THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.


Wednesday, May 13, 2015

It is an official big secret - I am not guilty of criminal contempt

Here is what I received today from the Appellate Division 4th Judicial Department.


 
 
What was surprising is that the decision to deny the "motion" for criminal contempt was made on May 11, 2015, before the initial appearance on May 26, 2011, sua sponte.  It shows just how bad Mary Gasparini's "motion" really was that the court saved her the embarrassment of having to argue her screwed up case.

As you can read in the order denying the "motion" for criminal contempt, the order itself and papers upon which it was made is a big secret and it is confidential, so forget you ever saw what you saw on this blog post.

But know that when judges and prosecutors screwed up, they try to hide it by sealing what cannot possibly be sealed - a criminal proceeding.

As I recall, recently a couple of judges and a prosecutor begged a court to destroy evidence of their misconduct (texting during a criminal trial), and wanted their texts made on cell phones that were issued and paid for by the government, to be sealed as private.

And they lost.

Here, the court conveniently uses the pretense of power to seal a proceeding that the court knows it cannot seal because of my waiver of confidentiality - as to disciplinary proceedings.  The criminal proceedings can never be sealed in this state.

Of course, to say that the dismissal of a criminal proceeding is confidential under Judiciary Law 90(10) is laughable, because Judiciary Law 90(10) does not make civil disciplinary proceedings confidential due to my waiver of confidentiality and applicable law, and Judiciary Law 90(10) does not apply to criminal proceedings, especially to proceedings contested on jurisdictional grounds (with which jurisdictional challenges the court apparently agreed).

And, of course, if the court had no jurisdiction to review the criminal contempt proceedings to begin with (not being "the court of record" and for many more jurisdictional deficiencies pointed out in my Memorandum of Law, upon which the court relied in denying the "motion" for criminal contempt), the court has no authority to seal the proceedings either, especially for no good cause shown.

Anyway, the court has cast me a bone so far, saying - here, calm down, we are not putting you in the Monroe County Jail for 30 days per pop, as Mary Gasparini asked us to do, and there were approximately 7 or 8 pops that I counted, so Mary Gasparini asked the court to put me for 8 months in jail for exposing her misconduct, incompetence and outright fraud, fabrication of court transcripts.

Am I glad?

It is too little and, possibly, too late.

The court cannot give me back my nerves, health and money spent on fighting the frivolous criminal charges.  I will not be the same person and the same attorney again, not after being charged with a crazy charge of violating my own privacy - and having to fight it for months!

My trust in integrity of our court system was forever destroyed in how the courts were handling my disciplinary case, including the criminal case that was fabricated as part of it - and the order denying the criminal contempt, but sealing itself, does not restore that trust.

It is a bittersweet victory since the "motion"  had to be dismissed sua sponte when it was filed, as clearly having multiple jurisdictional defects, plus it was brought by a prosecutor-witness-alleged victim, which was unacceptable by any canons of due process of law.

Moreover, the denial of the motion came conspicuously only after I demanded that the fabricated criminal proceedings, as well as the already prejudged, premature and fabricated attorney disciplinary "mitigation hearing" that is to be held without a judgment of liability, and without a court-ordered evidentiary hearing be open to the public, and after I demanded that the court should provide to me names of judges who authored "directives" referred to me as if coming from the court by the court's clerk and the court's appellate attorney.

So, the bone that was cast to me has strings attached and is actually an implied admission that the court screwed up - badly, and an implied request not to press farther - and I will.

Of course, the best course of conduct that I would undertake, had I been in the court's shoes (if I would be the counsel advising the court), I would dismiss the entire disciplinary petition of the Grievance Committee, as fabricated and unconstitutional, because then I would have an authority under Judiciary Law 90(10) to seal documents in such proceedings.

Otherwise, all of the court's shameful shenanigans in my disciplinary case will continue to be public.

A judge caught red-handed claims the order he disobeyed was wrong and needs correction

I blogged yesterday about Judge David Guy who acted as if he was assigned to a Surrogate's Court case while he was assigned to a removed Supreme Court case, and who caused my client (and husband) a lot of unnecessary effort and expense by his unlawful actions.

When I found (yesterday) that order of removal from the Surrogate to the Supreme Court, dated April 3, 2015

 
and when I forwarded it to the Supreme Court clerks to assign an Index No. and an RJI (Request for Judicial intervention) number to the case, as they were supposed to do immediately after the order of removal was issued (but did not do to this day because they were not notified that the case was removed), the Supreme Court clerk, according to my admission to me, consulted the assigned judge, Judge Guy, who allegedly told Ms. Sanfilippo that the order of removal of Judge Guy's administrative superior, Judge Mulvey, is "erroneous".
 
As a result Ms. Sanfilippo authored and gave me the following letter:
 
 

Of course, neither Ms. Sanfilippo, nor the assigned judge, Judge Guy, have authority to deem a clear and unambiguous order of assignment as "erroneous" - at least while there is no other order on file.

Of course, Ms. Sanfilippo had no authority to say what she said in her letter to me because the only order she has at this time is the order of April 3, 2015, by Judge Mulvey, and according to her statement to me, she did not speak to Judge Mulvey about it, she only spoke to Judge Guy who either misread the court order or deliberately misled me that he was assigned to the Surrogate's Court case instead of a removed Supreme Court case (different statutes apply).

Apparently, when a judge committed a blunder, a judge may ask his superiors to correct his blunder IN ARREARS in order to save his hide?

What is the most amazing part in this is that the judge is seeking an order of REMAND to the Surrogate's Court, which is for parties to do and not for a judge, and this way Judge Guy clearly stepped in as an ADVOCATE for those parties for whom it is preferable to keep the case in the Surrogate's Court - and that would be my client's opponents, because in the Supreme Court it is too easy to make motions to consolidate several pending related cases, which will further reveal conflicts of interest of politically connected attorneys involved in the whole Mokay mess.

So much for the rule of law, ladies and gentlemen.

And, since we have (allegedly) equal protection of laws in this country, if you do not like an order of Judge Mulvey, just ask the court clerk to correct it in your favor.

Of course, I asked Judge Guy to step down and notified his superior and the New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct of his behavior.

We will see if Judge Guy will ever be punished for pretending he was a lawfully assigned Surrogate's Court judge and attempting to change the order he disobeyed when caught red-handed.



Tuesday, May 12, 2015

What do you do if a judge knowingly misleads you about his own authority to decide a case in a particular court?

In view of the fact that on April 7, 2015 a jury trial was scheduled in the case Mokay v. Mokay on damages (Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, see my blog "the Mokay saga" and my blogs for early April 2015), while the Appellate court designated one of the plaintiffs in the Mokay case as a tortfeasor (and thus official party defendant in that same case where his attorneys represent both party plaintiffs and party defendants, requiring them to disgorge all legal fees claimed as damages, see my blog about the "trio" of tortfeasors), I filed two court actions.

First, February of 2015 I have filed a lawsuit against the Estate of Andrew Mokay, one of the Plaintiffs in the Mokay action, in order to determine percentage of guilt, if any of my husband, as opposing to the decedent Andrew Mokay as a tortfeasor; and

Second, on April 1, 2015 I have filed a petition on behalf of my husband Mr. Neroni in the Delaware County Surrogate's court asking the Surrogate's Court to:
  1. make Richard Harlem, attorney for the Estate (and attorney for all Plaintiffs in the Delaware County Supreme Court) to disgorge legal fees granted to him by Judge Carl F. Becker on 7/5/2011 and put the money back into the Estate to make the Estate solvent against the claim of my husband as a potential creditor; and
  2. to stop disbursing moneys from the Estate, once again, to keep the Estate solvent.






Once again, I filed the Petition in the Surrogate's Court on April 1, 2015.  Here is a scan from the file index of the Surrogate's court's case Estate of Andrew Mokay, File No. 2007-021 from April 1, 2015 to today's date.



The index clearly shows that the filings continue beyond April 3, 2015.

Yet, without notifying me as the attorney of record in the Surrogate's Court case, on April 3, 2015 Chief Administrative Judge for the 6th Judicial District Judge Mulvey issued an administrative order:




That order was ordering TWO things:

1) REMOVAL of the case from the Surrogate's Court to the Delaware County Supreme Court;
2) Assignment of Judge David H. Guy TO THE SUPREME COURT case.

The order of assignment of April 3, 2015 was never provided to me as the attorney of record for the petition, or to the court to which it was removed - neither the Delaware County Clerk Sharon O'Dell, nor the Delaware County Supreme Court Clerk Kelly Sanfilippo were copied on the order, and the order was not filed in the Delaware County Supreme Court, and not assigned an index number or an RJI number up to this day (I checked today when I found the order in the Surrogate's Court file).

The supervising judge Michael V. Coccoma (see my blogs about him and his wife Ellen Coccoma who I caught in committing fraud upon the court and who, of course, was never punished by judges who are all her husband's subordinates) was notified of the removal of the case, clearly saw that the court order was not copied to the court to which the case was transferred, or to the parties in the Surrogate's Court action, but did nothing to intervene and correct it.

While, according to the April 3, 2015 order of assignment, Judge Guy was assigned ONLY to the removed Supreme Court case, Jude Guy acted as if he was assigned to the Surrogate's Court case, and did the following (also see the index scan above):

1) On April 7, 2015, the day when Judge Kevin Dowd illegally started an ex parte trial in Mokay v. Mokay during the legitimate medical leave of the Defendant, Judge Guy, without authority, issued a decision in the Surrogate's court denying my motion to recuse Judge Becker "as moot", and claiming that "[t]he matter has been duly reassigned to the undersigned by the Administrative Judge, but without mentioning that "the matter" was "reassigned" to Judge Guy only after it was removed to the Supreme Court and that Judge Guy had no authority to act as the Surrogate's Court judge.




2) On April 8, 2015 Judge Guy illegally issued "citations" in the Surrogate's Court and illegally scheduled the matter to be heard "on submission" on May 5, 2015 in the Surrogate's Court.




3) My client expended a lot of efforts and money to have the citations properly served, without knowledge that the citations were illegal and proceedings were already removed from the Surrogate's Court;

4) On May 1, 2015 I received a phone call from the Surrogate's Court Clerk Ms. Hulse who told me that Judge Guy rejected service of process upon several people because it was in accordance with the CPLR and not the Surrogate's Court act.

At the time when he rejected service of process in accordance with the CPLR, Judge Guy clearly knew that he was assigned only to the removed Supreme Court case and that he was proceeding in the Surrogate's Court case without authority - but never notified me that the case was a Supreme Court case and directed me to ask him, in a letter, to issue supplemental citations.

I complied, without knowing that Judge Guy has no authority to act as a Surrogate and that the Surrogate Court has lost jurisdiction over the case long time ago, as per the April 3, 2015 order of removal.

Moreover, at that time, Judge Guy clearly knew that, for a case removed to the Supreme Court, service of process must be done in accordance with the CPLR and not the Surrogate's Court act, and thus, requiring me to ask the court for supplemental citations and to re-serve in accordance with the Surrogates' Court Act was not only an act without authority, but also a mere harassment meant to inconvenience me and my client.

On May 5, 2015 Judge Guy illegally issued Supplemental Citations in the Surrogate's Court without having any authority to do that.





David Mokay and Patricia Knapp were served in accordance with the CPLR.

David Mokay was served first by several attempts at personal service, which he ducked, and then by "nail-and-mail" service, after David Mokay's residence address was ascertained and confirmed by his neighbors, co-tenants in the apartment building.

Patricia Knapp was served by a substituted service upon her husband at her residence (and then by mail), which is permissible under the CPLR which governs service in New York Supreme Court.

Judge Guy ordered David Mokay re-served under the Surrogate's Court Act personally, knowing that (1) it was not possible because David Mokay was ducking service and (2) that David Mokay was served in accordance with CPLR at the time when the case was transferred to the Supreme Court and CPLR applied instead of the SPCA (of which I did not know).

After first ordering me to serve Christine Reed on a P.O. Box (which I did by certified mail), Judge Guy ordered me to personally re-serve Christine Reed in "Meridale, NY".  Christine Reed was by that time already served by certified mail, in accordance with SPCA 307, as a person whose domicile in New York was not proven and for whom the court knew only her P.O. Box number in Meridale, which was not good evidence that she resided in that town, in the State of New York, or even in the United States of America.

Judge Guy clearly knew that he (1) had no authority to issue citations in Surrogate's Court (2) issue citations with an incomplete address, ordering me to find a person in the town of Meridale, NY without any assurance that she resides there.  Judge usually do not direct people to search for the persons to be served on the streets or under bridges, but there was no residential address pointed out in the citation, although Judge Guy obviously equated a P.O. Box in a town of Meridale, NY with a residential address and a domiciliary in the State of New York, United States of America, which cannot be discerned from a P.O. Box.

On May 6, 2015 I received "Answers" from attorneys Michael Getman and Richard Harlem.

Richard Harlem was claiming, among other things, that I did not plead the Petition properly in compliance with the Surrogate's Court act.

Of course, by the time of the answer, unbeknownst to me - and hopefully (for Mr. Harlem's sake) unbeknownst to him, Surrogate's Court act no longer applied, as the case was removed on April 3, 2015 to the Supreme Court, of which Jugde Guy did not notify the parties.

On May 6, 2015 I asked Judge Guy for an extension of time to amend the Petition to take care of the claimed pleading deficiencies under the Surrogate's Court Act pointed out in Mr. Harlem's "Answer and Affirmative Defenses".

Judge Guy received that correspondence on May 7, 2015 and it was filed with the Surrogate's Court (because I did not know that the case was a Supreme Court case, and I directed my filings and correspondence to the Surrogate's Court).

Today is May 12, 2015.  I came to work on the file to the Surrogate's Court today and the clerk of the court made no attempt to give me any notifications from Judge Guy that the Surrogate's Court does not have jurisdiction over the case since April 3, 2015, and that I should not waste my time and money of my client preparing amended petitions in the court that lost jurisdiction over the case over a month prior.

Moreover, when I pointed out to Ms. Hulse that, according to the court order, the case has been transferred to the Supreme Court on April 3, 2015, she was surprised.

Delaware County Clerk Sharon O'Dell was no less surprised, stated they did not receive a copy of the order for filing and they cannot assign an index number allowing the case to proceed, until and unless they receive the order of removal dated April 3, 2015, from Judge Mulvey directly.

My husband and client, Mr. Neroni, as well as I, feel that he is the victim of continued harassment of the court system.

Had he known of the order of April 3, 2015, we could have made a motion to consolidate the three related cases in the Supreme Court.  The fact that Judge Mulvey did not even make aware clerks of the court to which the case was removed of his order of removal and assignment of Judge Guy to the Supreme Court, speaks of deliberate actions of Judge Mulvey to deprive my husband of time-sensitive information.

Of course, I am turning in all participants in this "assignment order" and how it was hidden from me and from the clerks of the transferee court, to the NYS Judicial Conduct Commission and to authorities responsible for commencing criminal investigations and prosecutions.

Enough is enough.




You wonder why the feds have to do the job of the New York State Attorney General in investigating and prosecuting corruption and fraud in New York State government? Because the claimed job of the NYS Attorney General is to protect the fraudsters

Two leaders of the New York State Legislature have been indicted this year, Dean Skelos and Sheldon Silver.

Why the indictment was by the feds, and not by the New York State Attorney General?

The answer is very clear - because the NYS Attorney General REPRESENTS the State officials, even when they are sued for fraud and corruption.


So, if you have a corrupt legislator - NYS Attorney General defends him and will raise issues of various judge-created "immunities", "deferences", "comities" and what not - and will ask the federal court, likely successfully, to punish the victims of fraud who dared to file a civil rights action, with paying attorney's fees to the corrupt governmental official, for the inconvenience of being sued for corruption, and represented for free by the New York State Attorney General.

Yet, the New York State Attorney General ALSO has, as one of his duties, to protect people of the State of New York, voters who elected him, from fraud.  The NYS AG makes this pledge before every election.

Yet, when it comes to doing his job, when it comes to investigating and prosecuting corruption in the New York State government, the NYS AG's status as the attorney for the corrupt public officials prevents him from doing the job he was elected for.

I bet the public did not vote to have the NYS AG oppose civil rights lawsuits targeting misconduct of governmental officials, on behalf of those officials whose misconduct is the subject of those civil rights lawsuits.

It is time to change the law and eliminate the position of the NYS AG, or to legislatively prohibit NYS AG to represent public officials sued for misconduct in office - because committing misconduct in office is not part of their public duties, and while 80% of taxpayers cannot afford their own attorney, those same taxpayers should not be forced to pay for the legal defense of fraudsters.

As we have it now, the New York State Attorney General is a sworn public official who violates his oath of office as a matter of discharging his duties.

That means - people of the State of New York cannot take care of corruption in their own state government and must ask the feds to do it for them?

A change in the law is overdue.

Monday, May 11, 2015

Mary Gasparini's confession

When Mary Gasparini argues something to the court, and especially on issues in which she has no competency as an attorney, she sometimes makes interesting revelations.

For example, Mary Gasparini, as a criminal prosecutor, argued to the court that exposure of prosecutorial misconduct (her OWN misconduct), is not protected by the 1st Amendment.

I cited a case claiming that it is - that blogging for public interest is protected by the 1st Amendment.

Mary Gasparini attempted to shift the issue and said the following:


Mary Gasparini stubbornly refuses to accept the law of the State of New York that provides that an attorney who is the subject of a disciplinary proceeding holds the key to the proceeding's privacy and confidentiality - as soon as the attorney waived her own privacy (and I did, in writing, on notice to Mary Gasparini, in December of 2014), the proceeding is DEEMED open to the public as a matter of law.

Thus, Mary Gasparini's claims that anybody "blogged sealed records and documents" are fraudulent and defamatory.

Obsidian (the case sited in the snippet) actually provides that even if statements in the blog about a private person, but on issues of public interest, are FALSE, they are still protected by a higher standard against defamation, under the 1st Amendment of the State Constitution.

Mary Gasparini asserts that Obsidian is a case about defamation, not confidentiality.

To say that is the same as to say that my case is the case about confidentiality, not defamation.

If is it not about defamation, does it mean that Mary Gasparini just acknowledged to what she has been accused on the blog - conspiring to cook court transcript and knowingly submitted fabricated transcripts to get her way?

So, now, as Mary Gasparini argues, it must be illegal in New York to publicly report commission of a crime if it is committed by a prosecutor and a judge in the course of a publicly funded proceeding that is open as a matter of applicable New York law? 

And, as she argues, I must be put in jail for violating the sealing order that was put in place to protect my privacy that I waived?

The word "stupidity" does not even begin to describe what is going on, and that taxpayers money are spent on such prosecutions, done clearly for purposes of personal revenge, should be a subject of criminal investigations by state and federal law enforcement - if they are independent enough and have enough courage and integrity to do investigate public officials for fraud.

Dumber and dumber...

Here is the argument of disciplinary prosecutor Mary Gasparini of Syracuse, NY that attorney disciplinary proceedings - and criminal proceedings that she concocted based on such disciplinary proceedings - should not be open to the public.


Mary Gasparini does not know what all 1st year law students know - that in criminal cases the prosecuted person is a Defendant, not a Respondent.  By positioning a criminal Defendant as a Respondent, Mary Gasparini attempts to confuse the court and shift it toward civil standards of proof and civil procedure, and away from constitutional protections required of all criminal cases.

Judiciary Law 4 provides:

    §  4.  Sittings  of  courts  to be public. The sittings of every court
  within this state shall be public, and every citizen may  freely  attend
  the  same,  except  that  in  all  proceedings  and  trials in cases for
  
  • divorce, 
  • seduction, 
  • abortion, 
  • rape, 
  • assault with intent to commit rape,
  • criminal sexual act,  
  • bastardy or  
  • filiation, the court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court.
There is a rule of statutory interpretation that is drilled into law students from day one of law school - if a statute contains a list of exceptions, that list is exhaustive and nothing else may be added by interpretation.
Attorney disciplinary proceedings are not part of exceptions where, by New York statutory llaw, the court is given discretion to CLOSE proceedings to the public.
Yet, such a trifle as statutory law will not deter Mary Gasparini.
She stubbornly wants me in jail for breaking my own privacy and confidentiality.
This is what Mary Gasparini argues to the criminal court:
To coerce the court to impose upon me a criminal conviction secretly and without a hearing,Mary Gasparini cites are cases in civil criminal contempt where summary judgments are allowed.
Mary Gasparini also argues that publicly discussing issues of public concern - issues of prosecutorial misconduct and of HER OWN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY (using cooked cooked court transcripts) should be punished because the issue there is that I breached "confidentiality". Whose? My own, of course - New York State Court of Appeals clearly indicated that confidentiality protected in attorney disciplinary proceedings are designed to protect the attorney who is the subject of those proceedings.
First I was charged in a "civil" attorney disciplinary proceeding and prosecuted for NOT committing a crime of practicing law without a license - and 5 courts ignored that issue.
Now I am charged in a criminal proceeding for violating my own privacy and confidentiality.
We live in an increasingly Orwellian world - and the court will only persuade me what I already know if Mary Gasparini's request for a secret contempt of court finding on papers against me for violating my own privacy... I know for a long time that, at least in New York courts and in federal civil rights litigation the rule of law is dead.

Friday, May 8, 2015

The Delaware County Department of So-So Services is going to enforce new vehicle use policy after the State Comptroller blasted them? Right!

Couple of days ago all local newspapers covered the scathing criticism of Delaware County vehicle use practices in the State Comptroller's audit report.

Delaware County, through its Chief of the Board of Supervisors Mr. Eisel assured the Delaware County taxpayers that what is going on is not corruption and that Delaware County will sure change their practices.

Well, they are not changing.

Just minutes ago I was walking my dogs (at about 5:10 pm) on the Legion Field in Delhi, NY.

Kids were playing baseball there.

Here we go - the Department of Social Services white car No. 95 came down the road at a high speed, windows down, elbow hanging outside, down a dirt road, stones kicking up, a clear joy ride, no concern for the county-owned vehicle, because if that was his own car, I doubt if he would go that fast with the windows open and the dust and stones coming through.

The car stopped by the baseball field, a heavy-set man in a baseball cap on backwards, black T-shirt, pops out of the car - and stays at the field, watching the game.

I did not have time to stay on and see for how long he was there, but I wonder whether that car is equipped with the "black box" that would show the route.  I will try to obtain it from Delaware County So-So Services on a Freedom of Information request.

It is nice to know my tax dollars work somewhere so "efficiently", as Mr. Eisel recently pledged to Delaware County taxpayers.

I wonder what Mr. Eisel is driving now.