondering how could a judge arrive at this particular opinion if it contradicted the record in front of him.


Was it negligence?


Was it bias?


Was it somebody's influence?


I can raise on appeal the first two issues, even though it's a risk: attorneys, including myself, were punished for raising issues of bias and negligence of judges.


When you are raising issues of potential influence upon a judge, even though the threshold for a motion to recuse/disqualify is "appearance of impropriety", and thus, your reasonable perception based on facts you know, the key is "facts you know".


What if your reasonable perception is based on the facts you do not know?


Enter American Inns of Court.


I've learnt about this organization only very recently.   Even though the existence of the American Inns of Court is not secret, I've not seen it advertised in my law school, Albany Law School, during my studies, it was never discussed in conversations with my fellow colleagues, and my fellow colleagues, some practicing for decades, never heard about it, I asked.


The essence of the American Inns of Court is that it is a national foundation, with regional chapters in, as I understand, every state and multiple Inns per state.  Also, there are Inns in federal bars.


The association is between lawyers, judges (and judicial law clerks) for the declared purpose of promoting excellence in the legal profession and promoting "collegiality" and ethics.


As an example, the Federal Inn of Court's mission statement is located on the webpage of the Federal Bar Council for the U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit.


The mission of the Inn of Courts is announced, in part, as follows:


"the Inn endeavors to create a community of lawyers and jurists who care about the legal profession and each other, in the hope that members of the Inn will guide, mentor and befriend each other at formal meetings and in their spare time".


Membership in this particular Federal Inn is transparent, in most state Inns which I researched membership for both lawyers and judges is secret, see, for example, the site of The Intellectual Property and Innovation Inn of Court in Albany, New York.


Membership for lawyers from a private sector is far from free.  In the Federal Inn of Court for the 2nd Circuit the lowest that a lawyer from a private sector must pay to participate is $445.00 per year.  Judges and their law clerks who are also participating in activities and receptions preceding activities, pay nothing in the federal Inn, reduced fees (as compared to lawyer members) or nothing in various state chapters where information is available.


According to descriptions available at various Inn of Court sites, monthly member meetings are considered very important duty of members, often start with "light cocktails" and are either preceded or concluded with receptions.


Now, if judges do not pay for their participation, that means that judge's dinner fee with cocktails every month is covered by the lawyer members of the Inn.


While the main declared purposes of the Inns is promoting excellence and ethics in the legal profession, the way that excellence is promoted raises, to me, big concerns.


It is a problem to me if the judge on my case and my opponent "guide, mentor and befriend each other", as the Federal Inn mission statement suggests, behind closed doors.


While one at least has the benefit of seeing the roster of members in the Federal Inn for the 2nd Circuit, in other Inns even that is not available.


American Inns of Court, thus, present a distinct possibility that the judge on your case and the opponent attorney on your case may be secret members of an association which meets behind closed doors at least every month, where the judge receives the distinct financial benefit of a free or reduced-fee lavish meal with cocktails and where your judge and your opponent in litigation have plenty of opportunities to "guide, mentor and befriend" one another behind closed doors, without notifying you.


In legal terms, that is called an ex parte communication and grounds for disqualification of the judge and for discipline against both the judge and your opposing counsel, but you will never know whether such ex parte communication ever took place, because, once again, membership of judges and lawyers in most American Inns of Court is secret, and where it is not secret, as in the Federal Inn I described, what they discussed at their meetings is secret because public is not allowed in.


Just think that every time that any judge is looking down into the courtroom during a case and one of the lawyers of him belongs to the Inn, he might have a financial interest in the case because that lawyer is paying his bill for the drinks and food once a month and for any other activities sponsored for the judge by the Inn or the Inn Foundation.


I am saying "any judge", because membership in the Inns is secret and you do not know whether a particular judge on your case is or is not a member of an Inn.


As an analogy, let's say a lawyer owns a restaurant, and a certain judge can come there at least once a month and the tab is on the house, for all food and drinks.  If that same lawyer had a case in front of that judge, would you then consider it improper?  Right there you have a conflict of interest, or at least an appearance of impropriety where the judge knows that the lawyer appearing in front of him paid his last monthly restaurant bill and will pay the next months?  And wouldn't it be deceitful on behalf of both the judge and the opposing counsel when you or your attorney have no knowledge of these activities going on a regular basis?


Shouldn't the judge and the attorney disclose such a relationship when the judge is assigned to the case?  Did you ever receive such a disclosure from a judge, that he is a secret or open member of a certain American Inn and that the opposing counsel or his law firm is also a member and supports the judge with free monthly meals?


Additionally, American Inns of Court distribute scholarships, they hold regional and national conferences or meetings, there is also a "reciprocal visitation agreement" for individual members of American Inns of Court and English Inns of Court.


If a judge member of an American Inn of Court does not pay the membership fee or pays it at a reduced rate as compared to fees of attorney members, while through such membership a judge gets access to the "reciprocal visitation" benefits to go overseas, these opportunities raise even more concerns as to appearance of impropriety and potential of influence upon judges through the system of the American Inns of Court. 


This secret membership of judges in the Inns of Court where they meet on monthly basis with rich attorneys in order to "guide, mentor and befriend" each other presents the following practical concerns to me as an attorney, litigant, citizen and voter:

1. How can the voters who voted a certain judge into office be able to monitor whether the judge is or is not influenced in his decisions if the judge agrees to an open (as in Federal Inn) or secret (as in state inns) membership in an association where attorneys, also secret members, pay membership dues enabling them to meet with judges behind closed doors, wine and dine the judges, socialize with judges, befriend, mentor and be mentored by judges?  To me as a voter, such a possibility destroys presumption of integrity of any judge in any state, including my State of New York, because we simply do not know about membership in the Inns of any of the judges.
2. How can litigants and their counsel be assured whether or not the judge they appear in front of and the powerful or rich opposing law firm are not meeting at monthly receptions sponsored for the judge by membership fees of the law firm and discuss your case behind your back?  I asked once whether a judge's son worked for the opponent, and was slapped with sanctions by that judge who also refused to step down, even though I knew that the judge's son did work for the opponent in the action.  The same result can follow if an attorney or litigant would a question whether the judge and the opposing counsel are secret members of American Inns of Court, yet, since the membership is, once again, secret in most inns, and access to national Inn membership directory is part of the benefits members pay for, this is a distinct possibility.  The only way to protect an attorney or litigant asking such a question is to mandate such disclosure by the judge through a mandatory statute.

Yes, we do have freedom of associations in this country protected by the 1st Amendment of the United States Constitution.


And yes, judges do not check their constitutional rights as to what they do in their free time when they are sworn into office.


But the voters and taxpayers who pay judicial salaries and benefits do that on an assumption that judges maintain their oath of office, and the main component of judicial duty is independence.  Thus, judges must be careful in exercising their freedom of association in their free time, so that no to create an appearance that they are fraternizing with rich attorneys behind closed doors who, in return for monthly receptions and national and international travel, get to influence judicial decisions, "befriend and mentor" judges.


Ex parte communications between attorneys and judges are prohibited because they deny opponents due process and equal opportunities in litigation.


The problem with the Inns is not that such ex parte communications specifically about litigation are taking place.  I cannot say that for sure because I simply do not know who are the members attorneys in a particular inn, who are the member judges, what, if anything, the member judges are paying into the association, what benefits the judges and/or their family members receive from the Inn, but when such memberships simply exist, and such secret opportunities exist, that alone undermines public trust in the integrity and independence of the judiciary.


As federal taxpayer and voter and taxpayer and voter in the State of New York, I consider it necessary to make all judges, whether federal or state, to disclose their membership in the Inns and to mandate disclosure by the judge to litigants, on demand, all monetary and non-monetary benefits they receive through membership in American Inns of Court, and to do that as a matter of statute, because otherwise judges will simply stifle such inquiries with sanctions and retaliate against inquiring attorneys by taking their licenses and livelihoods, as they are doing to me (see my blogs herein) and as they are doing to many more attorneys in the country. 


I would also demand that, if judges are participating in American Inns of Court, thus creating a potential of influence upon their decisions, member directories of all Inns must be open to the public to be able to verify potential conflicts of interest and potential to influence judges in litigation.


Presumption of integrity of the judicial profession must be substantiated by lack of secret dealings behind closed doors between judges and attorneys, for a perceived financial benefit for judges.

The requirement that attorneys must maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary as a condition to allow attorneys to practice law and earn a livelihood must be substantiated by information ensuring that such public confidence is justified.

I feel deceived by the system where I am required to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary as a condition to hold my license (constitutionality of this condition is a separate topic), while the judiciary is undermining its own integrity by participating in closed-door monthly receptions sponsored by rich attorneys where judges and rich attorneys "guide, befriend and mentor" each other without disclosure of such relationships to the public, voters and litigants.

Secret participation of judges in the American Inns of Court, secrecy of membership for attorneys, reduced fees or no fees for judges and their law clerks and high membership fees for attorneys, combined with frequent and expensive benefits judges receive from such membership in terms of lavish monthly meals, drinks and availability of Inn-sponsored international travel, as well as the possibility of being "guided, befriended and mentored" by powerful lawyers behind closed doors over lawyer-paid meals severely undermines appearance of independence of the American judiciary.

What is judicial misconduct in Ohio is business as usual in New York...

In Ohio, a judge was recently disciplined with a suspended stay for a year for removing a public defender who dared to criticize a judge for abuse of discretion when the judge refused to accept a guilty plea from an indigent defendant who withdrew his consent and then agreed again.

 

In New York, Delaware County, Judge Carl F. Becker is allowed to do on the bench whatever he wants, while courts bounce lawsuits against him under various judge-created doctrines, the Commission for Judicial Conduct bounces meritorious complaints against him with barely an explanation or without any good faith explanation, while the judge viciously retaliates against complainants, knowing that there will be no discipline against him for such a retaliation.


New York is not Ohio, I guess.

 

So far, I have counted 11 lawsuits against Judge Becker in state and federal courts filed within the period from 2004 to 2013, only three are still pending, others were uniformly dismissed on the grounds of absolute judicial immunity, covering even malicious and corrupt acts on the bench.


Such a dismissal means that the court refuses to review whether Judge Becker did or did not engage in malicious and corrupt conduct on the bench, as claimed by the plaintiffs in these lawsuits, claimed under oath, by the way.

 

Yet, those dismissed cases make interesting reading.  Complaints in federal courts at least, are certified under oath.  By dismissing on the grounds of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts, the courts essentially say in plain English the following:  "we know that what you might be saying about the judge engaging in malicious and corrupt acts on the bench might be true, but the concept of judicial immunity (that judges created in protection of judges) does not allow us to even look in that direction, so we are forced to dismiss your lawsuit, even if such a dismissal leaves you completely without a remedy". 

 

So far, 9 people dared to sue Judge Becker against all odds, obviously considering it important to at least signal to the public what Judge Becker is doing wrong:

 

1. David Roosa
2. Joseph Orlando
3. Michael Hazen
4. Alecia Bracci
5. Frederick J. Neroni
6. Tatiana Neroni
7. Joseph Goodnough
8. Maria Aron
9. Nicholas Mitchell

People who filed lawsuits against Judge Becker over a span of time from 2004 by David Roosa to 2013 by Nicholas Mitchell, claim that Judge Becker was involved in conduct reflecting his bias, discrimination against people with disabilities, retaliation against critics, using extrajudicial evidence and ex parte communications in his decisions, favoritism etc. etc. etc.  The list goes on.  Case law on the issue of judicial misconduct shows that Judge Becker has long ago passed the critical mass of misconduct which requires to take the judge off the bench.  Yet, he is still there.  For some reason that I, as a member of the public, would like to have the State of New York explain to me.


It is not easy to win a lawsuit against a judge.




Remember, his brother (or sister) judge reviews that lawsuit against a judge.




And his brother (or sister) judge will either invent a doctrine covering a member of her class, or will apply the doctrine created by another brother judge, and will not look whether such a doctrine does or does not comport with the Federal Constitution, as long as it serves "independence of the judiciary".  From the tenets of the law.




Lawsuits of David Roosa, Joseph Orlando, Michael Hazen, Alecia Bracci, Tatiana Neroni, Frederick J. Neroni and Joseph Goonough against Judge Becker were dismissed on immunity grounds, and only the case of Frederick J. Neroni was recently partially remanded by the appellate court on a narrow issue whether under the new precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court Mr. Neroni's challenge to constitutionality of two New York statutes can proceed in federal court.  Cases of Alecia Bracci, Tatiana Neroni and Frederick J. Neroni (another case) are pending on appeal.




The case Aron v. Becker, a case where Judge Becker denied a pistol license based on alleged hearsay statements of his own unspecified employees, which somehow outweighed 4 affidavits in support of Ms. Aron from people who knew her and her stellar life record, is still pending.




I already wrote about my own case in one of my first posts, describing how Judge Becker viciously sanctioned me and my husband after I sued him in state court, and added to those sanctions after I sued him for retaliation in federal court.




Time permitting, I will publish all of the lawsuits against Judge Becker (which are public records anyway) online, analyze them in detail and link that analysis, lawsuit by lawsuit, to this blog.


It is time to do something in New York with non-existent judicial discipline. 


Judge Becker continues to sit on 6 benches:

1. Delaware County Supreme Court;
2. Delaware County Court - as trial court;
3. Delaware County Drug Court - as extension of Delaware County Court (trial part);
4. Delaware County Court -as appellate court from local justice courts of Delaware County;
5. Delaware County Family Court;
6. Delaware County Surrogate's Court

Since Judge Becker occupies all benches in his county, people and especially attorneys, are afraid to speak out, because the judge can affect every single aspect of their lives, by taking away their children in Family Court, or holding them in child neglect, stripping them of a possibility of good employment and subjecting them to humiliating supervision of the judge's former client of 27 years Delaware County Department of Social Services, or taking away their property in Supreme Court or taking away their liberty in the criminal County Court...




The vengeance of this particular judge is vicious and systemic, as my case shows, and people have a right to be afraid.  Yet, there comes a time when being afraid will get you nowhere and will not protect you or your loved ones.




Meanwhile, New York State continues to condone Judge Becker's behavior, no matter how bad it gets, no matter how badly he bends or violates the law and people's rights, no matter what kind of trauma, stress, heartbreak, injury he leaves as his "legacy", no matter how openly he favors and disfavors attorneys and parties based on their social and political status and affiliation with the judge himself, or his friends and former co-workers.




New York state even provides to Judge Becker, when he is sued, free legal representation at taxpayer's expense.  Judge Becker's free legal counsel is the New York State Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman or one of 640 attorneys from Mr. Schneiderman's office, and all resources of the state of New York.  By the way, Eric T. Schneiderman was elected by you to the position of the New York State Attorney General on a platform that he will protect New Yorkers from fraud.  Yet, when such fraud, as an example, is committed by a judge on the bench, Eric T. Schneiderman does the reverse and protects the culprit from your rightful lawsuit, at your expense, while you might be scrambling to find an attorney willing to put his license and livelihood on the line to take your case. 




Why does New York State Attorney General, even though he was elected by you to defend you from public officials violating your rights, defends Judge Becker when he violates your rights, from your rightful lawsuits.


Apparently, his "obligation" to defend the politically powerful outweighs his promises to the voters before he was elected.  Moreover, do not forget that NYS Attorney General is himself a licensed attorney, and his license is within the hands of the judiciary.  Thus, the judiciary has independence from the law for malicious and corrupt act, and you have as a result a timid legal profession which scrapes and bows to judges no matter what they do, in order to keep their licenses intact.  Those who criticizes the judge, be he or she an attorney or not an attorney, does it only at her own peril.


But sometimes, no matter what the risk, you need to do what is right.  There are moments in life where you are squarely staring at a choice that you cannot shirk. 


So far, the 9 people from the list made those choices and filed those lawsuits alone.


Of course, whatever they are doing, can only make a dent in the armor of judicial immunity, if at all.


A systemic legislative initiative, or, possibly, a referendum to amend the State Constitution are needed to change the situation where judges usurped the power to be above the law, the power which nobody, not one person in the U.S. can have.




And such an abomination of justice is declared to help you as public in general to maintain independence of your elected judicial officers.  I as a voter do not need or want my elected public servants, judicial officers, to be independent from the law and the very Constitution that they take an oath to protect when and in order to get on that bench.




It is time to do something about it.




I am sure Judge Becker is not alone in having become a tyrant on the bench.




Immunity and impunity made him a tyrant.




You know that absolute power corrupts absolutely.




You will not expect not to discipline a child if he errs.  You know that if you don't discipline him, he'll err more and worse.




Not disciplining public officials, including judges, has the same effect.  Judges are only human.


If you don't treat infection, it has a potential of growing into a gangrene and killing you.




Judicial immunity is undermining America democratic traditions declaring that nobody is above the law and everybody is equal under the law.  It's time to make that maxim work, as applied to our public servants, judicial officers.




If we, the People of the State of New York, do not take action to end this shameful concept of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts of judges on the bench, we will continue to suffer injuries from judicial misconduct while having no remedies for such injuries.




Maybe also (although there is little hope for that without public outcry and media attention), New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct will finally look into the matter and consider sworn allegations of Judge Becker's victims in those dismissed and pending lawsuits?



As well as sworn allegations of victims of misconduct against other judges? 




Judicial discipline does not require as a pre-requisite a judgment against such a judge and does not have statutes of limitations, at least that is what is being declared to the public.  Maybe it's time to practice what is being preached about equality under the law and that sun is the best disinfectant?




It is in our hands not to be silent, to call on our representatives in the State and Federal Legislatures to put an end to the perversion of justice called "absolute judicial immunity" and to introduce effective, transparent and open system of judicial discipline, with active public participation.

 

 

 

 

The secret judges in the state of New York

When you review the website of any court in the State of New York or judicial directory on the website of New York State Court administration, there is a big chance you do not know that the list of judges that you see may be incomplete for that particular court and is definitely incomplete as to the statewide judicial directory.


There is a corps of the so-called "judicial hearing officers" whose names are not published by the New York State Court Administration.


Existence of such judicial hearing officers is defined not by a statute introduced by the Legislature, and not by the New York State Constitution.  It is defined by the court system itself through their own regulation, 22 NYCRR 122.


The names of judicial hearing officers appointed under 22 NYCRR 122 are not known to the public, unless members of the public want to engage in a battle with the Office of New York State Court administration and spend money on copies of public records, as well as months on correspondence with NYS OCA's counsel who will reject any general FOIL requests as to the entire court system and will refuse to provide a list of judicial hearing officers currently serving in the State of New York, claiming that no such list exists as a public record.


It is a good trick for the NYS OCA not to create this list, and then to reject FOIL requests on this basis, while at the same time not publishing the names of such judicial hearing officers directly on the websites of courts where they serve, along with the names of judges and in the statewide judicial directory.


Yet, there might be great significance in knowing the names of such judicial hearing officers.


Such judicial hearing officers, as I learnt accidentally through a broadly cast FOIL request, are retired judges who, as attorneys, may be law partners in law firms representing parties in the same courts where they have members of their law firm serving as judicial hearing officers.


Such services, according to 22 NYCRR 122 and rules of conduct for judges, represent a direct conflict of interest.  Yet, neither you, nor your lawyer will know about it, because names of these judicial officers are not published along with the names of sitting elected judges of the courts where they are appointed to serve.


I raised this issue in a letter to the Appellate Division Third Judicial Department and to the New York State Court Administration.


My review of public records, and research on database Westlaw showed that Levene, Gouldin and Thompson continued to appear in front of Appellate Division Third Judicial Department while its law partner Eugene Peckham was serving as judicial hearing officer in that court.  Rules of that same court do not allow a former judge to appear in that court for 2 years after the judge's retirement.  In this case, the law firm of the court's own judicial hearing officer was appearing in front of the court at the same time as its law partner was serving as part of the court.


The Appellate Division 3rd Department never announced on its website that Eugene Peckham was its judicial hearing officer, nor does it announce the names of any other judicial hearing officers.


The Appellate Division 3rd Department refused to answer my inquiry as to the list of names of judicial hearing officers serving at the period of time when I was prosecuting or defending appeals in the court since 2009, in order to verify potential conflicts of interest.


Instead, the Committee for Professional Conduct which is appointed and supervised by the Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department, commenced a disciplinary proceedings against me, accusing me of not appearing to depositions at the time when I was not even practicing law.


I do not know until this day whether any law firms which opposed me at any time on appeals in front of Appellate Division Third Department were disqualified because their law partners or associates were serving as judicial hearing officers of the court.  The court is not forthcoming with this information and instead is trying to take my license and thus turn me into a disbarred attorney in order to reduce my credibility as a public advocate against official misconduct.


The public also must know that there is no age limitation for judicial officers under 22 NYCRR 122, even though the public of the state of New York just turned down a constitutional amendment to push the mandatory retirement age of judges to 80.  Judicial hearing officers may perform the same duties as judges perform, without any age limitations, in complete defiance of the public vote at the referendum.


Therefore, the wishes of the sovereign clearly expressed in a referendum in November of 2013 in not allowing judges past 70 to serve are flaunted by the court system through court rules, over which the public has no direct control, and the public does not even get to know the names of their public servants who are serving at the public expense, and at a great public expense.


For example, attorney and retired judge Eugene Peckham was, according to NYS OCA answer to my FOIL request, appointed as a judicial hearing officer in 25 courts in the year 2012, including 4 courts each in 6 counties and the Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department.  Counties included Otsego, Delaware, Broome, Chenango and two other counties.  Broome County is where Attorney Peckham's law office is and where majority of his work is done.  Yet, I doubt that opponents of his law firm were made aware that he was judicial officer of the court in which his law firm was appearing.  Yet, I firmly believe that litigants and attorneys who were opponents of the law firm of a judicial hearing officer serving in courts where his law firm appears, were entitled to at least know that information in order to make a decision whether to raise the issue of disqualification or not.


As a member of the public, I do not find the fact that the names of public servants who have the same authority as judges, is not made known to the public by publishing their names along with names of sitting judges.


As a member of the public, I do not find it acceptable that the NYS OCA disregards the public vote pertaining to age of judges and promulgates and continues to enforce rules of appointment of judicial hearing officers which have no age limitation.


 I would presume that the public vote must mean something to the court administration.


There is still another issue of public concern pertaining to judicial hearing officers and attractiveness of this position to sitting judges who lose half of their pay at retirement.


Compensation for positions of judicial hearing officers are $300.00 per day, as defined by court rules.  If a judicial hearing officer works 250 business days a year in only one court, he gets $75,000.00, more than doubling his pension.  In fact, if a judicial hearing officer is assigned to 4 courts per county which are usually located in the same building (Surrogate's, Family, County and Supreme Courts), he can hold hearings in all four courts in one day, be paid for each court separately, and his pay per day may then become $1,200.00.  Nothing in 22 NYCRR 122, as far as I can see, precludes charging $300.00 per day from each separate court.  If a judicial hearing officer can make it the same day to a neighboring county, which is quite possible, and hold another set of hearings in the 4 courts of the neighboring county, his daily pay will become $2,400.00.


If such performance is multiplied by 250 business days a year, a single judicial hearing officer may potentially earn $600,000 on top of his pension and on top of earnings from his law practice, because judicial hearing officers are not prohibited to practice law, as sitting judges are , see New York Constitution, Article VI section 20(b)(4), 26(2), which is yet another area of concern.


New York Constitution, Article VI section 20(b)(4) specifically states the following:


"b. A judge of the court of appeals, justice of the supreme court, judge of the court of claims, judge of a county court, judge of the surrogate's court, judge of the family court or judge of a court for the city of New York established pursuant to section fifteen of this article who is elected or appointed after the effective date of this article may not:


...


(4) engage in the practice of law, act as an arbitrator, referee or compensated mediator in any action or proceeding or matter or engage in the conduct of any other profession or business which interferes with the performance of his or her judicial duties, " highlighting added.




The constitutional prohibition for sitting judges to practice law arises is motivated by the need to insulate a sitting judge from any influences upon a judge's judicial independence.  A judge is elected by public vote and can only act on behalf of the People of the State of New York and not at the bidding of his paying clients.  The same must be true for judicial  hearing officers who are given the same authority as sitting judges to hear and determine issues in litigation.


When judicial hearing officers are, on the one hand, given the same authority as a sitting judge, but are not prohibited to practice law, as Eugene Peckham's case demonstrates, the potential of influence upon such judicial hearing officer is there, and , respectfully, such service by judicial hearing officer violates the legislative intent of New York State Constitution prohibiting sitting judges to practice law in order to protect both independence of their judicial decisions and public trust in the integrity of the judicial system.


At this time, what kind of integrity of the judicial system can we talk about when the judicial system hides the names of judicial hearing officers from the public who is paying an arm and a leg for such judicial officers?  What kind of integrity can the judicial system claim when it allows judicial hearing officers to practice law in direct contradiction of the voter's will embodied in the New York State Constitution which prohibits judges to practice law and restricts their age of service to 70?


The numbers of compensation that judges can earn per day show how lucrative and coveted this position is and how much influence individuals who can approve or disapprove these appointments may be.


Of my particular concern is the fact that certain high-ranking judges who get to approve these perks, have relatives who are practicing attorneys appearing in courts, in front of sitting judges who are close to retirement and covet such post-retirement perks.  


One of such judges in a position to recommend or not recommend a retired judge for such a perk is the Hon. Michael V. Coccoma, Chief Administrative Judge of upstate New York, see 22 NYCRR 122 as to the procedure of whose recommendations are required for such appointments.  


Judge Coccoma is married to Ellen Coccoma.


Ellen Coccoma is, upon my personal knowledge, a practicing attorney, a special counsel in a large Binghamton law firm Hinman, Howard & Kattel and is also serving as Otsego County Attorney a full-time officer and employee of Otsego County.   My husband actually owns property in Otsego County and pays property taxes on it.  I wonder whether he also pays part Ms. Coccoma's salary and benefits for the time she works for a private law firm.  I know of at least one court case where Ms. Coccoma appeared multiple times and for multiple hours daytime when , I am sure, she is supposed to work for Otsego County as its full time employee and officer.


When a judge who is close to retirement rules in favor of, let's say , Ellen Coccoma in my example, the wife of Judge Coccoma who gets to recommend that judge to a lucrative and extremely well-paying post-retirment perk, there is no assurance to me as an attorney or member of the public that the decision the judge has made was not influenced by his aspiration to garner a favor of Ellen Coccoma's husband in order to secure the lucrative position of a judicial hearing officer in the future.


Such concern would not have existed if relatives of individuals who get to decide on judge's post-retirement perks would be prohibited to practice law, at least before judges who are close to retirement age.


Moreover, a judicial hearing officer may be similarly influenced to rule for attorney Ellen Coccoma, because if he doesn't he simply might not be reappointed and lose his perk.


Since Ellen Coccoma was taken in as a "special counsel" by a huge law firm, the appearance of favors flowing to Ellen Coccoma are flowing to the entire law firm and all of its clients.


In other words, any time any judge close to the age of 70 rules in favor of Hinman, Howard & Kattel, there are questions whether such rulings were influenced by considerations of appeasing Ellen Coccoma's husband the Hon. Michael V. Coccoma with a view for the judge to get a lucrative post-retirement perk.


New York State Constitution sought to block potential influences upon judges by prohibiting them to practice law.  Such constitutional intent, in my opinion, goes out the door where judges can be easily influenced through the lure of lucrative post-retirement perks.


To me, it is a serious issue of public concern that the public should know about.


I will appreciate input on these issues by the public.

Is it ethical or proper for judges only to make ethical rules for judges?

There exist a New York State Advisory Committee for Judicial Ethics which is an official body issuing interpretations of New York State Canons of Judicial Conduct as "ethical opinions", often followed by courts and expected to be followed by judges.


The Committee is comprised entirely of judges.  Just as a precaution, in the event the content of the linked site is changed, I copied and pasted below the actual composition of the NYS Advisory Committee as it is today: 

Committee:

Hon. George D. Marlow (ret.), Chair,
Hon. Betty Weinberg Ellerin (ret.), Vice Chair
Hon. Jerome C. Gorski (ret.), Vice Chair
Hon. Daniel D. Angiolillo
Hon. Richard T. Aulisi
Hon. Arnold F. Ciaccio (ret.)
Hon. Vito DeStefano
Hon. David Elliot
Hon. Debra L. Givens
Hon. Michael R. Juviler (ret.)
Hon. Barbara R. Kapnick
Hon. Bentley Kassal (ret.)
Hon. James J. Lack (ret.)
Hon. Yvonne Lewis
Hon. Richard B. Lowe III
Hon. Robert M. Mandelbaum
Hon. Judith McMahon
Hon. Thomas E. Mercure
Hon. Denise F. Molia
Hon. Robert C. Mulvey
Hon. E. Jeannette Ogden
Hon. John M. Owens
Hon. Stanley Parness (ret.)
Hon. David J. Roman
Hon. Thomas J. Sheeran
Hon. Margaret T. Walsh

Honorary Members

Hon. Louis C. Benza
Hon. Lawrence J. Bracken
Hon. Harold J. Hughes


As the list shows, all of the members are sitting or retired judges.


Now, if judges were a self-regulated guild, I would understand that only members of the guild may regulate one another and establish their own rules.


When we are talking about elected public officials, with due respect and as a voter and part of the People of the State of New York who is the sovereign in the state of New York, I would object to judges establishing rules for themselves that govern their own ethics.


I would expect that the public must have an input into these rules of ethics and into interpretation of those rules. 


To include only judges into the panel of the Advisory Committee for Judicial Ethics sends a message to me as a member of the public that judges do not trust members of the public to participate in shaping judicial ethics?  And that is even though judges are not members of a private guild, but instead are individually elected public officers?


In my view it is the public who must define rules of ethics for its public officers, and should do it through its elected representatives in the Legislature.  It is also my belief as a member of the public that the public must have a supermajority on this Committee, whether lay members of the public have the necessary expertise in the law or not.  If the Committee is comprised predominantly by the public, nothing will preclude members of the public, if they comprise the Committee for Judicial Ethics, to consult experts who know the law, but the decision will still be not by the experts, but by the Committee comprised of public members.


Yet, judicial ethics concern important issues, such as disqualification and impartiality of judges, it is an issue of grave public concern and cannot be given to be define entirely or even predominantly to judges who have an obvious interest in defining such issues.  It cannot be given to define to lawyers either, because lawyers are financially dominated by judges in the most profound way.  Lawyers' licenses and livelihoods are in the hands of the judiciary, and lawyers are not neutral in defining rules of judicial ethics, as they are depending on the judiciary for their livelihood.


I, as a member of the public, believe, that judicial ethics must be defined, interpreted and the Advisory Committee for Judicial Ethics must be comprised predominantly of lay individuals, and of lay individuals who have nothing to do with the court system, who are not relatives, friends, spouses, significant others of officers or employees of the court system or lawyers.


Only then we as the public can be sure that opinions on judicial ethics are neutral and not self-serving.    


Opinions from the public are welcome.

Attorneys disciplined for criticism of the judiciary should unite in action

This is an appeal to attorneys who have been sanctioned for criticizing the government, including the judiciary, or who are currently undergoing such disciplinary proceedings.


I appeal to such attorneys, or former attorneys for that matter, to unite in order to address the dangerous tendency of the government to immunize judicial misconduct while allowing judges to retaliate against attorneys for criticism. 


I think that attorneys need to start to publicly assert their rights to independence of their profession from the judiciary.  Independence of attorney status from government influence and pressure, especially for the criticism of the government, has become an international norm, which is somehow slow coming to the U.S. soil.

I am planning to actively advocate, through this blog, books that I plan to publish, appeals to state, federal and international authorities and to national and international public, advocating for independency of the legal profession, both from the side of provider of legal services, and from the side of potential consumer of such services.


 I consider regulation of attorneys, and especially of civil rights advocates, such as myself, by the very government that the advocates may challenge in lawsuits and motions to recuse, in situations where an attorney is duty-bound to his client to raise issues of judicial misconduct in order to protect his client's constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial, a jeopardy to the American democracy.


My personal situation, undoubtedly, gave a trigger to my research on independence of the legal profession.


 On June 27, 2011 I sued a judge because no other measures to bring his misconduct under control were helpful, and disciplinary authorities refused to address his misconduct which I and my clients witnessed and experienced over years and across many cases. 


Immediately after I sued that judge, I was sanctioned by him 3 times in 3 different court cases within a month of the lawsuit, $1,250 on June 30, 2011, $1,250 on August 2, 2011 and $2,500 on August 10, 2011.  My husband was then sanctioned by that same judge on November 17, 2011 in the amount of $10,000; $20,700 and $500, for the total of $31,200.00. 


I sued in federal court for retaliation on December 19, 2011.  The judge immediately responded with two more sanctions in two more other cases on January 2, 2012, for $2,500 each against my husband and myself as his attorney and $5,500 each against my husband and myself as his attorney.


The total of sanctions in these 6 cases against me and my husband is $52,200.00.  No court is willing to see it as a pattern of retaliation, due to claimed jurisdictional restrictions of state and federal courts and the appellate division.  Yet, the same appellate division will, no doubt, willingly provide the cross-case "totality of circumstances " review in order to punish me, while denying me the same type of review to finally acknowledge that the judge is engaged in retaliation against me and is bent to disbar me as a punishment for my lawsuit against him.


The state lawsuit was dismissed on the basis of judge-created self-serving doctrine judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts, without reaching the merits.


The federal lawsuit was dismissed also based on judicial immunity, as well as for sovereign immunity, Younger abstention and even on the basis of appellate Rooker-Feldman doctrine, even though sanctions were imposed by the judge after the state lawsuit was filed and could not possibly be part of its record for purposes of appellate review.


All of these doctrines are judge-created and, in my legal opinion, are unconstitutional because federal courts are not allowed to engaged in legislative activity and only U.S. Congress can define jurisdiction of federal courts within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.


Appeals from sanctions were unsuccessful, because the appellate court lacks authority to review patters of misconduct across cases and restricted itself to "compartmentalized" review case by case.  At least that is what was claimed by the appellate court, even though the same appellate court does go outside of the record on appeal if it helps my opponents.  In my case, on the opposite, the appellate court not only refused to reach beyond the record on appeal and review the issue of the pattern of retaliation by the judge, but ignored a transcript  where an attorney admits on record to an ex parte communication with the judge, and , in another case, ignored two motions in order to affirm sanctions against me.


At this time, I am facing disciplinary charges based exclusively on sanctions imposed on me by a judge right after I sued him. 


It is important to mention that I followed all possible avenues to address the judge's misconduct through Commission of Judicial Conduct before I sued the judge as a point of last resort. 


The Commission for Judicial Conduct rejected all of my well documented complaints without investigation, and in New York a complainant does not have standing to appeal the dismissal of her complaint, and does not get to see the results of the investigation, if any.  Judging by the fact that the judge got himself assigned to all of my cases in 2011 and started humiliating me and my clients there even more than before, the judge has gotten that complaint where I asked the Commission to take the judge off the bench explaining that, based on my experience with the judge and on his conduct in several court cases, which I described in detail, the judge is a jeopardy to the public and undermines with his behavior public trust in the integrity of the judiciary and in the possibility of a fair administration of justice. 


I do not hope for any justice in the disciplinary proceedings because I have found out through Freedom of Information Law request and through other open sources about multiple conflicts of interest both in the disciplinary court that is about to review my case, and in the Disciplinary Committee.


One current member of the court-appointed disciplinary board (18 out of 21 members of disciplinary board are unpaid attorneys in private practice) currently prosecutes a "slip and fall" lawsuit based on the episode that allegedly happened on my own and my husband's property at the time she prosecutes me for disciplinary violation. 


Another member of the board who recently left the board, but who participated in investigation and initial prosecution, has an even "better" record. 


That member of the board accepted as a law partner an attorney who was turned into the board for investigation and prosecution, instead of disbarring her, as the complainant publicly requested.  The attorney in question is the spouse of one of New York's most high-ranking judges. 


Moreover, the same recent attorney member's law firm engaged in representation of two attorneys who are defendants in a lawsuit for fraud and fraud upon the court brought by my husband, at the time when complaints by my husband, myself and, upon information and belief, from the New York State Attorney General against these two attorneys were pending in front of the disciplinary board while the attorney was still the member of the disciplinary board. The two attorneys in question was a retired supreme court judge and former chief judge of a large administrative district and his son.


 Such representation continued while the attorney member whose firm represented people who were supposed to be investigated, instead investigated, prosecuted and disbarred my husband (the complainant about misconduct of the retired judge and his son), and commenced prosecution against me.   My husband was disbarred with participation of that attorney member without a hearing, after 37 years of practice, based on "collateral estoppel" applied to non-final court order out of an action "coincidentally" handled by the retired judge and his son. 


Apparently, membership in the disciplinary board affords a great opportunity to attorney members of such disciplinary board to show loyalty not only to the judiciary as a branch of the government, but to its individual members, including  retired judges and members of their families, by picking and choosing whom to prosecute and whom to instead protect from prosecution by disbarring and prosecuting their critics and by embracing investigated attorneys who are members of judges' families as law partners.  I doubt that such behavior adds to public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary or the legal profession.


 Pointing out conflicts of interest to the Committee falls on deaf ears.  As soon as I found the above mentioned conflicts of interests and addressed the Committee about them, the Committee brought disciplinary proceedings against me.


In the disciplinary proceedings, the Committee prominently accused me in Charge I Specification I of the complaint for not appearing at a deposition in a court case, failure to explain to the court why I did not appear, and for failing to oppose a motion to strike and for a default judgment, which ultimately led to a default judgment against my client.  Those are the allegations, and, if perceived on their face value, they spell out serious accusations of neglect of clients, that's why they are put as the very first charges.


Nevertheless, the disciplinary board which brought the charges omitted to mention that the transcript of the deposition and the motion in question are on file with the court and show the dates of September 15, 2008 for the deposition and December 10, 2008 for the motion.  I was admitted to the bar in 2009. 


Not only I did not have a duty to appear at that deposition or oppose that motion because I was not an attorney of record and NOT AN ATTORNEY at that time, but such an appearance would be qualified in New York as a crime of practicing law without a license if I did appear and did oppose that motion.  So, the disciplinary board is now set to punish me for NOT practicing law without a license in 2008, in full knowledge of falsehood, frivolity and illegality of such a claim.   It is an interesting legal point as to whether the state of New York has authority to discipline an attorney for NOT committing a crime of practicing law without a license when she was not an attorney. 


The disciplinary board was notified by me about the mistake over a year ago, by a letter with attached copies of the transcript of the deposition and of the motion.  Disciplinary board refused to correct the fraudulent charge.


I removed the case to the federal court claiming that no fair adjudication is available in state court.  The federal court remanded on Younger abstention grounds because the disciplinary board claimed my federal constitutional claims can be reviewed by the state court.  When the removal on this ground was ascertained by the disciplinary board, the disciplinary board made a motion for a summary judgment in state court claiming that I have no right to "air" my "general grievances", or, in other words, my constitutional challenges in the state court.


At the same time, the disciplinary board is now claiming, in an official letter, that I was admonished by it as an attorney in 2002.  Once again, I was admitted to the bar in 2009.  The disciplinary board has blocked my access to my own file with the board for years, so I do not really know what else they may have created on me.  Judging by the fact that the disciplinary board claims that they have records of admonishment against me allegedly made 7 years before I was admitted to the bar, there is a possibility that records exist that I was admonished by the board before I was even born.


Since I considered the false Charge I Specification I as attorney misconduct by the disciplinary board, I complained to the disciplinary board about its attorney members, which is the only way the complaint could be lodged for lack of other forum.  Even though Rules of professional conduct in New York do not indicate that attorney members or counsel for disciplinary board are absolved from the reach of the rules, the disciplinary board refused to recuse from investigation of the complaint and dismissed the complaint against themselves as unfounded.


Occupational licensing, and attorney licensing as part of it, is meant to protect the public from harm.  I wonder how the public is protected where the disciplinary board is trying to obtain a summary judgment against me for NOT practicing law without a license in 2008.  I wonder how the public is protected by victimizing me even further by stripping me of my license for doing my duty and trying to obtain fair adjudication by an impartial judge where all authorities in New York, including Commission of Judicial Conduct, state and federal courts, preferred to look the other way after a judge obviously abused his power and sanctioned my husband and myself $52,200 over the 6 months in 6 different court actions after I sued the judge in state court, including two sanctions after I sued the judge in federal court for retaliation.


The judge knows my husband and myself very well, knows that we have a minor child and a child in college under the age of 21 to support, but simply does not care in his vendetta.  I exposed the judge's misconduct and my husband and I must lose our livelihood, in the judge's obvious opinion expressed through sanctions.  Disciplinary authorities refuse to discipline the judge, but will discipline me for complaining about the judge's misconduct through motions to recuse.  "Coincidentally", the chief judge of my disciplinary court was a member of the Commission of Judicial Conduct who dismissed my complaint against the local judge without investigation.


Giving judges absolute immunity for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench, refusing to reach issues of such misconduct on the merits, refusing to have cross-case review on appeal, refusing to reach issues of pattern of retaliation of a judge and then enforcing his retaliative sanctions against me anyway hardly smacks of fairness or due process of law to me.


Yet, in New York I have no right of appeal, and, interestingly enough, while private discipline such as admonishment and censure must be proven by clear and convincing evidence (the rules are legislated by the same court that adjudicates the discipline and appoints investigators and prosecutors, as another point), the standard of proof is suddenly dropped to preponderance of the evidence for censure, suspension or disbarment, and then elevated back to clear and convincing evidence if the attorney seeks reinstatement.  Since my case is to be adjudicated by the court which set such rules that scream of favoritism to the disciplinary board, I understand that I am doomed, and this is why I decided to go public with what is going on. 


My fellow attorneys in the area who approached me to discuss the situation with the sanctions are terrified because of the sanctions imposed upon me, and the public may be assured that after I am disbarred or suspended, no attorney in the State of New York will dare to make a motion to recuse and ensure his client's right to a fair and impartial judge, no matter what kind of misconduct the attorney witnesses, how much it is substantiated.  An attorney license is an investment of a lifetime, and attorneys will think about themselves and their families before their clients, as already happened in Pennsylvania where attorneys failed to report that two local judges were selling juveniles into detention facilities, because there are rules prohibiting "scandalous" statements about judges.  One child committed suicide.  Was the public protected?  Misconduct in Pennsylvania is an extreme case, but attorneys should not be stifled or sanctioned in reporting any perceived misconduct of judges in view of tremendous power judges wield and tremendous danger that abuse of such power can cause American society and its individual members, especially when several generations of judges in the U.S. served under conditions of absolute judicial immunity for even malicious and corrupt acts, which can only breed the sense of absolute impunity and contempt to the rule of law by the judges.


In my case, this contempt is obvious in view of how many strange things continue to happen to me in my court cases. Transcripts, affidavits and the whole motions get lost, altered, "impounded" and ignored when their contents may help me or my clients, and rules are bent and double standards are created where attorneys working for the government or who have worked with the judge before he came to the bench are concerned.  Recently, I was sanctioned for a motion to compel production of the identity of a stenographer who took deposition in a court case where no transcript of the deposition was filed with the court and no notice was given to my clients in accordance with the law.  I was sanctioned (by my "favorite" judge, after I sued him) for making this motion to ascertain my client's elementary right of access to full record of court proceedings where they are a parties.  The attorney who concealed the deposition where, as it was reported to me, his own expert testified against his theory of prosecution, was "coincidentally" also a judge in a local justice court, and, thus, I was sanctioned for daring to point out his mistakes to the court.


I have amassed over the years a large file showing that the same disciplinary board, and disciplinary committees across New York state fail to discipline attorneys who are retired judges or sitting and their friends or family members, no matter what kind of misconduct is involved.  It appears to be a system that militates against this so-called presumption of integrity of the judiciary.  To require attorneys who are considered intellectual elite of the country to presume integrity of public officials who are given absolute immunity for their malicious and corrupt act is insane.  One does not have to be a rocket scientist to know that if misconduct is not addressed and is forgiven, it will repeat itself and get worse.  When courts refuse to reach the merits of judicial misconduct in civil rights lawsuit and cover judges with absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts, they in fact self-servingly protect themselves and perpetuate misconduct.


How many people will be happy or consider fair a situation where an object of your criticism holds your reputation, your livelihood and your investment of a lifetime into your education and training in his hands?  Meet Judge Carl F. Becker of Delaware County Court, New York, who considered it possible for himself to repeatedly sanction an immigrant female attorney and the spouse of the judge's law school classmate and lifetime rival in legal profession after she sued him for misconduct, and who tries to obtain her disbarment this way.  Shame on you, Judge Becker! You are a disgrace to the bench, and this is my personal opinion of you as a public servant, fully protected by the 1st Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.


It is time to take attorney licensing out of the hands of the government and join the civilized world where attorney independence from the government control and repressions is considered a fundamental requirement of a democratic society.


A democratic society does not need a timid bar, because such bar will be (and is now) unable to enforce protection of the U.S. Constitution against any violations by any governmental officials, including judges.


Moreover, statistics show that attorney regulation as it exists today  in the United States is not benefiting the public as it is claimed.


In New York, according to the statements of Chief Judge Lippman on many occasions, 80% of litigants cannot afford an attorney.  Attorney licensing is claimed to protect the public.  Instead, at least in New York, while it surely restricts entry into the market of legal services of new providers, it also raises the cost of services so that they cannot be afforded by the overwhelming majority of litigants.  It means that attorney licensing, at least in New York, protects the 20% of the top paying clients who can well afford to protect themselves and not to reach into the public pocket for such protection through attorney licensing.  Such an effect of occupational licensing upon the market of the regulated services has already been picked up by economists and cogently called "reverse Robin Hood effect".


As a last drop, I am, naturally, reading a lot on the Internet about independence of the legal profession and I found these three interesting cases.


Case No. 1.  The bar of the state of Iran has fought and succeeded in tabling proposed legislation subjecting the Iranian bar to regulation by the judiciary.  The Iranian bar claimed that such regulation interferes with independence of the bar.  The American bar claims that it is "self-regulated" while it has long been regulated by the government, and has apparently no concern about its independence, as long as it can keep high prices and restrict competition.  Overwhelming supermajority of lawyers in disciplinary boards, precluding members of the public from ever have a majority vote in any one disciplinary case of an attorney clearly indicates that the main purpose of discipline is, for the judiciary, to weed out the critics, and for the unpaid attorneys who are acting as if they are public investigators while at the same time being in private practice and competing with the disciplined lawyers, attorney discipline is a perfect way to weed out competitors. 


Case No. 2  Gryb v. Belarus.  An attorney from Belarus which the U.S. claim in the media is a totalitarian state, complained to the United Nations that his attorney status was terminated by the state in retaliation for his political activities.  The appropriate committee of the United Nations, where the U.S. is a member, agreed.  Yet, while sitting in judgment of violation of attorney's political rights by other countries, the U.S. refuses to give the right to its own attorneys to come to the United Nations with the same kind of complaints, because the U.S. ratified the International Covenant for Political and Civil rights with RUDs (reservations, understandings, declarations), one of which is that U.S. citizens do not have a right of private enforcement of the Covenant against the U.S.  Belarus did not restrict its citizens in this way.  Thus, American attorneys have less rights than attorneys from the "totalitarian state" of Belarus.


Case No. 3.  Kabanov v. Russia.  A disbarred attorney from Russia sued the state of Russia in the European Court of Human Rights for violation of his right of free speech, because his attorney status was terminated due to his criticism of a  judge.  The court found against Russia and awarded Attorney Kabanov 11,000 euros in damages. Based on the decision of the court, the attorney's status was reinstated.  A similar lawsuit of a disbarred attorney in the United States will be dismissed for sovereign immunity and on the grounds of the so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the attorney will be left without a remedy and disbarred forever.  This case demonstrates that American lawyers and other citizens have less remedies as to how enforce their basic human right to earn a livelihood than 28 countries of the European Union plus its aspiring members like Russia.


I believe, popular initiative is needed to change the way in which constitutional violations in the United States are enforced, which applies not only to attorneys, but to all individuals whose claims of constitutional violations are barred with a quagmire of judge-created doctrine leaving majority of victims of governmental misconduct with no remedy, and some of these victims are even sanctioned for their "frivolous" constitutional arguments and requests to the court for help.