The valiant New York State Bar Association and the Sgt. Schultz defense - see no evil, hear no evil

In 2009, New York State Bar Association surveyed 51 jurisdictions (all the states of the U.S. and the District of Columbia) to verify what kind of discovery, if any, U.S. jurisdictions provide to attorneys in attorney disciplinary proceedings.

On June 4, 2009, after the full survey, the NYSBA came up with the following results (I reduced the results into a table for convenience of reading) :

Group1	Group2	Group3
8 states and 3 out of 4 NYS departments appear to afford little to no discovery (page 5)	6 states and 1 NYS App. Div. Judicial Department “appear to provide” for “limited discovery” (certain kind of document production and witness information, but no express provision for depositions by respondent attorney)	35 states and the District of Columbia appear to provide for a fair amount of discovery (some states make their regular civil rules of procedure fully applicable to attorney disciplinary proceedings)
1.     Nevada 2.     South Dakota 3.     Kansas 4.     Virginia 5.     Delaware 6.     Connecticut 7.     Massachusetts 8.     Rhode Island 9.     NYD AD1st 10.NYD AD3d 11.NYD AD4th	·         Colorado ·         Hawaii ·         Tennessee ·         Michigan ·         Pennsylvania ·         New Jersey ·         NYS AD2d	·         Wyoming ·         Texas ·         New Mexico ·         Idaho ·         Montana ·         Wisconsin ·         Oregon ·         West Virginia ·         Washington ·         Alaska ·         Maine ·         Utah ·         California ·         Arizona ·         North Dakota ·         Oklahoma ·         Nebraska ·         Missouri ·         Arkansas ·         Louisiana ·         Iowa ·         Minnesota ·         North Carolina ·         South Carolina ·         Mississippi ·         Florida ·         Indiana ·         Illinois ·         Kentucky ·         Georgia ·         District of Columbia ·         Alabama ·         Ohio ·         New Hampshire ·         Maryland ·         Vermont

Furthermore, the NYSBA has found in the same survey that New York belongs to the 16 "winner" states who do not expressly apply evidentiary rules to attorney disciplinary proceedings.  The "winners" are:

• ·         Hawaii
• ·         New Jersey
• ·         New York
• ·         Alaska
• ·         Massachusetts
• ·         New Hampshire
• ·         Ohio
• ·         Pennsylvania
• ·         Connecticut
• ·         Washington
• ·         Kansas
• ·         California
• ·         Oregon
• ·         South Dakota
• ·         Mississippi
• ·         District of Columbia

Nor does New York allow the attorney a public hearing unless it is "allowed" by the court for "good cause shown", so, as I wrote here before, competent adults (attorneys) must ask court's permission to waive their own privacy, a unique situation.

After making all these findings, NYSBA stated that it does not really consider it necessary to change the status quo in New York, but if New York gets around to do that, then NYSBA advises New York to change its rules like the majority of states already did.

No statement that stripping attorneys in disciplinary proceedings of basic rights afforded in other parties in litigation in the same state, such as:

• discovery (paper discovery, subpoena power for pretrial depositions and at the trial);
• applicability of evidentiary rules (exclusion of hearsay, for example);
• public due process hearings

attorneys are deprived of very basic constitutional protections, making the whole attorney disciplinary process unconstitutional.

No, our valiant New York State Bar Association simply stated - if New York decides to come around to change the existing rules (or lack thereof), then it would be advisable to do it as the majority of our neighbors already did, otherwise, changes are not really necessary.

A classic Sgt. Schultz conclusion - see no evil, hear no evil, even when that evil is screaming in your face, according to your own findings.

The new disciplinary rules - that afford no discovery, subpoena power, evidentiary rules or public hearings to attorneys - were introduced on April 1, 2009.

Within 2 months time the New York State Bar Association surveyed 51 U.S. jurisdictions as to availability of procedural rights to attorneys in disciplinary proceedings, verified that New York belongs to the handful of the minority of states that do not provide any such rights - and did NOTHING about it, moreover, stated in the conclusions that no action is necessary to change the status quo.

How can the public rely upon zealous representation by attorneys whose association cannot even fight for equal rights of its members with the rest of New York population?

Menaces to society are not entitled to the rule of law

I described in this blog that I removed my disciplinary case to federal court, and it was remanded back on grounds of "lack of jurisdiction" (because the unfairness I was claiming was not racially-based) and because of the so-called "Younger abstention" (meaning that the federal court considered that the state court is competent and able to resolve my federal constitutional issues).

How the "competent court" has resolved my federal constitutional issues, I also described in this blog, but I will provide a brief summary once again.

The initial disciplinary court, the 3rd Department, entered into an ex parte communication with the prosecutors, issued an ex parte order of transfer of my disciplinary proceedings combined somehow with my husband's disciplinary proceedings (which concluded 3 years ago) to the 4th Department and blocked my access to the prosecutor's "application" for such a transfer that was never served upon me or my husband, for that matter.

The ex parte order with a caption including both me and my husband was the first time I saw my husband's name included into my disciplinary proceedings.  Apparently, the court does not have a clear picture who is being prosecuted, and it did not care.

The 4th Department court, after not receiving the full record from the 3rd Department and refusing to stay proceedings until the full record is provided by the 3rd Department, denied my federal constitutional claims without an explanation, once on a cross-motion, and the second time on a motion as of right to vacate, renew and reargue.  

After my motion to vacate, renew and reargue demanding, among other things, a reasoned decision on my cross-motion raising federal constitutional claims that were remanded on the Younger abstention from federal court, the 4th Department not only once again denied my motion without an explanation, reasoning or analysis, but also imposed upon me an anti-filing injunction without an explanation, reasoning or legal analysis - meaning that I may not, without court's permission, make another motion to the court.  

Enough of my pesky motions.  Enough of those pesky constitutional claims.  And enough of my pesky claims that I am entitled at least to a reasoning as to why my well-researched and pled constitutional claims are denied.

Now I am faced with a hearing.

Of course, it is a wonder as to how that hearing was even ordered since the prosecutor's motion for a summary judgment is still pending and is unresolved. 

I will have a hearing under the following conditions:

(1) the referee who the court refused to disqualify, is old, in my perception based on how he handled a trial conference, he has memory problems, and, most importantly, is not qualified by statute providing for clear requirements to qualifications of referees;

(2) I am not entitled to discovery;

(3) I am not entitled to send out witness subpoenas;

(4) the Department where the hearings are going to be held is located over 100 miles away from where the main witnesses are located, thus blocking for me any possibility for calling them even if I had subpoena power;

(5) New York State and 4th Department do not explicitly provide that evidentiary rules apply to such proceedings;

(6) I am not entitled to a jury trial;

(7) I am not entitled to even a public proceeding, as the court records were sealed under the statute that is supposed to protect my privacy, but, when I waived it, is now used by the court to protect itself and the prosecution from embarrassment and to intimidate me with the threat of contempt of court if I do publish the "sealed" court records, including those records which are in public domain and were not sealed are they were originally filed.


The federal court which was remanding the case back to the state court for a "fair determination", knew all of that.

Of course, in a federal civil rights litigation, I would have been entitled to:

(1) full discovery;
(2) a public trial by jury;
(3) rules of evidence fully applicable to all proceedings;
(4) reasoned decisions on constitutional issues
(5) strict rules as to how motions for a summary judgment can be brought (here, the prosecution first brought a motion for a summary judgment, without providing proof for their claims, and then the court rescued the prosecution by ordering a hearing while the motion for a summary judgment is still pending, which would NEVER have happened in federal court).

Attorney disciplinary proceedings are considered civil proceedings in New York.

There is no question that in other civil proceedings, litigants are entitled to public hearings, discovery, applicability of evidentiary rules and the CPLR, and to reasoned decisions on fundamental issues.

Since I am an attorney - and, "coincidentally", an attorney who criticizes judicial misconduct, and has been doing it for years - I am not entitled to any of the due process protections that normally must be afforded to litigants.

It is beyond the point to list attorneys who were engaged in: 

• "robo-signing" in foreclosures;
• ex parte communications with judges;
• filing (like my prosecutors) fraudulent charges and prosecuting them, with vigor, in several courts.

As long as you do not "cross the line", do the "taboo" thingy, say the "taboo" words "judicial misconduct" and especially if you do not make motions to recuse judges, do not speak out against pervasive judicial misconduct in our court system, contribute to election campaigns and private seminars of judges, wine and dine judges through "mentoring" programs, marry and befriend judges - you will be just fine with your law license.

The only attorneys that the public apparently must be protected from, and at its own expense (consider over 2 years of my disciplinary proceedings on fraudulent charges), appear to be civil rights attorneys seeking to protect that same public from official misconduct, including misconduct of judges and powerful attorneys.  

That is the same public where 80% of it cannot afford an attorney.  Yet, the same public can afford funding disciplinary proceedings on fraudulent charges to eliminate those few attorneys who are not afraid to do their jobs, be faithful to their oath of office and zealously and independently protect constitutional rights of their clients, and, as one of the most important of those rights - their right to an impartial judicial review.

To these menaces to society, such as I am, no normal rules of litigation should apply - because, if such rules would apply, prosecution would have to lose, and that cannot be tolerated.

A court permission to waive your own privacy?

I wrote on this blog about the order of December 17, 2014 "sealing" the order itself and the papers upon which it was made, including open public records from other courts and open newspaper articles.

In attorney disciplinary proceedings, the privacy that is protected is the ATTORNEY's privacy, and that privacy should be waiveable at attorney's WISH.  

Yet, since the December 17, 2014 order talked about "sealing" and "confidentiality", I had to make sure that I do not violate the court order if I actually publish it - and any papers it is based on.  Of course, the court has no right to seal public records from other courts, or newspaper articles in open access, or any other open-access records from third parties, without notification of the custodians or authors of such records.

I tested whether the December 17, 2014 order was, in fact, a "gag order" against me and an attempt of the court to close the courtroom from the public and the media and protect itself and the prosecutor from public scrutiny in a highly sensitive and politically charged case.

In my letter to the court I asked, politely, to unseal any records of my disciplinary proceedings and make them open to the public.  Since confidentiality of attorney disciplinary proceeding is for purposes of protecting my privacy, my privacy can be waived for the asking.  And I asked , in my letter, which is, in my view, all that is needed. 

Rules as to necessity of motions to "unseal" disciplinary records of attorneys are made for the benefit of attorneys and are directed at third parties, not attorneys themselves.  Apparently, that was not the view of the court.

The court replied to me in a letter that if I want to unseal the records of my own disciplinary proceedings, I need to do it on a motion, after filing a filing fee of $45, and the court will grant it only if there is "a good cause shown".

In other words, according to the court, it is not my call to waive my own privacy, it is the court's discretion, to allow me only "for good cause shown".

What is this "good cause shown", nobody knows.

The court did not concern itself with the issue that the only requirement for a person to be able to waive HER OWN privacy is to be a COMPETENT ADULT.

A licensed attorney is PRESUMABLY a competent adult.

In fact, any adult is considered competent under New York law unless adjudicated by a court incompetent.

There was never an adjudication (naturally) that I am incompetent.

Thus, under New York law, I can waive my own privacy without requesting anybody's permission.

(By the way, even incompetent adults do not need permission of a court to waive their own privacy, their guardian's permission is enough).

Apparently, that is not what the disciplinary court believes, and the reason why the disciplinary court's "beliefs" are contrary to existing New York law is, apparently, the highly political nature of the proceedings and the court's desire to protect itself and the disciplinary attorneys from public exposure into their procedures allegedly designed to protect that same public.  

To make motions to a court that denies motions, even on fundamental constitutional issues, without an explanation, reasoning or analysis, is an exercise in futility.  I am not going to be paying the state of New York money in filing fees and making motions ASKING the court to allow me to waive my own privacy when, once again, the condition precedent for me to waive such privacy without anybody's permission is simply to be a competent adult and simply DO it - and I did.

It is interesting to mention that the court "graciously" allowed me to file a motion to unseal the records that are going to be used in the disciplinary proceedings up and until February 6, 2014, without staying hearings in my proceedings.

Yet, hearings in my proceedings will have to be concluded, by order of the same court, by the same date of February 6, 2014.

Moreover, even if I make a motion now, the court, most likely, will not decide it until the proceedings will be over (judging by how much time it took to decide my previous motions), and the issue whether the public and the media should have been allowed into the courtroom, will be then declared "moot" by the court and will be an issue for appellate review.

Of course, I will insist that waiving my own privacy in attorney disciplinary proceedings and inviting members of the public and the press into the courtroom is my due process right that should be available to me for the asking (and I already asked, in a letter to the court) - and it is certainly not subject of the court's discretion "for good cause shown", nor should it be subject to any motion practice.

Courts keep generating more and more materials for my book on disciplinary proceedings in New York.  

I wonder if people who write such letters ever think what kind of "trace" in history they are leaving.  An infamous trace.

West Virginia joined the states punishing attorneys for criticism of judges, 1st Amendment be damned

Wouldn't you want to live in a dream world where you can eliminate your critics by taking away their licenses? 

Then, run for a judge and you can do it to your heart's desire, the 1st Amendment be doomed. 

West Virginia joins the states that discipline attorneys for criticism of judges - even though such criticism is a statement on the issue of grave public concern (integrity of a public officer), is in the core values protected by the 1st Amendment, an attorney has a duty to assure his or her client's right to an impartial adjudication (a fundamental constitutional right, by the way), discovery of judges' backgrounds in most states is unavailable, so the rules of judicial conduct require judges to recuse if there is even an APPEARANCE of impropriety. An appearance of impropriety is measured by a person's reasonable PERCEPTION. 

Yet, for purposes of discipline, a West Virginia judge required from an attorney FACTUAL BASIS for his statements and not reasonable perception. 

Thus, the right to an impartial adjudication of the litigant, and the right of the litigant to effective, independent, zealous and fearless representation was trumped by the fact that the objects of the criticism (judges) hold the livelihood of the critics (attorneys) in their hands. And in viciously pursuing such critics to the bitter end, revocation of their licenses, judges do not care whether they violate the U.S. Constitution which gave them the power to sit on that bench in the first place.

The interesting detail is that the disciplining judge, Justice Margaret L. Workman stated while disciplining the attorney that "the interests sought to be protected by the attorney disciplinary system require a less stringent standard than the actual standard", and with this statement Justice Workman rejected the attorney's 1st Amendment challenge.

I wonder if Judge Workman is aware of the concept of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution with the resulting pre-emption rule of federal law over inconsistent state law.  She should be aware of that clause, since she, as every judge in this country, took office swearing an oath of office as a pledge to uphold the U.S. Constitution, together with the Supremacy Clause and the 1st Amendment.

While the judge made a statement about the interests the attorney disciplinary proceedings sought to protect, there is no indication the judge paid attention to the interests the 1st Amendment was seeking to protect.

In fact, the higher the stigma and the consequences for the litigant, the higher should be the standards of protection, not the lower, as judge Workman stated.

But, of course, when "the interests sought to be protected" in this particular case, to shield judges from the most knowledgeable, capable, credible and eloquent critics - the attorneys who know what is going on in court better than the occasional litigant and whose statements would thus be believed by the public - those self-serving interests of the class of the judiciary, which class included Judge Workman herself, of course, trump everything, including the U.S. Constitution the judge pledged to uphold.

Following the logic of the judge, that the higher the government's interests in the proceedings, the lower should be the standards of defense afforded to litigants, criminal defendants should not be afforded any protections at all, because of the interests the state has - to protect the public from crimes.  Yet, the law is quite the opposite - the higher the possibility of a stigma and the graver the consequences to the litigant in terms of potential loss of civil rights, the higher should be procedural and substantive protection for the litigant, and NOBODY in this country, including judges, has authority to cancel protections of the U.S. Constitution, in ANY proceeding, for ANY reason.

Actually, when the government seeks to take away people's fundamental rights, such as, in the attorney disciplinary cases, a right to earn a living in the chosen profession and calling, an elevated standard of scrutiny, the so-called strict scrutiny, is applied by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Judge Workman should do a refresher course in constitutional law before being allowed on the bench since she demonstrated incompetence in constitutional law that would have garnered her a failing grade in law school and on a bar exam.  But - when you already made it to the bench, competence is not important any more, is it, as long as you can wield your power they way you want it?

The interests that the attorney disciplinary proceedings are sought to protect is - to protect the public from attorneys who are unfit to practice.  The lawyer was disciplined, on the opposite, for attempt to protect  his client and assure for his client an impartial judge.  Shielding judges from criticism, rightful or wrongful, is not within the purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings and attorney disciplinary proceedings should not be used as a sword wielded by the judiciary against its critics rather than for the true protection of the public.

An attorney should never be disciplined for attempting to do his job right, the way he understands it.

Independence of court representation is the cornerstone of democracy, much more important than super-sensitive sensibilities of judges who should not take this office if their temper cannot withstand criticism without lashing out against critics.

Attorney Grievance Committees unlawfully operating as collection agencies on public dime - is it any wonder why people are leaving the state of New York to leave behind the corruption, abuse of power and waste of their taxpayers' money?

I received just before Christmas from the Attorney Grievance Committee a request to confirm whether certain documents, including a letter from a certain state organization threatening me to turn a money judgment into the Attorney Grievance Committee "for collection"  are true and correct documents.


Apart from the fact that:


(1) enforcement of money judgments must be a separate court action in a different court than the disciplinary proceedings, and preceding the disciplinary proceedings, 


(2) that no such enforcement proceeding was brought against me;


(3) that the money judgment (sanctions unlawfully imposed upon me by Judge Carl F. Becker in retaliation for suing him, after I sued him) was satisfied through a court escrow over a year before the threat that the threat 


the interesting fact remains that the Attorney Grievance Committee is now discharging the functions of a collection agency - functions that the Committee is not authorized to do by any law or regulation.


What is also interesting is that the Attorney Grievance Committee is continuing to prosecute the fraudulent Charge IV claiming that I did not obey a lawful order of the "tribunal" (that would be Judge Becker who sanctioned me in retaliation for suing him), when I obeyed that unlawful order 2 years before the disciplinary petition was brought.


I guess, Mary Gasparini is too busy giving lectures about attorney ethics at CLE seminars to do due diligence for the job that New York taxpayers (including me) are paying her to do.


Of course, judging by how disciplinary proceedings are handled, due diligence - or the law for that matter - has nothing to do with what is going on, it is an order from up above to destroy me no matter what, the truth, the law, the Constitution and the due diligence be damned - and attorney Mary Gasparini of the Attorney Grievance Committee, NYS Appellate Division 4th Judicial Department, apparently and in my personal opinion, cares more about her own job security than about the truth, the law, the Constitution and the due diligence combined (or about such trifles as common decency or waste of public money on fraudulent and frivolous political persecutions of an attorney).


I raised in the state courts handling the issue (NYS Appellate Divisions, 3rd and 4th Departments) the issue that Attorney Grievance Committees in New York are not authorized to operate as collection agencies, as they habitually do.  The 3rd Department made an ex parte order of transfer of the case to the 4th Department, over 100 miles away from where my witnesses are, making it practically impossible for me to get people to testify for me, and is stalling access to papers upon which it granted the ex parte order.


The 4th Department denied my cross-motions raising federal constitutional issues without an explanation, and reacted to my motion to vacate that decision and give me a reasoned answer, which is what I am entitled to as a matter of due process of law, with yet another similar decision without an explanation, now accompanied with an anti-filing injunction, without a notice to me or opportunity to be heard on the issue why my access to court , a fundamental right, should be restricted.


To tell me that this is somehow "the rule of law" is to insult my own, and anybody else's, intelligence.  It's Star Chamber, pure and simple, and the court is frustrated that I delay my fate that was decided before the disciplinary petition was even filed.


I wrote in this blog enough as to how the federal court operates in my district, blocking any constitutional issues, including the one I raised about Attorney Grievance Committees operating as collection agencies without any authority under the law - it simply tossed the lawsuit as frivolous, and, as I said before, this shining example of unlawfulness will be included into a separate book about constitutional issues I raised that were tossed by courts.


I understand that no matter what the Attorney Grievance Committee does against an attorney marked for destruction, such as myself, who did the unthinkable, criticized judges for misconduct, and no matter whether actions of the Attorney Grievance Committee will be lawful or unlawful, fraudulent or not, the Attorney Grievance Committee or its attorneys or members will never be prosecuted, and the whistleblower like me who points out that certain actions of the Attorney Grievance Committee are not lawful, will be marked for destruction and destroyed. 


And I understand that public money, including my own hard-earned money paid as a taxpayer, will be used for that destruction, in the name of protection of the public, no less.


So, now the public money is being used to enable Mary Gasparini, of the Attorney Grievance Committee for the NYS Appellate Division 4th Judicial Department, to operate as a debt collector without any statutory authority to do that.


And Mary Gasparini, as well as her supervisors, apparently have no qualms using that public money for such purposes.


No wonder there is such a reported exodus out of the State of New York - the state where the taxes are high, the job market is bad, and the collected taxes are used on illegal adventures such as collection of a satisfied money judgment by Attorney Grievance Committees having no right to engage in debt collection.


Last years' report indicated that during the last decade people leaving New York State took with them $45.6 bln in personal income from the state's economy, which was close to 7% of the combined income of New Yorkers reported in 2010.


This years' report indicates that the exodus from New York continues, and I support such exodus wholeheartedly.


Only when the  New York state budget will have no money paying people like Mary Gasparini for lecturing at CLE seminars and engaging in debt collection instead of doing her job diligently and in good faith, maybe something will  then start changing in New York.


This year's report indicated that people continue to leave New York state.


It is time the state of New York should stop treating its taxpayers like dirt and starts paying attention to where abuse of power and waste by public officials hurts the state economy.


Actually, what I am experiencing, will make for a nice book on legal ethics/ primer into the legal profession, for pre-law and law students.  I have enough documentary materials for that for sure, and at least such a book will describe the real world of legal ethics, or rather, how the rules of legal ethics are used as a sword against critics of any misconduct of public officials instead of for protection of the public, as is their declared purpose.


So, if I am relieved of my license in order to make me less credible as a critic of the judiciary, first of all, as I wrote in this blog earlier, I will engage in providing services in arbitration and mediation, an unregulated activity in the State of New York.


Plus, I will then have the time to write those books - and since they will be based on documentary evidence and legal authorities, I don't think taking of my law license will take from their value or credibility.

A book is planned mapping constitutional issues that state and federal courts considered frivolous in litigation that my husband and/or I handled

My husband and I have been through a lot from the time that I was admitted to the bar in 2009.


The bar and the judiciary viciously opposed doubling of our legal services, which one judge called "double-teaming" (as in:  "I hate their double-teaming"), mostly in criminal and Family Court proceedings. 


For some local attorneys, my entry into the legal profession increased competition since my husband mostly handled cases outside of Delaware County, and I started to handle cases in Delaware County and adjoining counties, thus taking away business from other attorneys.  They hated it and openly declared promises to "run them out of town".


For many local judges, in me they acquired a pain in the ass since, despite being a beginner attorney, I was trained by one of the best lawyers in the area for many more years than my law school training, had three advanced degrees, including an advanced degree in teaching English, was and remain independent and mature-minded, stubborn, well-trained and well-researched in civil rights litigation, and, having been born and raised in a communist country (Russia), had a belief to uphold and enforce the rule of law.


I am not a person with a "whatever you say, Your Honor" mentality, who can be taught to scrape and bow to the so-called "authority", even when that authority is clearly wrong and is violating the law, the way I, a well-trained and well-researched individual with a law degree, understand that law.  Is this independent streak causing the demise of my career in law?  If it will, it will make for another good book, or two.


I understand that nobody likes criticism, yet attorneys, in zealously protecting their clients' rights, must criticize whoever violates their clients' rights, be it the judge or any public official, and must do it as often as often violations of those clients' rights occur.


So, the judicial system "double-teamed" with powerful attorneys - to get rid of us.


In 2011 they disbarred my husband, thus depriving the poor and under-served population of Delaware County of his services, including pro bono services that he generously provided to a lot of people, who could come to him or call him, before his disbarment, at any time and many of them got free advice from him.


After my husband's wrongful disbarment, without a hearing, after 37 years of service to his community, I tried to carry his torch as much as I could, providing free advice and free legal services as much as I could. 


Two years before my husband's disbarment a certain group of local public officials started to prepare grounds to disbar me, too.


From illegal (and dismissed) parking tickets in front of the courthouse where everybody parks, but only I was targeted as a "big-mouth attorney", to illegal (and dismissed) child neglect proceedings by people whose conflicts of interest will take a book to fully describe, and I, most likely, do not know the full extent of the conflicts which still keep emerging, to the judge who was at the head of the campaign to stop our "double-teaming" and "run me out of town" and whom I sued (Delaware County judge Carl F. Becker) assigning himself to the cases where I appeared as attorney or party and sanctioning me for raising constitutional arguments, to rumors being spread out all across New York courts, from local to the Supreme court level that I am either already disbarred or about to be disbarred, urging potential clients not to come to me - we had it all.


Both my husband and I tried to litigate multiple violations of our constitutional rights by state and local officials in federal courts.  We quickly learnt that federal courts are joined with the state courts at the hip and fiercely protect the state public officials from adjudication of misconduct, by "local rules", various judicially created doctrines and the so-called "judicial discretion" to punish litigants for frivolous conduct.


Over the years of litigation I've learnt to expect that every constitutional argument that I am bringing in state or federal court, no matter how well researched, reasoned or supported by legal authorities (even though there is no requirement to support constitutional arguments by legal authorities, as the only legal authority such arguments require are the U.S. Constitution and your own reasonable interpretation of it, and whether it is reasonable is for the jury and not the federal judge to decide), will be rejected, ridiculed and sanctioned.


Finally, I decided to pull into a book and publish the following:


(1) the constitutional issues that state and federal courts declared frivolous in cases that I handled for myself and/or my clients;


(2) the legal authorities and reasoning I used to support my argument;


(3) the reasoning of various courts rejecting my constitutional arguments, where available (because some courts rejected my constitutional arguments without any reasoning);


(4) the names of judges who rejected my constitutional argument, their biographies and appearances of conflicts of interest that I was able to find, and their history of handling other constitutional arguments, as well as their history of retaliation for criticism; 


(5) the value of the arguments I was bringing, not just for me, my family members or my clients, but for the entire American public.


I hope the book will provide a valuable for litigants, attorneys and other readers inside and outside of the United States insight into the workings of the American judicial system, the myth of the so-called "access to justice for all" and the myth that the allegedly "honorable" judges in the American allegedly "honorable" court system allegedly uphold the U.S. Constitution instead of violating it at every possible turn.


I plan to publish three versions of the book in several languages:  English, Russian and Spanish.


The book will be put together and published within a reasonable time of the conclusion of my disciplinary case.  I hope you will be my readers.  I promise I will work hard on the book and make it worth my readers' time and money.