19 seconds per exhibit! Judge Kevin Dowd makes record speed in accepting multipage exhibits at the ex parte secret trial without looking at them

I obtained the "non-jury trial minutes" from the Delaware County Supreme Court for the trial that was held by Judge Kevin Dowd (subpoenaed witness in the case) ex parte, after Judge Dowd diagnosed me without seeing me and rejected my doctor's diagnosis as being "without merit" and deeming me not appearing at the trial without good cause (of course, an immigrant female attorney may not have a good cause not to appear at Judge Dowd's trial, even with a properly diagnosed medical injury, it is only American-born male attorneys who are given adjournments for medical reasons for the asking by Judge Dowd).

The non-jury trial minutes copy of which I received directly from the Delaware County Supreme Court Clerk, did not have a stamp that it was filed officially with the court, and the index of the case Mokay v. Mokay did not have an indication, as of yesterday, that the non-jury trial minutes made (allegedly) on April 7, 2015 were filed with the court:

The "non-jury trial" (jury was dismissed because Judge Dowd deemed that I waived jury trial for my client by injuring my back and not appearing for that reason) started at 10;39 am and evidence was closed at 1:24 pm, with a lunch break from 11:57 am to 1:15 pm.

Thus, the net time of the trial for receipt of evidence was 1 hour 18 minutes before noon and a whopping 9 minutes in the afternoon, for the total of 1 hour 27 minutes.

That is, ladies and gentlemen, 87 minutes of the court's valuable time that was spent on the trial.

During those 87 minutes of the court's valuable time the court (Judge Dowd) accepted: 

• 273 documentary exhibits, of those 240 exhibits were accepted, without any foundation testimony, at the opening of the trial, 
• 22 exhibits were received during testimony of Richard  Harlem, Esq., in a peculiar manner - the exhibits were first received and only then offered to Richard Harlem for identification
• Then, the witness on the stand offers 7 exhibits without foundation testimony, and they are received, and then
• Richard Harlem identifies 2 "business records" (billing records" and they are received.

I have to say that Judge Kevin Dowd, probably, made it into the Guinness book of records in the speed with which he accepted 273 documentary exhibits contained in several large boxes, during the time period when the judge was not able to even read those exhibits and see whether they are relevant to the trial.

87 minutes to accept 273 multi-page documentary exhibits.

That is, 19.12 seconds per exhibit.  Record speed! Way to go, Judge Dowd!

Of course, the judge did not care whether anything Richard Harlem offers is relevant to the trial, Judge Dowd would have accepted against my husband anything at all, whether relevant or not, as long as it was against my husband.

It is not surprising that Judge Dowd instructed court security to mislead the public that the trial was concluded when the jury was dismissed, so that nobody would see the particulars of how the judge DID NOT read what is offered in evidence to the court - because he COULD NOT read multi-page documents at the speed of 19.12 seconds per each, it is simply not physically possible.

We will see what kind of ex parte decision the ex parte non-public trial produced.

That, ladies and gentlemen, was a definition of a "speedy" trial - I only wonder why Judge Dowd bothered to come to conduct it.  He could just as well have ordered Richard Harlem to deliver boxes of evidence into his chambers, he accepted additional evidence in his chambers from Richard Harlem anyway.

But the Attorney Hartmann, a seasoned lawyer, actually asked the court what Attorney Hartmann knew the court had no authority to give to him - a continuation of jurisdiction over the trial on damages, after the trial on damages was over, to submit evidentiary materials post-trial and to hold additional hearings on damages post-trial.

I am holding my breath whether Judge Dowd will grant that request.

Nothing is impossible for Judge Dowd when he is trying to bend over backwards for a son of a judge Richard Harlem - and to exact revenge against my husband for suing Judge Dowd and exposing him as incompetent, which this trial only confirms tenfold.

Appellate Division 4th Department - Oh, what a tangled web they weave when first, second, third, etc. time they practice to ... mislead and discriminate against litigants the court does not like

Here is what I received today from Appellate Division 4th Department:

The letter is in direct contradiction to the previously issued directive to the Grievance Committee to file an Affidavit of objections to open proceedings to the public.

Before Ms.Gasparini filed her affidavit and before I had an opportunity to respond to it, the court already made a decision - through its clerk Ms.Carafell, and refused to produce to me an order of the court refusing to open court proceedings to the public, in compliance with New York State Constitution, Article VI, paragraph 4, subsection (b) (requiring that all decisions of an appellate court must be made not by its clerk, but by a quorum of four appellate justices with a concurrence of three appellate justices).

So, in the 4th Department it is the clerk making orders and interpreting the applicable law.

Interestingly enough, the 4th Department allows Mary Gasparini, an employee of that same court, to continue prosecuting the civil disciplinary case after Mary Gasparini filed a botched-up criminal proceeding (that the court had to dismiss before the initial appearance date, it was so bad), where Mary Gasparini was the prosecutor, sole complaining witness and the alleged victim, making Mary Gasparini absolutely disqualified from prosecuting the disciplinary case.

Obviously, the court is ok with this situation.

The only thing that the court is concerned about is how to keep the public and the press away from my disciplinary proceedings so that it does not witness a hearing of the PROSECUTION's motion to confirm that FABRICATED referee's report based on UNAUTHORIZED "decision" by the referee and upon FABRICATED court transcripts - which is uncontroverted.

After dismissing the criminal proceedings sua sponte on May 11, 2015, the clerk of the court has the audacity to tell me that I "voluntarily" decided to make my motions to disaffirm and for other relief on submitted basis, and not because I was forced, by the fact that Mary Gasparini's fabricated criminal charges against me, to "choose" whether to appear on the civil motion and at the same time run the risk of being arrested and locked up for the crazy charge of violating my own privacy - and possibly die in jail, because nobody at this point can guarantee my safety when in the custody of the New York State government, or whether to make the civil motions on submitted basis.

It is a real choice, I know.

After having taught Mary Gasparini how to properly file criminal charges against me - which Mary Gasparini, in view of her utter incompetence, failed to do anyway - the court now tells me that because I "chose" to make a motion to disaffirm on submitted basis, I cannot now ask that the proceedings, whether on submitted basis or otherwise, be open to the public.

The court does not recognize that the prosecutor MAY NOT make a motion to CONFIRM the referee's report on submitted basis, that such a motion can be done ONLY with a due process hearing in view of due process issues of my interest in my livelihood and reputation involved.

So, apparently, a hearing on the prosecutor's motion TO CONFIRM is a must - with the respective request to open that hearing to the public, even if the court chooses to exercise selective blindness and claim that my pending cross-motions were "voluntarily" filed on submitted basis only, even though I was forced to do that by Mary Gasparini's frivolous criminal charges - dismissed sua sponte before the initial appearance on those charges when I started to press the court to open all proceedings, including the criminal proceedings, to the public and the press.

We'll see what the "honorable" court will do next.

Stay tuned.

PS  By the way - note that this letter dated May 13, 2015 does not bear the usual stamp CONFIDENTIAL on top of it - so the proceedings are now open to the public, even though Ms.Carafell is pressuring me to jump through additional hoops to have the proceedings open to the public, even though the only thing the law requires of me is make a request to open and waive my privacy (which I did numerous times)?

Will Richard Harlem NOW be disbarred for fraud upon the court? A stunning sworn confession of a Mokay plaintiff, Daniel Mokay

Today I received a stunning piece of evidence that undermines the Mokay v. Mokay lawsuit.

What I found amazing is the first affirmative defense, paragraph 2 at the bottom:

Even more interesting is that the Verified Answer was verified by Zelda R. Smith, legal assistant to Richard Harlem, on May 6, 2015:

Of course, Daniel Mokay is not a "Defendant" in his individual capacity in this lawsuit, he was brought into the lawsuit only as Executor for the Estate of decedent, and there is no way to sue the decedent for contribution other than through suing his Estate.

Two days before the date when Daniel Mokay made the above shown sworn statement through his attorney Michael Breene, stating under oath that the action in Mokay v Mokay was brought because of wrongdoing of the Estate's decedent Andrew Mokay, 

Daniel Mokay fraudulently asked another court, through his attorney Richard Harlem, for the following relief (attached is a snippet from the draft of the order proposed by Daniel Mokay through his counsel Richard Harlem):

I say "fraudulently" because the Estate could not possibly incur the same amount of legal fees (claimed as damages) as the other five plaintiffs in the action, for the simple reason that the Estate was not a party to the Mokay action from June 2007 (the commencement of the Mokay action) to March 2008.  

Moreover, on May 4, 2015 Daniel Mokay made yet another sworn statement in his verified response to my husband's petition to stay distribution in the Estate of Andrew Mokay due to Mr. Neroni's action for contribution against the decedent:

This is the statement from the January 22, 2015 decision that Mr. Neroni (and I as his counsel) allegedly misinterpreted:

So, on May 4, 2015 Daniel Mokay made a sworn statement that Mr. Neroni "misinterpreted" the statement in the decision of the Appellate Division 3rd Department clearly describing three people to be part of the alleged conspiracy to commit fraud in the Mokay action, one of them clearly being the decedent:

Yet, on May 6, 2015, through his other attorney Michael Breen, in another action, Daniel Mokay makes a diametrically opposite sworn statement, that it is the decedent's actions, together with the alleged actions of Mr. Neroni that "caused harm to the beneficiaries of the estate", and Daniel Mokay even specified what kind of harm he is accusing his own decedent (and father off) - that his father "took from the beneficiaries property which he was obliged to give them".

In other words, Daniel Mokay both accuses his own father (whose legal representative Daniel Mokay is, as the Executor of his Estate) of stealing property, but he also asserts that the Mokay action was an action for interference with prospective rights of inheritance of the Estate's beneficiaries - a non-existent cause of action in New York.

Also, when Daniel Mokay states that "the Executor and the estate are faultless with respect to the Plaintiff's claims", Daniel Mokay (and his attorney) apparently pretend they do not understand that the Plaintiff has no other way of bringing a contribution action against the deceased but to sue his estate - that is the legal way of how it is done in the State of New York.

So, on May 4, 2015 Daniel Mokay claimed, under oath, in two actions (Mokay and petition-to-stay-distribution) that the decedent did not commit any wrongdoings and was not a tortfeasor in the Mokay action.

Two days later, on May 6, 2015, Daniel Mokay claimed in a third action, also under oath, and without notifying the other two courts of his sudden change of heart, that the decedent did, indeed, commit wrongdoing "against beneficiaries of the Estate".

First, the Mokay action was commenced in June of 2007 on behalf of five children of the decedent as beneficiaries under a contract to make a will, not as beneficiaries of the Estate, and Daniel Mokay's attorney Richard Harlem argued that on Daniel Mokay's behalf to Judge Garry in October of 2007.

By the way, the contract to make a will was, by the time of commencement of the Mokay action, rejected by probate court in May of 2007.

Second, the five beneficiaries under the decedent's oral contract to make a will, Daniel Mokay one of them (which the children are claiming the decedent has breached) sued the decedent's widow Connie Mokay, who was also a beneficiary under the contract to make a will.

So, if Daniel Mokay is now saying that the Estate, represented by Richard Harlem, was suing on behalf of beneficiaries of the Estate, an untenable situation arose where 

1. the Estate, legal reprsentative of the decedent, could not sue on behalf of the Estate's beneficiaries on the basis of wrongdoing of its own decedent, 
2. Estate could not sue on behalf of five beneficiaries against its other beneficiary, the decedent's widow; and
3. if Estate was representing the interests of the estate's beneficiaries in the Mokay action (which was not part of the 2nd Amended Complaint, by the way), then individual lawsuits by the beneficiaries could not be allowed by the court, and ALL of that is new evidence for new motions to be brought in the Mokay action, to vacate any fraudulently obtained judgments.  

And, by the way, since Daniel Mokay now admitted under oath that the lawsuit was on behalf of beneficiaries of the Estate, which included the decedent's widow Connie Mokay, a co-defendant in the action, it appears that Richard Harlem represented in the Mokay action EVERBODY except Mr. Neroni, two defendants and five plaintiffs. 

I simply don't see how Mr. Harlem can keep his law license after this confession of Daniel Mokay.

And now let's review a sticky equal protection of laws issue.

Mr. Neroni was disbarred for alleged fraud upon the court - without a hearing - with a collateral estoppel attached to a partial summary judgment in an action where the conflict of interest was denied by Judge Fitzgerald, but is now reasserted with new force by the Appellate Division's January 22, 2015 decision and by admission under oath by Daniel Mokay sworn to on May 6, 2015.

So, will Mr. Neroni's order of disbarment will NOW be vacated? 

And will Richard Harlem (and attorneys who helped him) be finally disbarred for openly committing fraud upon the court and for stubbornly pursuing a frivolous lawsuit for 8 years?

The stenographer in the ex parte non-public Mokay trial was the Facebook friend of a subpoenaed witness, the presiding judge's law clerk

Yesterday, I've learnt an interesting fact about the Mokay trial that was conducted on April 7, 2015, in an ex parte manner, in my absence as the defense counsel, despite my documented medical leave and back injury, and that was conducted without presence of the public and while duping members of the public into believing that the trial did not proceed after the jury was dismissed.

The stenographer on the case was a Facebook friend of a subpoenaed witness, the presiding Judge Kevin Dowd's law clerk Claudette Newman - and the even more interesting fact is that as soon as I published a blog about several stenographers being listed as Facebook friends of Claudette Newman, Claudette Newman made her friend-list private.

Nothing like - I cannot even say a little - a LOT of "appearance of impropriety" going on, don't you think?

With these details and even without more (and, as far as I know, there is much more), it is very clear that the integrity of the Mokay trial was compromised.

How the name "Neroni" causes judges and hearing officers to disregard their orders of assignment, as well as the rule of law and elementary human decency

An interesting scientific phenomenon presented itself in New York courts.

As soon as judges see the word "Neroni" on a pleading, they forget about the law, civility, decency or reasoning and act with a purpose - to show the Neroni's that they are below any possible law.

A number of judges in the Mokay case (read my post "the Mokay saga", here and here, and the early April posts for this year) disregarded the obvious problems with the case in order to push it forward, have my husband unlawfully disbarred and keep him disbarred, and that would be:

• suing on a rehashed non-existent cause of action - tortious interference with prospective rights of inheritance;
• suing on one testamentary instrument (oral) after probating another in another court;
• having one law firm represent in one action the tortfeasor and ihis alleged victims, while claiming attorney fees as sole damages in the action - just to name a few problems.

There is applicable law as to all of the above, had I or my husband brought a case like that, it would have been dismissed as frivolous long time ago - and we would have been punished for conflicted representation.  But, since the conflicted representation is undertaken by a son of the Supreme Court justice and by the retired (and now late) Supreme Court justice, any misconduct that they committed in bringing and prosecuting a frivolous action is cured by their blue blood - and no law needs apply, especially when what is at stake is an unbridled son-of-a-judge's greed and the need to "get" a Neroni, the critics of judicial misconduct against the ephemeral requirement of the "rule of law" that judges have learnt to disregard knowing of their impunity to do whatever they want.

I have a disciplinary action pending, spawned, after I sued him, by a judge who is now running for the cover of an "early retirement" 2.5 years into his 10-year term after obtaining a re-election by making false statements to the voters, and who participated in the Mokay mess, first, by approving for probate one testamentary instrment, and then, through the Supreme Court, by enforcing a different testamentary instrument in the same case, the one he rejected in the Surrogate's Court.

The disciplinary action is prosecuted at this time by a wiz of a prosecutor who does not know, among other things, that she cannot prosecute and be at the same time a complaining witness and a claimed alleged victim in a criminal case SHE spawned against me - which was so bad that the court had to dismiss it sua sponte before the initial appearance date.

Yet, in the disciplinary action a court-appointed referee defied the court order of appointment directing the referee to conduct an evidentiary hearing on liability for my benefit.  The deadline for the referee to conduct such a hearing was February 6, 2015.  The referee openly defied that court order, failed to conduct the evidentiary hearing and instead, usurped the state constitutional authority of an appellate panel to decide cases in the appellate court and made a "decision" himself.

Instead of immediately replacing the referee and ordering the new referee to actually comply with the court order and conduct the court-ordered evidentiary hearing, the court is playing with me, pretending it does not understand what is going on and directs me to file "motions" to replace the referee, while the court already accepted what the referee did - unlawfully and while defying the court order to conduct a hearing - and scheduled a hearing in "mitigation" which does not happen before the court made a decision on liability (and the COURT did not do that - the referee did).

Similarly and at the same time, in the new case that I filed on behalf of my husband and that was transferred from the Surrogate's Court to the Supreme Court by a court order, the judge assigned to the case in the Supreme Court defies the court order of assignment and directs clerks in two courts to disregard the order of removal and assignment made by the judge's superior - and the superior knows about it and so far remains silent.

The Lady Justice appears to be very much sighted, moreover, the whole New York judicial system appears to be sitting on the scales of justice preventing the "rule of law" from taking effect where a "Neroni" is involved.

Recently, a judge (who was subpoenaed to testify about his own misconduct and misconduct of his staff in the Mokay case) declared "without merit" my doctor's diagnosis of a back injury that left me unable to appear at a trial, dismissed the jury, declared that my non-appearance because of a documented back injury, with a medical leave from work, as a waiver of the jury trial on behalf of my husband and myself, and conducted a trial in my absence.

That was done after that same judge gave two adjournments for medical reasons to my husband's opponents, without requiring their physicians to provide to him sworn statements as to their medical condition, and while the disabled counsel was one of several trial counsel, so the remaining trial counsel could proceed without the disabled counsel.

In the eyes of that judge (Kevin Dowd) disability of an American male attorney, even if documented without a sworn statement, always trumps a disability of a female Russian immigrant attorney, especially one who criticized the judge and subpoenaed him to testify, and especially the one who sued the judge on behalf of a client and whose husband sued the judge.

The judge had the indecency of having his law clerk threaten that I will be physically brought into the courthouse after I provided proof of my medical disability to the court.

So, disability of a non-Neroni counsel is grounds for an adjournment of a jury trial.  Disability of a Neroni counsel constitutes waiver of the jury trial.  This is how the "law of whim" operates in our neck of woods.

And, when the purpose is to "get", inconvenience or harass a Neroni, judges and referees do not have to abide by their own orders of assignment - or by the applicable law.

If such a "rule of whim" exists for the Neronis, it can - and does - exist for any other disfavored attorney or litigant in New York court, and it is the rule of whim and not the rule of law, that controls.

And that means that the rule of law in the State of New York, the rule that the law applies equally, without concern for one's status or identity, and in a predictable manner, is dead.   

Will judge Mulvey tolerate open insubordination to his orders by a judge and clerks of two courts? Will Judge Mulvey lose his own face as the court administrator and judge to save face of his subordinate who does not seem to be able to read Judge Mulvey's orders?

An order was made by the Chief Administrative Judge in the 6th Judicial District:

The order was clear and unambiguous and was copied to Judge Mulvey's superior Judge Coccoma.

Neither Judge Mulvey nor Judge Coccoma found the order erroneous or made any corrections.

It is clear from the order that the Clerk of the Surrogate's Court should have transferred the file to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, based on the order of transfer/removal dated April 3, 2015.

The clerk of the Surrogate's Court did not do that.

The judge assigned to the Supreme Court, instead of complying with the order and presiding over the removed case in the court where the judge was assigned, claimed to the Petitioner and his attorney that he was assigned to the Surrogate's Court and kept pressuring Petitioner's attorney to serve in accordance with the rules of the Surrogate's Court.

Even after the assigned judge was notified that Petitioner's attorney is aware of the change of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, the assigned judge arrogantly continued to disregard the clear and unambiguous order of removal and of assignment made by Judge Mulvey on April 3, 2015 and directed the Supreme Court Clerk Kelly Sanfilippo to send me a letter advising me that the case was in the Surrogate's Court despite the order of April 3, 2015, and that the order of April 3, 2015 is "erroneous".

So, I guess, what is happening in the 6th Judicial District is that clerks of two courts - the transferor and the transferee court, together with the judge assigned to the transferee court - collectively defy Judge Mulvey's order of removal and of assignment.

Will Judge Mulvey "correct" the order which is not erroneous on its face and indicates what Judge Mulvey wanted and directed to do - a transfer of the case to the Supreme Court and an assignment of judge Guy to the removed Supreme Court case?

Will Judge Mulvey concede that he "made an error" with his order of removal and remand it to the Surrogate's Court - simply because Judge David H. Guy does not appear to be able to read that order of removal and messed up the case by acting, without authority, as if it is still pending in the Surrogate's Court?

So, to save Judge Guy from rightful accusations of misconduct, Judge Mulvey will present himself as not knowing what he is doing when he is issuing orders of removal and transfer?

I bet the safest way for Judge Mulvey to act is to leave things as they are - and remove Judge Guy from the case where he has already shown his incompetence through inability to read and comprehend even the order of his own assignment - to the Supreme Court case.

If a judge cannot comprehend a written order clearly stating that he is assigned to a Supreme Court and not to any other court - that judge should not be on the bench, and it is the incompetence of Judge Guy that should be Judge Mulvey's concern as the court administrator of the 6th Judicial District, and not the concern of how to save Judge Guy from prosecution for misconduct by acknowledging that it is Judge Mulvey who made an "erroneous" decision of transfer and not Judge Guy who does not seem to be able to read and comprehend court orders of assignment.

Not only Judge Guy committed insubordination to Judge Mulvey's order by failing to follow it, but he coerced clerks of two courts, the transferor and the transferee court, to deem Judge Mulvey's clear and unambiguous orders as "erroneous" and to disregard them and direct other people (parties in litigation and Delaware County Clerk) to disregard them.

Will Judge Mulvey tolerate such an insubordination that makes him look like he does not have the court administration in his judicial district under control?

Judge Guy insists on his non-existing authority to proceed as a Delaware County Surrogate even after being notified that I know of the order of removal to the Supreme Court

Yesterday I wrote on this blog about Judge Guy acting as a Delaware County Surrogate in a case that was removed, as of April 3, 2015 to the Delaware County Supreme Court and to which Judge Guy was assigned only as an Acting Supreme Court justice.

Yet, even after being notified that I know of the order of removal, Judge Guy acts pretending that he still has authority as a surrogate.

Today I received an e-mail from the Delaware County Surrogate's Court Clerk Lisa Hulse forwarding to me the letter of Judge Guy responding to my letter dated May 6, 2015 where I asked for an adjournment in the Surrogate's Court, not knowing that the Surrogate's Court does not have jurisdiction over the proceedings since April 3, 2015, pursuant to the order of removal.

In the letter, Judge Guy stubbornly (and unlawfully) states that the case will remain "on the calendar" in the Surrogate's Court, even though it has been removed to the Supreme Court (without my knowledge) as of April 3, 2015, of which Judge Guy has failed to notify me - or anybody else.

Of course, I know, as well as Judge Guy does, that I have absolutely no obligation to serve anybody in accordance to the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act once the case has been removed to the Supreme Court, or follow directives of the Surrogate's Court as to service, scheduling or anything else, after that court has lost jurisdiction over the case, as per court order of Judge Mulvey dated 4/3/2015 (above).

Judge Guy stubbornly continues to tell me that I did or did not acquire personal jurisdiction in the Surrogate's Court pursuant to the SPCA (Surrogate's Court Procedure Act), while knowing very well that (1) he was never assigned to that court in this case, (2) the Surrogate's Court no longer has jurisdiction over the case since April 3, 2015, (3) SPCA no longer applies.

Due to Judge Guy's stubborn unlawful actions the only conclusion that I can reasonably arrive at is that his misconduct in concealing the order of removal from me was deliberate, and that he is acting in this case (not surprisingly, as many judges did before him) as an advocate on behalf of Richard Harlem (son of the retired and now late Supreme Court Justice and Chief Administrative Judge of the 6th Judicial District Robert Harlem) and on behalf of Richard Harlem's client the Estate of Andrew Mokay.  

Well, one of the judges who were committing misconduct in this same case, Judge Carl F. Becker, is retiring 3.5 years before his mandatory retirement time.

Maybe, it is time for Judge Guy to consider retirement, too, if he cannot either read, or understand, or follow, even his own orders of assignment.