THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.


Monday, February 9, 2015

Nancy Deming, a member of the Independent Judicial Election Qualifications Commission - what a briliant idea!


I checked out today the composition of the "Independent Judicial Election Qualification Commissions" for the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department.

I will put my thoughts about the entire composition and the whole idea of this "Independent" Commission into another blog, but one name deserves special attention.

Attorney Nancy Deming of Delhi, New York, as a member of "Independent Judicial Election Qualification Commissions".  As independent as independent can get.  Especially from what I know of her, and especially under the circumstances.

Nancy Deming was on the School Board of the Delaware County School District when her son was in that school, and left the Board when her son graduated, begging the question - did she hold her position to secure leniency or favors for her son?

Now she is on the "Independent Judicial Election Qualification Commissions", while continuing to practice in front of the very same courts for which she is "independently" picking judges, and she will practice in front of the newly elected County Judge (who is also a Family Court judge, a Surrogate's Court Judge and, most likely, will be appointed, like Becker was, as an Acting Delaware County Supreme Court Justice), which she will have helped elect by providing "qualifications" for such an election.

"Coincidentally", Nancy Deming of Delhi, NY is on the Committee at the time when Delaware County was granted a second position of a County Judge, when the current County judge Carl F. Becker is to retire without serving out his full term because he turns 70 4 years before his 10-year term runs out, so there are actually two judicial elections to "independently" pick judges for.

Not to mention that Nancy Deming's husband, also an attorney, James Hartmann, agreed to a dirty job of being a trial lawyer in a politically tainted case against my husband Frederick J. Neroni, whom Judge Becker hates with a passion, while I received information from a reliable source that the candidate about to run for the second seat of a County Judge is Porter Kirkwood, the current Delaware County Attorney, Judge Becker's pet, who I personally know for his incompetence, and lack of integrity, more on that in a separate blog.

For Nancy Deming to select an "eligible" judicial candidate under the circumstances is to secure a ticket to favorable decisions in front of two judges -

  • Judge Becker who is also a Family Court judge and an Acting Supreme Court justice in this county, and Nancy Deming is practicing in front of Judge Becker in all of these courts; and
  • if elected, the (dis)honorable Porter Kirkwood.
By the way, if Porter Kirkwood is elected, it will become a hereditary right of attorneys representing (for decades) the Delaware County Department of Social services to preside over child neglect cases brought their own clients in Delaware County Family Court and while assessing credibility of their own clients based on extrajudicial evidence.  Also, bear in mind that Porter Kirkwood, same as Judge Becker, possible has insider information from Social Services about every resident of Delaware County, so when Judge Becker decides cases today, he may be delving into his knowledge of information that a neutral judge would have no access to - and I do know that he did it in several cases without disclosure of his involvement through Social Services before election in 2002, and he fails to disclose such involvement, while records that he consults or knows about are private and you will never be able to access them to help you on a motion to recuse.

Remember, the Social Services have two types of files - hard copies and electronic files.

While Social Services declare an "open file policy" for people who have been charged with child neglect or administratively prosecuted on "indicated reports", first, they lie about giving you full access to the file, and I know that Porter Kirkwood personally lied to me that there is no file for a person for whom I found out later there was a file, and a file implicating Judge Becker in misconduct.

Also, there are electronic files maintained by Social Services that neither you nor your attorney will ever be allowed to see, and both Becker and Kirkwood had or have at this time access to such records.

Judge Becker presided over cases of his client the Delaware County Department of Social Services since 2002, after representing that Department for 27 years.

Porter Kirkwood, if elected, will continue this dishonorable tradition.  He has been with the Department also for more than a decade.

Imagine - to assess credibility of your own decades-long clients!  What a present for the Social Services.  What a slap in the face of Delaware County residents.

Delaware County voters!

If I were you, I would turn out at the voting site in droves, not to allow Porter Kirkwood to grab the judicial position.

As to Nancy Deming - my residual respect to this attorney just sunk below zero when I saw her on that list, at this time, and under the circumstances.

A member of an "Independent Judicial Selection Commmission", no less.





Sunday, February 8, 2015

Just published an update with documents and detailed analysis about Mary Gasparini urging the Referee to file false documents with the court


You can read the updated blog here.

Attorneys and judges in New York: until you are caught, snort (cocaine)


This is the so-called "diversion rule" of the NYS Supreme Court Appellate Division 4th Judicial Department.  It says:

"When an attorney who is the subject of a disciplinary investigation or proceeding raises in defense of the charges or as a mitigating factor alcohol or substance abuse, or, upon the recommendation of counsel to the Attorney Grievance Committee, the Court may stay the matter under investigation or the proceeding and direct that the attorney complete a monitoring program sponsored by an approved lawyers’ assistance program (22 NYCRR 1022.20 [d] [3] [a]).

Upon proof of successful completion of a Court-ordered monitoring program, the Court may dismiss the charges. In the event of failure to successfully complete such a program or the commission of additional misconduct during the pendency of the proceeding, the Court may rescind the order diverting the attorney to a monitoring program and reinstate the charges or matter under investigation (see 22 NYCRR 1022.20 [d] [3] [b])."


Now, when did a statement of, let's say, a criminal that he committed a crime because he was drunk or high prevented courts from finding him guilty?

Good luck trying to prove to the court that, since your client was drunk or high, it somehow negated his guilty state of mind.

It will, most  likely, be considered as an aggravating circumstance, not as a mitigating circumstance.

Not so with attorneys.

As soon as you say - in your defense, no less, or "in mitigation" of allegations of already adjudicated misconduct - that you committed attorney misconduct because you were drunk or high on illegal drugs, you get a chance to have the charges dismissed after you complete a "court-ordered monitoring program".

And remember - proceedings where you admitted that you were drunk or high, but which are dismissed because of the court-ordered monitoring program, never become public, so your clients will never know that you actually were drunk or high when handling their cases.

Is not that great?

Yet, I know of one court case where the NYS Supreme Court Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department actually found, in a custody proceeding, that the father should lose custody because he used illegal drugs - cocaine.

Please, note that the Appellate Division 3rd Department which, similarly to the 4th Department, has a "rule of diversion" for attorneys who are drunk or high when handling their client's cases, considered that same factor against a father in a custody proceedings.

But the kicker in this case is that - guess what? - the father, David Rikard, who lost custody of his child  in this custody case because of the use of cocaine WAS AND STILL IS AN ATTORNEY!!!

So - do his clients know about his cocaine use?  Did he stop the cocaine use?  Does he still continue it while representing his clients?




Look at David Rikard's arguments to the court when he tested positive for cocaine in a court-ordered drug test:

"The father, on the other hand, never directly disputed his use of cocaine, but argued that he had not used drugs in the presence of the child."

So, David Rikard did not use cocaine in 2009-2011 in the presence of his child, but did he use cocaine while preparing for his court cases?  Do his clients whom he represent at that time know about Mr. Rikard's use of cocaine.

Time and again substance abuse is called a growing problem in the legal profession, see here.


New York State Lawyer Assistance Trust published a study about substance abuse recently which starts with the phrase "Lawyers work high stress jobs in a high stress world".

Tell me, whose jobs nowadays is not stressful?

But why only for attorneys being working for their clients under the influence of illegal drugs is a mitigating, not an aggravating factor?

Why it is an aggravating factor in a child neglect proceeding? Custody proceeding - see, again, Rikard v. Matson? Criminal proceeding - where the use of drugs and alcohol is a conscious choice and does not negate the state of mind (and good luck making that argument to the court)?

Of course, Attorney Rikard is untouchable by attorney discipline for a simple reason that he is a buddy of the former Vice-Chair of the NYS Commission for Judicial Conduct Stephen R. Coffey, who was still in office at the time Rikard v. Matson was decided on January 13, 2011.  




That is likely why the Appellate Division could, but did not refer David Rikard to be investigated and prosecuted for potential attorney misconduct.  

Who would dare touch Mr. Rikard?  What if Stephen Coffey would then investigate and prosecute the offending judges for hurting his buddy?  

So - nobody dared to investigate or discipline him for his potential drug use when representing his clients.

You know how this little "diversion program" in all 4 Departments came to be?



Somehow the good judge Kaye's concerns resulted somehow in application of "diversionary" rules to attorney discipline proceedings, which are allegedly commenced for protection of the public, of clients, not of attorneys.

And yet, the public may not even be allowed to know that a certain attorney HAD a drug problem when he did something that hurt his clients.  Rehabilitation through undergoing a secret monitoring program under the secret monitoring of a secret court does not do the clients whose cases the attorney did while drunk or high any good, will it?

Once again - why for lawyers being committing misconduct while being high on illegal drugs is a mitigating factor while for everybody else the same behavior is an aggravating factor?

Because some politically connected lawyers and - God forbid - judges - may be "using" and conveniently created rules protecting themselves, under the guise of protecting the public?

Because, "to be part of the club", "to belong", you need to drink together?  Use together?

Why the fact that substance abuse is rampant in the legal profession must be used to protect not the clients from such attorneys, but attorneys from discipline for misconduct toward those clients?

So, as far as my case is concerned - I have no excuse.

When I was making motions to recuse a biased judge, I was not drunk or high.

What a pity.  That could have been a "mitigating factor" or a "defense". 

And the scariest part for the public is what the NYS Lawyers' Assistance Trust stated in yet another of its studies: 


What is scary is that not just statistics of attorneys seeking help is not available, but also nobody knows numbers of attorneys NOT seeking help and being drunk and high on illegal drugs while representing clients.

Do we need to now new rules mandating random "pee-in-a-cup" test for attorneys as a pre-requisite of practicing law?  Because otherwise you will never know if your attorney is drunk or high while representing you.

And guess what - attorney David Rikard is now - yahoo! - Judge David Rikard in the Prattsville Town Court, New York.

So, the question is, is he snorting on the bench, or off the bench when he is reading your pleadings?   

A request to the court to allow a party to make a motion to challenge the court's jurisdiction and misconduct... All those developments of the "law", all for me? I am flattered...


Due to an anti-filing injunction imposed upon me by the NYS Appellate Division 4th Judicial Department (my disciplinary court) without statement of grounds, notice, opportunity to be heard on that issue or a hearing (all requirements of the law), I now have to ask the court's permission to make the following motions that are usually done at any time the need arises and "as of right", as of constitutional federal due process right which should pre-empt any inconsistent state law:

(1) I am asking the court to allow me to make a motion to vacate is orders and dismiss the proceedings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to several charges affected by a recent change in case law;  apparently, if the court does not have jurisdiction over the case, it cannot give or not give me permissions to challenge that jurisdiction, it is legal nonsense - but that's what I am required to do, under the threat of contempt of court, so that's what I am doing;

(2) I am asking the court to allow me to make a motion to recuse and disqualify the court, for the court's own misconduct;

(3) I am asking the court to allow me to make a motion to disqualify the prosecutor and to sanction her for frivolous conduct (since it is a civil proceedings and rules of frivolous conduct must apply to the civil prosecutor, as a point of equal protection of law).

We will see if the court will graciously allow me to make motions that federal law does not allow state courts to NOT allow, under the federal pre-emption doctrine.

Stay tuned.

Saturday, February 7, 2015

Since there is no way to keep attorney licensing and discipline to even appear lawful and not stupid and insane, like it is in my case, shouldn't we simply abolish attorney licensing?


If I bring an Article 78 writ of mandamus and prohibition against a Referee, CPLR 7804(i) presupposes representation of the court-appointed Referee by the New York State Attorney General, obviously, at public expense, even if the Referee is sued for usurping an elected public office.  As I said before in this blog, New York does not have an effective legal remedy to enjoin unauthorized actions of appellate courts and their court-appointed referees or judicial hearing officers because the only venue where one can sue those courts is in those same courts.

  (i)  Appearance  by  judicial  officer.  Notwithstanding   any   other
  provision  of  law,  where  a  proceeding  is brought under this article
  against a justice, judge, referee or judicial hearing officer  appointed
  by  a  court  and  (1)  it  is brought by a party to a pending action or
  proceeding, and (2) it is based upon an act or  acts  performed  by  the
  respondent  in  that  pending  action  or  proceeding either granting or
  denying relief sought by a party thereto, and (3) the respondent is  not
  a  named  party  to  the  pending  action  or proceeding, in addition to
  service on the respondent, the petitioner shall  serve  a  copy  of  the
  petition  together  with  copies  of  all  moving  papers upon all other
  parties to the pending action or proceeding. All such parties  shall  be
  designated  as respondents. Unless ordered by the court upon application
  of a party the respondent justice, judge, referee  or  judicial  hearing
  officer  need not appear in the proceeding in which case the allegations
  of the petition shall not be deemed admitted or denied  by  him.    Upon
  election  of the justice, judge, referee or judicial hearing officer not
  to appear, any ruling, order or judgment of the court in such proceeding
  shall bind said respondent. If such  respondent  does  appear  he  shall
  respond  to  the petition and shall be entitled to be represented by the
  attorney general. If such respondent does not elect to appear all  other
  parties shall be given notice thereof.
 


CPLR 506(1)(b) provides that any justice of the Supreme 
Court can only be sued under Article 78 for a writ of 
prohibition in the Appellate Division of the Judicial District 
where the judge or justice serves.
 
    1. a proceeding against a justice of the supreme court or a judge of a
  county  court or the court of general sessions shall be commenced in the
  appellate division in the judicial department where the action,  in  the
  course  of  which  the  matter  sought  to  be  enforced  or  restrained
  originated, is triable, unless a term of the appellate division in  that
  department  is  not  in  session,  in  which  case the proceeding may be
  commenced in the appellate division in an adjoining judicial department;
  and
 
Therefore, the only way to sue an appellate judge and an appellate court
is in that same court - which is counter-productive, if not outright stupid,
or both, for obvious reasons.
 
What remains when the New York State Attorney General wears these hats:
 
(1) the one of an elected public official and my representative
who is duty-bound to protect me from fraudulent actions and deceptive
tactics of the government;
 
(2) the attorney for the State of New York and for each and every
one of its subdivisions, which representation includes my
disciplinary prosecutor and my disciplinary court (in the literal
sense - an appeal from the remand is still pending
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, with the
NYS Attorney General representing the disciplinary
court and the disciplinary prosecutors);
 
(3) an New York State officer with an exclusive authority to
bring a writ of quo warranto (ousting) proceedings 
pursuant to Executive Law 63-B
to oust Stephen R. Sirkin for usurping the power to act as if
he was elected as a Supreme Court Justice and appointed
by the NYS Governor to serve as a justice of the Appellate Division
before Sirkin retired (which never happened), because otherwise
Sirkin cannot be authorized in any way, shape or form to
decide motions in attorney disciplinary proceedings (which he
nevertheless did in my proceeding);
 
(4) an attorney designated by statute to represent Sirkin if I bring 
an Article 78 writ of prohibition against him to stop/enjoin him
from acting in usurpation of powers of duly elected and duly 
appointed by the Governor appellate justices, CPLR 7804(i).
 
So, NYS Attorney General represents everybody in town,
individuals and entities with diametrically opposite and 
irreconcilably conflicting interests, and acts as a prosecutor,
a witness, a counsel and a protector to the same people
in various related proceedings.  Apparently,
all of these actions of the NYS Attorney General,
including representation, at public expense, of individuals
sued for exceeding their authority, acting without authority,
or acting in malicious and corrupt manner, and representing
at the same time clients with irreconcilable conflicts of interest
is apparently "authorized by statute" in New  York.
 
The same behavior, at the same time, is prohibited to
all attorneys by New  York Rules of Professional Conduct,
begging, once again, the question. 
 
If NYS Attorney General, wielding tremendous
power in the State of New York and who can wreak
real havoc in people's lives with this power, is not amenable
to attorney discipline because he is "designated by statute"
to de facto violate Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys, 
why do those Rules and attorney licensing and
discipline based on alleged violations of those Rules 
even exist? 
 
Simply as a means of social control and quashing competition
by powerful and politically connected law firms?
 
Attorney disciplinary against me proceedings are handled, 
allegedly, in order to protect the public from me, but the public is not allowed to see how it is being protected from me, and I am being criminally charged for allegedly attempting to tell the public about how it is being "protected" from me.  

And this secret "protection of the public" without
public participation is getting stupider and stupider
by the day.

Isn't THAT proof that attorney licensing should be abolished?





 
 

What happens to people who file false criminal charges in retaliation for civil lawsuits filed against them? Depends who files such false criminal charges?


Mary Gasparini attempted to charge me criminally for violating allegedly three "mandates" of the court:

(1) an order of December 17, 2014 that "sealed" my disciplinary proceeding pursuant to Judiciary Law 90(10) which protects, according to the case decided by the same court in 2009, either the complainant in such a proceeding (and in my proceeding there was no complainant) or the attorney who is subject of the disciplinary proceeding (and I expressly waived my privacy and confidentiality in these proceedings); I already wrote that Mary Gasparini (the disciplinary prosecutor) is uniquely trying to put me in jail in punishment for violating my own privacy - an outrageously stupid and incompetent move, but I did not see anything but stupid and incompetent moves from Mary Gasparini in these proceedings;  such a "mandate" may not be legal, as explained here, and a criminal contempt of court for this mandate does not lie;  see also the list of papers that the court has "sealed" under this order which shows just how laughable a "sealing" order under Judiciary Law 90(10) is;

(2) this letter by the court clerk dated December 31, 2014 and written when the court was not in session, explaining to me that I need to provide to the court a "good cause" to waive my own privacy in my own disciplinary proceedings; a letter of a clerk is not a mandate of the court for purposes of criminal contempt of court proceedings, and criminal charges for violating the "mandate" of a "letter" of a court clerk may not be used, in my legal opinion  after diligent research, to start a criminal proceeding against a person;



(3) this letter by the court clerk dated January 9, 2015, see my blog post here.  The court pretended to have sent it to me to my unplugged fax machine on January 7, 2015.  The prosecutor Mary Gasparini had delivered to me personally on January 12, 2015, acting as an agent of the court and further disqualifying herself. 




The letter was written when the court, and written to me similarly when the court was not in session, invites me to make a motion to disqualify the referee.


Neither of the letters may be considered as a "lawful mandate of the court" for purposes of a criminal contempt proceeding.

And I remind my readers that Mary Gasparini has filed the false criminal charges against me after and appears like in retaliation, because I sued her on December 10, 2014 for fraud upon the court and blogged about the filing of the lawsuit the same day.

But - since a disciplinary prosecutor is bringing this crap, excuse my French, she will probably be allowed to proceed, and even win.  She has never lost before, no matter how frivolous, fraudulent, stupid and outright insane her claims were.

We will see what happens.  Stay tuned.


Friday, February 6, 2015

Beware of the court reporter Debra Garrison. She falsified my court transcript and can falsify yours, too.


Here is the front and the last pages of a transcript of the pre-scheduling conference in my disciplinary proceeding that was held on January 12, 2015, as well as the "Exhibits" page.

The front page of the transcript shows that court reporter Debra Garrison took the record and calls it mysteriously "proceeding of Tatiana Neroni" instead of a "pre-trial scheduling conference".



The "Exhibits" page shows a "witness" and "witness's" "statements" - instead of a "Direct Examination" and "Cross-Examination", the usual designation of a witness's testimony at hearings.





The next page of the transcript shows that it is allegedly an EBT, that I allegedly made waivers and stipulations in that EBT, was called to testify, was sworn in and testified.



Of course, there was no EBT, no stipulations or waivers, no calling of witnesses, no swearing in of witnesses and no testimony - nor could there be because the Referee made a Decision on liability against me 22 days before that alleged "hearing" (or, in reality, what was noticed as a pre-trial scheduling conference of January 12, 2015):


In the middle of the transcript I tell the Referee that I am aware that the previous stenographer incorrectly claimed that the previous scheduling conference was "a hearing" and that I made stipulations and waivers, and indicate that I make no stipulations and waivers on January 12, 2015.

The Referee confirms - "no waivers".



After hearing that, stenographer Debra Garrison still prepares a transcript where she puts at the top of it that there were waivers, stipulation and that it was a hearing.




Moreover, knowing full well that 


  • I was never called as a witness, that
  • Debra Garrison has never sworn me in and that 
  • I have never testified on January 12, 2015 (nor could I, because the appearance was noticed and scheduled as a pre-trial conference and because the Referee announced his "Decision" up front and later stated that the only further proceedings will be "in mitigation", and that was not yet scheduled)
Debra Garrison provided at the end of the transcript a false certification that I was properly sworn in and testified:






Of course, I will contest this clear falsification under oath.

But I am publishing this post for the public to beware of this "professional" court reporter.

She can falsified your court transcripts, ladies and gentlemen, the same way as she falsified mine.