THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.


Wednesday, October 8, 2014

The Younger abstention, attorney disciplinary proceedings and fraud committed by the government

When a disciplinary proceeding was commenced against me based on (1) two fraudulent charges and (2) three sanctions of a judge I sued before he started imposing sanctions on me, and in view of a history with the disciplinary court where the court refused to apply the law and ignored facts in the record on appeal in cases involving me or my husband, I removed my disciplinary case to a federal court.


I did it under a federal removal statute 28 USC 1443 and added a 1983 action to the removed disciplinary proceedings.


My disciplinary proceeding was remanded because I am white - I am not joking.  The federal court "read" the removal statute, 28 USC 1443, as requiring the denial of equal protection to be on the grounds of racial discrimination, even though there is not a single word about it in the text of the statute, and federal courts have no authority to change federal statutes by interpretation.


The court also dismissed my 1983 action on the so-called "Younger abstention" grounds.


The Younger abstention is a way for federal courts to refuse to consider federal constitutional claims brought in a civil rights lawsuit because a state court proceeding is pending where a party (theoretically) raise his or her federal constitutional claims.


Never mind that jurisdiction of federal courts is defined only by Article III and by the U.S. Congress and federal courts cannot invent rules to restrict their own jurisdiction to review federal constitutional claims.


Never mind that there is no condition precedent in the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983 demanding that federal constitutional claims must be first raised in state courts.


Never mind the tradition of the New York State courts to either ignore constitutional claims altogether, on the trial and appellate levels, or apply the court-created doctrine of the so-called "constitutional avoidance", resolving cases on "state grounds" without reaching constitutional issues, even though constitutional issues also involve issues of Supremacy of the U.S. Constitution over the inconsistent state laws (which is sometimes called pre-emption).


Never mind that after New York State courts ignore federal constitutional issues, there is no appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court as of right, where 9 justices have over 5000 petitions filed annually for their review and grant 75, according to statistics.


Never mind that if a party goes back to federal court AFTER his constitutional claims are (1) ignored;  (2) considered frivolous; or (3) "avoided"  by state courts, he is blocked from raising those same federal constitutional claims now by the so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine in which the aggrieved party who is desperately trying to get access to court to review his/her federal constitutional claims is now called a LOSER (I was always of the impression that the word is a vulgar middle-school jargon, not a legal term).


Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts will now claim they do not have jurisdiction to review the federal constitutional claims previously dumped by federal court on the Younger abstention grounds, because the claims should have been reviewed on appeal from the state court decision (remember - "constitutional avoidance" at best in state courts + lack of appeal as of right to the U.S. Supreme Court).


This process of trying to nail jelly to the wall when a party tries to get SOME COURT review his or her constitutional claims on the merits is impossibly difficult enough without the government party applying for such a Younger abstention in federal court initially does not apply for it in bad faith.


In my case the New York State government has risen to new heights, or rather, sank to a new low when it (1) obtained a Younger abstention to have my federal claims go to the state disciplinary court, and then (2) argued to the state disciplinary court to prohibit me to raise those claims in that court - and, judging by the fact that the court dismissed my cross-motion that raised federal constitutional issues without ANY explanation, the government succeeded in its fraud.


Once again, and this may be a valuable insight for pro se civil rights plaintiffs, Younger abstention is usually sought when:


(1) a civil rights lawsuit is filed in a federal district court;
(2) a state proceeding in the nature of an enforcement action is pending in state court or even administrative agency;
(3) it is claimed to be possible to raise federal constitutional claims in state proceedings.


Of course, administrative agencies in New York have no authority to resolve constitutional challenges to statutes and regulations, and the only court that is entitled to review and resolve such challenges is the New York State Supreme Court (the lower trial court of general jurisdiction), yet,  Younger abstention is applied left and right (according to case law) when administrative proceedings and proceedings in County courts or Family courts are pending.


In my case, the Younger abstention was applied because a disciplinary proceeding was pending in the state Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 3rd Judicial Department.


Of course, when a proceeding was removed to federal court as of right, it may not be at the same time perceived as "pending" in state court for purposes of the Younger abstention, and a motion to apply such a Younger abstention in federal court before the disciplinary proceeding was remanded is premature.


Yet, the federal court "resolved" this clear jurisdictional problem by claiming that it does not have jurisdiction over my removed case because I did not claim racial discrimination in removing the case under 28 USC 1443 (there is, once again, not a single word requiring that I should have pled racial discrimination in that statute).


A brief summary of what has happened in my disciplinary case as to the Younger abstention.


On March 20, 2013 Bruce J. Boivin, Assistant Attorney General, New York State, argued to the federal district court that I can raise my general constitutional claims in state court proceedings under the Younger abstention.


On November 18, 2013, the federal district court agreed with Mr. Boivin, applied the Younger abstention and dismissed my federal constitutional claims to the infirmities of attorney disciplinary system in New York.


I raised federal constitutional challenges to infirmities in the attorney disciplinary process in the state court proceeding on remand.


On January 8, 2014, attorney Allison Coan of the Appellate Division Third Department, in a sworn statement to the court, claimed to the state court that I "cannot be permitted to use this proceeding or Court as a forum to ... air her discontent with the attorney disciplinary system generally, or grievances against Judge Becker specifically", Affirmation of Attorney Coan, pages 13-14, paragraph 30.


In other words, Allison Coan asked the court to deny me even the opportunity to be heard on my facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to attorney disciplinary system in state court, which was diametrically opposite to the Committee's claim to the federal court that I will be allowed to do just that in state court.


Apparently, Attorney Coan failed to read statements made by attorney Bruce Boivin on her behalf on March 20, 2014 which triggered the court to apply the Younger abstention.


Had the court been presented the statement of Allison Coan made later to the state court, requesting the state court NOT to consider my federal constitutional claims, the federal district court would have been constrained to deny dismissal of my federal constitutional claims on the Younger abstention grounds.



Then, Allison Coan (1) claimed my request to disqualify her committee for bias is frivolous;  (2) after saying that the Committee made an ex parte application for an order of transfer of the case to the 4th Department anyway, and the two Committees, of the 3rd and 4th Department, and the two courts, the 3rd and 4th Department, to this day stall me from obtaining accesss to the Committee's ex parte application that already resulted in an ex parte order of June 11, 2014 transferring the case to the 4th Department.


In the 4th Department, attorney Mary Gasparini continued prosecuting and endorsing every word the 3rd Department said, including Allison Coan's statement that I should not be allowed to use state courts as a forum to air my "general grievances" (federal constitutional challenges) to the attorney disciplinary system.


As a culmination of those efforts, on September 30, 2014 the 4th Department court agreed not to give me a forum to raise federal constitutional challenges by denying my cross-motion raising such challenges without one syllable of an explanation.


At this time, the 4th Department has "held" and "reserved" a summary judgment for the prosecution while at the same time ordering a trial before a referee (an incompatible task, as any law student tested on what a summary judgment is would tell you).


Yet, in view of those same constitutional infirmities of the attorney disciplinary system that the court refused to address, why would the court care about compliance with the law if it knows that I have no right of appeal and no recourse from whatever the court may do with me).


To make appearances of impartiality, the court assigned a referee to hear factual issues while a motion for a summary judgment is still unresolved.


Yet, it bears mentioning, what kind of referee was assigned.


Last November, New Yorkers by overwhelming majority rejected an amendment of the state Constitution as to the proposal of the judiciary to extend the mandatory retirement age of judges to 80.  Apparently, you the people of the State of New York considered it prudent and ensuring a fair trial when judges retire at the age of 75.


The Legislature pushed a little farther anyway with the age of court referees, but still cut it off at the age of 76.


I was appointed a referee who turns 80 on October 16, 2014, to hear an enormous amount of facts that the court did not analyze in its decision of September 30, 2014.


In other words, the review of an extremely complex case and my fate is now rested on the shoulders of an octogenarian.


A brilliant move.


Moreover, the referee is a retired judge out of Wayne County Court, even though by law, Judiciary Law 114, 115, a retired judge out of Wayne County court is not entitled to serve as a court referee, and a cut-off age for such a referee if he/she is qualified (which my referee is not) is 76 years of age, while my referee, according to publicly available information, retired because he turned 75 in 2009, and turns 80 on October 16, 2014.


Imagine


  •  if the court and the prosecution allows themselves to display such a disdain to the rule of law as it was displayed in my disciplinary case, while disciplining an attorney,
  • if breaking the law is done by the court and the prosecution in order (allegedly) to protect the public (from my zealous advocacy on behalf of my clients),


what can the same court do to you, ladies and gentlemen, when zealous advocates like me are quashed and other members of the bar are intimidated by my example and example of attorneys like me, also disciplined for the contents of their advocacy for their clients, and will refuse to raise for you issues that are essential to your cases - for fear of retaliation from the judiciary?










Tuesday, October 7, 2014

When validity of statements are defined by identity and status of speakers, the rule of law goes out the door...

I always thought that the law must apply equally across the board.


Yet, I have learnt (the hard way) that the contents of one's speech may be perceived very differently.


According to my own experience, my research of case law and my review of multiple law review articles and books on the law and about the U.S. Supreme Court and the judiciary in general, the same constitutional argument may be:


(1) disregarded completely if it comes from a "lay" individual who is not an attorney - because he or she "does not know what he/she is talking about";


(2) glorified if it comes from a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (or lower court, for that matter) as an example of wonderful creativity and innovation;


(3) lauded or at last tolerated if it comes from a law professor, and


(4) be a basis of attorney discipline and sanctions if it is raised by a civil rights attorney in litigation.


It does not seem like the rule of law to me.



American lawyers lack protection that European lawyers have for statements on behalf of their clients

I have written in this blog that I have a disciplinary proceeding pending against me for sanctions imposed upon me by a judge who I sued before he started to impose the sanctions.


All sanctions were imposed for my statements on behalf of clients.


Today I've read the "Summary of International Standards Concerning Attorney Disbarment" by the American Bar Association which cites to the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and to cases of the European Court of Human Rights.


In particular, what caught my attention is footnote 5 on page 2 of the "Summary" where the ABA cites to a case Steur v. Netherlands, where an attorney was disciplined for questioning good faith of an investigative officer where the attorney's client was charged with social security fraud.


The attorney was disciplined for "impugning the character" of the officer, and his appeal was dismissed.


The European Court of Human Rights held that punishing the attorney for statements on behalf of his client was a clear violation of attorney's right to freedom of expression, and was wrong because it could have chilled expression during advocacy, inflict harm on the legal profession and can lead to denial of a fair trial to the clients.


In this country, attorneys do not even have a right to be heard on any level higher than (in New York) the level of the appellate court.  Attorneys in the U.S. are not given the right to appeal any further, are not given the right to remove their case in federal court, unless they can claim RACIAL discrimination (as my case showed).


In Netherlands, the attorney was provided two more layers of review AS OF RIGHT - right to an appeal, and right to contest the finding of discipline in the European Court of human rights.


In this country which attempts to proclaim itself as "the leader of the free world", elementary rights afforded to attorneys in Europe, are not given to American lawyers targeted for their advocacy for their clients.


When attorneys are punished, whether through sanctions, arbitrarily imposed fees for "frivolous conduct" or attorney discipline, for advocacy for clients (and especially where criticism of the judiciary is part of such advocacy), the public which is already grossly underrepresented in court (less than 20% of litigants can afford legal representation in the U.S.) loses honest advocates who are courageous enough to step on toes of public officials who violate clients' civil rights.




The American Bar Association referenced in the "Summary" I mentioned above the opinion of the United Nations Organization that "if attorneys are unable to vigorously defend their clients for fear of disbarment, they will be unable to provide the legal services required to ensure meaningful access to counsel".


In view of what has happened and is continuing to happen to me based exclusively on the contents of my advocacy on behalf of my clients, and in view of the fact that multiple attorneys have been suspended or disbarred in the U.S. and are continued to be disciplined in a variety of ways, including suspension or disbarment, there is no way to obtain independent legal counsel in the U.S., as any and all American lawyers would be afraid of a disciplinary action based on the essence of their advocacy and will not raise sensitive issues on behalf of clients for fear of attorney discipline or financial sanctions.


Such punishment is clearly against the public's best interest, and until the public starts paying attention to punishment imposed on attorneys for the contents of their statements in court on behalf of their clients, access to justice in the U.S. will remain as abysmal or non-existing as it is now.

Monday, October 6, 2014

A complaint was filed against Judge John Weidman, Oxford Town/Village Court, NY

Just filed a complaint against judge John Wiedman, of Oxford Town/Village Court.


I made a motion to recuse the judge in a criminal case, based on my personal knowledge and affidavits from two witnesses, about judge's ex parte communications, history of misconduct with defendant's brother and disrespectful behavior toward me.


The judge had an opportunity to recuse without any statements, that is what judges usually do when they recuse.


This judge was different.


He waited until I came to argue the motion, ordered me to argue only the portion of the motion to recuse out of the omnibus motion (several motions in one, as required in the criminal case), then repeated my claim that in view of evidence of judge's disrespect to me my client cannot obtain a fair trial from this judge, CONFIRMED that the judge did not respect me, and stated on record that "one gets respect that one deserves".


With that, the judge NEVER DENIED what was in the sworn statements in support of my motion to recuse.


Rules of judicial conduct MANDATE judges to respect attorneys and parties appearing in front of them.


If the judge cannot abide by that requirement of respect, he must recuse - and Judge Weidman did recuse from the case, but only after he claimed his disrespect to me, in violation of the rules of judicial conduct, as a matter of right, and claimed that I do not deserve respect.


And made this claim before a courtroom full of people, sending the present lay individuals and attorneys a message that to make a motion to recuse is wrong, no matter how meritorious such a motion may be, and that making such a motion will subject the defense counsel to humiliation from the court.


I bet that no attorney whose livelihood depends on assigned cases from this judge would dare to make a motion to recuse after today.


Good job, Judge Weidman, in intimidating the public and attorneys into believing that it is YOUR rule and not the rule of law that is the law in the Town of Oxford court.


Naturally, today I filed a complaint about Judge Weidman's behavior to the Judicial Conduct Commission (including two instances of ex parte communications, an improper threat of a bench warrant, disrespectful, demeaning and sexist conduct toward a female attorney).


If the complaint is tossed, we will know that what Judge Weidman did is an allowed and encouraged behavior in New York judges, and we will then expect more of the same, from this judge and from other judges.


As to the judge's expression of disrespect to me, I am not surprised.  Usually abusers of women do not respect their victims, especially those who stand up for themselves and for others.  And Judge Weidman is no exception.

Saturday, October 4, 2014

A right to due process of law must include a right to a reasoned decision of constitutional challenges

Even before I went to law school, I always thought, as many people who have no law degree whatsoever, that when a person is trying to resolve important issues pertaining to his/her life, property, livelihood, reputation in court, that person is entitled not only to be heard by an impartial judge, but also to get a decision from that judge that at the very least explains to the person the court's reasoning, and especially if fundamental constitutional rights are involved.


Apparently, not so in attorney disciplinary proceedings.


Today, I've got a decision from the 4th Department in my much publicized disciplinary case that was based in its entirety on sanctions from Judge Becker imposed by him on me after I sued him.


Obviously, important 1st Amendment retaliation and due process issues were involved which were not yet reviewed on the merits by any other courts because the issue was either outside of the record or barred by judicial immunity.


I have filed a cross-motion with a supporting affidavit/memorandum of law on 159 pages, and with 101 documentary exhibits.


The decision of the 4th Department that I received today recites the procedural history of the case, it recites documents upon which the decision is made, and it contains:


  • 0 (zero) analysis, 
  • 0 (zero) reasoning, and
  • 0 (zero) substantiation of the decision.


I will skip my further analysis of what is wrong with the court decision, it will be expressed in writing to the proper tribunals in the future.


I think that, since the court denied me challenges to constitutionality of attorney disciplinary system in New York that were remanded by federal court under the guise that the state court can fairly review and rule on such issues -  I am owed just that, a ruling on the issues, or, in other words, an explanation why the court denied my challenges.


And, if decisions regarding other attorneys' reputation and livelihood are made this way by this court, too, this policy of providing no reasoned decisions in proceedings involving attorneys' reputations and livelihoods is a systemic violation of attorneys' due process of law in New York.













Friday, October 3, 2014

A third complaint has been filed against Judge Revoir

Just filed a third complaint against Judge Frank B. Revoir, Jr., who was an assigned judge in the Delaware County Family Court, but who is otherwise out of the Chenango County Family Court.

I wrote on this blog about the 1st and 2nd complaints about this judge here and here.

The third complaint was filed because Judge Revoir recused from a case where he engaged in illegal acts, without correcting his illegal acts.  I doubt that Judge Revoir somehow did not have knowledge that criminal prosecutions were commenced based on his illegal arrest warrant.

I remind the readers of the essence of the grievance against Judge Revoir:

1/ Judge Revoir presided over a Family Court custody modification proceeding.

2/ Only one petition was in front of Judge Revoir, one filed by the mother.

3/  Judge Revoir dismissed that petition for lack of jurisdiction on August 29, 2014 orally, but did not enter that order until September 29, 2014.

4/ On September 1, 2014 the mother, together with this writer, complained about Judge Revoir's unlawful and abusive behavior during the court proceedings on August 29, 2014 to the Judicial Conduct Commission;

5/ On September 4, 2014 Judge Revoir issued a written order under the same docket as the petition that Judge Revoir dismissed 6 days earlier for lack of jurisdiction.  The order of September 4, 2014, was thus void for lack of jurisdiction.

Moreover, the order of September 4, 2014 gave relief on the merits to the petitioner's opponent (the father) who never filed any petitions for relief and was thus not entitled to any relief, especially after the only pending petition of the mother was dismissed.

6/ Judge Revoir's court served the illegal order of September 4, 2014 by mail to the mother's Albany P.O. Box.  By law, the mother was expected to receive the letter within 5 days, by September 9, 2014.

7/ Yet, the very next day after the illegal order of September 4, 2014 was issued by Judge Revoir, on September 5, 2014, Judge Revoir accepted a petition from the father to enforce the September 4, 2014, before the mother could have been expected to receive the order of September 4, 2014.

As part of enforcement, Judge Revoir signed an order to show cause demanding the mother to answer the court why she should not be punished for violating the order of September 4, 2014 which was (1) illegal, and (2) was not received by that time by the mother, nor could be presumed to have been received by the court, CPLR 2103 (adding 5 days to any deadlines where pleadings or court orders are served by mail).

Judge Revoir also signed an arrest warrant of the mother on September 5, 2014 to enforce Judge Revoir's illegal order of September 4, 2014 made in the absence of all jurisdiction.  In view of invalidity of the order that was being enforced, of September 4, 2014, the arrest warrant was equally illegal.

8/  The mother was arrested at Taser point in front of her child on September 5, 2014.

9/  The grandmother was, according to her lawsuit filed in Delaware County Supreme Court, Index No. 2014-911, assaulted by Delaware County Sheriff's Deputy Derek Bowie with the help of his vehicle;

10/  Derek Bowie was not removed from the investigation and prosecution of cases, he did not, upon information and belief, report vehicular assault upon the maternal grandmother Barbara O'Sullivan, and instead proceeded filing, investigating and prosecuting criminal charges against Barbara O'Sullivan and her daughter.

11/  "Coincidentally", after I effectively cross-examined Derek Bowie and his co-workers at a felony examination, Derek Bowie's employer the Delaware County Sheriff denied me access to Barbara O'Sullivan who was a pre-trial detainee in the Delaware County Jail at the time, before she was released on bail, claiming that the jail personnel must look at the contents of my attorney file - which is a violation of attorney-client privilege and was never done to me before for 5.5 years that I was visiting that same jail with the same files contained in the same envelopes, as my husband did for 37 years before me.

You can listen by following links contained here to how the chief of Delaware County Jail explains to me about his employee's alleged right to "flip through the pages" of my attorney file and that Delaware County Jail regularly opens legal mail to inmates and pre-trial detainees and how the Delaware County Attorney clumsily tried to wriggle out of the situation where the Chief of Delaware County jail proclaimed a policy that could hurt the County big time if brought up in a federal lawsuit.

Delaware County is, by the way, a county which was the focus of the media for some time, specifically because of "police power gone too far", to the point of creating difficulties for certification of the Delaware County Sheriff's Department with the New York State Criminal Justice Department.

I wonder how the Sheriff's Department may remain certified when it allows police officers assault residents with their police vehicles, not report it, commence criminal proceedings against the victims and continue to handle weapons while claiming that their fingers are "numb" to the point of a serious injury.

12/  Delaware County police aggravated their misconduct further by making leaks to the press about Barbara O'Sullivan and her daughter Alecia Bracci, several times, to Binghamton television (which resulted in a flood of hate comments on Facebook), and to the Oneonta Daily Star, while no corresponding press releases can be found on the website of the Delaware County Jail, see the media releases of the Delaware County Sheriff on his own website.



Apparently, the Delaware County Sheriff has no control over his personnel who make their own leaks to the press, even where the Sheriff does not issue official releases, and make such leaks during the pendency of a criminal proceedings, obviously impairing defendants' right to a fair trial.

13/  Delaware County police claimed under oath to the Delhi Town Court that the dog belonged to Alecia Bracci in their court testimony on September 22, 2014.  When they have won relief they sought from the court with that testimony, Derek Bowie turned around and filed more criminal charges against Barbara O'Sullivan, now claiming that Barbara O'Sullivan was the dog's owner, and that information was leaked to the Daily Star.

On September 22, 2014 Derek Bowie appeared in court for the testimony in full uniform, with a Taser and a pistol attached to it, as far as I could see.

Yet, he testified about his alleged "serious injury" from the alleged dog bite, and testified that his fingers are "numb".

For the "serious injury" Derek Bowie was sporting, as of September 22, 2014, 4 days after the alleged attack, a band-aid on his arm, and his numb fingers did not prevent him from having access to weapons, one semi-lethal, the other lethal.

13/  The dog warden left the dog "in quarantine" without medical care for more than 24 hours, tazered, maced and clubbed, with a metal taser node sticking through his upper jaw.

Yet, no charges for animal cruelty were brought against the dog warden.



14/ Upon information and belief, on September 24, 2014, the day when I reported my recorded conversation with the Chief of Delaware County Jail and pointed out that life of Barbara O'Sullivan and her daughter may be in danger, Derek Bowie filed more criminal charges against Barbara O'Sullivan, now claiming that Barbara O'Sullivan, and not her daughter Alecia Bracci, was the owner of the dog, and filed a complaint seeking to deem the dog a dangerous dog (which could lead to court-ordered destruction of the dog).

The "dangerous dog" proceedings which could result in destruction of the dog were, thankfully, dismissed today, but without prejudice, according to Barbara O'Sullivan, no thanks to Judge Revoir.

15/  Coming back to Judge Revoir - on September 29, 2014 Judge Revoir came around to sending a written order of dismissal of the petition filed by the mother, which was allegedly signed by Judge Revoir on August 29, 2014, but was not entered for a month, until September 29, 2014.  Judge Revoir, in entering his order of dismissal of August 29, 2014, certainly did not explain why he then made an order on September 4, 2014 under the same docket, or, in other words, out of that same dismissed petition and why he enforced that invalid order through an equally invalid arrest warrant the next day, September 5, 2014.

Even though Judge Revoir dismissed the petition on August 29, 2014, he left pending the motion filed by the father in that same docket, in opposition to that same dismissed petition (filed one day before the returnable date and never served).  Such a decision was obviously illegal.  When a petition is dismissed, all pleadings pertaining to that petition are dismissed and stop to exist, too.

16/ On September 30, 2014 Barbara O'Sullivan filed a lawsuit against Derek Bowie for vehicular assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress in Delaware County Supreme Court.

17/ On October 1, 2014 Judge Revoir communicated to me, through a court clerk, his recusal from all of my cases and from Alecia Bracci's case.

Yet, Judge Revoir recused without vacating his illegal orders that created havoc in the lives of a child, a young woman, a middle-aged disabled woman and an innocent animal.

Since orders of Judge Revoir were made after he announced he is dismissing the mother's petition for lack of jurisdiction, Judge Revoir's order of September 4, 2014 and arrest warrant against Alecia Bracci of September 5, 2014, were, in my legal opinion, made in clear absence of all jurisdiction and may subject Judge Revoir to a federal civil rights lawsuit for money damages.

Judge Revoir recused without any apology for his abusive and insulting behavior in the courtroom.

Did Judge Revoir know about criminal proceedings commenced against vocal critics of the judge based on the judge's illegal orders?  News in the court system travel really fast, and it is up to the Judicial Conduct Commission to verify whether Judge Revoir did or did not have such knowledge.

I wonder whether Judge Revoir recused the way he did, without vacating his illegal orders described here, so that criminal proceedings against people who criticized him and dared to complain about him, should go on - whether proceedings are based on illegal orders or not.

Is this a message sent by the local judiciary - if anybody hires me, that person suffers? Or, if anybody criticizes or complains against a judge, that person suffers - along with her relatives, her children and her pets?

Because if this is the message, it is the wrong message to make, and that is exactly why I filed the third complaint against Judge Revoir.





Wednesday, October 1, 2014

Barbara J. O'Sullivan is suing the Deputy Sheriff Derek Bowie for vehicular assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress

A lawsuit has been filed in the Delaware County Supreme Court by Barbara J. O'Sullivan against Derek Bowie, the Deputy Sheriff of the Delaware County Sheriff's Department, for vehicular assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress for Derek Bowie's alleged actions on September 5, 2014.

Ms. O'Sullivan is seeking nominal, special, actual and punitive damages against Derek Bowie.

Since September 5, 2014, the date of the alleged vehicular assault of Derek Bowie upon Barbara O'Sullivan, Derek Bowie has brought against Barbara O'Sullivan several criminal proceedings which Derek Bowie himself investigated.

The case name is O'Sullivan v. Bowie, Delaware County Index No. 2014-911.