THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.


Monday, January 5, 2015

The Mr. Sunshine who blocked sunshine to the illiterates of Florida - for president?


The "Time" magazine has recently run an article on Jeb Bush, son and brother of two presidents who may run for president in 2016, calling him "Mr. Sunshine".


"TIME" wrote about "Mr. Sunshine's" family (father and brothers are former presidents), political views, aspirations for a possible presidential campaign, nothing singular.

Yet, to me, to call this man "Mr. Sunshine" sounded like an insult.

"Mr. Sunshine" caught my attention recently because he, as the Governor of the State of Florida, signed into law the controversial "5-strikes" statute allowing to impose anti-filing injunctions upon pro se litigants if they lose in court 5 times in a 5-year period.


To me, as a long-time researcher of the subject of access to justice and discrimination against pro se litigants, anti-filing injunctions are unconstitutional as prior speech restraints, as unconstitutional violations of people's right of access to court and as a discrimination against pro se litigants.

Anti-filing injunctions against pro se litigants are especially egregious at a time when, according to statistics, 80% of litigants or more cannot afford legal representation, when the language of the law is extremely complicated to the point that even trained lawyers and judges differ, sometimes drastically, on their interpretation of the same law.

In my experience as an attorney, judges treat pro se litigants with extreme disdain.  Pro se litigants regularly are not invited to court conferences where attorneys of represented parties are invited, are regularly talked down by judges.  Often, the only thing the judge wants to tell a pro se litigant is "go hire an attorney", even if the pro se litigant cannot afford to do that.

With the level of competency, or rather, incompetency of judges that I encounter in my daily practice as an attorney, combined with the attitude of judges toward pro se litigants, I will not be at all surprised if all cases of pro se litigants are marked for dismissal, whether they are good or not, under the "move up or move on" judicial principle, "move up" meaning "appeal" and "move on" meaning "give up".

If a pro se party cannot afford a lawyer to represent him or her in a trial court, most likely he or she will not be able to afford an even more costly and cumbersome appeal - and will not be able to navigate the maze of appellate rules on his/her own.

When that happens, and the deadlines to appeal are past, then the dismissing decision ("adverse decision") in the meaning of the "vexatious litigant" statute becomes final, and the pro se litigant has "waived" his/her right to an appeal.  Of course, how can you "waive" anything when you simply cannot pay for fighting in court, below or on appeal, but that's what it is.

The statute is not concerned with whether the adverse decision against a pro se litigant is correct or incorrect, constitutional or unconstitutional, done with violation of judicial ethics/undisclosed conflicts of interest or not.  Finality trumps fairness every time, and the count of the "5 strikes" is purely technical.

5 adverse decisions against you as a pro se litigant in 5 years - and your right to access to court is even more doomed than before.  "Before" you "just" could not afford an attorney and experienced disdain of judges, "after" you cannot even access the courts and file a grievance with the government (under a fundamental federal constitutional right protected by the Petitions Clause of the 1st Amendment) without permission of an administrative court judge.

Here also comes the possibility of being charged with "contempt of court" if you file a lawsuit without permission, even for an egregious constitutional violation.

The "5 strikes" statute also provide for a "security bond" that a "vexatious" litigant may be required to post in order to gain a right to file a lawsuit at all, including lawsuits involving constitutional issues.

So, let's follow the logic of the statute - the moneyed litigants whose moneyed attorneys are literate (presumably) enough to word lawsuits in such a way that they pass the "meritorious lawsuit" muster with literate (presumably) judges do not need to post security bonds.  It is the illiterate and the poor who cannot afford attorneys in the first place who must pay security to be able to have access to court.

Not only the "5 strikes law" is targeting the percentage of the population who cannot afford an attorney to begin with, which is 20% on average in every state.  Illiterate people are affected by this law even harder than poor, but literate people.

Illiterates can fall victim of the law simply because they do not understand the complicated language of the law and cannot express themselves correctly, while judges, in their disdain to pro se litigants and with their busy caseloads, do not care to give pro se litigants the benefit of the doubt.

To the illiterates, the "5 strikes law" simply prohibits them any hope of access to court, ever.


I understand that for Mr. Sunshine interests of the poor and of the illiterate are too mundane to consider, even if they are his own constituents.

At this time, many if not most states do have vexatious litigant statutes, and such statutes predominantly target pro se litigants.

With that in mind, I pulled some official numbers on illiteracy across the United States and then put those numbers into a table.  For each state, I took three numbers from official sources (National Literacy Survey of 2003, the latest available): 


  1. Average illiteracy rate for the state;
  2. Lowest illiteracy rate and name of county with the lowest illiteracy rate;
  3. Highest illiteracy rate and name of county with the highest illiteracy rate.
I then measured the range between counties with the lowest and the highest illiteracy rates per state.

You know where Mr. Sunshine's state ended up?  

It made the 2nd place among states with highest illiteracy rates.

In Miami-Dade County the level of illiteracy - percent of people lacking "basic literacy skills" was in 2003 52%!!!

Florida ceded the laurels of the biggest loser only to Texas (Mr. Sunshine's brother's state), where there are 65% of illiterate people in Starr County.

The interesting fact about both Florida and Texas is that there are counties in both of these states with illiteracy levels of just 7%, a difference of 58% for Texas and 45% for Florida.

Think about it! More than half of population of one county is illiterate in Florida (2/3s in Texas), where the Bush brothers make their homes.

And in both "Bush" states (and in New York, by the way, from where yet another presidential contender, Mr. Cuomo, hales) the average percent of illiterates in the populations is about the same as the percent of people who cannot afford an attorney.

So, to eliminate those pesky pro se illiterates from court proceedings completely appear to be the unspoken purpose of the "5 strikes" statutes signed into law by Mr. Sunshine.

For the legislators in Florida who undoubtedly belong to the literate part of population, to introduce and for "Mr. Sunshine" to sign into law a statute that bars access to court of the poor and the illiterate is not only unconstitutional - it is simply disgusting, completely and utterly disgusting.

Mr. Sunshine blocked from access to court the most underprivileged of his constituents - the illiterate people.

One can only guess what kind of laws he can sign into law on a bigger - presidential scale.

Good job, Mr. Sunshine, you will make a great president!





Name of state
Average % of illiteracy
Lowest % of illiteracy
Highest % of illiteracy
Range
The "most literate county"
The "most illiterate county"

Texas
19
7
65
58
Randall County, Roberts County
Starr County
Florida
20
7
52
45
St. Johns County
Miami-Dade
New York
22
7
46
39
Ontario County
Queens County
Arizona
13
9
45
36
Coconino County
Santa Cruz County
New Jersey
17
6
37
31
Sussex County
Hudson County
Idaho
11
7
37
30
Ada County
Clark County
Georgia
17
8
36
28
Fayette County, Forsyth County
Atkinson County
New Mexico
16
5
33
28
Los Alamos County
Luna County
Washington
10
6
34
28
Island County, San Juan County
Franklin County
Alabama
15
7
34
27
Shelby
Bullock
California
23
7
34
27
El Dorado County
Colusa County
Kansas
8
5
32
27
Thomas County
Seward County
Louisiana
16
8
29
21
St. Tammany Parish
East Carroll Parish
Massachusetts
10
4
25
21
Barnstable County
Suffolk County
Mississippi
16
9
30
21
Lamar County
Jefferson County
Alaska
9
7
27
20
Juneau Borough, Sitka Borough
Aleutians East Borough
Colorado
10
5
25
20
Clear Creek County
Costilla County
North Carolina
14
8
28
20
Dare County
Halifax County
Virginia
12
6
26
20
Poquoson city, York County
Greensville County
South Carolina
15
10
29
19
Lexington County
Allendale County
Tennessee
13
6
25
19
Williamson County
Henderson County
Arkansas
14
9
26
17
Saline County
Lee County
Maryland
11
6
22
16
Anne Arundel County
Prince George's County
Nebraska
7
5
21
16
Banner County
Colfax County
Oklahoma
12
8
24
16
Cleveland County, Garfield County, Rogers County
Texas County
North Dakota
6
5
20
15
Burleigh County, Cass County
Emmons County, McIntosh County
Pennsylvania
13
7
22
15
Chester County
Philadelphia County
Kentucky
12
7
21
14
Fayette County
Clay County
Oregon
10
7
20
13
Benton County, Clackamas County
Morrow County
Missouri
7
4
16
12
Platte County
Pemiscot County
West Virginia
13
10
22
12
Jefferson County, Putnam County
McDowell County
Illinois
13
5
15
10
Monroe County
Alexander County
Nevada
16
8
18
10
Douglas County
Clark County
Ohio
9
4
13
9
Delaware County
Adams County, Franklin County, Holmes County, Vinton County
South Dakota
7
5
14
9
Hughes County
Buffalo County
Hawaii
16
12
20
8
Kauai County
Kalawao County
Indiana
8
5
13
8
Hamilton County, Hancock County
Elkhart County
Iowa
7
5
13
8
Johnson County
Buena Vista County
Michigan
8
4
12
8
Livingston County
Wayne County
Minnesota
6
4
12
8
Carver County
Watonwan County
Wisconsin
7
4
11
7
Ozaukee County, Waukesha County
Menominee County
Rhode Island
8
5
11
6
Bristol County, Newport County, Washington County
Providence County
Vermont
7
5
11
6
Chittenden County
Essex County
Connecticut
9
5
10
5
Middlesex County
Fairfield County
Montana
9
7
12
5
Lewis and Clark County
Big Horn County, Golden Valley County, Lincoln County, Mineral County, Sanders County, Wibaux County
Utah
9
7
12
5
Davis County, Morgan County, Summit County
Beaver County, Duchesne County, San Juan County
Maine
7
6
10
4
Cumberland County
Aroostook County, Somerset County, Washington County
New Hampshire
6
5
9
4
Rockingham County
Coos County
Wyoming
9
7
11
4
Teton County
Big Horn County, Carbon County, Platte County
Delaware
11
10
13
3
New Castle County
Kent County
District of Columbia
19
19
19
0

A second complaint has been filed against Judge Mary Work of Ulster County Surrogate's Court, for retaliation and harassment after the 1st complaint filed September 4, 2014


On December 30, 2014 I withdrew from two court cases in Ulster County where Judge Mary Work was and still is the presiding judge.

I did it on consent of my former client, by filing and serving notarized consents to change counsel in accordance with New York CPLR 321(b), as required by law.

No permission of the court is necessary when an attorney withdraws on consent of the client.  By operation of law I am no longer the attorney of record in those two cases from the moment my consents were filed with the court.  

Yet, today I received a phone call from Judge Work's clerk's office where Judge Work's employee, after acknowledging that I did file notarized consent to change attorney with Jduge Work's court, still claimed that Judge Work "did not relieve me" from the case, that there will be a conference about it,  that I need to accept a fax from the court about it or have the case read to me.

I indicated to Judge Work's employee that I am no longer attorney of record by operation of law, no matter what Judge Work says, pursuant to CPLR 321(b), and that I cannot appear in any further proceedings, as my client has relieved me.

Judge Work's employee continued to claim that Judge Work still issued some directives to me in a letter, which I, once again, refused to accept by fax or by having it read to me.

Judge Work must know the law, she is not a novice on the bench.  

She must know that a consent to change counsel filed with the court ends representation of an attorney, and the court has no power to bring a private attorney back in.  I was not assigned, I was retained, I was relieved, and that's the end of it.

My point is - why is Judge Work so desperate to have me, and not another attorney, or not my former client pro se, in this case, even after I left the case?

Combined with what Judge Work's said in the joint order of November 17, 2014 covering two proceedings which could not be merged or disclosed to one another's parties, I truly believe that Judge Work is retaliating against me and against my now former client for making the motions to recuse and especially for complaining against her to the Commission for Judicial Conduct.  

Since this appears to become a pattern in New York where New York judges engage in a course of retaliation if a motion to recuse is filed, no matter how well founded and supported the motion is, I felt it my obligation to file a 2nd complaint with the New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct about misconduct of Judge Work and requested to protect my now former client from Judge Work's retaliation.

By the way, this is not the first time when Judge Work manipulated with consents to change counsel specifically with me and this particular client.

In yet another court (the third court) Judge Work issued a decision ignoring my pleadings and claiming that I did not file a consent to change counsel to come into the case, while not only I filed and served such a consent, but I saw it in judge Work's Family Court's file, and the filing of that Consent to Change Counsel was the only reason why I was not only given access to the file, but was allowed into the back room in the Ulster County Family Court's office to make my own copies of the file.

It appears that Judge Work manipulates consents to change counsel, she ignores them when she does not want a certain attorney to be in a case or wants to ignore her pleadings, or, in my case, she wants to keep me in the case to keep retaliating against me and my former client, even though I left the case on my former client's consent.