A link to the memorandum of law in opposition to criminal contempt proceedings against a civi lrights attorney for waiving her own privacy in her own disciplinary proceedings that were instituted for her criticism of judicial misconduct

As promised in my earlier blog post, I have posted my memorandum of law in opposition to the criminal contempt proceedings by which my disciplinary prosecutor attempts to put me in jail for waiving my own privacy.

The platform of this blog does not allow to post files, so I posted it on Facebook, and here is the link to it.

Porter Kirkwood to Delaware County Judge. His arrogance and incompetence is fitting for the position

I just put a blog regarding dismissal of a case Neroni v. Peebles before I had an opportunity to even file an Appellant's brief.

Defendants did not appear in the court below, as the case was dismissed before it was served.

Therefore, by law, I had no opponents on appeal.

Yet, the 2nd Circuit actively invited defendants to appear as opponents.

Porter Kirkwood "appeared", filing a Notice of Appearance where he failed to even state the name of his client.  And the 2nd Circuit, the same 2nd Circuit that must issue a "defective document filed" notification, accepted that Notice of Appearance "in blank" as if it was good and proper.

So, Porter Kirkwood purported to represent on that appeal - somebody, at least his Notice of Appearance does not disclose who that somebody could have been.

With this staggering level of diligence and competence, the only place which will be right for Porter Kirkwood is - you got it right - the place of Delaware County Judge.

Voters of Delaware County, New York.

You will not find any judicial candidate quite as this one.  

Access to court in a civil rights case for Tatiana Neroni? No issues coming from her can be deemed meritorious

In May of 2014 I have filed a civil rights case Neroni v. Peebles in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York.

The case raised multiple issues of public concern and listed multiple public officials (including judges) and multiple politically connected attorneys as defendants.

The case was dismissed before it was even SERVED, by a judge whose recent law clerk (as I learnt later on) was accepted for employment by the law firm of one of the defendants.

I appealed that "sua sponte" dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit.

The 2nd Circuit first tried to force me to get admitted to the 2nd Circuit bar while doing a pro se appeal.

I refused.

The 2nd Circuit forcibly "admitted" me to its bar anyway.

Then, the 2nd Circuit engaged in a game of treating defendants in the court below (where the case was dismissed before the action was served and before those defendants appeared in the action and became parties) as proper parties to the appeal.

The 2nd Circuit bent over backwards to call those non-parties "Appellees, invite them to appear in the action, and make me serve papers on them.

The NYS Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney General refused to appear in the appeal, practically supporting my argument to the court, with legal authorities, and stating that since their clients were never served before the court below dismissed the case, they are not parties to the appeal.

The court ordered me to make a separate motion to strike the Appellees.

I did.

Today I received a notification that my motion to strike Appellees as parties was denied.

I got curious as to why that happened, even though the 2nd Circuit's own case law provides that defendants who did not appear in the court below before the case was dismissed (as it happened in my case), are not proper parties in an appeal from such a dismissal.

I logged into Pacer.gov and retrieved the following order that the court did not consider necessary to notify me of:

First of all, I must note that, unlike all other civil rights cases where my husband or I were involved with the 2nd Circuit, this is the first time when the "troika court" that made a decision on the appeal did not consist of senior-status judges, and I wonder whether the dismissal was actually a knee-jerk reaction of the judges to my blog here describing there court as the court consisting of people too old to handle the rigorous regiment of constitutional appeals.  

Yet, the senior status judges who are usually assigned to the fast-and-sloppy track deciding constitutional appeals (or, rather, rubber-stamping dismissals of such appeals), at least pretended that they had reviewed the case.

These "active-status" three judges did not even pretend that they reviewed the appeal, because the Appellant's Brief was never filed, nor was I allowed to even set a deadline to file it.

The court dismissed the constitutional civil rights appeal from a case raising issues of denial of access to court, court bias and issues of misconduct of judicial officers and court personnel OUTSIDE of court proceedings and thus not subject to any judicial immunity, without even wanting to see what I MIGHT say in the Appellant's brief - before such Appellant's brief was even filed.

So, when you, ladies and gentlemen, file a constitutional appeal with the 2nd Circuit, you have two options - either a "troika-court" of three senior status judges who pretended to read the case, but rubber stamp a denial of the appeal in a summary "non-precedential decision", or you get an active-duty "troika court" dismissing the appeal without even having an opportunity to review it.

And that is happening while a civil rights litigant has a right to FULL appellate review DE NOVO of all legal issues raised in the lower court.

I guess, the 2nd Circuit is afraid of my ability in raising those legal issues that they dismissed the appeal without allowing me to file an Appellant's brief?

By the way, in that same blog where I provided a table of ages of the judges of the 2nd Circuit, I suggested that instead of appointing 2nd Circuit judges for life, people should change this status quo by introducing to elect federal judges.  That would have been a shock to the system of the 2nd Circuit judges who have become too comfortable in their jobs and allow themselves to do whatever their whims tell them, and not what the law requires them to do. 

I am not at all surprised that the retaliation came, and that the retaliation came, "accidentally", the very next day after I did not appear in the fabricated criminal proceeding in my disciplinary action where my disciplinary prosecutor asked the court to put me in jail for 30 days for violating my own privacy.  

I wonder what the 4th Department's ruling on the criminal proceeding will be, as I obviously was not curious enough to appear there and verify it in person.

As to this decision by the 2nd Circuit "troika court" in Neroni v. Peebles (that I published in this blog above), I will certainly publish the entire "non-meritorious" Neroni v Peebles lawsuit, with exhibits and all, on Facebook, by the end of this week.  

When I publish it, the public will be the judge as to whether there are "no arguably meritorious issues" for discussion, or whether the 2nd Circuit and every one of its judges had an institutional interest to hide these issues as far as possible and prevent any review of issues raised in my lawsuit.

It's funny that what I raise in lawsuits is, first, declared as having no merit, and about 2 years down the road, I hear the same ideas from the speech of some high-and-mighty government official as his own novel and progressive ideas.

While such "noble" tricks makes one puke, the point is that I want the public to know what KIND of ideas our glorious federal courts and judges, sworn to protect the U.S. Constitution and citizens of the U.S. of America from violations of that Constitution, consider so lacking in merit that they dismiss an appeal BEFORE THE APPELLANT'S BRIEF WAS FILED, and without even setting the deadline for filing such a brief.

And that is, after the court below also dismissed the case before it was even served.

And that was after the 3rd Department and its Professional Conduct Committee engaged in an ex parte communication and left my disciplinary case when Neroni v. Peebles was filed and when the requests to waive service were sent out to defendants.

Something is fishy in the state of New York.   Read Neroni v. Peebles and find out what exactly is so fishy and so sensitive that two courts refused me access to the courts with those issues.

As to what I am going to do next with Neroni v. Peebles, I will notify the public through this blog when any next steps will be made.

Please, give me until the end of this week to publish Neroni v. Peebles on Facebook.

I will provide a link to the lawsuit here or will make a short new blog notifying of the update.

Stay tuned.

New documents were filed in my disciplinary case showing prosecutorial and referee misconduct and fabrication of transcripts

Yesterday I did not appear in the purported criminal proceeding fabricated against me by Mary Gasparini, attorney representing the Attorney Grievance Committee who was disgruntled that I sued her for fraud and fraud upon the court.

The proceeding was unlawful, but I had a pattern where that same court granted whatever Mary Gasparini wished, no matter how unlawful, and, therefore, had no trust in the integrity of that court or New York State judicial system as a whole.

Moreover, in the event (no matter how impossible under the current law) that the 4th Department would arbitrarily abuse its power, as it always does with me, and would decide to put me in jail for 30 days (as Mary Gasparini asked) for VIOLATING MY OWN PRIVACY and for TALKING ON THIS BLOG ABOUT MY OWN DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS and about PROSECUTORIAL AND JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT in those proceedings, I did not want to run any risk of "accidentally" dying in jail "of natural causes".  

So, naturally, I did not appear personally (nor did I have to, by law), but instead I filed a Memorandum of Law in opposition to the legality of the criminal proceedings.

I also filed today a motion to disaffirm whatever the "referee" could have filed with the disciplinary court without providing to me the court-ordered hearing, and on the basis of two fabricated transcripts and one "Decision" that the referee made, without authority, and without any evidentiary hearings (that he was ordered to conduct).

Both of these documents will be posted today or tomorrow in one of the Facebook groups dealing with court reforms, and links to the group will be provided herein.

Since fabrication of court transcripts is a serious matter of public concern, I will use all available legal remedies to make sure the appropriate authorities learn about such fabrication and take appropriate action.

One thing that people who participate in fabrication of charges against me, fabrication of documents against me, including court records, and opening of safari in courts against me and my husband - I am tenacious.  

I did, am doing and will continue to be doing thorough investigation and research of what is going on and will not relent until people involved in abuse of power and political persecution against me and my husband will be brought to justice by appropriate authorities. 

Stay tuned.

What was the court so afraid of in my disciplinary pleadings, opposition to prosecution's motion for a summary judgment and my cross-motion, that it unlawfully sealed those pleadings?

Judiciary Law 4 provides that all court proceedings are open to the public.  Judiciary Law 90(10) says nothing that attorney disciplinary proceedings, or its records, must be sealed, and multiple precedents provide for an attorney's right to waive her own privacy in such disciplinary proceedings, which I already did multiple times and in writing.

I decided to make public at least the points, if not the arguments and supporting authorities for the arguments in my cross motion that the NYS Appellate Division 4th Judicial Department denied twice, one time on September 30, 2014 without an explanation, and another time, when I brought a motion to vacate, renew and reargue as of right, and asked, as a point of my constitutional due process right to a reasoned court decision, without an explanation, reasoning, and with an anti-filing injunction and with an unlawful sealing order, without a notice to me or opportunity to be heard on those issues.

These are the "secret" issues that the court does not want you to see;

These were the points of my opposition to Petitioner's pending motion for a summary judgment that the court ordered a hearing on (but unlawfully sealed), and which the referee refused to give me that hearing:

1. Point I.  That the Petitioner (disciplinary prosecutors) failed to provide to the court all the pleadings when bringing a motion for a summary judgment, which is a requirement under the law for bringing such a motion.
2. Point II..  That the Petitioner, while not putting in the actual record of the proceedings, attempted to change the petition by adding to it a new charge through a motion for a summary judgment, which was not a lawful move.
3. Point III.  That the Petition fails to state a claim in attorney misconduct, and that Petitioner conceded that Charge IV (failure to pay fines) is moot.
4. Point IV.  That Charge I Specification I (charging me for not practicing law on behalf of "clients" in 2008 when I was not an attorney and was not allowed to practice law) must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and with imposition of sanctions upon the Petitioner and its attorneys. 
5. Point V.  Unavailability of collateral estoppel in regards to Judge Becker's sanctions for frivolous conduct because Judge Becker positioned himself as a victim of my alleged harassment and thus disqualified himself from imposing sanctions as a matter of law, and because of the difference between the rules of frivolous conduct in court proceedings, 22 NYCRR Article 130, and in attorney disciplinary proceedings, 22 NYCRR 1200.
6. Point VI.  That the standard of proof in attorney disciplinary proceedings by preponderance of the evidence violates my right to due process and equal protection of laws, as compared to the rules of private discipline and rules of reinstatement requiring the standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence.
7. Point VII.  That there is new evidence indicating that sanctions imposed upon me by Judge Becker which are the basis of the proceeding are part of unconstitutional abuse of power and retaliation by Judge Becker in violation of my due process and 1st Amendment rights which preclude application of collateral estoppel, and such evidence was not and could not be reviewed by any court before the disciplinary court.
8. Point VIII.  That my right to criticize the judiciary in court proceedings on behalf of myself and my clients is fully protected by the 1st Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and its freedom of speech, freedom of association and petitions clauses, and specifically, that viewpoint and subject matter discrimination, especially discrimination based on viewpoint and subject matter of grave public concern, is unconstitutional.
9. That new developments in the law precluded application of collateral estoppel, such as:
1. De facto overruling by Judge Becker of his own decision that a motion to challenge his legality as a judge was frivolous;
2. De facto overruling by the Appellate Division 3rd Department as to whether my arguments in Shields v. Carbone were frivolous, in a later decided appeal in People v. Carbone, with similar arguments but no sanctions;
3. De facto overruling by Judge Becker of Shields v. Carbone in the later decided by him Martens v. Neroni where he recognized that I was not an attorney at the time of DEC proceedings that he used in Shields v. Carbone as a basis for sanctions against me, in Martens v. Neroni Judge Becker recognized that I was never fined by the DEC Commissioner, contrary to what he said in Shields v. Carbone as a basis for imposition of sanctions against me;
4. A reversal in an administrative proceedings in Orange County in 2012 that affected the basis of Judge Becker's decision on sanctions in Family Court in 2011 and in the proceedings that exposed undisclosed disqualification of Judge Becker in Family Court proceedings;
5. A reversal in another related administrative proceeding that affected the basis of Judge Becker's decision in Family Court;
6. The decision of Judge Becker in Family Court of 2010 that was partially overruled by factual findings in Pennsylvania in September of 2012;
7. The partial partial reversal and remand on appeal in Neroni v. Becker in federal court that undermined the basis of Judge Becker's sanctions;
8. A new precedent on misconduct of judges in New  York providing for taking judges off the bench for exactly the same conduct as Judge Becker engaged in in the proceedings where he sanctioned me;

These are the points of my cross-motion that the court denied without an explanation or reasoning, and the second time, after I asked for a reasoned decision as a matter of due process of law, in my motion to vacate, renew and reargue as of right, with an anti-filing injunction and sealing order:

1. That the Petitioner and its attorneys (at the time I made the cross-motion the Petitioner was the Professional Conduct Committee of the NYS Appellate Division 3rd Department) should be disqualified from proceeding and that the petition should be dismissed for grievous prosecutorial misconduct.
1. Fraudulent Charge I Specification I attempting to discipline me for NOT committing a crime of practicing law without a license in 2008;
2. Fraudulent Charge IV charging me for not paying the sanctions as of January 29, 2013 (the filing date of the Petition) while the sanctions were paid into the court escrow in the summer of 2011;
2. That attorney discipline is selectively enforced in New York and is not enforced at all against politically connected attorneys and attorneys related to judges, with examples:
1. Non-prosecution of the wife of Richard Sise, Chief Judge of the NYS Court of Claims, and acceptance of Ms. Cornelia Cahill into Hiscock & Barclay, her disciplinary prosecutor's firm, as a partner;
2. Non-prosecution of attorneys - New York State Senators - involved in self-interested voting which protects the market of legal services and puts the legal profession into disrepute;
3. Non-prosecution of attorneys employed full-time in public service for using taxpayer-paid time for private practice, examples were:
1. Ellen Coccoma, wife of Chief Administrative Judge of Upstate New York Michael V.Coccoma who, while being a full-time Otsego County Attorney, is involved in private practice during her taxpayer-paid time;
2. Porter Kirkwood (now running for the seat of Delaware County Judge) who, while being a full time Assistant County Attorney in Delaware County, maintained a private law practice and represented clients during taxpayer-paid time and in conflict with his public employment
4. Non-prosecution of attorney Stephen Coffey, former Vice Chair of the NYS Commission for Judicial Conduct, for his threats of criminal prosecution against anybody who would touch "his" bail money, when his law firm was fired before final disposition of a criminal case.  Attorney Coffey or his law firm lost on two appeals, refused to return the money for years despite two court orders, and was never disciplined for that misconduct.  Karen Peters is the Chief Judge of my initial disciplinary court, was on the same Commission for Judicial Conduct with Mr. Coffee, did not disqualify herself while reviewing complaints against her own courts, same as Mr. Coffee did not disqualify himself while reviewing complaints about Judge Becker involving Mr. Coffee's own misconduct.
5. Non-prosecution of Delaware County District Attorney Richard Northrup for trading plea bargains for agreements from criminal defendants not to prosecute Richard Northrup in civil court proceedings.
6. Non-prosecution of attorney and former judge of a justice court Diane Schilling, former counsel for Michael V. Coccoma, who was taken off the bench for attempting to fix another judge's wife's traffic ticket, but was not disciplined as an attorney, was embraced as a partner by a law firm of Anthony Cardona (son of late Judge Cardona, Chief Judge of the NYS Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department, my initial disciplinary court) and of Amanda Kuryluk, niece of the judge of the U.S. District Court, Northern District of New York.  The law firm, after embracing Diane Schilling as a partner, engaged in deceptive advertising of Diane Schilling's virtues, including the fact that she was a judge, while not mentioning that Diane Schilling was taken off the bench for misconduct.
7. Non-prosecution of Chief Assistant District Attorney and son of a judge Michael Getman, as well as his father, a judge, for engaging in a fraudulent scheme in a non-profit;
8. Non-prosecution of attorney (now judge) Carl F. Becker for engaging in conflicted representation (representing Delaware County Social Services and a private client who wanted to adopt a child, and creating a false indicated report, now vacated, against another person in a way absolving the private client);
9. The unwritten policies in all 4 attorney grievance committees in New York not to prosecute prosecutors, as demonstrated by recent publications and investigations in ProPublica.org.
3. That licensing of attorneys by the very same branch of the government whose misconduct attorneys are duty-bound to challenge is a violation of the principle of independence of court representatives and human rights defenders, and is undermining democracy in the United States;
4. I also raised appearance of prosecution against me based on my national origin, as a Russian native and an immigrant attorney.
5. That Judiciary Law 90 is aimed at unconstitutional stifling of criticism by attorneys against judicial misconduct.
6. That conflation in the disciplinary court of legislative, executive and judiciary powers disqualifies the court from presiding over the disciplinary proceedings.
7. That positioning the practice of law as a "privilege" rather than a due process right, is a violation of attorneys' due process of law.
8. That the court's rulemaking demonstrated bias in favor of disciplinary prosecution where the court put in an elevated standard of proof for private discipline, dropped it down to preponderance of the evidence for public discipline (censure, suspension, disbarment), and then raised it once again for purposes of reinstatement of law licenses.
9. That certain specific instances of bias and misconduct of the 3rd Department Court and its judges against me and my husband disqualified the court from presiding over my disciplinary case.
10. That here is a clear potential of retaliation against me by the 3rd Department court because of my continuing inquiry as to appointment of judges and judicial hearing officers into that court.
11. That there is an appearance of impropriety where 22 NYCRR 122 provides a possibility of financial influence over judges of the Appellate Divisions by Michael V. Coccoma whose wife Mr. Neroni was suing at the moment and I was asking the court to sanction for frivolous conduct.  The 3rd Department recused from reviewing this issue in my disciplinary action, but still resolved the issue, in favor of Ellen Coccoma, in another action, Kilmer v. Moseman, in January of 2015.
12. That I ask the court to recuse because I already made the case of my political persecution under the guise of disciplinary prosecution public, through this blog.
13. That Judge Becker is unfit for the bench, based on multiple lawsuits against him (only some of them were mine or my husband's) raising serious issues of misconduct.

Apparently, all of the above issues, issues of serious public concern, were too explosive to be given public access, so the court decided to seal the proceedings, without any basis in law for doing that, and the new Petitioner, the 4th Department's Attorney Grievance Committee, is now trying to put me in jail for publicly addressing these issues of grievous public concern.

But - these issues must be addressed.  And I insist they should be addressed.  And I insist the public should know how these issues are addressed by courts.

When the NYS Attorney General's hats get confused, or why do taxpayers pay money to the Assistant Attorney General Michael Danaher?

I received recently a transcript from a civil proceeding where I raised an issue of constitutionality of a certain court rule.

When a litigant raises the issue of constitutionality of a statute or court rule, the New York State Attorney General must be given notice of that challenge.

I did serve the New York State Attorney General with that challenge.

NYS Attorney General appeared in the action through his Assistant Attorney General Michael Danaher who, according to data collected by seethroughny.net, has a base salary of $123,930.00 per year (not counting benefits) and who has actually received in 2014 (the year when the challenge was heard) $122,401, according to the same source.

Michael Danaher filed an opposition to my motion where he did not even mention the issue of constitutionality, the only reason why the Attorney General was called into that action.

At the oral argument on the motion, Michael Danaher appeared in person (paid for his travel and for his "work" by taxpayers), and presented to the court the following arguments:

Once again, Michael Danaher said that he came to court that day "representing the OCA" (the Office of Court Administration) and "the judiciary" and "to support the integrity of court orders", while he was called into the case for the ONLY reason of supporting or opposing a challenge to constitutionality of a court rule or statute.

Mr. Danaher's office is and has been at the time of the motion hearing, in Binghamton, NY.

The hearing was held on June 19, 2014 at 3 Court Street, Delhi, New York, where the Delaware County Supreme Court is located.

Mapquest.com shows that Michael Danaher had to spend approximately 3 hours roundtrip to come to Delhi, NY to tell the court that he "represents the OCA and the judiciary", has come to "support integrity of court orders" (when the only reason he was brought into the action by notice was a challenge of constitutionality of a court rule), and he came to court without any intention of making any arguments.

So, you, ladies and gentlemen, taxpayers of the State of New York, paid your taxes to fund Mr. Danaher's joy ride over the scenic Catskill mountains in June of 2014, and that included wear and tear on his car, gas, and the high salary that Mr. Danaher paid that day and the previous days when Mr. Danaher put in oppositions to my motion without having a clue as to why he was even called into the case.

Moreover, Michael Danaher made that trip to claim he is there in support of "integrity of judicial orders".

He meant the order by which Judge Becker, after I sued him for misconduct, showered several sanctions upon me, in Neroni v. Harlem included, and in Neroni v. Harlem the sanctions were imposed by a judge who was a witness and a co-conspirator in a case (the case asserted a conspiracy with a judge behind Mr. Neroni's back, during proceedings where Mr. Neroni was not a party, to influence the Mokay v. Mokay proceedings due to which Mr. Neroni was prematurely disbarred in 2011 while the case is ongoing to this day).

It was an order by the judge who already granted to Richard Harlem's client the Estate legal fees from the Mokay litigation claimed as damages in the Mokay action, behind Mr. Neroni's back, so Judge Becker was not supposed to be anywhere near the case involving his own misconduct as a participant in that conspiracy to commit fraud.

Moreover, in that case Judge Becker punished me for - guess - quoting contents of public pleadings of Michael Danaher's colleague from the same office, Mary Walsh, another Assistant Attorney General from the Binghamton office.

The pleadigns referred to the fact that Richard Harlem's and his father Robert Harlem's attempts to commit fraud upon the court are nowhere to be an accident or mistake, but that there is a pattern of similar conduct, as evidenced by Michael Danaher's colleague's investigation of this father-son pair of attorneys in the Blanding case, see the actual open-court pleadings of Michael Danaher's colleague Mary Walsh for quoting which I was sanctioned by Judge Becker as "invading privacy" and "harassing" Robert Harlem and Richard Harlem.

So - the "integrity of the court orders" that Michael Danaher appeared to support (even though he was called into the case for a completely different reason) was to make sure that nobody overturns a retaliatory and unconstitutional order of Judge Becker, a witness in the proceeding over which he was presiding and who sanctioned me for absolutely legal conduct, quoting public records as proof that actions of defendants charged in Neroni v. Harlem (fraud and fraud upon the court) were not an accident or mistake, but happened prior.

If that is how Mr. Danaher and other public servants in the State of New York do their jobs, there is no wonder why New York is in a permanent budgetary crisis.

People of the State of New York need to cut the waste of public funds. 

Start that cut with cutting useless workers like Michael Danaher.

Jailhouse lawyers and the hypocrisy of attorney licensing as a consumer protection technique

The State of New York punishes practice of law by individuals who are not licensed attorneys as a felony since 2013 and has been punishing it as a misdemeanor for years prior.

Licensing of attorneys is declared to be done by the government for protection of the public.

Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court, as far back as in 1969, and that is 46 years ago, has struck down state regulation punishing a person for providing legal assistance to other prisoners.

The Supreme Court has stated in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) the following:

The above U.S. Supreme Court case should be read broadly to ensure the intended effect of the 1st, 5th and 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, to ensure constitutionally guaranteed true access to court for poor and poorly educated litigants vindicating their constitutional rights.

When read broadly, we have a U.S. Supreme Court case, a mandatory precedent for the states, that provides that in the absence of "some provision" by the states for a "reasonable alternative" to assist "illiterate or poorly educated" individuals to prepare legal documents pertaining to their fundamental constitutional rights, the state may not validly enforce a regulation which absolutely bars provision of legal services to such indigent litigants by non-attorneys.

Yet, we have not only inmates who continue to struggle, without legal representation, and without funds to pay to prepare legal documents for post-conviction relief, but we also have criminal defendants who, according to the State of the Judiciary 2015 address in New York, are habitually denied counsel at arraignment, or provided substandard representation by public defenders carrying unmanageable case loads.

We also have people being evicted, losing custody of their children, being foreclosed on their homes, being sued for consumer debt, and having no access to a lawyer because these litigants are poor.

The only thing that bars such litigants from representation in court by a knowledgeable, but unlicensed representative, for free or for a reduced cost, is criminal statutes for unauthorized practice of law, statutes that should be held unconstitutional where the state does not provide a "reasonable alternative" to a private attorney to assist the illiterate, poorly educated and poor litigants in their needs.

The State of New York does not have such a reasonable alternative.

Therefore, attorney licensing in New York, declared to be in place to protect the consumers, does not protect the consumers, is in fact hurting the consumers, is unconstitutional as blocking poor litigants' access to courts and preventing them to have trusted and knowledgeable, if not licensed, court representatives of their own choice.  

Such attorney licensing system clearly exist only as an anti-competitive measure to protect the market and high prices that the majority of the public cannot afford, for politically connected attorneys.  

And, therefore, attorney licensing should be abolished as not providing the declared benefit to the consumers and  hurting the consumers.