The Chenango County Family Court, New York, continues to block access of litigants to their own files

I've written on this blog that I know of three cases where the Chenango County Family Court blocks people's access to their own court records and digital recordings of proceedings, especially when judicial misconduct is a potential issue.


Now I know about four such cases, and in all of them the litigants were indigent, issues of judicial misconduct were involved, in 1 case out of 4 the person was not entitled to an attorney, in 1 out of 4 a person was denied assigned counsel and in 2 out of 4 assigned counsel refused to do discovery in a pending case or to communicate with their clients, thus, jeopardizing the case and refusing to provide any assistance of counsel, yet the Family Court continued in one case and continues in another case to use the fact that the person had or has an assigned counsel to deny them access to the court records.


Based on the facts reported to me, which I have no reason to doubt, it appears that the Chenango County Family Court (NY) has a policy to block litigants from raising issues of judicial misconduct in order to protect judges.


Such issues were already raised against the Chenango County Family Court in a federal lawsuit, Davis v Campbell, 3:13-cv-0693-LEK-ATB filed by a pro se indigent plaintiff, but the lawsuit was dismissed by Judge Lawrence Kahn of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York before it was even served, on "immunity" grounds, even though the person asked for declaratory relief (to declare that what the court did was a violation of the U.S. Constitution).
I provided an analysis of how the dismissals and discrimination against pro se indigent plaintiffs occurs in cases like this in an earlier blog post here.


Declaratory relief is not subject to any judicially created immunities, nor is a request for prospective injunctive relief of an ongoing constitutional violation, and the indigent plaintiff was intimidated against appealing the case because the federal district court "certified" the case as frivolous (made in bad faith) and thus chilled the indigent litigant from appealing the case.


So, next time when you read in a scholarly article or book that most of the judges are allegedly honorable and only very few engage in judicial misconduct - think again.

If that is true, why the judicial machine on both state and federal sides is so active in stalling claims of judicial misconduct on all levels - from assigning the "right" counsel who does not want to work for the indigents, to intimidation of attorneys by sanctions and revocation of licenses for criticism of the judiciary, so that attorneys would be terrified and would refuse to make motions to recuse.


Why would a district federal court be "certifying" that a pro se federal lawsuit that is clearly claiming multiple constitutional violations was brought in "bad faith" by an indigent plaintiff before that plaintiff had the benefit of consulting an attorney or serving the lawsuit?


It appears that in such "sua sponte" dismissals courts act on behalf of judges, in completely violation of court-advocate rule.


And this will remain how things are done in courts until and unless victims of this misconduct come forward and start speaking out.

What is an attorney to do if she is prosecuted on fraudulent charges? Speak out - nothing else helps.

I have stated since the time I first started this blog in March of 2014 that I am the target of political prosecution by the Committee for Professional Conduct based on 3 sanctions imposed upon me by Judge Carl F. Becker "for frivolous conduct",  and that all sanctions were imposed by Judge Becker upon me after I sued the judge for misconduct.

Moreover, I wrote that two charges in the disciplinary petition were fraudulent and the remaining charges - unconstitutional, as representing personal vendetta of a disqualified and biased judge who I sued right before he imposed the sanctions.

All sanctions were imposed in 2011, none were for hurting a client.   

Since the Committee for Professional Conduct for the 3rd Department, even when presented with documents showing that their charges are fraudulent, refused to withdraw the charges, it is time to publish documentary evidence showing that the charges are fraudulent.

I want to show to the public just how incompetent, immoral and corrupt prosecutors in the Professional Conduct Committee for the 3rd Department are for (1) bringing such charges and (2) continuing with them for 1.5 years in 2 courts, state and federal.

I want to show the public just how incompetent, immoral and corrupt prosecutors in the Attorney Grievance Committee for the 4th Department are for continuing to prosecute these fraudulent charges where they had in front of them documentary evidence clearly showing the charges are fraudulent.

Charge I Specification I says that Judge Carl F. Becker, of Delaware County Supreme Court, sanctioned me on August 10, 2011 in the amount of $1,250 because:

(1) I allegedly represented clients in an action "Matter of M & C Brothers, Inc. v. Bradley W. Torum, Samme Chittum-Torum, Tyler Harcott, Genevieve Gorder";

(2) It was implied that depositions in that case were repeatedly adjourned through my fault, otherwise why should that statement be in the disciplinary charges against me;

(3) that Judge Becker ("the above referenced court") issued a scheduling order directing completion of depositions by a date certain, subject to a conditional order of preclusion permitting an aggrieved party to seek an order striking the offending party's claims or defenses, and

(4) that I (THE RESPONDENT) committed the following attorney misconduct by ALLEGEDLY violating the order of preclusion and by ALLEGEDLY doing nothing to oppose the motion to preclude:

(a)  I ALLEGEDLY did not appear for scheduled depositions;
(b)  I ALLEGEDLY offered no explanation as to why I did not appear;
(c ) I ALLEGEDLY failed to submit written opposition to plaintiff's subsequent motion to strike the answer.

(5)  Judge Becker ("the above referenced court") then allegedly granted plaintiff's motion to strike and entered a default judgment against the defendant;

(6) If a reasonable reader not knowing anything but what is in the Petition (such as the court) reads the Petition, it will understand from Charge I Specification I that Judge Becker punished me for not appearing at the deposition, offering no explanation and failing to submit written opposition to plaintiff's motion to preclude.

Since it is Charge I Specification I, the very first charge, it is the most serious charge in the Petition - and it is serious, it is a charge of gross neglect against the client.

This charge was submitted by attorney Peter Torncello to a court, Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department, in a verified Petition, where attorney Torncello has sworn to the truth of allegations contained in the Petition under oath:

Only Peter Torncello committed perjury because his allegations in Charge I Specification I did not and COULD NOT happen, and here is why.

Here is the front page of the transcript of the deposition in question:

The transcript was on file with the Delaware County Supreme Court as part of the file M & C Brothers, Inc. v. Torum, Index No. 2007-280, and on file in the Appellate Division as part of the Record on Appeal from the subsequent motion to vacate the judgment of default.  Peter Torncello did not even have to come to Delhi, NY in Delaware County to check out that record, it was right under his nose in Albany, NY.

The front page of the transcript clearly shows that the deposition in question was held in September of 2008.

Peter Torncello stated in the same disciplinary petition that I was admitted to practice law in 2009, see the front page of Torncello's petition, paragraph 2:

Here is the second page of the transcript of the same deposition.

 It clearly shows that:

(1) There was an attorney representing Bradley Torum and Samme Chittum-Torum at the deposition on September 15, 2008;  and that

(2) That attorney was my husband Frederick J. Neroni.

Thus, it was clearly untrue that:

(1) I was an attorney at the time of the deposition;
(2) that I had a duty to appear at that deposition;
(3) that no attorney appeared at that deposition.

Here is the Affirmation of Mailing of the Order to Show Cause for the motion to preclude in question:

The first page of the application for the Order to Show Cause shows that :

(1) Judge Becker was not the assigned judge on the case at the time the application was made, it was judge Eugene E. Peckham;

(2) The application was made on December 9, 2008 when I was NOT AN ATTORNEY, not the attorney of record on the case and not only I did not answer the motion, but if I would answer that motion representing myself as an attorney at the time, that would be a crime of practicing law without a license;

(3) that the counsel for the defendants Torum and Chittum-Torum at that time was Frederick J. Neroni (my husband) and not I.

(By the way, my husband did not have to answer the application either because it was never served - and no affirmation of service of a signed Order to Show Cause is on file with the court).

So, Peter Torncello is accusing me, under oath, of NOT practicing law without a license, which, ladies and gentlemen, is insane and Peter Torncello should be checked out for mental instability.

Charges II and III charge me with being sanctioned by Judge Becker after I sued him, in Shields v. Carbone and in Adams v. Bracci.  I already described these cases in detail in my blogs, as well as Judge Becker's misconduct in those cases.  

"Coincidentally", when I brought a motion to vacate the sanctions imposed upon me and my indigent client in Adams v. Bracci, all hell broke loose upon my client, the presiding judge went berserk to the point I had to turn him into the Committee of Judicial Misconduct, but the Judge still retaliated against my client by issuing an illegal bench warrant against her, which turned into a SWAT team production against her AND her disabled mother where my client's mother was assaulted by a police vehicle and her tablet with which she was video recording police misconduct was destroyed.

Charge IV charges me with the following:

When I filed notices of appeal of the sanctions in the summer of 2011, I filed the full amounts of sanctions into court as an escrow/bond - and thus ceded control over that money.

My affirmation of bond was on file with the Delaware County Clerk, who by law is the clerk for the Supreme Court of the State of New York in Delaware County who is responsible to accept such filings.

The Delaware County COURT CLERK (a supporter of Judge Becker in his elections of 2012) failed to transfer the money to the Lawyers' Protection Fund when one appeals were denied - and I was somehow to blame.

Yet, by January 2013 when the disciplinary petition with Charge IV was filed, the money was with the Delaware County Clerk's office for a year and a half, for which documentary evidence existed - that Peter Torncello simply was too lazy to check that, or checking that evidence would run contrary to his orders, to prosecute and disbar me no matter what.

These obviously fraudulent charges are continuing and survived in two courts so far and are pending in the third court, despite the fact that I provided all documentation to each court, and the Committee clearly does not have AUTHORITY, nor do the courts in question, for prosecuting me for NOT practicing law without a license in 2008, before my admission to the bar.

I actually notified the Committee several times about their "mistake", and the Committee ignored me.

I created an electronic record and sent the full copy of the deposition (above) and the Order to Show Cause (above), with supporting affirmation, dated also in December of 2008, to Mr. Zayas, Peter Torncello's subordinate attorney, who also left the Committee together with Peter Torncello after I sued both of them for fraud upon the court (dismissed by Judge Tormey for failure to serve after their counsel waived defects of service by filing an Answer on the merits).

Yet, attorney Torncello still proceeded with his fraudulent claims.

In fact, to avoid making the above false statements, all that Peter Torncello had to do was to actually read the records of the 3rd Department and of the court which issued all the orders that Peter Torncello was talking about.  This is elementary due diligence for any attorney, the due diligence that Peter Torncello did not feel he was obligated to do - because Peter Torncello, based on his own letter to me when I complained to the Committee of his misconduct, is unaccountable, is above the law and can allow himself to toss complaints against himself.

All that Peter Torncello had to do NOT to file fraudulent charges in 2013 was simply to look into the court file that of the case he was referencing and do his due diligence in order (1) not to take the court's time with frivolous claims;  (2) not to defraud the court and (3) not to bring false charges against an attorney - all of which is attorney misconduct FOR PETER TORNCELLO.

Yet, as I said, no matter that I've already proven beyond ANY doubt that Charge I Specification I and Charge IV are frivolous charges and Charges II and III are part of Judge Becker's unconstitutional personal vendetta, the case still proceeds, and now the Committee for Professional Conduct of the 4th Department insists that a summary judgment (judgment without a trial or hearing) should be granted on the fraudulent charges.

I am an attorney.

I am supposed to instill into my clients that there is a rule of law in the State of New York, and to advise them how the law operates.

Yet, in application to myself I know that there is no law if people look at something that is factually and legally impossible and continue to prosecute me on these impossible, insane and fraudulent charges.  Why?  Because a bunch of judges want my disbarment since I am publicly criticizing their misconduct, and the judges do not know how to handle the truth other to destroy the messenger of that truth.

And - unfortunately - attorneys on the Committee feel that any whim of any judge, no matter how unlawful and unsupported - is the Committee's command.  


But - since fraud upon the court is a basis for disbarment in the state of New York, when will attorneys John Casey and Peter Torncello be disbarred?

So, in New York an attorney who happens to criticize judicial misconduct, can be prosecuted on CHARGES THAT ARE KNOWN TO BE FRAUDULENT TO ALL PARTICIPANTS, FOR YEARS, and without any recourse against the perpetrators of the fraud.

And this is, supposedly, the rule of law in the State of New York.

When will attorney Peter Torncello be disbarred for using his power to block a disciplinary investigation and prosecution against himself? When will attorney John Casey, of Hiscock & Barclays, be disbarred for selling his prosecutorial discretion to retired judge Robert Harlem and his son Richard Harlem?

Here is a letter that Chief Attorney Peter Torncello (who resigned amid investigation into his potential misconduct in allegedly falsifying time sheets, but also sued for fraud upon the court) - wrote to me when I turned HIM in for misconduct into HIS Committee for Professional Conduct - because in New York, there is no other way to turn in disciplinary prosecutors.

Peter Torncello reviewed the complaint against himself and refused to investigate it quoting a "policy" that he applied to himself and that prohibited him to investigate and prosecute HIMSELF because of pending litigation against himself.

In his letter, attorney Torncello (who still has his law license intact) explained to me that I need to address with my " allegations" his litigation counsel.

Apparently, attorney Torncello, chief attorney of the Committee for Professional Conduct who has taken livelihood and reputation of many attorneys during his representation of the Committee for several years, did not really understand that the Committee was not his personal fiefdom and that if a member of the public (me) makes a complaint to the Committee about an attorney (Peter Torncello), Peter Torncello has no right to investigate it, prosecute it, make any decision upon it.

Peter Torncello also did not seem to realize while writing this letter that the complaint filed WITH the Committee should be reviewed BY the Committee - and if it is about members or attorneys of the Committee - all that has to be done is appointing disinterested investigators and prosecutors who would handle it.

Peter Torncello did not seem to realize that the Committee members or attorneys HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REJECT complaints AGAINST THEMSELVES without first RECUSING from HANDLING SUCH COMPLAINTS in ANY WAY.

Peter Torncello did not seem to realize that he had no right to direct me to "communicate solely" with his litigation attorney on matters pertaining to misconduct of Peter Torncello when all I was asking was that the COMMITTEE FOR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, a governmental body entrusted to deal with issues of attorney misconduct (not Peter Torncello personally) should do its duty and investigate misconduct of several attorneys, those attorneys being attorneys for the Committee and attorney members of the Committee.

Once again - if a mechanism of disqualification is not in existence in the Committee where misconduct of its own members is the issue of a complaint to the Committee (as Peter Torncello's letter clearly shows), it is frivolous for these prosecutors to claim prosecutorial immunity, given to prosecutors by the U.S. Supreme Court specifically because they are otherwise subject to attorney discipline.

I also provided a diagram of how the little policy of non-prosecution that Peter Torncello generously applied to the complaint AGAINST HIMSELF is - or is not - applied at the Committee's whim and in accordance with the status of the attorney  who is the subject of the complaint and the attorney's relationship with members of the Committee.

It is not the policy which rules in the Committee for "Professional" Conduct, Appellate Division, 3rd Department - it is clear, obvious and unadulterated corruption.

I apologize for the small font in the diagram and request the readers to use the magnification that computers and tablets allow to view this table.  Unfortunately, I was not able to make the diagram larger while preserving all details in it.

 

Here is for your comparison:

The date of my husband's disbarment - July 7, 2011 (connected to the actual court decision by a link).

Next, here is a scan of John Casey's self-advertisement showing that:

(1) he is a law partner in Hiscock & Barclays;

(2) he has been a member of the Committee for Professional Conduct in 2007-2013, including the time when my husband was prosecuted by his Committee and disbarred:

A scan from New York E-courts from the case Neroni v. Harlem showing that a Request for Judicial Intervention (request for a judge to be assigned to the case) was filed on 6/13/2011, before Mr. Neroni's disbarment, and that Hiscock & Barclays, where John Casey was at the time a law partner, represents the Defendants:

The law of agency in New York applies equally to all partnerships, including law partnerships:  if a partnership represents a party, each partner of the partnership is PRESUMED by law to be representing that party.

Thus, John Casey, who was supposed to prosecute Richard Harlem and Robert Harlem (you can word-search their names on this blog to see the extent of their misconduct) instead, is PRESUMED to have accepted them as paying clients, and thus is PRESUMED to have shared in their attorneys' fees, and thus is PRESUMED to have received a bribe from two attorneys to not prosecute them and to instead prosecute the complainant against them - which is what John Casey did.

My question remains - when will this corruption end and when John Casey will be prosecuted and disbarred for his misconduct? 

New York state law has no mechanisms for disqualification of disciplinary attorneys from investigating and prosecuting themselves

Time and again I myself and other people I talked with, come across a peculiar problem with reporting attorney misconduct in the state of New York, and that is reporting misconduct of attorneys who are either employed by the committees of professional conduct, or are members of such committees.

In other words, there is a problem in reporting and enforcing attorney discipline against attorneys who enforce attorney discipline against other attorneys.

Attorneys who represent attorney disciplinary committees, as well as attorneys who are members of such committees and constitute super-majorities of such committees in all 4 Appellate Divisions of the State of New York, are bound by the same rules of professional conduct as any other licensed attorney in New York.

Or, at least, they should be, but they obviously are not.

In my experience, when I found out that 18 attorney members of the Committee for Professional Conduct of the 3rd Department are engaged in fraudulent conduct, specifically, filed fraudulent disciplinary charges against me, and that is after I pointed out their mistake with documentary proof based on court records, and they continued their prosecution based on fraudulent charges, I had a right to report these attorneys for misconduct.

Yet, to report them where?

The only forum to report them to appeared to be THEIR OWN DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE.

So, that's what I did.

In addition of suing the attorneys involved for fraud upon the court, I reported them to their own disciplinary committee, and asked to appoint a special investigator and prosecutor to verify my complaint against them.

What I received back astounded me.

It was a letter from Peter Torncello, then chief attorney of the Committee (since then Peter Torncello resigned amid investigation into his own misconduct on allegedly other grounds than fraud upon the court that I sued him for).

In that letter Peter Torncello notified me that I should direct my inquiries and complaints to Mr. Torncello's LITIGATION COUNSEL!!!

In other words, Peter Torncello, who I sued in his INDIVIDUAL capacity, for fraud upon the court, claimed that I cannot inquire about his misconduct with the only forum, the Committee for Professional Conduct of the Appellate Division 3rd Department, which covers all attorneys practicing within its jurisdiction, including Peter Torncello himself.

Moreover, Peter Torncello tossed charged against himself and his brethren and sisters in the Committee, and then turned around and complained to the 3rd Department Court that appointed him about my complaint regarding his misconduct to the Committee, which normally no attorney can do.

The Committee for Professional Conduct of the 3rd Department never investigated or prosecuted its own members for misconduct and fraud upon the court, never recused from such prosecutions and investigations - even though no prosecutor, very obviously, has a right to investigate or prosecute THEMSELVES.

Since I am "only" the complainant to the Professional Conduct Committee, I appear not to even have standing to make a motion to the Appellate Division 3rd Department to have a special investigator or prosecutor appointed to investigate and prosecute the prosecutors.

At this time, I have the very same problem with the 4th Department Attorney Grievance Committee who proceed with fraudulent charges filed by the 3rd Department Professional Conduct Committee and are involved in the same prosecutorial misconduct, and that refers both to attorneys who prosecute the case, and attorney members of the Committee who direct their actions.

I wonder if I have to, once again, turn in now attorneys of the 4th Department into their own Committee - obviously with the same results that they will toss my complaint laughing, because I cannot do anything to appeal their misbehavior or address it in any way other than ask the court to sanction them for frivolous conduct (which I did). 

Yet, attorney discipline is a proceeding separate, apart and independent of any court proceeding, and that remedy is obviously unavailable against the disciplinary prosecutors who, for all purposes, appear to be above the law in the state of New York and not subject to the very same attorney disciplinary rules that they are enforcing against other attorneys.

If one tries to sue these disciplinary prosecutors in federal courts (and I tried, on my husband's behalf), disciplinary prosecutors immediately claim  absolute prosecutorial immunity in state and federal courts from liability for any misconduct that they committed while carrying out their prosecutorial duties.

Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court only granted that absolute prosecutorial immunity on the understanding that there is attorney discipline available against the prosecutors (not that federal courts, bent to protect the government in any form and for any misconduct, care much about precedents that do not favor the government).

In case of disciplinary prosecutors in the state of New York, such discipline is, very obviously, not available, as no mechanisms to investigate or prosecute misconduct of the disciplinary prosecutors exists under New York law,  because NOBODY IS GRANTED STANDING to challenge disqualification of investigators or prosecutors, and thus nobody can effectively enforce that only qualified investigators and prosecutors investigate and prosecute disciplinary attorneys turned in for misconduct.  Nobody is given a right to challenge the disciplinary attorneys' practice of tossing complaints against themselves, a due process violation.

So, the disciplinary attorneys in New York are given a free rule to rid the public of legal services of any attorney they can target for prosecution, for whatever fraudulent and vile reasons, without any recourse for the public.

I have raised the issue in federal court, but, given the institutional bias agaisnt civil rights litigants as a whole, disbarred attorneys specifically, and I raised it on behalf of a disbarred attorney, and general bias of federal courts in favor of the government under the claims of "comity" and "federalism", federal courts rejected this idea.

Yet, stripping disciplinary prosecutors of their immunity at least until they have effective mechanisms of discipline installed against them in state law, seems as a logical thing to do, flowing directly from the the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court precedent on prosecutorial immunity, Imbler v. Pacthman.

No legal remedy in the State of New York against arbitrary behavior of intermediate appellate courts

When a state court in the state of New York is acting in an arbitrary manner or outside of its jurisdiction, there is a legal remedy available for it, at least theoretically.

It is the so-called Article 78 proceeding which replaced the writs of mandamus and prohibition against judges and must be brought up in the intermediate appellate courts as courts of original jurisdiciton.

An Article 78 petition can be filed as of right against any judge of a New York state court that is lower than an intermediate appellate court.

There is no such remedy available on the federal level, as the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, specifically prohibits injunctive relief against state courts in their official capacities, and the writ of mandamus is, in effect, a request for such injunctive relief.

Yet, when it is the Appellate courts, acting as courts of original jurisdiction, which do something arbitrary and outside of their authority, New York law provides no legal remedy against such misconduct, as the highest court in the state, the New York State Court of Appeals, lacks authority to intervene and issue writs of mandamus against intermediate appellate courts acting as courts of original jurisdiction.

This gap leaves litigants in intermediate appellate courts as courts of original jurisdiction (mostly, attorneys in disciplinary proceedings) without a legal remedy available to all other litigants in New York courts.

And, I believe, this gap must be closed by the Legislature, as at this time the way Article 78 is shaped, it denies equal protection to litigants in intermediate appellate courts as courts of original jurisdiction.

Is the Constitution still the Supreme Law of the Land in this country? Apparently not - if judges look for "compelling precedent" to allow executions of the innocent to proceed...

Cannot recover after reading the blog of an active federal judge where he answers a question he posed to himself - whether, hypothetically, he would authorize an execution of a person he knows IS INNOCENT to proceed.


Judge Kopf of a federal court in Nebraska, provides three reasons as to why the answer to that question will be "yes", that he will in fact authorize, as a judge, an execution of a person that he, as a judge, knew was innocent of the crime he was charged with, convicted for and condemned to death for.


I will quote Judge Kopf's own words, with my highlighting:


"

Hypothetically, if I were confronted with a case where the petitioner was factually innocent of murder and I knew that he was factually innocent of murder and there was no federal legal remedy available to stop the execution, I would probably allow the execution to proceed if I was satisfied that there was precedent that compelled such a result. For example, should the Supreme Court hold that factual innocence is not cognizable as a “stand alone” federal claim, I would follow that precedent.

Hypothetically, if I were confronted with a case where the petitioner was factually innocent of murder and I knew that he was factually innocent of murder and there was no federal legal remedy available to stop the execution, I would probably allow the execution to proceed if I was satisfied that the petitioner could also resort to a fair and speedy pardon process prior to the execution.

Hypothetically, if I were confronted with a case where the petitioner was factually innocent of murder and I knew that he was factually innocent of murder and there was no federal legal remedy available to stop the execution, I would probably allow the execution to proceed if I was satisfied that the petitioner had “sat on his rights” thus contributing to the absence of a legal remedy to address his factual innocence."

Thus, the three reasons why a federal judge would allow an execution of an innocent person to proceed are:


(1) if there is such a precedent (in another case another judge allowed the same injustice to be done);


(2) a pardon procedure is available (a discretionary relief from the executive branch) - in other words, if the Governor, on a whim, without considering the issue of guilt or innocence, may just decide to forgive the condemned to death prisoner, whether he committed any crimes or not - you understand how unlikely that is;


(3) the innocent person is himself to blame that he did not raise his innocence earlier - but he did, by pleading not guilty from the very beginning of the criminal proceedings!


So, an outspoken and honest judge who can be thanked at least for his honesty, for expressing what he feels about such "hypothetical" situation as having to condemn to death an innocent person knowing about his innocence - provides three reasons why such a gross injustice as using the law to take the life of an INNOCENT human being may be justified:


(1) if some other judge before this judge already did the same thing and provided a "precedent" for the present judge to rely upon - this argument perpetuates injustice, and violates an ancient principle that abuse of the law, even if it is a long abuse of the law, does not make the abuse the actual law;


(2) if somebody else may still (unlikely though it is) come to the rescue of the condemned INNOCENT person - then it is still good and lawful to condemn him to die;


(3) this is a classic - blame the innocent victim that he or she did not yell loud and persuasive enough that he or she is innocent.  What happened with the right of defendant to remain silent, plea of not guilty.  Moreover, what does timing have to do with anything when we are talking about the case where THE JUDGE KNOWS THE PERSON IS INNOCENT!!!


What Judge Kopf described about his feelings is all that is wrong with our judiciary system:


(1) perpetuate the injustice based on prior injustice;
(2) pass the buck to somebody else who may do your job for you;
(3) blame the victim.


To devise "legal" reasons justifying sending to death the person who the judge KNOWS IS INNOCENT is simply sick - but the problem is that this reasoning, from my personal experience and research, reflects the reasoning of the entire judicial system of the United States and its "sovereign states" where courts which habitually choose "finality" over fairness, even when they know they commit gross injustice.
And they do that after having been sworn in office to protect the U.S. constitution which, among other things, prohibits cruel and unusual punishment - and tell me, is there a more cruel punishment than to punish with a death penalty an innocent person who committed no crime?
The 8th Amendment that Judge Kopf is sworn to protect, never ONCE entered his reasoning.






When we have judges who look for precedent allowing them to violate the very Constitution they are sworn to protect, who in their right mind can call this judicial system "access to justice" and "the rule of law"?

A judge will not disbar a judge

I have been analyzing reports of judicial misconduct and reactions to them from various states of this country.


As you, probably, know if you read my blog regularly, I am also researching the issue of judicial retaliation against attorneys who criticize judges.


A peculiar pattern appears from all reports of judicial misconduct.


A judge apparently can do nearly anything - and still escape with his or her law license, and all that an attorney has to do to lose his law license is to criticize a judge.


I decided to put some of my findings into a table illustrating to what lengths judges can go and still keep their licenses.


With no effective judicial discipline, ever expanding judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts and nearly no criminal prosecutions of judges no matter what they do on the bench - judgeships are, probably, the safest careers of all.


Such careers are safety nets for incompetent and immoral people who can do ANYTHING in their office - and still escape with their law license.


Apparently, the public does not have to be protected from a lawyer the same way that people are to be protected from a rogue judge.


It is beyond me why attorney disciplinary authority do nothing to remove law licenses from former judges taken off the bench for misconduct or mental instability - it is very easy to do, by using the same "collateral estoppel" that is regularly used against attorneys who get disbarred without an opportunity for a hearing because some state court has decided a related issue by a low evidentiary standard.


Here, disciplinary standards are the same in the judicial disciplinary proceedings and the attorney disciplinary proceedings.


So why not discipline these judges as attorneys, too?


The only answer that comes to explain this situation is judges of the attorney licensing courts are afraid to create such precedents as to not to destroy their own safe harbors, should they themselves be removed from the bench for misconduct, incompetence or mental instability.


And that is one good reason to take attorney licensing out of the hands of the judiciary.

No.	Name of Judge	State	What did the judge do	Disciplined as a judge?	Suspended or disbarred?	Where works now
1.	James C. Tormey	New York	Asking a court employee to spy against a democratic judicial candidate, a judge of Family Court;  demoting and harassing the employee when she refused	No	No	Chief Administrative Judge, 5th Judicial District
2.	Bryan Hedges	New York, Onondaga County Family Court	Allegedly molestation of a 5-year old deaf-mute niece The alternative version is that Judge Hedges actually warned Attorney Morin that Judge Tormey is planning a retaliation against her, and that’s why he was destroyed by Judge Tormey’s friend William Fitzpatrick who failed to get a payoff from Judge Hedges	Yes, taken off the bench	No
3.	Diane L. Schilling	New York, East Greenbush Town Court (also until the scandal, special counsel to Judge Coccoma, Chief Admin. Judge of upstate New York)	Fixing a traffic ticket for another judge's wife	Yes, taken off the bench	No	Partner in MGuire and Cardona where a son of a late chief appellate judge Anthony Cardona and a niece of the present federal NDNY judge Mae D’Agostino are partners.  The law firm mentions in the website that Diane Schilling has “served” as a judge in East Greenbush court, not that she was taken off the bench
4.	Robert Restaino	New York, Niagara Falls City Court	Jailed the whole courtroom full of people because one cell phone rang	Yes, taken off the bench	No
5.	Gerald P. Garson	Former judge of NYS Supreme Court	Convicted for bribery	Taken off the bench	Disbarred
6.	Gilbert A. Abramson	Family Court, Saratoga County	Sexual jokes and suggestive behavior with female litigants	Taken off the bench	Registration status delinquent, but not suspended or disbarred
7.	Gerard E. Maney	Family Court Judge Albany County	Caught driving drunk, asked for a "professional courtesy" from the police	Censured, remained on the bench Joseph W. Belluck, a Manhattan lawyer, wrote that it was “mind-boggling” that the judge would be left on the bench after making “a calculated effort” to ensure that the law “would not be applied to him personally.”	No	Acting Supreme Court Justice, Supervising Judge, Albany County Family Court
8.	Cory Woodward	California, Superior Court Kern County	Having Sex in chambers	Reprimand, remained on the bench	No
9.	Scott Steiner	California, Superior Court, Orange County	Having sex in chambers	Reprimand, remained on the bench	No
10.	Wade McCree	Detroit, Michigan	Having sex in chambers with a witness in a criminal case, discussing sentencing of her husband who did not pay child support with that witness	Taken off the bench	No
11.	Kimberly Brown	Indiana	47 counts of misconduct: Delayed release of defendants from jail, failed to train court employees, created hostile environment for staff, did not cooperate with investigation	Taken off the bench	No
12.	Cynthia Brim	Illinois, was a judge since 1994, had mental breakdowns since 1994, with at least 5 hospitalizations	shoved a court deputy, found not guilty by reason of temporary insanity	Taken off the bench for mental instability	No
13.	Robert Spitzer	California	Gross neglect of cases, delays, disorganized files	Taken off the bench	Suspended, but not disbarred
14.	Giselle Polack	Florida, Broward County Drug Court	DUI	Suspended From the bench	No