THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.


Wednesday, February 22, 2017

Can federal employment be conditioned on watching "sensitivity training" videos despite an impeccable performance on the job?

An administrative judge Gary Suttles, of Social Security Administration, was fired for refusing to watch a 17-minute LGBT-awareness video.

The judge was on the job for 12 years, obviously without a disciplinary record, and stated in an e-mail that he treats everybody equally and with respect.

Apparently, that was not enough for him to keep his job.

He was fired - and sued the federal government.

A lawyer specializing in such issues reportedly stated in an interview about this case:

""If it's a requirement in the job in terms of training, you ought to take it," he said, "and if you really feel that strongly about it you can say, 'I won't take it, but I will recuse myself if the people in court fall into this protected group.'"

I disagree.

An employer, especially when the employer is the federal government, may not order just any training, the training must be related to the job performance, and must be related to the particular problems in the job performance.

A desire to simply "raise cultural awareness" is not enough to jam certain training down people's throats.

In this case, the judge clearly stated that he treats everybody in his courtroom with equal respect, and thus there were no reasons to fire him.

Political issues aside, the question here is:

  • if an employee does his job;
  • did not commit misconduct, and
  • did not commit discrimination of any kind while on the job
can he be fired for simply refusing to watch "cultural awareness" training videos - once again, if he never discriminated against anyone for any reason and if he pledges to treat everybody equally and with respect, which is what the duty of a judge presupposes?

Can such "discrimination awareness videos" be regarded as asking from the judge to give MORE regard to members of the LGBR community instead of being neutral and impartial and treat everybody as equal under the law?

I will follow this lawsuit and report the outcome on this blog.

Stay tuned.


An Arkansas lawyer was disciplined in South Carolina for hiring private investigators who did their jobs well, for conduct allowed in Georgia, Arkansas and by the American Bar Association

It is a well known fact that the police is allowed to lie to the subject of its investigation in order to obtain information.

And, the police is often working under the guidance of an attorney - the state or county prosecutor guiding the investigation.

I have never read about a prosecutor disciplined in any state for directing the police to lie to a suspect in order to elicit information.

In fact, in the police training lying to the suspect, or "duplicity and pretense" are paraded as legitimate interrogation and investigation techniques.

Yet, in a case with apparent equal protection problems, a private attorney was just disciplined by the State of South Carolina for doing exactly the same.

An Arkansas attorney Cecil Duff Nolan, Jr. allegedly hired and sent into South Carolina private investigators who lied to suspects in order to collect information.

Here is what the attorney was disciplined for:



Ok, where do I begin.

First, South Carolina, as far as I know, does not have a criminal statute prohibiting surreptitious telephone recording when one party to the recorded telephone conversation gives consent to the recording.

And, without such a statute, there is no right to regard such recording as a crime.

Moreover, South Carolina courts, also as far as I know, adhere to federal rules regarding surreptitious telephone recording, which is a one-person consent statute - so, if the investigators gave themselves consent to record a conversation they participated in, their conduct was lawful.

As to impersonating somebody else - here, posing as a customer or potential customer - and "prodding", or, rather, asking about products, how else does the court think an investigation can be conducted, just walk through the front door, introduce yourself as a private investigator, "honestly" (or, rather, stupidly) say what you are investigating and why, and expect to receive honest answers to your questions?

By this disciplining decision South Carolina in effect prohibited its attorneys to hire investigators at all - because what private investigators did in this case is their usual investigation techniques and practices.

Nor are any "third party rights" violated.

The investigators were actually investigating potential infringement of somebody's intellectual rights.  There is no "third party right" to be free from an investigation into your own misconduct - because this is what South Carolina disciplinary decision implies.

So, on the one hand, "...over the last 35 years courts have upheld countless confessions even though the investigator lied to the suspect during an interview or interrogation. In most of these cases the investigator made false statements about being in possession of evidence that implicated the suspect in the crime e.g., eye-witness, fingerprint, DNA, etc."

And that is in criminal cases, where consequences of such lying by investigators are dire.

Yet, investigators lying to the suspect in the exact same manner, or worse, as an attorney's private investigators in a civil case were - impersonating somebody else, asking some questions as if they were customers and not investigators - somehow results in discipline.

Now what?

South Carolina attorneys will not be hiring investigators for fear of discipline?

Or, private investigators will suddenly turn stupid and start presenting themselves to people under their investigation as private investigators?

For example, this private investigator who was sharing online some of his tricks and success stories:



I doubt that the private investigator or his staff member just marched to the ex-wife and asked her - what is your extra source of income that you do not want to reveal to your husband with whom you are involved in a child support battle?  Because, otherwise, that private eye would not have gotten the information he actually did get.

Since it was for a court case, I wonder if the attorney or party who hired him was sanctioned by the court for not being honest with the ex-spouse who was concealing her income from the court and the ex-husband - or, in other words, involved in misconduct, as the disciplined attorney suspected the defendant company was, in infringing his client's intellectual property rights.

All that the disciplining South Carolina court achieved is that people will first hire investigators and, only after investigators conclude their investigation, will hire an attorney, or will engage in any other tricks to simply separate and shield the attorney from the knowledge that an investigator was hired by the party, and that will be the end of it.

The court pretended it legitimately imposed discipline, the attorney accepted a light discipline in order to keep his license no matter whether discipline was fair or legitimate or not, and the bar at large will continue to do the exact same thing, making more precautions against getting caught.

There is one word to describe this disciplinary decision.

Stupid.

My next question would be - who was the defendant in that intellectual property infringement case, and what kind of connections did the defendant have, what kind of strings were pulled to use taxpayer money to commence a disciplinary prosecution on such a stupid subject in the first place, and to bring it to imposition of attorney discipline, second?

The disciplinary case indicates that the court case that has led to discipline was initially commenced in a federal court in Georgia in 2009.

The only case filed in 2009 that Pacer.gov, the official registry of federal court cases, has with attorney Cecil Duff Nolan, Jr. as attorney of record, is this case, for alleged unauthorized use of PVP protected oat seeds.

Here is the full complaint filed in that case:





The only problem that I see with South Carolina case is that the disciplinary case states that the federal case was removed from a federal court in Georgia to South Carolina.


Yet, the docket of the case shows that the case was not removed, but was dismissed with prejudice on stipulation of parties.













To me, this disciplinary case appears to be quite mysterious.

There is, once again, only one case filed in federal court in Georgia in 2009 with Cecil Duff Nolan, Jr. as an attorney of record.  It is, indeed, an intellectual property infringement case where the complaint mentions that the defendants were located in the State of Georgia, but some of them could be located "in other states".

Was it the correct case, was attorney Cecil Duff Nolan Jr. an attorney of record in that federal case, or only in the "removed" case in South Carolina, I do not know.

If he was, the case was not removed.

If he wasn't attorney of record in federal court before the mysterious removal, and only represented the plaintiff in a state court proceeding, it may be a different case.  South Carolina disciplinary opinion does not identify the case, or the name of the client and the client's opponent in that litigation, which extremely confuses the issue - because, once again, the disciplinary decision is so nonsensical that the only plausible explanation for it that it was made for the so-called "extrajudicial reasons" - not for the reasons stated in the decision, but because of some political connections.

In other words, that the disciplinary case was fixed.  To me, that a disciplinary case against an attorney, and especially an out-of-state attorney, was fixed, is not at all a surprise.


Yet, the mystery is - why? Who pulled the strings and for what reason?  And what power that "somebody" has over the South Carolina Supreme Court and its disciplinary counsel?

I will appreciate tips from readers as to whether the case I found on Pacer.gov is the correct case for which attorney Nolan was punished or not.  As I said, the case I provided here is the only one filed in a federal court in the State of Georgia in 2009 with attorney Nolan as the attorney of record.

And, my question remains - was attorney Cecil Duff Nolan, Jr. disciplined because he was a very good out-of-state trial attorney



who obtained really damaging evidence with the help of private investigators against somebody who had influence upon South Carolina Supreme Court?


Saturday, February 18, 2017

#DelawareCountyFamilyCourtJudgeGaryRosa sees a bright color (red) when he sees my name and is confronted with the truth of his own, and his law clerk's incompetence and misconduct

Some time ago I wrote about inability of Judge Gary Rosa, despite his promises to voters when he came to the bench, not only to be unbiased, but to even be competent and honest in his court decisions, and to apply mandatory procedure to undisputed facts in application of mandatory U.S. Supreme Court constitutional precedents.

I made a motion to vacate sanctions imposed upon me by the now-"retired" Judge Carl F. Becker who got on the bench in 2002 without evidence he was elected (in 2010 Delaware County Board of Elections could not produce any documents that would prove authenticity of Carl Becker's 2002 elections in response to my FOIL request, and Carl Becker did not file a certificate of elections, as required by law, in 2002, so he was clearly a usurper of public office) and who got on the bench for the second time in 2012 by making false claims to voters in his election campaign.

I made the motion at the end of 2016, because the sanctions imposed in 2011 were rendered unconstitutional and void by the two U.S. Supreme Court precedents decided in June of 2015 and in June of 2016.

I also reminded the presiding judge (at that time I made the motion, Judge Mary Rita Connerton was presiding over the case) that for a judge to disobey a U.S. Supreme Court order is a disciplinary violation that recently resulted in suspension from office until the end of his term of the Chief Judge of the State of Alabama Roy Moore.

When I received a decision on motion, it was not by Judge Connerton, but by Judge Gary Rosa who declined to apply two clear mandatory precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court to clear and indisputable facts of the case:


  1. that sanctions were imposed in 2011 for contents of a motion to recuse - in violation of Reed v Town of Gilbert decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2015 declaring content-based regulation of speech unconstitutional; and
  2. that sanctions were imposed in 2011 by a judge who commenced, as an accuser, the proceedings for sanctions, and who complained as a complaining witness and victim, of having been allegedly harassed by the contents of the motion to recuse (on behalf of an indigent pro bono client, by the way) - in violation of Williams v Pennsylvania decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2016, and declaring adjudication of court cases who act both as accusers and adjudicators a violation of due process that renders such decisions void (a nullity, like they never happened).
Moreover, Judge Rosa stated that I was trying to "intimidate" him by the reference to Judge Moore (while I never knew Rosa was presiding over the motion, I thought it was Connerton, and referencing the legal duty of a public official, and the consequences for not fulfilling that duty cannot be viewed as an act of intimidation anyway) by referencing the discipline of the Alabama Chief Judge Roy Moore and claimed - falsely - that the Alabama Chief Judge Roy Moore was not disciplined for defiance of the U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which was contrary to a clear text of Chief Judge Roy Moore's order of discipline.

Since I did not have an opportunity to timely file a motion to recuse Judge Rosa, because I as never notified that Judge Connerton recused and Judge Rosa self-assigned to the case, I made a motion to vacate, renew, reargue and recuse after I received Judge Rosa's denial of my motion.

I also filed an appeal of Judge Rosa's decision to the Appellate Division 3rd Department, where I stated the following issues:

In the appeal I stated that Judge Rosa, upon my information, actually discussed this particular case with the parties, in an ex parte manner, during his election campaign of 2012 - moreover, upon the statement of witnesses to me, he expressed his indignation as to the very sanctions imposed upon me and the indigent party, my then pro bono client, by Judge Becker, and claimed that tthe very sanctions that he reverently discussed in his two decisions so far are evidence of Judge Becker's unfitness to be a judge.  Moreover, Rosa told at least two witnesses that these particular sanctions, and Becker's misbehavior in this particular case were a large reason as to why he is running for the bench at all, to give the public an honest judge instead of Judge Becker.

That statement, upon my information, secured for Judge Rosa votes of two voters for sure, and more voters very likely - the party and her relative who talked to Judge Rosa and those who were inspired by that conversation by being present and listening during that conversation in TWO elections - of 2012 and 2015.

After having secured votes for himself by making ex parte statements about a case, Judge Rosa assigned himself to that same case and made a decision contrary to his pre-election pledge.

I reflected that in my motion to vacate, renew, reargue and recuse Rosa.


Moreover, since I had witnesses ready to testify for me against Judge Rosa, I demanded an evidentiary hearing on the motion to recuse, if Judge Rosa does not recuse voluntarily.
put the motion on the court docket - and thus the motion was not officially heard, as is required by law for lawful court decisions - and Judge Rosa's decision on the motion should thus be void for that reason alone.




I also pointed out that Judge Rosa's method of application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent - by "fact patterns" and "matters" instead of constitutional issues resolved - is incorrect and would have prevented the absolute majority of the U.S. Supreme Court cases from being decided:




I pointed out that the decision on such a motion should be a no-brainer for any self-respecting judge, because the U.S. Supreme Court precedent is clearly in my favor, as applied to facts that Judge Rosa did not dispute:

  1. that sanctions were imposed in 2011 for contents of a motion to recuse;
  2. that sanctions were imposed in 2011 for contents of a motion to recuse after a proceedings for sanctions commenced, as accuser, by the adjudicating the judge himself, and for alleged harassment of the judge that the judge claimed, as a personal offense against himself, in his sua sponte order to show cause that initiated proceedings for sanctions, and in his order imposing sanctions at the end.
This particular prong of analysis chartered out the mandatory procedure, set by the U.S. Supreme Court, that Judge Rosa should have applied to the legal analysis of my motion - and never did, in violation of his oath of office, pledging to uphold the U.S. Constitution and mandatory precedent based on it.






I also pointed out to Judge Rosa that, as much as he wanted to apply the so-called "collateral estoppel" to the order of suspension of my law license, he could not legally do that for the simple reason that the order of suspension came after the sanctions, and thus, undoing the sanctions will undo the order of suspension, very simple.

A classic chicken-and-egg argument.

I then asserted, under oath that based on non-hearsay statements of a party in the case, Judge Rosa had an ex parte communication with that party in 2012, solicited her vote based on his condemnation of the very sanctions he is now refusing to vacate, and is deciding the case, unlawfully, based on his extrajudicial knowledge of the case and without disclosure of his ex parte communication.


The assigned attorney for the party in question, Rosemary Richards, was apparently so paralyzed by fear after reading this motion that she has forgotten about her duty to even TELL HER CLIENT that:

1) a motion like that was filed; and
2) that is mentions the party's statements to me about Judge Rosa and his misconduct -

apparently, Rosemarie Richards was afraid that her client would confirm the truth of my statements in the motion to her and request Rosemarie Richards to support my motion on the party's behalf.

Not even telling a client that a motion was filed in his case is, by the way, a client neglect and a disciplinary violation.

Moreover, it will not be the first disciplinary violation for Rosemarie Richards in this particular case alone - I already wrote earlier how Rosemarie Richards sold out this same indigent client out before, in 2014, forgoing her client's motion without even reading it after she took over the case.

In my motion to recuse that attorney Richards preferred not to show to her client, I also spelled out in my motion to recuse Judge Rosa a claim that he assigned himself to the case in order to retaliate against him for criticism of him and his law clerk, and for my husband's complaint requesting disbarment of his law clerk's husband, and that Judge Rosa already engaged in apparent attempts to thwart felony investigations and prosecutions in TWO criminal cases where I or my husband were victims.

I would like to stress that the minimum threshold upon which a motion to recuse can be made as a matter of due process is APPEARANCE of impropriety.

I did not have to PROVE that Judge Rosa or his law clerks got self-assigned to the case in retaliation against me, my husband and my family.

All I had to do is raise the issue that it so APPEARS from the circumstances of the case, that an impartial observer, after learning about all the facts in the case, can simply draw a reasonable INFERENCE from those facts that it APPEARS that such a retaliation is occurring.










I also pointed out that Judge Rosa decided a case against me not on the law but on his perception that reference to discipline of Alabama Chief Judge Roy Moore in a motion filed in front of a completely different judge is somehow an attempt to intimidate him, Judge Rosa,  while I did not even know that Judge Rosa assigned himself to the case when I was making the initial motion.


I wonder if Judge Rosa, or his law clerk Nancy Deming who no doubt helped research and draft Judge Rosa's decisions in this case, or both of them, are developing some sort of a paranoia in regards to me, and, apparently, after I filed the motion, Judge Rosa confirmed that in his "order of recusal", about that - further in this article.



My motion to vacate, renew and reargue, with exhibits, was on 71 pages, with documentary exhibits - because a motion to recuse in New York requires extensive statement of facts, so I followed the requirements.

Yet, the motion to recuse did not have to happen, because, as I stated in the Conclusion in that motion, my previous motion, the one that Judge Rosa denied while refusing to follow mandatory U.S. Supreme Court precedent, was on 3 PAGES total, with, 1.5 pages of the argument, all other pages constituted the notice of motion, the caption and the notarized signature.

Short motion, two mandatory precedents, a mandatory procedure, a no-brainer - it had to be decided in my favor, if the law was to be applied.

But, the law cannot be applied when it will be in favor of a reporter of judicial misconduct, and, specifically, in favor of me.

No, no, no and no.

Vacating sanctions against me will undo my order of suspension, return me into practicing law, and will allow me to sue the hell out of Judge Rosa's law clerk's husband James Hartmann, based on an affidavit of David Mokay who said that he never sued my husband, right after James Hartmann obtained a $300,000 judgments against my husband on behalf of David Mokay, while David Mokay never appeared in the case, never provided any sworn statements in the case and never testified in the case.

Judge Rosa cannot have that.  He has to do damage control, which is what he did.

Judge Rosa also knows that I was the only attorney in Delhi, NY and surrounding area who handled ALL types of litigation, and handled it successfully:

  • Family Court - defense of parents in child neglect and abuse cases, custody litigation;
  • criminal courts;
  • federal civil rights litigation; and
  • the Supreme Court - as a trial AND appellate attorney.
People are still writing to me from Delaware County and other counties of New York - of course, I cannot advise them, but the fact is that they are writing to me telling their stories and telling me that they cannot find an attorney who would not be afraid of judges and who would take a civil rights case together with a criminal and a family court child neglect or abuse case.

I did it, and handling all cases at the same time by one attorney, and thus with one trial strategy, often brought results that cannot be attained by conflicting trial strategies of different assigned counsel who are afraid of their own shadow and, hoping for more assignments at $75/hr, are selling out their clients into plea bargains and "settlements" with social services, often committing them to a lifetime of misery.

Also, Judge Rosa who obviously wants to advance in the judicial world, get assignments as Acting Supreme Court judge, and, since he is still young, possibly a bid in the future for the Supreme Court and a jump to an appellate court, who knows - knows when to apply the law, and when to cave to his own and his law clerk's wishes of retaliation, and to the will of the superiors.

So, Judge Rosa would not apply the mandatory law to the facts to rule in my favor - because my return as a practicing attorney to the area, with my policy of free consultations on the phone and in office when people could call or come to my home office at any time of day or night to share their problems and get legal advice - will undermine the social control of the poor which is what the Family Court is doing together with the police and the District Attorney, and Judge Rosa is not continuing this dis-honorable tradition.

What was the reaction of Judge Rosa to my motion?

He could voluntarily recuse without saying a word - that is what judges who ever recused usually did and do.

But, not Judge Rosa.

Judge Rosa made a production out of his own recusal.

He created a full-blown "DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION" - even though at the end of that "DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION" Judge Rosa recused from deciding that same motion.

Before, I start commenting on the decision, I must say this:  when a judge recuses from a case, he cannot make any "analysis" of that case whatsoever, he simply recuses because he cannot be impartial any longer, so any of his "analyses" is void. 

Yet, Judge Rosa managed to violated even that clear rule.

His "order" of self-recusal violated even that simple rule  Judge Rosa attempted to influence a judge who would come after him in "analyzing" the case anyway before stating that he is seeing red because of my "baseless personal attacks" - supported by evidentiary proof - and supported by a request for an evidentiary hearing for more proof and more testimony, if Judge Rosa is not impressed with what has been already provided.



In that decision Judge Rosa once again issued an "order" outside of any docket, in violation of court rules - see file number but no docket number,


posted in large black blocks a threat that violation of that "FAILURE TO OBEY THIS ORDER MAY, AFTER COURT HERAING, RESULT IN YOUR CONFINEMENT TO JAIL FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO SIX MONTHS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT"


I keep wondering, in what ways CAN a person violate an order of self-recusal of a judge?

Can anybody, please, enlighten me on that? 


But, apparently, Judge Rosa was not thinking rationally at that point, his only purpose was to do something nasty to me, and a threat of incarceration, even a completely stupid threat, for violating an order of self-recusal of a judge - an impossible act - apparently appeared to Judge Rosa like a good idea.

Judge Rosa even kindly gave me a notice that I can appeal his order of self-recusal "within 30 days of receipt of a final order",


While giving me that notice, Judge Rosa knew full well that such a notice was stupid, too, for TWO reasons:  

  • an order of self-recusal of a judge is not appealable, and
  • an order granting a motion (here - to recuse) is not appealable by the party to whom the order was GRANTED, and, even though Judge Rosa could not bring himself to mention that word in his "order" of self-recusal, he GRANTED my motion to recuse.
What am I going to do on such an appeal - argue to the appellate court that Judge Rosa improperly granted my motion to recuse, by recusing himself?

That would be frivolous, and such an appeal was subject to sanctions.  So, Judge Rosa is giving me a notice that I have a right, under the Family Court Act 1113, to engage in frivolous conduct, to appeal and unappellable court order? 

Once again, Judge Rosa's rage guided his hand.

So, after
  • deciding a second motion out of docket;
  • sending a stupid intimidating notice to me not to violate the order of Judge Rosa's self-recusal under the threat of spending 6 months in jail for contempt of court; and
  • sending me a no less stupid notice of appeal of an order that was not appealable by me for not one, but for two reasons

Judge Rosa engaged in analysis of the case that he had no right to engage in because he was RECUSING from that case.

Judge Rosa's rage guided his hand by stating, in the very first phrase of the order of SELF-RECUSAL, that I am "an attorney presently suspended from the practice of law in the courts of the State of New York", knowing full well that his obligation to apply two mandatory precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court, which he first refused to do, and then recused from doing - would have eliminated my suspension.

Actually, what is my attorney status, was absolutely irrelevant to Judge Rosa's decision to recuse or not to recuse from the case, yet, apparently, for Judge Rosa it was not only relevant, but of paramount importance, even though, had Judge Rosa applied the law to the facts on the motion correctly, he had to rule in my favor and thus UNDO that suspension.

But nevertheless, Rosa continues to recite - incorrectly, by the way - the contents of my motion to recuse against Judge Becker, the very case that Rosa discussed with Alecia Bracci and her mother Barbara O'Sullivan, in 2012 and solicited their votes by expressing his indignation about Becker's behavior in this very case by imposing these very sanctions, Rosa referred two other cases where I was similarly sanctioned by Becker, in 2011 (in a similar manner that was rendered unconstitutional by U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 2015 and 2016) - and then engages in a full-blown "DISCUSSION" preceding his recusal.

And there comes the core of Judge Rosa's order of recusal. 


"Because of Ms. Neroni's baseless personal attacks against both the undersigned and his court attorney, the undersigned finds himself angered to the point of doubting his ability to be objective".

Like Judge Rosa was objective to me before.

In other words, "I SEE RED from Ms Neroni's motion, to the point that I cannot follow mandatory procedure of the U.S. Supreme Court, cannot apply mandatory precedent to indisputable facts".


And, as I said above, the basis of making a motion to recuse a judge in New York is an APPEARANCE of impropriety.

Of course, I was not a fly on the wall in Judge Rosa's chambers and cannot provide a recording proving that Judge Rosa has ACTUALLY conspired with Nancy Deming, and God knows with whom else, in order to
  • block my access to an effective court remedy,
  • deny my motion to recuse and
  • prevent my reinstatement as an attorney. 
My reinstatement would create a number of inconveniences for Rosa's law clerk's husband James Hartmann, and for Rosa in representing my clients in child neglect and abuse case and in criminal cases HONESTLY, and making motions to disqualify judges or prosecutors based on reports of their misconduct and documents that raise questions about their bias and misconduct without any problem.

But, any reasonable person who is not in the pay of the government and is not dependent on favors from New York State court system, would conclude the same from Judge Rosa's long history of misconduct regarding me and my family members in the short period of time that he is on the bench - as presented in my 71-page motion to recuse, with documentary exhibits.

Yet, what does Judge Rosa's statement in his "order" of self-recusal means for other litigants in his court?

Well, first, it is clear that Judge Rosa became just another Judge Becker - with the same disregard to the law, the same (or worse) dishonesty and the same desire to use his power, law or no law, in favor of himself and "his own", and against those who criticize him and "his own".

Second, Judge Rosa's admission is very important that he can be so personally biased that he cannot apply clear constitutional precedents to undisputed facts.

There is the law that

  1. punishing for contents of speech is a violation of the 1st Amendment (Reed v Town of Gilbert, 2015); and that
  2. court cases decided by judges acting as both accusers and adjudicators are void (Williams v Pennsylvania, 2016) - thus voiding all sanctions imposed upon me by Judge Becker -

and there are these INDISPUTABLE sets of facts:

  1. that I was, indeed, sanctioned in 2011 for contents of my motion to recuse without application of strict scrutiny, and
  2. that I was, indeed, sanctioned by a judge in 2011 who was both an accuser and an adjudicator in the case (started proceedings sua sponte, claimed personal injury to himself) - which was rendered unconstitutional in 2015 and 2016 by clear U.S. Supreme Court cases.
So, this is a "hypothetical" for any law student to decide immediately in favor of the moving party - but that is, without looking at the identity of the party.

Judge Rosa looked.  And saw red in my name and my criticism of him and his law clerk.

It is also apparent that Judge Rosa is a coward.

He recused, with threats and improper "analysis" and characterization of the case, and while claiming "baseless personal attacks" on my behalf BEFORE the evidentiary hearing that I demanded for the motion to recuse if he would not recuse voluntarily.

Moreover, I used as exhibits on the motion criticism of judge Rosa in my blogs for which - if they were false - neither Judge Rosa nor his clerk Nancy Deming tried to sue me for defamation.

As one attorney who knows Rosa very well characterized him as a general who would lose his army in battle because he freaks and is unable to make a proper decision, always looking at his superiors as to how to decide - and when he makes a decision, often it is just stupid. 

It is apparent that Judge Rosa has no temperament, competence or integrity to be on the bench.

If he cannot control himself by just criticism and factual documents submitted to him about himself and his law clerk to the point that he cannot apply clear law to clear undisputed facts, he should not be on the bench.

He is a jeopardy to anybody who appears in front of him in the courtroom.

By the way, this is what Judge Rosa decided at the end of all of that lamentation: he ordered himself to recuse, and AFTER he recused himself, he had no power over the case whatsoever.

But, that did not stop him from making another step: AFTER recusing himself, he FURTHER ordered that "the matter shall be referred to the 6th Judicial District Administrative Judge for assignment to another Judge".


And who is the counsel for the 6th Judicial District Administrative Judge at the moment who is going to handle this "assignment to another Judge"?

Porter Kirkwood, of course, Judge Becker's cohort who has brought a frivolous child neglect proceeding against me and my husband in 2009 in double retaliation:

  • for me filing a motion to recuse against Becker in 2009 for presiding, without disclosure, over child neglect cases where Becker, in bench trials, decided credibility of his own clients of 27 years, the Delaware County DSS workers (the case where I filed the motion was for a client who was not a friend or family member, just a client); and
  • because I turned his own son in for discipline when he gang-assaulted my son in Delaware Academy, hurting my son - and, due to my son's infancy at that point, my son STILL has a right to sue Kirkwood's son, the statute of limitations did not yet expire, so Kirkwood had a conflict of interest then, by bringing and prosecuting a child neglect case against us, causing a rebellion in his own office, at the "Legal Department" of Delaware County, and has a conflict of interest to advise his employer, the administrative judge, to assign any judges to my case now.

The Porter Kirkwood who has lost his judicial election to the same Gary Rosa in 2015 likely because of my blogs about the experimental program therapy-by-pedophilia-and-voyeurism for "juvenile sex offenders", children held captive in foster care in Delaware County, NY, under Kirkwood's control as their attorney.

Kirkwood stupidly boasted about such a program in his meeting with the voters - you can see the video of him doing that,
  • here (as to the general incompetence of Porter Kirkwood as to sex offender laws in New York),
  • here - showing how Kirkwood boasted that his "experimental" program of "treatment" for "juvenile sex offenders" (children) in foster care costs Delaware County taxpayers "only" $56,000 a year;
  • here - how Kirkwood boasted about his success in "luring" into engaging in "experimental" sex abuse of children in his care a consummate shopaholic and drunkard #DrRichardHamill, who was caught in lying to the court, to help another famous liar, then criminal prosecutor #PeterTorncello, get a criminal conviction;
  • here - discussing the "methods" of "Dr" Hamill;
  • and here - pointing out a court case in the 2nd Circuit that ruled application of Dr Hamill's methods even to an adult sex offender unconstitutional.

By the way, as to the attorney who elicited improper testimony of Dr. Hamill and inflamed the jury by improper references to that testimony in summation (the case I quoted about Dr. Hamill above, People v Riback), #Peter Torncello was elevated after his misconduct into a position of attorney for attorney grievance committee, 3rd Department, committed more misconduct in his elevated position
  • fraud upon the court in my disciplinary case - Torncello argued contrary to court papers that I had to, and did not appear at a deposition of a client in 2008 when I was only admitted to practice law in 2009, and refused to withdraw that fraudulent claim even when confronted with court records showing that the deposition was held in 2008, that fraudulent charge was withdrawn only after
    • a removal of the case to federal court,
    • a remand back to 3rd Department and
    • a transfer of the case to the 4th Department
  • falsifying time sheets
was allowed to resign from his public position without suffering any discipline or criminal prosecution whatsoever and is now employed in private practice,


QUOTE
=======

"As the dissenting Justice in the Appellate Division put it, these numerous "summation misstatements of fact and law . . . when combined with the opinion by the prosecutor that defendant's acts were those of a pedophile . . . rose to such a level that defendant was deprived of the fair trial to which he was entitled" (People v Riback, 57 AD3d 1209, 1220 [3d Dept 2008, Malone, J., dissenting]). We recognize that County Court repeatedly sustained defense counsel's objections during the prosecutor's summation, and instructed the jury to disregard parts of it. After a certain point, though, the cumulative effect of a prosecutor's improper comments during summation may overwhelm a defendant's right to a fair trial (see People v Calabria, 94 NY2d 519, 523 [2000]). Given the inflammatory nature of the charges in this case, there was a reasonable possibility that this prosecutorial misconduct contributed to the verdict."

UNQUOTE
========

the 3rd Department HIRED Peter Torncello to work for its attorney disciplinary committee, and when Peter Torncello continued to engage in improper conduct there, by, reportedly, falsifying court records, he was let to resign - but was never investigated, prosecuted or disciplined.  That's the way of things in the progressive and civil rights-loving State of New York). 

So, the circle came back to ground zero.

The one person who will be deciding the fate of my license is Porter Kirkwood, who has initiated the process of persecution against me and my husband (that eventually led to the taking both of our law licenses) by bringing a frivolous  (and dismissed) child neglect proceeding against us after I had the audacity to make a motion to recuse Porter Kirkwood's buddy Judge Becker in August of 2009 for presiding, without disclosure of prior representation for 27 years of Delaware County Department of Social Services that appeared in Becker's court as a Petitioner and witness in child neglect and abuse cases.

The person to whom I likely cost a judgeship so far.

The person whose son can still be sued by my son for a gang assault on school grounds.

The person who has likely recently orchestrated a threat against me through an anonymous account created for purposes of posting that threat:



By the way, the blog I am currently preparing is spelling out in excruciating detail , based on "scientific research" as to HOW EXACTLY "juvenile sex offenders" are "treated" and experimented upon in such programs - will be even more "sensational", but I am sure that people who did that to the children will feel no shame at all.

And of course, how can I possibly "know anything", being an expert in this field and having researched that subject for 17 years, and how can I possibly "know anything" about Delaware County, after being its opponent in litigation, and suing it for so many years...

So, Porter Kirkwood will now decide which judge to appoint to rule on the motion where deciding the motion on the law will return my law license - where sanctions were imposed by his friend and co-conspirator Judge Becker, to remove me, the only person who has ever dared to point to Judge Becker the obvious - that he should not make credibility determinations in child abuse and neglect proceedings after representing those people for 27 years.

I did not receive from the 6th Judicial District (Porter Kirkwood) or from Delaware County Family Court, or from any other source, any assignments of new judges to that still pending motion.

I will publish any such assignments, and any decisions that will be produced by Kirkwood-assigned judges.

And I will publish a detailed analysis of Kirkwood-authorized illegal experimentation on children in foster care, which can be characterized as sexual abuse of children in foster care in Delaware County, New York, by the government, under the guise of "experimental therapy".

The court system in New York appears to be regurgitating and reshuffling in new positions the same people who keep getting caught, but keep getting rescued by the same system - and keep coming back to settle their scores against their critics, in total disregard of the law, again, and again, and again.

As to the recused-with-threats Judge Rosa, what can I say.

Beware of this incompetent coward.